BJ  1261  . H2  5  1923 
Haas,  John  Augustus  William, 
1862-1937. 

Freedom  and  Christian 
conduct 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


https://archive.org/details/freedomchristianOOhaas 


FREEDOM  AND  CHRISTIAN 
CONDUCT— AN  ETHIC 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •  BOSTON  •  CHICAGO  •  DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •  SAN  FRANCISCO 


MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 


THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OP  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


FREEDOM  AND 
CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 

AN  ETHIC 


BY 


JOHN  A.  W.  HAAS 

President  of  Muhlenberg  College 


fork 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1923 

All  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1923. 

BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  printed.  Published  January,  1923. 


Press  of 

Hamilton  Printing  Company 
Albany,  N.  Y.,  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 


After  eighteen  years  of  teaching  Senior 
classes  in  college  ethics,  experience  and  experi¬ 
ment  has  led  to  the  results  formulated  in  “The 
Problem  of  Freedom.  ”  The  purpose  is  to  fur¬ 
nish  a  comprehensive  ethics  for  students  in  a 
church  college,  which  shall  have  in  view  the 
whole  ethical  development,  both  ancient  and 
modern,  and  state  it  in  a  systematic  philosoph¬ 
ical  form.  There  is  an  inclusion  of  the 
ethics  of  Christianity  and  its  correlation  with 
general  ethical  questions.  No  sane  reason 
exists  why  the  ethics  of  Christianity  should  be 
neglected  in  any  fair,  modern  treatment.  Its 
exclusion  is  simply  due  to  an  unjustified  prej¬ 
udice  of  certain  philosophical  attitudes.  The 
point  of  view  which  is  maintained  is  that  of 
freedom  as  the  great  ethical  question.  Its 
solution  is  suggested  through  personality, 
which  is  expanded  beyond  its  current  meaning. 

The  aim  of  a  course  of  ethics  should  not  only 
be  an  acquaintance  with  the  academic  ethical 
problems,  but  also  an  awakening,  a  develop¬ 
ment  and  a  strengthening  of  the  moral  sense  in 
young  men  and  young  women.  All  great  ques¬ 
tions  ought  finally  to  receive  a  moral  adjudg¬ 
ment.  For  this  reason  the  practical  relation¬ 
ships  of  moral  life  have  been  treated  under 
the  third  main  part,  ‘  ‘  The  Functioning  of 
Freedom. ”  These  practical  applications  of 
ethical  truth  have  been  found  very  helpful  to 
the  student,  because  they  lead  him  to  con¬ 
scious  deliberation  of  moral  questions  on  a 
reasonable  basis,  and  stimulate  him  to  form  a 


vi  PREFACE 

philosophy  of  life  that  does  not  omit  the  ethical 
issues. 

Most  paragraphs  open  with  questions.  These 
are  intended  to  prepare  the  mind  for  the  criti¬ 
cal  attitude  of  the  discussion  of  a  problem. 
The  presentation  is  argumentative,  and  should 
be  used  as  the  basis  of  discussion  in  the  class. 

The  manner  in  which  classes  have  raised 
objections  and  asked  questions  has  been  a  great 
aid  in  the  solutions  suggested.  The  main  pur¬ 
pose  of  this  book  has  also  received  criticism  and 
approval  from  friends  whose  judgment  is  worth 
while.  The  gratitude  of  the  author  is  expressed 
to  all  who  have  aided  him,  and  especially  to  Mr. 
Horace  Mann,  who  has  prepared  the  index. 

The  literature  given  in  the  references  at  the 
end  of  each  chapter  is  simply  representative. 
The  effort  is  made  to  lead  the  student  to  new 
views  differing  altogether  from  the  position 
taken  in  this  book,  as  well  as  those  that  are  in 
agreement.  In  addition  to  the  lists  furnished 
and  books  quoted  there  is  much  valuable  mater¬ 
ial  in  The  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  and 
in  Hasting’s  Cyclopedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics. 

While  there  is  a  specific  use  for  the  college 
class  in  this  discussion,  it  can  be  of  value  to 
general  readers  in  centering  their  minds  upon 
moral  problems. 

May  this  effort  aid,  not  so  much  in  acceptance 
of  the  author’s  ideas,  as  in  the  arousing  of  an 
interest  in  ethics,  and  a  purpose  to  make  it  less 
superficial  and  more  thorough  in  present  day 
thought. 

Muhlenberg  College  J.  H. 

Allentown,  Pa. 

January,  1923. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION 


PRELIMINARY  PROBLEMS 

Chapter  I.  The  Problem  of  Freedom  as  a  Science  . 

The  age  of  problems;  the  problem  of  freedom; 
what  is  the  problem  of  freedom;  what  sort  of 
science  is  ethics;  what  are  the  sciences  of  value; 
is  ethics  related  to  other  sciences;  it  ethics  uni¬ 
versal. 

Chapter  II.  Freedom  and  Religion 

The  nature  of  the  problem;  what  ethics  does  for 
religion;  is  freedom  independent;  what  does  the 
history  of  religion  show;  religion,  character,  and 
conduct;  does  religion  influence  our  instincts;  our 
desires  and  religion;  religion  and  habits;  what 
value  have  motives;  sanctions,  ideals  and  religion; 
the  realization  of  moral  freedom;  what  message 
has  Christianity. 

PART  I.  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  FREEDOM 

Chapter  III.  Free  Will  ...... 

The  basic  problem;  the  metaphysical  assertion; 
what  does  psychology  teach;  the  brain  and  free 
will;  biological  theory  and  freedom;  sociology 
and  freedom;  causality  and  freedom;  the  difficulty 
of  religion;  Christianity  and  free  will. 

Chapter  IV.  Conscience  and  Freedom 

The  organ  of  freedom;  the  meaning  of  conscience; 
the  judgment  of  acts;  the  law  back  of  the  judg¬ 
ment;  the  origin  of  the  law;  the  intellectual  ele¬ 
ments  of  conscience ;  what  is  the  power  of  emotion ; 
the  conscience  and  volition ;  is  there  a  social  con¬ 
science;  the  authority  of  conscience;  Christianity 
and  conscience. 


PAGE 

1 


14 


28 


54 


Vlll 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Chapter  V.  Freedom  and  Pessimism  ...  72 

What  is  the  problem;  the  causes  of  pessimism; 
pessimism  and  human  moods;  can  we  know  and  be 
glad;  the  emotional  dilemma;  axe  our  actions  satis¬ 
factory;  civilization  and  pessimism;  reigion  and 
pessimism;  is  Christianity  pessimistic. 

Chapter  VI.  The  Leading  Ethical  Ideas  .  .  95 

What  do  we  mean  by  the  leading  ethical  concepts; 
wrhat  are  ideals;  the  good  and  the  end;  rights  or 
right;  what  is  duty;  what  are  virtues;  the  inter¬ 
relation  of  ethical  ideas. 

PART  II.  THE  FINDING  OF  FREEDOM 

Chapter  VII.  Freedom  Through  Pleasure  .  .115 

The  claim  of  pleasure;  ancient  hedonism;  what  is 
utilitarianism;  evolution  and  hedonism;  pleasure 
and  reason;  is  pleasure  happiness;  individual  or 
social;  the  end,  the  ideal,  the  good,  the  right  and 
pleasure;  duty  and  pleasure;  virtue  and  hedonism; 
the  philosophy  of  hedonism;  Christianity  and 
hedonism. 

Chapter  VIII.  Freedom  Through  Reason  .  .  145 

What  does  reason  promise;  the  ancient  advocates 
of  reason;  modern  intuitonism;  Kant  and  his  suc¬ 
cessors;  can  reason  reject  feeling;  reason  and 

asceticism;  does  reason  give  us  the  highest  good 
and  the  right;  duty  and  reason;  how  does  reason 
explain  virtue;  the  philosophy  of  rationalism; 
Christianity  and  reason. 

Chapter  IX.  Freedom  Through  Personality  .  .  174 

What  of  the  will;  will  and  personality;  personality 
and  individuality;  does  personality  answer  the 
social  demand;  personality  and  the  ideal;  right, 
duty  and  personality;  personality  and  virtue;  the 
historical  approach  to  personality;  personality  and 
Christianity. 


CONTENTS 

PART  III.  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  FREEDOM 


Chapter  X.  The  Individual  Life  .... 

Virtues  or  duties;  is  the  ethical  life  a  pure  devel¬ 
opment;  the  power  of  a  cause;  freedom  and  voca¬ 
tion  ;  work  and  freedom ;  the  bodily  life ;  the  mental 
life;  the  power  over  life. 

Chapter  XI.  Basic  Social  Virtues  .... 

The  Kindly  Virtues,  kindness,  gentleness,  meekness, 
non-resistance,  mercy,  forgiveness,  charity,  friend¬ 
ship,  fraternities;  Truth  and  freedom,  wisdom, 
lies,  misrepresentation,  judgment  of  others,  per¬ 
jury,  progaganda,  the  press,  prejudice,  freedom 
of  thought;  Justice  and  freedom,  righteousness, 
knowledge  and  public  opinion,  selfish  interest, 
group  conflict,  nationality,  race,  justice  and  law. 

Chapter  XII.  The  Family  ..... 

What  is  the  value  of  the  family;  the  spirit  of  the 
family;  courtship  and  engagement;  marriage; 
divorce;  the  evil  of  prostitution;  the  single  life; 
the  freedom  of  woman ;  the  right  of  the  child. 

Chapter  XIII.  The  Church  . 

Why  treat  of  the  church;  the  church  and  truth; 

the  nature  of  the  church’s  work;  the  social  work 

of  the  church;  the  church  and  its  worship;  the 
church  as  an  organization ;  the  church  and  the 
state. 

Chapter  XIV.  The  State  . 

What  is  the  place  of  the  state;  what  is  the  idea  of 
the  state;  the  task  of  the  state;  the  state  and  the 
nation;  the  absolute  state;  the  socialistic  state;  the 
state  and  anarchism;  the  right  of  revolution;  the 
state  and  war;  the  state  and  internationalism. 


PAGE 

202 


228 


249 


267 


286 


Index 


311 


FREEDOM  AND  CHRISTIAN 
CONDUCT— AN  ETHIC 


FREEDOM  AND  CHRISTIAN 
CONDUCT— AN  ETHIC 


PRELIMINARY  PROBLEMS 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  FREEDOM  AS  A  SCIENCE 

The  age  of  problems.  It  is  quite  customary 
in  our  day  to  approach  any  body  of  connected 
facts  and  their  laws  from  the  angle  of  the 
problem.  The  modern  mind  seems  averse  to 
starting  with  great  principles.  It  would  rather 
derive  these  after  asking  questions  and  stating 
problems.  And  thus  the  method  of  the  problem 
is  most  appealing.  Nevertheless  no  problem 
can  be  merely  presented,  but  it  calls  for  the  in¬ 
troduction  of  discussion  and  for  certain  data 
upon  which  any  just  discussion  must  rest. 
Problems  and  principles  must  be  interwoven 
to  arrive  at  the  best  results.  To  deal  merely  in 
problems  raises  questions  and  produces  doubts 
without  aiding  in  their  proper  solution.  To 
begin  with  principles  to  the  neglect  of  seeing 
problems  brings  about  an  unverified  dogmatism. 
The  true  procedure  balances  problems  and 
principles. 


1 


2 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


The  problem  of  freedom.  Our  task  is  not, 
however,  to  enter  upon  the  general  logical  ques¬ 
tion  of  problem  and  principle,  but  to  endeavor 
to  make  clear  one  of  the  great  problems  of 
thought  and  life.  Among  the  many  subjects 
that  should  call  forth  the  effort  and  interest  of 
human  thought  is  that  of  freedom.  What  do 
we  really  mean  by  freedom?  Is  it  only  a  politi¬ 
cal  problem,  an  economic  question,  a  social 
difficulty?  Or  is  its  compass  larger  and  deeper, 
and  does  it  extend  to  that  which  is  funda¬ 
mentally  human?  The  last  supposition  seems 
to  be  the  best.  It  would  make  the  problem  in 
its  fulness  and  fundamentality  the  moral  prob¬ 
lem.  To  determine  the  question  of  freedom 
would  mean  to  outline  the  main  questions  of 
morality  or  ethics.  It  is  this  interpretation  of 
freedom  with  which  we  are  concerned.  Our 
endeavor  to  give  an  answer  will  lead  us  to  posit 
some  sort  of  ethical  system. 

What  is  the  problem  of  freedom?  Is  there 
any  justification  in  the  assertion,  that  the 
answer  to  the  problem  of  freedom  will  lead  to 
some  sort  of  a  system?  A  system  is  only  really 
possible  where  there  is  a  science.  Is  ethics  a 
science  or  is  it  merely  an  art?  Does  it  deal 
with  data  that  can  rightly  be  co-ordinated  into 
a  science,  or  is  it  only  a  collection  of  practical 
rules  and  maxims  for  human  life?  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  question  of  our  freedom 
as  it  eventuates  in  the  doing  of  good  or  evil, 
right  or  wrong,  touches  the  whole  practice  of 
life  and  all  of  human  conduct.  It  enters  into 
our  thoughts,  desires,  habits,  feelings,  decisions, 
judgments,  and  actions.  But  does  it  follow, 


FREEDOM  AS  A  SCIENCE 


3 


that  because  the  problem  of  freedom,  or  of  ethics, 
has  as  its  material  the  character  and  actions 
of  men,  that  this  material  cannot  be  systema¬ 
tized?  A  system  which  makes  possible  a 
science  is  attained  in  one  of  two  ways,  or  in 
two  ways  combined.  The  one  is  to  collect  all 
possible  facts,  and  then  to  pass  on  to  generalize 
them,  and  derive  laws  and  principles.  The 
other  is  to  assume  certain  fundamental  princi¬ 
ples  and  then  to  establish  them  by  deriving  con¬ 
sequences  from  them  that  explain  the  existent 
facts.  The  problem  of  freedom  can  be  discussed 
in  either  of  these  ways,  and  perhaps  best  by 
their  combination.  Ethics  can  therefore  claim 
to  be  a  science.  /  We  may  perhaps  define  it  pro¬ 
visionally  as  the  science  of  character  and 
conduct  that  establishes  real ,  vital,  human 
freedom. 

What  sort  of  science  is  ethics?  To  claim 
that  the  problem  of  freedom  is  a  science  does 
not  settle  the  question.  What  do  we  mean  by 
a  science?  Is  there  only  natural  science,  or 
can  the  term,  science,  be  applied  justly  to 
other  groups  of  data  than  those  that  we  find 
in  nature?  What  types  of  sciences  can  rightly 
be  distinguished  in  human  thinking?  The 
answer  to  the  inquiries  will  help  us  to  classify 
these  sciences.  There  are  sciences  which  we 
may  designate  as  existential  and  descriptive. 
They  simply  deal  with  data  as  data,  describe 
them  and  then  deduce  their  laws.  As  an  ex¬ 
ample  of  such  sciences  we  may  take  chemistry, 
which  is  typical  of  the  whole  group  of  similar 
sciences.  But  a  totally  different  class  is  that 
of  the  normative  sciences.  A  norm  is  a  standard 


4 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


and  it  implies  valuation.  The  sciences  called 
normative  rest  upon  value  and  worth.  They 
include  a  judgment  about  data.  It  is  necessary 
to  include  the  existence  of  facts  when  we  give 
an  estimate  of  their  worth,  but  the  existence 
is  not  of  prime  importance.  But  to  deal  with 
mere  worth  because  the  emphasis  is  put  upon 
it  and  to  consider  the  existence  as  negligible 
is  an  error.  How  can  a  value  be  a  value  if 
the  things  to  which  it  is  attached  are  deemed 
uncertain.  Value  is  not  an  agnostic  escape 
from  existence;  it  does  not  belong  to  fictions 
but  to  a  definitely  characterized  set  of 
existences. 

What  are  the  sciences  of  value?  In  human 
knowledge  there  are  three  great  sciences  of 
value.  The  first  is  logic,  which  gives  the  laws 
of  correct  thinking.  It  is  not  concerned  with 
how  we  think,  but  how  we  ought  to  think  when 
we  want  to  think  correctly.  Since  the  modern 
movement  of  pragmatism  there  has  been  a 
constant  effort  to  make  logic  descriptive  and 
really  to  sink  it  into  psychology.  But  the  em¬ 
phasis  upon  value  as  a  reality  which  began  in 
modern  thought  with  the  philosopher  Lotze 
cannot  be  swept  aside  by  the  increasing  mass 
of  detail  examinations  as  to  how  thought  func¬ 
tions.  The  second  normative  science  is  aesthe¬ 
tics.  This  deals  with  the  estimates  of  the 
beautiful.  It  asks,  what  is  beauty,  and  what 
are  the  true  standards  of  the  beautiful?  We 
cannot  have  any  scientific  approach  to  art  un¬ 
less  we  allow  the  valuations  of  aesthetics.  It 
is  the  third  valuing  science  with  which  we  are 
concerned;  namely,  ethics  or  the  science  of 


FREEDOM  AS  A  SCIENCE 


5 


freedom.  Its  problem  is  to  ascertain  whether 
the  judgments  and  estimates,  good  and  bad, 
right  and  wrong,  virtuous  and  vicious,  evaluate 
facts  that  in  their  worth  can  be  put  into  rela¬ 
tions,  which  grow  out  of  the  actualities  of 
value  and  are  systematic  and  scientific.  The 
description  of  human  motives  and  of  human 
actions  resulting  from  them  is  not  morality 
unless  they  are  judged  according  to  standards. 
The  motives  and  actions  must  be  real  and  with 
them  as  equally  real  there  go  the  estimates  of 
character  and  conduct.  When  we  thus  ap¬ 
proach  the  facts  of  the  moral  life  we  have  the 
material  which  is  capable  of  scientific  discus¬ 
sion,  and  we  th(^n  arrive  at  as  valuable  and 
real  a  science  in  its  place  as  any  that  claims 
our  attention  and  study. 

Is  ethics  related  to  other  sciences?  Why  is 

it  necessary  to  ask  a  question  like  this?  Ought 
we  not  proceed  at  once  to  the  discussion  of  the 
problem  of  freedom  without  further  prelimin¬ 
aries?  If  we  were  inclined  to  the  method  so 
largely  employed  today  we  would  simply  pro¬ 
ceed,  and  claim  all  that  we  could  for  our 
science;  but  this  onesided  procedure  is  making 
onesided  men.  It  is  a  part  of  the  defective 
education  which  never  coordinates,  and  en¬ 
courages  students  to  elect  courses  as  the  Indian 
collects  scalps.  In  ethics  with  its  universal 
human  claim  it  is  necessary  if  anywhere  to 
show  its  interrelation,  and  thus  to  put  character 
and  conduct  into  their  proper  place.  A  true 
science  grows  more  valuable  when  seen  in  the 
light  not  only  of  its  own  claim  but  also  in  the 
light  of  all  related  human  knowledge.  We 


6 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


must  be  led  to  think  not  only  in  detail  and 
down  to  the  minutiae,  but  also  in  the  large  re¬ 
lations  of  the  whole  and  the  great  total  of 
truth. 

What  sciences  is  morality  related  to?  From 
which  of  them  does  it  borrow  facts  and  results? 
As  soon  as  we  begin  to  examine  any  ethical 
situation  particularly  in  its  practical  function¬ 
ing  we  shall  be  led  back  to  psychology.  To 
understand  character  we  must  know  the  human 
mind.  As  far  as  ethical  value  is  clothed  in 
desires,  wishes,  wants,  motives  it  needs  the 
study  of  psychology.  Instincts  and  habits  deter¬ 
mine  conduct  and  action.  The  problem  of  the  will 
which  is  fundamental  in  the  study  of  freedom 
presupposes  knowledge  of  human  behavior. 
The  composite  fact  of  conscience  leads  us  into 
some  sort  of  psychological  analysis.  In  all 
moral  valuation,  therefore,  we  must  be  sure  that 
our  psychology  is  correct.1  But  the  knowledge 
of  the  human  mind  does  not  of  itself  determine 
the  value  of  conduct. 

Again  the  problem  of  freedom  cannot  pass  by 
its  dependence  on  philology.  The  examination 
of  the  history  of  language,  and  the  study  of  the 
meaning  which  man  has  put  into  human  words, 
show  us  how  some  ethical  terms  have  arisen 
and  how  man  has  understood  them.  The  Ger¬ 
man  ethical  writers  like  Wundt2  have  paid  some 
attention  to  the  testimony  of  the  common  mind 
of  man  in  the  making  of  its  words  of  moral  im¬ 
port.  Nietzsche  in  the  effort  to  re-value  all 
values  has  used  his  learning  as  a  philologian 

1  Alexander  Shand,  The  Foundations  of  Character. 

2  Ethic,  Part  I,  Chapter  I. 


FREEDOM  AS  A  SCIENCE 


7 


to  convince  us,  if  he  can,  how  we  must  redefine 
the  terms  and  words  which  have  been  abused 
in  the  interest  of  the  weak.  To  the  degree  that 
language  reveals  the  reflection  of  man  on  the 
questions  of  good  and  bad  it  is  worth  while 
studying  in  ethics. 

But  the  question  of  freedom  leads  us  to  the 

story  of  freedom  in  human  history.  It  is  not 

without  benefit  that  we  can  trace  the  historv 

%> 

of  morals.  A  notable  example  is  the  study  of 
Lecky  in  his  history  of  European  Morals. 
Westermarck3  and  Hobhouse4  have  collected 
much  material  relative  to  early  customs  and 
practices  of  the  incipient  moral  life.  But  it  is 
not  only  in  these  and  similar  detail  studies  of 
morals  in  their  historical  aspect  that  we  find  a 
dependence  of  ethics,  but  also  in  any  general 
history  of  man  the  moral  life  and  advance  or 
decadence  dare  not  be  omitted  wherever  man’s 
manners  and  customs  are  traced  to  their  moral 
import. 

Similarly  the  problem  of  freedom  must  have 
some  regard  for  economic  conditions.5  Man’s 
search  for  food  and  shelter  condition  his  life. 
They  do  not  make  his  virtues  and  vices  as  mere 
virtues  and  vices,  but  they  often  give  direction 
and  content  to  them.  The  moral  valuation  is 
not  caused  by  the  economic  strivings  of  men, 
but  it  cannot  be  fully  appreciated  apart  from 
them.  Because  the  life  of  freedom  affects  the 
whole  man  his  material  interests  must  be  con¬ 
sidered.  These  concerns,  however,  must  not  be 

s  The  Origin  and  Development  of  the  Moral  Ideas. 

4  Morals  in  Evolution. 

5  Cf .  1  ‘  Goods  and  the  Good,  ’  ’  in  Haas  1 1  In  the  Light  of 
Faith,”  p.  180. 


8 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


made  the  complete  motive  of  man,  and  morals 
must  not  be  reduced  to  an  economic  denomin¬ 
ator.  Some  modern  ethics,  as  e.  g.  Dewey  and 
Tufts,  seem  to  indicate  the  reverse.  They 
color  ethics  so  largely  by  economics,  that  one 
would  almost  receive  the  impression  that  morals 
are  the  outcome  of  economics. 

The  struggle  to  establish  a  science  of  soci¬ 
ology, — which  up  to  this  time  has  not  succeeded 
if  we  judge  from  the  diversity  of  treatment, — 
must  be  given  some  place.  The  collection  of 
many  facts  relating  to  human  society,  the 
gathering  of  statistics,  the  practical  considera¬ 
tion  of  the  social  bearings  of  marriage,  divorce, 
the  prison  problem  and  similar  questions, 
are  not  without  use  in  any  ethical  study.  The 
whole  outlook  on  life  as  social  raises  the 
problem  of  the  relation  of  the  individual  to 
society  which  cannot  be  overlooked  in  the  study 
of  freedom  and  ethical  thought.6 

After  having  shown  to  what  degree  morals 
are  dependent  on  all  of  these  sciences  we  may 
ask:  Does  ethics  in  turn  render  service  to  any 
of  them?  History  if  fully  studied  cannot  re¬ 
main  under  the  dominance  of  a  purely  economic 
philosophy;  it  must  give  some  room  to  moral 
judgments.  Because  man  is  not  only  an  eating 
and  fighting  being,  but  also  a  being  with  a  con¬ 
science  his  doings  must  be  subject  to  judgments 
of  right  or  wrong.  When  we  study  the  move¬ 
ment  of  man’s  great  ideas  and  ruling  ideals  we 
must  apply  some  moral  measurement.  But 
this  measurement  must  never  be  that  of  one  age 

«  Cf.  Edward  C.  Hayes,  Sociology  and  Ethics. 


FREEDOM  AS  A  SCIENCE 


9 


as  applied  to  all  ages,  little  as  we  can  finally 
escape  some  ethical  appraisement. 

One  of  the  remarkable  developments  in  the 
latest  economic  thought  is  the  introduction  of 
moral  standards  to  problems  of  business,  com¬ 
merce,  etc.,  in  short  to  economic  questions.7 
Judgments  resting  on  the  golden  rule,  decisions 
growing  out  of  moral  ideals  of  truth,  honesty, 
justice,  and  righteousness  are  being  discussed 
among  economists.  Practical  societies  of  busi¬ 
ness  men  are  choosing  service  as  their  motto, 
and  there  is  going  on  a  moralization  of  our 
material  pursuits.  Ethics  is  conquering  eco¬ 
nomics,  and  the  good  is  attempting  to 
standardize  goods. 

Sociology  cannot  escape  the  moral  impress. 
In  fact  in  many  evil  situations  of  society  the 
sociologist  is  not  only  a  mere  describer  of  con¬ 
ditions,  but  also  a  preacher  of  righteousness. 
He  has,  often  without  knowing  it,  a  code  of 
social  morality  which  he  applies  in  his  criti¬ 
cisms  and  denunciations.  The  great  social 
movement  of  socialism,  in  addition  to  its  ma¬ 
terial  appeal,  has  frequently  used  the  claim  of 
justice  and  won  men  by  its  moral  demands. 
Much  of  sociology  has  borrowed  ethical  ideas 
and  is  indebted  to  the  underlying  and  universal 
moral  conceptions  of  men.  Thus  morals  give 
as  well  as  receive  in  the  great  body  of  human 
thought  and  knowledge. 

Is  ethics  universal?  Matthew  Arnold  said 
that  conduct  is  three-fourths  of  human  life.  Is 

7  Of.  Annals  of  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 
Science,  Vol.  Cl.  No.  190 — May  1922,  “The  Ethics  of  the 
Professions  and  of  Business.’ ’ 


10 


CHBISTIAN  CONDUCT 


this  true,  or  is  ethics  so  universal  as  to  consti¬ 
tute  four-fourths?  Are  there  any  actions  exempt 
from  the  moral  judgment?  Apparently  there 
are  actions  which  are  ethically  indifferent,  to 
which  the  term  ‘  ‘  adiaphora ?  ’  is  applied.  It 
seems  to  make  no  difference  morally  whether 
I  wear  a  blue  tie  or  green  tie,  whether  I  eat 
veal  or  lamb,  whether  I  take  a  vacation  at  the 
seashore  or  the  mountains,  whether  I  go  to 
visit  one  friend  or  another.  Thus  there  may 
be  many  actions  which  do  not  appear  to  enter 
at  all  into  the  question  of  moral  value.  They 
are  decisions  entirely  free  and  have  no  bearing 
on  my  virtues  or  faults.  And  yet  even  seem¬ 
ingly  indifferent  actions  may  gain  a  moral  im¬ 
port  through  their  connection  and  through  the 
attitude  assumed  toward  them.  If  my  wearing 
a  tie  of  one  or  another  color  is  a  matter  of  pride, 
or  a  departure  from  good  judgment,  and  if  my 
eating  veal  or  lamb  influences  my  health,  and  if 
my  going  to  the  seashore  or  the  mountains  be¬ 
comes  a  subject  of  the  most  favorable  place 
for  my  benefit,  or  a  problem  of  thrift,  and  if 
my  visit  to  one  friend  or  another  depends  upon 
certain  preferential  obligations,  then  all  of 
these  actions  are  no  longer  indifferent.  In  this 
manner  as  our  life  is  connected,  and  we  grow  in 
the  knowledge  of  moral  implications,  there  are 
fewer  and  fewer  actions  which  are  morally 
indifferent.  In  our  ethical  development  the 
claim  of  the  good  or  bad  becomes  more  and 
more  universal. 

Does  this  universal  claim  of  freedom  make 
ethics  paramount?  Are  its  judgments  to  be 
applied  to  all  spheres  of  life?  If  this  be  as- 


FBEEDOM  AS  A  SCIENCE 


11 


serted  then  can  e.  g.  art  be  for  art’s  sake?  It 
is  true  that  art  must  seek  simply  the  satisfac¬ 
tion  of  the  sense  of  the  beautiful.  In  its  efforts 
it  may  portray  in  sculpture,  painting,  drama, 
novel,  etc.,  both  good  or  bad.  It  may  idealize 
life,  or  it  may  show  things  in  their  bare  reality. 

Whether  a  subject  is  morally  right  or  wrong 
cannot  apparently  limit  the  creative  impulse  of 
the  artist.  And  yet  it  is  a  fact  that  the  desire 
of  the  artist  must  be  pure.  In  all  its  realism 
art  cannot  justly  glorify  what  is  morally  ugly. 
The  beautiful  must  be  related  to  the  good.  The 
ancient  Greeks  saw  tjie  beauty  of  goodness, 
and  their  great  thinker  Plato  desired  the  good¬ 
ness  of  beauty  for  the  protection  of  the  young. 
Art  has  not  only  an  artistic  influence  but  at 
the  same  time  a  moral  effect.  For  this  reason 
there  can  be  no  indifference  whether  art  is  high 
and  noble  or  whether  it  is  decadent.  In  fact 
where  the  ethical  life  degenerates  art  finally  also 
decays. 

Another  problem  opens  up,  when  we  inquire 
whether  all  men  are  subject  to  moral  judgments, 
or  whether  certain  outstanding  individuals  are 
not  subject  to  moral  standards,  and  can,  in  the 
claim  of  their  individuality  and  freedom,  act 
as  they  desire  ?  It  may  be  that  there  are  great 
characters  who,  with  a  larger  vision  and  an 
outlook  to  the  future,  seem  to  violate  the  ex¬ 
isting  moral  customs  of  society,  and  are  never¬ 
theless  leaders  of  a  new  light.  An  outstanding 
example  of  such  men  is  Socrates.  A  conflict 
between  standards  of  society  and  the  individual 
conscience  will  take  place  again  and  again. 
But  does  it  follow,  that  creative  powers  or  royal 


12 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


positions  justify  extended  privileges?  We  may 
understand  the  special  difficulties  and  tempta¬ 
tions  of  certain  positions  in  life.  The  bohemi- 
anism  of  the  artist,  the  prerogatives  of  the  ruler 
can  be  sympathetically  weighed.  But  when 
this  has  been  done,  can  we  grant  a  special 
morality  to  any  one?  Is  e.  g.  Shelly,  because 
of  his  poetic  power,  to  be  excused  for  his  rela¬ 
tions  to  Mary  Godwin?  Can  we  condone 
Byron’s  wild  escapades?  Is  Wagner  such  a 
superman  of  music  that  his  abandonment  of  his 
wife,  his  relations  to  Matilda  Wesendonck,  and 
his  alliance  with  Cosima  Von  Buelow,  are  to  be 
forgotten?  Shall  Poe’s  wild  carousals  be 
entirely  excused?  Surely  with  all  possible  al¬ 
lowance  we  cannot  exempt  these  and  like 
individuals  from  a  fair  moral  judgment. 

REFERENCES 

James  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  Introduction, 
Chapters  I,  II. 

J.  Hyslop,  Elements  of  Ethics,  Chapters  I,  II. 

J.  H.  Muirhead,  The  Elements  of  Ethics,  Book  I. 

John  S.  Mackenzie,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Introduction,  Chap¬ 
ters  I,  II. 

Frank  Thilly,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chapter  I. 

Theodore  Be  Laguna,  Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Ethics, 
Chapters  I,  II. 

Chas.  D’Arcy,  A  Short  Study  of  Ethics,  Introduction. 

Henry  W.  Wright,  Self-Realization,  Part  I,  Chapters  I,  II. 

John  Dewey,  Human  Nature  and  Conduct,  Part  I,  Section  3. 

A.  E.  Taylor,  The  Problem  of  Conduct,  Chapter  I. 

Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Vol.  I,  Introduction. 

W.  Wundt,  Ethics,  Introduction. 

Vladimir  Solovyof,  The  Justification  of  the  Good,  Introduc¬ 
tion,  Part  III,  Chapter  VII. 


FREEDOM  AS  A  SCIENCE 


13 


W.  R.  Sorley,  Moral  Values  and  the  Idea  of  God,  Chapters 
I,  II,  III,  IV. 

R.  R.  Marrett,  Origin  and  Validity  in  Ethics,  in  Personal 
Idealism,  Philosophical  Essays  edited  by  Henry  Sturt,  p. 
221  ff. 

Alexander  Sutherland,  The  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Moral 
Instinct. 


CHAPTER  II 


FREEDOM  AND  RELIGION 

The  nature  of  the  problem.  Why  do  we  try 

to  correlate  freedom  and  religion?  Has  the 
problem  of  ethics  as  freedom  any  bearing  upon 
religion,  and  does  religion  affect  ethics?  These 
questions  are  not  like  the  problems  of  the 
scientific  character  of  morals  formal  and  logi¬ 
cal  matters,  but  they  deal  with  the  living  con¬ 
tacts  and  the  real  contents  of  ethics  and 
religion.  Ethics,  with  its  basis  built  upon 
freedom,  and  its  striving  directed  toward  free¬ 
dom,  seems  at  first  sight  to  have  no  value  for 
religion  as  the  search  after  the  divine.  The 
two  are  different  in  purpose  and  largely  in  con¬ 
tent.  But  when  we  regard  them  as  they  form 
a  unity  in  the  total  of  human  life,  and  as  they 
go  together  historically,  the  logical  separation 
is  overcome  by  the  actual  relation. 

What  ethics  does  for  religion.  Does  history 
give  any  information  of  an  ethical  influence 
upon  religion?  Is  freedom  a  factor  in  man’s 
dependence  upon  God?  When  we  look  broadly 
at  the  development  of  the  religion  and  the 
morals  of  mankind,  we  find  again  and  again 
that  the  permanence  of  religion  depends  upon 
its  ability  to  measure  up  to  the  ethical  advance. 
Religions  have  decayed  when  they  could  not 
adjust  themselves  to  moral  awakening.  A 

14 


FREEDOM  AND  RELIGION 


15 


typical  example  is  found  in  the  religion  of  the 
Greeks.  It  was  an  amoral  naturalism  clothed 
into  the  stories  of  humanized  gods.  The  gods 
had  all  the  defects  of  their  natural  background 
and  all  the  weaknesses  of  the  Greek  life. 
When  Xenophanes  saw  that  in  natural  religion 
men  made  the  gods  after  their  own  image  the 
seeds  of  doubt  were  sown.  But  it  was  the 
moral  advancement  of  Greek  thought  begin¬ 
ning  with  Socrates  which  most  effectually 
destroyed  the  old  faith.  Plato  asserted  that 
the  stories  of  the  gods  were  not  fit  to  be  taught 
to  the  young.  This  influence  was  also  brought 
to  bear  upon  Greek  religion  when  the  drama¬ 
tist  Euripides  questioned  the  justice  of  the  gods 
in  the  great  crises  of  human  existence.  Thus 
the  ethical  advance  outstripped  the  possibility 
of  religion  with  its  morals.  Similar  results 
follow  either  in  the  independent  growth  of 
morals  among  a  people,  or  when  an  ethically 
superior  religion  comes  to  a  group.  The  final¬ 
ity  of  a  religion  is  its  possibility  of  meeting  all 
just  moral  growth  of  individual  and  common 
life.  Consequently  ethical  content  is  very 
fundamental  to  religion. 

Is  freedom  independent?  To  ask  this  ques¬ 
tion  is  to  raise  the  problem  whether  conversely 
ethics  is  also  dependent  upon  religion?  This 
is  the  larger  problem.  The  assertion  is  fre¬ 
quently  made  in  our  day  that  morals  are 
autonomic,  i.  e.  that  they  bear  their  law  within 
themselves  and  are  independent  of  religion. 
Ethical  culture  societies  are  endeavoring  to 
show  that  different  religious  positions  make  no 
difference  in  morals,  and  that  men  ought  to 


16 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


develop  a  moral  life  unhampered  by  any  reli¬ 
gions  consideration.  At  the  same  time  many 
such  ethical  groups  teach  some  kind  of  theism 
or  pantheism.  They  also  live  upon  many  ethi¬ 
cal  customs  which  have  developed  historically 
out  of  some  religion.  While  secularisation  is 
going  on,  and  morality  itself,  and  industry, 
politics,  education,  science,  family  life,  etc., 
etc.,  are  divorced  from  religious  influence,  it 
still  remains  true,  that  religion  has  practically 
produced  marvelous  moral  changes.  “Not 
only  have,  by  means  of  it,  drunkards  and  crim¬ 
inals  been  reformed,  prostitutes  led  to  a  pure 
life,  sinners  in  general  made  to  repent,  the  sick 
made  well,  but  the  character  of  whole  commun¬ 
ities  has  been  radically  altered,  even  trans¬ 
formed,  in  the  course  of  a  few  years.  Such  facts 
as  these  are  not  open  to  even  scientific  doubt, 
because  they  are  checked  up  by  overwhelming 
evidence  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the  general 
principles  of  normal  and  abnormal  psychology 
on  the  other  hand.  *  ’ 1 

What  does  the  history  of  religion  show?  Is 

there  any  evidence  that  in  the  various  forms 
which  religion  has  taken  there  is  always  an 
ethical  implication!  Modern  speculation  upon 
the  common  features  of  the  development  of 
religion  begins  with  the  assumption  that  the 
primitive  religion  was  some  sort  of  psychic, 
dynamic  impersonal  power  grasped  by  feeling. 
It  is  called  mana,  after  a  term  found  by  Cod- 
rington  in  New  Zealand.  Whether  this  assump¬ 
tion  is  justified  or  not,  it  at  least  implies  that 


i  Chas.  A.  Ellwood,  The  Reconstruction  of  Religion,  p.  34. 


FREEDOM  AND  RELIGION 


17 


man  projects  a  spiritual  value  into  life,  and 
this  takes  him  away  from  a  material  view  of 
life  and  affects  all  his  customs  and  morals,  be¬ 
cause  in  primitive  life  religion  determines 
everything.  The  next  stage  assumed  is  ani¬ 
mism,  which  gives  souls  to  all  things  and  partly 
personalizes  them  as  the  young  child  still  does. 
Under  animism  morals  become  more  elevated. 
When  men  take  a  fetich  they  ascribe  a  virtue 
to  it  not  only  for  their  help,  but  they  also  accept 
some  obligations.  However  low  this  form  of 
religion  is  it  carries  with  it  certain  duties. 
Somewhat  higher  is  totemism,  which  takes 
some  living  form  and  makes  it  the  symbol  and 
power  in  tribal  life.  The  largest  social  cus¬ 
toms,  and  many  duties  of  kinship  grow  out  of 
totemism.  There  are  frequent  evidences  of 
ancestor  worship,  and  this  is  more  powerful 
ethically  and  produces  higher  results  than 
totemism  for  the  individual  and  common  life 
in  obedience,  etc.  Polytheism  with  its  glaring 
defects  has  many  more  moral  relationships,  and 
some  of  them  rise  fairly  high  when  the  gods 
are  more  social  than  natural.  But  the  greatest 
advance  is  made  when  henotheism  arrives, 
which  is  the  taking  up  of  the  worship  of  one 
god  at  a  time.  It  is  introductory  to  mono¬ 
theism,  the  worship  of  one  God  alone.  Under 
monotheism  the  high  ethical  standards  of 
Judaism,  and  the  supreme  ethics  of  Christian¬ 
ity  have  developed.  When  men  depart  from 
ethical  monotheism  and  revert  to  deism  they 
lose  moral  power  because  God  is  separated 
from  the  actual  life  of  the  world.  A  still 
lower  reversal  is  pantheism,  whether  scientific 


18 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


or  poetical.  Under  polytheism  pantheism  was 
a  striving  after  unity.  When  however  it 
occurs,  after  the  personal  moral  valuation  of 
God,  it  destroys  the  inherent  worth  of  good  and 
bad  and  degrades  man  to  an  amoral  naturalism. 
These  outstanding  facts  and  suppositions  in 
the  history  of  religion  all  support  the  claim 
that  religion  at  all  stages  and  in  all  forms  has 
an  ethic. 

Religion,  character,  and  conduct.  Has  real 
religion  an  influence  upon  character  as  this 
conditions  conduct?  Is  it  so  universal  as  by 
its  very  existence  in  man  to  affect  his  morals? 
In  its  full  value  religion  is  universal  and  abso¬ 
lute.  It  is  a  life  within  man  which  is  all  em¬ 
bracing.  Because  life  in  us  is  a  unity  the 
power  of  religion  touches  every  action.  It 
helps  to  make  character.  “  Character,  which 
is  central  to  morals  and  must  precede  the  con¬ 
sideration  of  conduct,  cannot  remain  untouched 
wherever  religion  exists  as  a  fact  and  reality 
in  the  human  soul.  If  character  is  dependent 
upon  religion  it  follows  that  the  nature  of  our 
conduct  cannot  be  separated  from  the  consider¬ 
ation  of  the  religious  life.  As  man  is  normally 
religious,  he  is,  therefore,  normally  dependent 
in  his  moral  life.”2 

Does  religion  influence  our  instincts?  A 

problem  which  is  not  always  realized  is  the 
reliance  of  the  life  of  freedom  upon  our  natural 
instincts.  The  instincts  are  the  raw  material 
of  our  life.  If  our  morals  demand  some  con¬ 
sideration  of  our  instincts,  can  it  be  shown  that 

2  Haas,  ‘ 1  In  the  Light  of  Faith,  ’  ’  p.  205. 


FREEDOM  AND  RELIGION 


19 


religion  bears  in  upon  our  freedom  because  it 
changes  the  instinctive  roots  of  life?  There  is 
a  large  group  of  instincts  out  of  which  action 
readily  follows  unless  by  control  and  modifica¬ 
tion  we  overcome  the  urge  of  the  instincts.  If 
e.  g.  we  select  the  instincts  of  acquisitiveness 
and  combativeness  and  fear,  we  know  that  tliev 
must  be  hemmed  in  to  make  our  individual  and 
common  life  bearable.  Can  this  change  be 
brought  about  by  the  longing  of  freedom  alone? 
Wherever  we  allow  vital  religion  to  lift  us 
beyond  ourselves  we  shall  not  press  acquisitive¬ 
ness  to  such  an  extreme  as  to  endanger  society, 
and  make  it  acquisitive  rather  than  coopera¬ 
tive.3  Combativeness  which  leads  to  war  will 
be  restrained  when  the  considerations  of  the 
common  regard  of  men  for  each  other  is  rein¬ 
forced  by  a  religion  of  love.  Fear  which  even 
in  primitive  religion  is  counterbalanced  by  awe 
and  reverence4  is  at  last  overcome  when  God  is 
accepted  as  Father.  But  not  only  are  certain 
instincts  crowded  back  but  others  are  given 
fulfillment  through  the  religious  attitude  and 
thus  produce  new  moral  results.  As  an  ex¬ 
ample  we  may  refer  to  sympathy  which  may  be 
taken  as  an  instinct  counterbalancing  self-pre¬ 
servation  and  forming  the  basis  of  altruism. 
When  religion  of  a  high  type  takes  hold  of 
sympathy  it  enlarges  sympathy  beyond  the 
immediate  contacts,  and  gives  it  a  universal 
human  meaning.  In  this  manner  religion 
affecting  our  instincts  works  upon  our  ethical 
life. 

3  Of.  Tawney,  The  Acquisitive  Society. 

4  Leuba,  A  Psychological  Study  of  Religion,  p.  128  ff. 


20 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


Our  desires  and  religion.  If  we  study  our 
mental  life  we  shall  find  that  in  addition  to  in¬ 
stincts  we  must  give  a  large  place  to  our 
desires.  Instincts  operate  through  our  desires. 
Feelings  and  emotions  are  shot  through  with 
desires.  We  express  our  wants  and  our  long¬ 
ing  through  desire.  The  psychological  under¬ 
standing  of  freedom  must  consider  the  pressure 
of  desire  upon  character.  But  our  problem  is 
whether  religion  can  so  affect  desires  as  to  pro¬ 
duce  a  difference  in  our  morals?  The  com¬ 
munion  with  the  divine  certainly  takes  hold  of 
our  desires.  Without  religion  desire  is  cen¬ 
tered  upon  the  immediate  wants  of  the  body 
and  upon  material  life.  But  when  the  super¬ 
natural  enters  into  our  considerations  it  lifts 
our  desires  beyond  the  wants  of  the  visible  and 
natural  and  they  seek  a  spiritual  end.  It  is 
through  such  seeking  that  the  whole  ethical 
attitude  is  changed  and  men  strive  for  higher 
values. 

Religion  and  habits.  Every  tendency  in  our 
life  in  toward  fixation  of  certain  actions.  This 
fixation  is  habit.  Habit  has  a  fundamental 
importance  for  morals.  They  rest  on  good 
habits.  One  of  the  central  ideas  of  ethics  is 
virtue,  and  what  else  is  virtue  but  the  habit  of 
doing  the  good.  Right  formation  of  habits 
makes  a  steady  moral  life.  Has  religion  any 
contribution  to  make  in  the  forming  of  habits 
which  will  influence  our  life  of  freedom? 
Wherever  religion  crystallizes  into  certain 
modes  of  action  that  are  not  merely  ceremonial, 
but  touch  our  inner  life  and  our  relation  to 
others,  it  makes  for  ethical  habits.  A  very  apt 


FREEDOM  AND  RELIGION 


21 


illustration  can  be  found  in  the  virtue  and 
habit  of  generosity.  There  may  be  in  some 
men  a  natural  inclination  to  communicate  to 
others;  the  social  feeling  may  be  large.  But 
when  a  whole  group  is  distinguished  by  out¬ 
standing  generosity  we  seek  for  a  further  cause. 
The  Jews  are  marked  for  their  liberality.  For 
centuries  their  religion  has  taught  them  to  give 
largely  and  has  made  the  law  of  the  tithes 
obligatory.  This  long  training  of  the  religious 
ideal  has  produced  the  habit  of  generosity.  In 
the  same  manner  all  virtues  in  a  group  or  in 
individuals  are  influenced  very  quietly  but  con¬ 
stantly  by  any  religious,  living  ideals. 

What  value  have  motives?  We  cannot 
escape  the  fact  that  motives  are  also  a  part  of 
our  inner  life  that  make  character  and  produce 
action.  Is  the  power  of  the  motives  untouched 
by  religion?  Is  it  not  true  that  the  intellectual 
and  particularly  the  emotional  content  of 
motives  is  deeply  affected  by  religion?  “Let 
us  look  at  a  moral  action  and  analyze  it  in 
order  to  demonstrate  this  contention.  A  stu¬ 
dent  is  in  an  examination  and  is  put  upon  his 
honor  to  use  no  dishonest  means  in  his  work. 
The  temptation  arises  that  would  move  him  to 
break  his  word  and  promise.  What  will  be  the 
strongest  motive  to  keep  him  true?  He  may 
be  kept  by  the  desire  not  to  forfeit  the  regard 
of  his  fellow-students.  His  character  may 
possess  a  self-esteem  which  he  does  not  desire 
to  lose.  But  a  more  powerful  and  purer  motive 
would  be  the  motive  that  a  man’s  honor  is  a 
high  possession  which  is  not  to  be  lost,  and  a 
noble  standard  not  to  be  violated.  What  is 


oo 

AbJ  «J 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


the  force  of  this  ideal  of  honor?  What  is  its 
origin?  Does  it  not  go  back  to  the  period  of 
the  prowess  of  the  knights  when  the  mainten¬ 
ance  of  honor  meant  respect  for  the  truth, 
observance  of  purity  and  defense  of  woman? 
But  no  noble  knight  was  able  to  maintain  the 
strength  of  his  honor  unless  he  finally  caught 
the  vision  of  the  Holy  Grail.  And  though  the 
origin  of  honor  may  today  be  forgotten,  the 
character  of  honor  as  a  motive  and  its  ideali¬ 
zation  rise  to  a  religious  height.  Honor  even 
thus  is  not  as  powerful  as  would  be  a  direct 
consciousness  of  the  bearing  of  religion  upon 
a  moral  issue.  Can  anything  equal  in  potency 
the  conception  4 Thou  God  seest  me?’  The 
motive  of  the  presence  and  holiness  of  God  is 
all-compelling. 9  9  5 

Sanctions,  ideals  and  religion.  In  continu¬ 
ing  the  study  of  the  relation  of  religion  to 
morals  we  are  confronted  with  the  problem, 
whether  the  sanctions  and  ideals  of  the  ethical 
life  can  be  helped  by  religion?  Sanctions  are 
the  external  and  objective  forces  of  custom, 
manners,  opinions,  laws,  beliefs,  etc.,  which 
impinge  upon  our  motives.  Ideals  are  our 
aims  and  purposes  of  life  which  we  accept  as 
our  guiding  stars.  We  accept  sanctions  in  our 
ideals,  and  sanctions  often  lead  to  ideals  and 
aid  in  forming  their  content.  If  we  begin  to 
enumerate  some  sanctions  and  ask,  does  reli¬ 
gion  make  them  different,  we  shall  find  that  all 
sanctions  can  be  elevated  by  religion.  Religion 
itself  does  not  stand  as  simply  one  of  the  sanc- 

r,Cf.  Haas  “In  the  Light  of  Faith,”  p.  213. 


FREEDOM  AND  RELIGION 


23 


tions.6  Let  ns  consider,  as  an  example,  the  vir¬ 
tue  of  purity  with  its  motive.  We  may  be  con¬ 
trolled  by  the  sanction  of  law,  or  public  opin¬ 
ion,  or  through  the  knowledge  of  the  dangers 
of  impurity  when  they  are  presented  to  us  in 
all  their  awful  reality  and  their  terrible  results. 
But  if  religion  is  an  actuality  to  us,  and  the 
sense  of  God  is  real,  there  is  a  mightier  sanction 
in  the  belief  that  our  bodies  are  not  mere  pro¬ 
ducts  of  nature  but  temples  of  God  and  His  Holy 
Spirit.  This  belief  goes  deeper  and  is  far  more 
powerful  than  any  fear  of  results,  or  any  pres¬ 
sure  of  opinion,  or  any  threat  of  law.  The  lack 
of  the  sense  of  the  reality  of  God  is  no  proof  of 
its  inefficiency. 

Ideals  can  be  created  in  many  ways  but 
whatever  enters  upon  their  formation  must  be 
personally  weighed  and  adopted.  The  attrac¬ 
tiveness  of  high  ideas,  the  beauty  of  noble 
words,  the  excellence  of  good  deeds,  may  shape 
ideals.  Great  characters  will  lead  to  emulation. 
Noble  sentiments  of  literature  and  heroic 
appeals  of  art  will  lift  us  to  nobler  purposes 
and  aims  in  life.  The  power  of  virtue  will  have 
its  sway.  But  the  question  remains,  can  not 
religion  do  still  more  than  any  one  of  these,  or 
all  of  them  combined!  If  we  select,  as  one 
instance,  the  ideal  of  service,  what  can  give  it 
the  greatest  impetus!  The  joy  of  life  in  help¬ 
fulness,  the  necessity  of  service  for  the  common 
good,  the  inspiration  of  noble  examples,  the 
inherent  beauty  of  the  moral  nature  of  service  ! 
All  of  these  are  effective.  Nevertheless  when  we 


6  This  was  the  contention  of  Bentham  and  Spencer. 


24 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


take  service  and  raise  it  above  its  humanitarian 
appeal,  and  find  in  it  the  highest  exhibition 
of  divine  love  as  shown  in  Christ,  the  Servant, 
we  have  an  appeal  that  far  outweighs  all  other 
considerations.  The  judgment  of  Christ,  that 
what  we  have  done  to  one  of  the  least  of  His 
we  have  done  unto  Him,  is  the  strongest  motive 
to  make  service  one  of  our  controlling  ideals. 

The  realization  of  moral  freedom.  One  great 
difficulty  has  always  confronted  those  who 
believe  in  and  accept  the  value  of  the  good. 
Does  the  good  prevail,  and  has  virtue  its  re¬ 
ward!  Or  do  we  not  find  that  vice  is  frequently 
successful  and  powerful?  The  good  do  not 
always  prosper,  and  the  seed  of  the  righteous 
does  sometimes  beg  for  bread.  Is  there  con¬ 
sequently  only  a  partial  triumph  of  the  good, 
and  must  we  object  to  the  statement  of  Schiller, 
that  the  history  of  the  world  is  the  judgment  of 
the  world?  These  questions  cannot  be  answered 
from  the  mere  considerations  of  the  moral  life. 
It  was  this  conviction  which  led  Kant  to  become 
the  classic  advocate  of  the  necessity  of  a  future 
life  and  the  demand  of  a  moral  governor  of  the 
universe.  Kant  was  moved  to  stress  these  relig¬ 
ious  beliefs  as  necessary  assumptions  to  sustain 
the  reality  and  permanence  of  the  moral.  Men 
need  the  belief  in  God  and  eternity  that  right 
may  remain  right.  If  God,  in  the  definition  of 
Matthew  Arnold  is  “the  power  not  ourselves 
that  makes  for  righteousness”  only  in  limited 
time,  then  there  is  merely  a  striving  towards 
righteousness  but  no  assurance  of  its  victory. 
The  full  realizations  calls,  however,  not  only  for 
mere  continuance,  but  also  for  the  faith,  that  the 


FREEDOM  AND  RELIGION 


25 


universe  lias  a  moral  order  and  a  plan  to  be  ful¬ 
filled,  because  God  is  ethical  and  not  mere  force, 
or  totality,  or  all-embracing,  unique  individual¬ 
ity.  The  ideal  of  freedom  and  its  growth  imply 
the  endless  unfoldment  of  life.  Where  God  as 
supremely  moral  is  denied,  or  where  the  future 
life  is  made  uncertain,  there  both  the  individual 
and  society  have  lost  the  necessary  foundation 
for  the  faith  in  the  good  and  the  permanence 
and  supremacy  of  a  moral  world  order. 

What  message  has  Christianity?  Does  the 
Christian  faith  substantiate  its  claim  that  it  has 
the  greatest  and  best  moral  content  within  it? 
This  problem  we  must  meet  not  only  here,  but 
in  connection  with  every  question  in  our  whole 
study.  Must  it  not  justly  be  a  part  of  any  full 
and  fair  discussion  of  ethics  to  compare  its 
results  with  the  claim  of  Christianity?  If  it  is 
superior  can  we  stop  with  any  lower  ideals? 
Is  philosophical  ethics  truly  universal  and  im¬ 
partial  if  it  passes  by  and  simply  ignores  the 
ethical  attitudes  of  Christianity? 

When  we  endeavor  to  sum  up  briefly  the 
ethical,  idealistic  conceptions  of  Christianity  we 
shall  find  that  its  supreme  principle  of  morals 
is  love  of  man  for  man  exhibited  in  brotherliness 
of  thought,  feeling  and  deed.  It  makes  for 
individual  rights  and  common  justice,  and  seeks 
the  general  welfare  because  it  inculcates  sacri¬ 
fice  for  the  common  good.  By  limiting  the 
pursuit  of  material  things  it  helps  to  overcome 
the  strife  and  bitterness  of  selfish  commerce, 
industry  and  labor.  It  militates  against  im¬ 
purity  and  the  mere  life  of  sex,  and  elevates 
the  ideal  and  life  of  the  married  estate.  All 


26 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


intemperance  and  dishonesty  are  opposed,  and 
pride,  hypocrisy  and  pretense  are  castigated. 
Arrogance  and  self-complacency  are  thrust 
aside.  The  individual  man  is  to  be  free  from 
false  control  of  law,  to  become  self-reliant  and 
responsible.  For  the  social  life  it  proposes  the 
ideal  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  in  which  His  holy, 
just,  and  loving  will  for  the  good  of  men  is  to 
prevail.  This  ideal  defends  the  weak  against 
the  strong,  overcomes  the  practice  of  retaliation, 
destroys  mere  class-feeling  and  narrow  national 
bonds  for  a  common  brotherhood.  Race  is  to 
be  no  hindrance  to  unity.  Rich  and  poor  are 
alike;  educated  and  ignorant,  prominent  and 
obscure,  master  and  slave  are  on  the  same 
spiritual  plane.  The  meek  shall  inherit  the 
earth  when  non-resistance  is  appreciated  as 
against  the  militaristic  attitude  of  destruction. 
All  life  will  be  joyful,  hopeful,  helpful,  leading 
into  the  social  order,  which  compared  with  all 
our  failures  in  the  present  and  past  orders, 
promises  common  happiness,  justice  and  love.7 

“Christianity  has  supreme  moral  power 
because  is  combines  so  many  high  ideals  in 
Jesus  Christ.  In  Him  the  divine  perfection  is 
presented  in  human  form.  His  ideal  perfection 
leads  us  to  adore  Him,  and  His  saving  love 
moves  us  to  follow  Him.  Through  His  act  His 
life  is  offered  to  us,  and  if  we  accept  it  He  lives 
in  us  through  faith.  His  strength,  therefore,  is 
shaped  in  our  weakness  and  leads  us  to  freedom. 
In  Him  all  graces  unite,  strength  and  humility, 

7  This  paragraph  rests  upon:  Votaw,  “ Primitive  Christian¬ 
ity  an  Idealistic  Social  Movement:  “American  Journal  of 
Theology,  January  1918. 


FREEDOM  AND  RELIGION 


27 


justice  and  mercy,  holy  zeal  and  forgiving 
love,  purity  and  rescuing  power  for  the  lost. 
Thoughtful  and  active,  forceful  as  a  man  and 
gentle  as  a  woman,  hating  evil  and  saving  men, 
full  of  strong  impulse  and  yet  calmly  balanced, 
strong  in  the  virtue  of  every  temperament  and 
without  its  weakness,  He  stands  as  the  supreme 
moral  ideal  in  whom  age  after  age  finds  now 
inspiration.  The  moral  perfection  and  inspira¬ 
tion  of  Jesus  Christ  is  the  guarantee  of  the 
permanence  of  Christianity  in  the  world  ’s  moral 
progress.  It  is  essentially  true  that  if  the  Son 
makes  us  free,  we  are  free  indeed.’ ’  8 

8  Haas,  1 1  In  the  Light  of  Faith,  *  ’  p.  220. 

REFERENCES 

Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics,  Chapters  VI,  VII. 

Borden  P.  Bowne,  Principles  of  Ethics,  Chapter  VII. 

Jas.  Hyslop,  The  Elements  of  Ethics,  Chapter  IX. 

Vladimir  Solovyof,  The  Justification  of  the  Good,  Part  I, 
Chapter  II,  Part  II,  Chapter  II. 

Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Book  I,  Chapter  II;  Book  II,  Chapter 
VIII. 

W.  Wundt,  Ethics,  Part  I,  Chapter  II. 

Newman  Smyth,  Christian  Ethics,  Introduction  V. 

W.  Hocking,  Human  Nature  and  its  Remaking,  Part  VII. 

W.  R.  Sorley,  Moral  Values  and  the  Idea  of  God,  Chapter 
XIII. 

G.  T.  Ladd,  What  I  Ought  To  Do,  Chapter  XII. 

Sir  Henry  Jones,  A  Faith  That  Enquires,  Lectures  VIII,  IX. 

John  A.  W.  Haas,  In  the  Light  of  Faith,  “The  Depend¬ 
ence  of  Freedom’ ’  p.  203  ff. 

James  Ten  Broeke,  The  Moral  Life  and  Religion,  Parts 
II,  III. 


PART  I.  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  FREEDOM 


CHAPTER  III 

FKEE  WILL 

The  basic  problem.  Is  there  any  compelling 
reason  for  identifying  the  ethical  problem  with 
freedom?  Are  we  justified  in  making  the  quest 
after  an  ethical  system  the  problem  of  freedom? 
This  basic  question  demands  an  answer  ;  other¬ 
wise  all  that  is  claimed  in  the  assertion  of 
freedom  falls  to  the  ground.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  some  of  the  immediate  data  of  our 
consciousness  are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  lead  us 
to  the  conviction  that  we  are  free  in  our  actions. 
We  seem  to  know  and  feel  that  we  make  our 
own  judgments.  Deliberation  balancing  possible 
choices  is  present.  The  selection  of  a  choice 
appears  to  be  our  own,  and  we  arrive  at  a 
decision  for  which  we  accept  responsibility. 
There  is  no  escape  from  the  impression  that  we 
make  obligations  our  own,  or  that  we  reject 
them.  When  we  have  done  certain  actions  they 
meet  either  with  approval  or  disapproval.  In 
the  case  of  disapproval  we  blame  ourselves 
and  accept  the  guilt  of  the  accusation  of  our 
thoughts  against  our  deeds.  Remorse  may  fol¬ 
low,  and  its  occurrence  is  best  explained  on  the 
assumption  of  our  freedom.  Unless  all  of  these 

28 


FKEE  WILL 


29 


mental  phenomena  are  deceptive  they  cannot  be 
easily  set  aside  in  any  explanation  of  freedom. 
Nevertheless  the  problem  is  larger  and  we  must 
consider  other  psychological  facts,  and  weigh 
in  addition  certain  claims  of  the  natural  sciences 
and  certain  metaphysical  questions, 
y 'Freedom  is  not  only  the  problem  of  the  liberty 
r  y of  our  choices  and  action,  but  also  the  question 
w  of  the  aim  of  the  moral  life.  Is  it  true  or  not, 
\hat  we  all  seek  happiness,  however  we  may 
define  it?  If  we  accept  this  goal  of  human  life, 
does  it  not  follow  that  morals  to  justify  their 
claim  must  attempt  to  solve  this  search  after 
happiness.  Now  happiness  is  not  possible  ex¬ 
cept  there  be  vital  freedom.  Liberty  of  mind 
and  action  is  the  outstanding  essential  element 
without  which  happiness  is  unattainable.  Con¬ 
sequently  freedom  is  the  implied  goal  in  human 
life,  and  we  must  ask  how  it  can  be  best  found 
and  realized.  It  has  a  living  content,  and  must 
not  be  confused  with  the  negative  idea  of 
independence.  When  the  American  colonies 
declared  their  independence  from  England,  they 
simply  severed  connection  with  the  mother 
country.  The  relation  of  dependence  was  to 
cease.  But  the  ideal  of  liberty  which  was  in  the 
minds  of  the  founders  of  our  country  was  larger. 
Human  strivings  in  government  and  life  cannot 
be  found  in  mere  independence  but  in  a  positive 
ideal  of  a  fulness  of  happiness  of  life  through 
liberty. 

,  Freedom  is  more  than  an  individual  aim 
among  men.  To  be  real  it  must  also  be  social. 
There  must  be  a  liberty  for  all  and  not  only  for 
each  individual.  My  happiness  and  your  happi- 


30 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


ness  ought  not  to  clash;  and  the  social  good  of 
liberty  cannot  be  set  aside  without  strife  and 
destruction  of  happiness  through  the  desire  and 
contest  for  individual  happiness.  The  common 
trend  of  society  today  as  the  outcome  of  the 
movements  of  history  is  very  commonly  charac¬ 
terized  as  democracy.  Democracy  is  defined, 
as  not  merely  the  possession  of  common  political 
privileges,  but  also  as  essential  equability  in  all 
relations  of  life.  Its  three  great  ideas  have  been 
called  liberty,  equality  and  fraternity.  The 
latter  is  the  religions  implication  of  democracy. 
Brotherhood  must  grow  out  of  religion.  Equal¬ 
ity  is  the  social  demand  of  democracy;  and  it 
must  be  valued  in  its  possibility  by  studying 
the  history  of  society.  But  liberty  or  freedom 
is  the  moral  demand  of  democracy.  It  is  there¬ 
fore  not  accidental  or  arbitrary  when  we  assume 
freedom  as  the  moral  answer  for  the  happiness 
of  society.  The  more  it  obtains  in  its  balanced 
reality,  not  as  the  selfish  prey  of  individuals,  or 
of  groups  in  society,  whether  they  be  economic 
or  national,  the  larger  will  be  the  sum  total  of 
human  satisfaction  with  life  and  its  common 
human  joy  and  peace. 

The  metaphysical  assertion.  May  there  not 
be  a  direct  metaphysical  solution  of  the  problem 
of  free  will!  If  this  is  possible  onr  question 
can  be  solved  without  further  discussion.  The 
effort  to  cut  the  Grordion  knot  of  freedom  and 
determination  has  been  made  in  modern  think¬ 
ing.  After  Immanuel  Kant  had  endeavored  to 
overthrow  the  power  of  theoretical  and  pure 
reason  in  the  ultimate  questions  of  life,  and  had 
found  only  a  strongly  bound  and  closely  connec- 


31 


FREE  WILL 

ted  causality  on  the  basis  of  mathematics  and 
physics,  he  assumed  that  all  this  was  phenome¬ 
nal.  The  direct  reality  he  asserted  was  in  the 
human  will.  In  the  phenomenal  world  we  are 
bound,  in  the  real,  nouomenal  world  we  are 
free.  Fichte  in  his  treatise  on  the  vocation  of 
man  also  chose  to  exalt  freedom  through  the 
essential  reality  of  the  will.  But  this  emphasis 
on  the  will  took  a  direction  not  contemplated  by 
Kant.  Schopenhauer,  who  coined  the  famous 
phrase  “the  will  to,”  made  it  the  will  to  live. 
But  this  will  led  to  misery,  and  became  imper¬ 
sonal  and  like  the  energy  of  the  universe.  Thus 
freedom  was  lost  in  the  depersonalized  will  as 
force.  Von  Hartmann  followed  Schopenhauer 
and  explained  all  life  through  the  philosophy 
of  the  unconscious,  which  is  the  blind  urge  of 
energy  below  consciousness.  While  these  phil¬ 
osophers  did  not  identify  their  impersonal  will 
with  the  energy  of  natural  science,  this  was  the 
only  logical  outcome.  And  thus  the  free  will 
was  stranded  through  universalizing  will.  A 
partial  rescue  was  provided  in  the  speculation 
of  Nietzsche  who  asserted  the  will  to  power. 
This  will  to  power  seems  on  the  one  hand  the 
mere  result  of  biological  necessity  just  like  the 
superman.  But  on  the  other  hand  there  is  a 
stressing  of  direct  human  will  and  action. 
Nietzsche1  never  resolved  this  contradiction. 
Bergson  makes  the  self  the  author  of  the 
free  act,  and  finds  liberty  in  the  inner,  pure, 
qualitative  character  of  duration2.  The  open 

1  Figgis,  The  Will  to  Freedom,  gives  a  fair  discussion  of 
N  ietzsche. 

2  Of.  Time  and  Free  Will,  espec.  p.  169  ff. 


32 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


reassertion  of  free  will  came  through  the 
pragmatists.  William  James  coined  the  term 
“the  will  to  believe/ ’  He  claimed  that  one 
might  take  the  choice  of  freedom  over  against 
the  claim  of  necessity,  and  with  equal  right 
gamble  on  the  freedom  of  will.  There  was  no  re¬ 
buttal  of  the  claims  of  necessity,  but  only  an 
acceptance  of  freedom  as  highly  useful,  practi¬ 
cal  and  workable  as  a  hypothesis  in  human  life. 
Upon  consideration  of  all  of  these  efforts  to  es¬ 
tablish  the  will  to  freedom,  we  cannot  honestly 
conclude  that  this  short-cut  in  the  question  of 
liberty  is  valid.  It  seems  rather  an  escape  of 
despair  than  a  real  effort  to  weigh  and  evaluate 
the  difficulty  of  freedom  and  determination.  The 
different  arguments  against  freedom  must  re¬ 
ceive  our  attention,  and  we  must  continue  to 
estimate  them  and  to  correlate  them  with  the 
claim  of  liberty. 

What  does  psychology  teach?  Have  we  fairly 
considered  all  the  evidence  when  we  dealt  with 
the  immediate  data  of  deliberation,  choice,  judg¬ 
ment,  remorse,  etc.?  There  are  other  facts  whose 
import  deserves  mention.  Whenever  we  come 
to  any  action  motives  have  brought  about  the 
specific  action.  Sometimes  a  motive  moves 
along  a  direct,  straight  course,  and  prevails 
without  any  apparent  conflict.  But  mostly 
motives  are  complex,  and  in  their  movement 
there  is  conflict  in  which  the  strongest  will  win. 
Does  this  not  demonstrate  that  our  choices  and 
deliberations  are  caused  by  motives  and  are  not 
as  free  as  they  seem?  Surely  our  mental  life  is 
not  disconnected  and  our  decisions  do  not  jump 
up  out  of  our  mind  like  a  jumping- jack  out  of 


FREE  WILL 


33 


his  box.  But  are  motives  forces  in  ns  that 
control  ns  without  our  knowledge  and  power 
over  them?  We  must  be  careful  not  to  make  of 
motives  fictitious  energies  instead  of  freely 
adopted  and  chosen  directions  in  the  course  of 
our  actions.  The  motives  are  our  motives;  we 
chose  them  or  reject  them. 

Another  question  arises  when  we  regard  the 
place  and  power  of  habit.  Habit  arises  for  the 
sake  of  economy  in  our  life.:  But  when  certain 
habits  have  been  formed  they  are  fixed  ways  of 
doing  things.  In  the  face  of  the  many  fixed  and 
determined  actions  through  habit  we  can  not 
claim  that  our  ideas  and  volitions  are  undeter¬ 
mined  and  incalculable  in  their  liberty.  But 
after  we  have  allowed  for  the  fact  of  the  large 
range  of  habits  as  the  foundation  of  our  virtues 
or  vices  which  constitute  our  moral  life,  we  may 
still  inquire  how  did  habits  arise?  Were  they 
inherited  or  are  they  acquired,  and  did  we  con¬ 
trol  their  formation?  Surely  it  is  true  that 
whatever  influence  training  has  had  upon  us, 
we  cannot  escape  responsibility  for  our  habits. 
Some  of  them  were  made  in  the  period  beyond 
early  childhood.  To  the  degree  that  we  were 
active  in  the  making  of  our  habits  we  are 
obliged  to  accept  the  praise  or  blame  attaching 
to  them.  Our  present  habits  may  control  us; 
but  were  we  not  masters  of  the  past  and  respons¬ 
ible  for  it?  It  is  also  true  that  while  habits  are 
exceedingly  powerful  it  is  still  possible  through 
some  great  experience  to  break  up  habits  and  to 
reform  a  whole  life.  Habits  are  not  absolute 
masters,  and  we  are  not  their  slaves  unless  we 
desire  to  be  so. 


34 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


The  continuance  of  certain  motives  and  the 
constancy  of  certain  habits  make  our  character. 
Whatever  we  do  and  all  our  conduct  depends 
on  our  character.  Is  character  so  stable  that  it 
determines  us  to  the  exclusion  of  change  ?  Can 
character  be  claimed  as  making  against  the 
freedom  of  action?  What  we  do  is  certainly  the 
outcome  of  our  character,  but  our  character  was 
made  by  our  past  actions,  decisions  and  ideals, 
for  which  we  are  responsible.  It  is  never  an 
absolutely  static  thing,  but  is  being  affected 
constantly  by  what  we  think  and  do.  As  years 
go  on  character  will  become  increasingly  fixed, 
but  as  long  as  men  make  moral  progress  char¬ 
acter  grows.  Character  not  only  determines 
actions,  but  actions  help  to  make  character. 

A  problem  which  is  often  slighted  is  the  effect 
of  temperament  on  the  life  of  freedom.  In  the 
variety  of  temperaments,  which  consist  of  com¬ 
binations  of  certain  tendencies  that  are  strong 
or  weak,  bright  or  depressing,  joyous  or  gloomy, 
there  exist  certain  guiding  and  determining 
characteristics  of  our  mental  life.  From  these 
we  cannot  escape.  They  influence  our  moods, 
and  we  are  active  or  phlegmatic,  melancholy  or 
sanguine.  But  these  temperamental  conditions 
for  which  we  must  make  allowance  in  judging 
men  are  no  hindrance  to  freedom.  They,  like 
our  instincts,  are  a  certain  kind  of  raw  material 
of  the  mind  which  can  be  used  and  shaped. 
Temperament  cannot  be  destroyed  but  it  can  be 
controlled,  modified,  and  used  in  our  choices 
even  while  it  gives  color  to  them.  What  we 
have  found  true  in  motives,  habits,  character, 
temperament,  is  true  of  instincts  and  all  other 


FREE  WILL 


35 


data  of  our  mind  that  condition  us.  None  of 
them  enslave  us,  and  they  cannot  be  explained 
in  the  interest  of  absolute  determinism.  We 
are  determined  and  conditioned  by  all  that  is 
naturally  a  part  of  our  mind,  but  we  are  never¬ 
theless  in  control  of  our  freedom.  A  careful 
psychology  does  not  destroy  the  sense  and 
feeling  of  our  liberty. 

A  further  problem  has  been  raised  through 
the  development  of  the  measurements  of  intel¬ 
ligence  by  tests.  A  large  number  of  school 
children  were  examined,3  and  it  was  found  that 
the  great  mass  of  children  of  the  common  people 
rated  quite  low.  Only  a  small  group  coming 
from  successful  mercantile  or  professional 
classes  had  a  high  average.  It  was  also  ascer¬ 
tained  that  through  the  newer  immigration  the 
rate  of  intelligence  was  further  depressed.  Does 
not  this  limitation  of  mind  militate  against  the 
claim  of  freedom!  This  difficulty  is  increased 
by  the  results  obtained  during  the  war.  An 
examination  of  1,700,000  men,  both  officers  and 
privates,4  showed  that  the  average  mental  age 
of  Americans  is  about  14,  and  that  45,000,000, 
or  nearly  half  of  the  whole  population,  will 
never  develop  beyond  the  mental  stage  of  a 
normal  12  year  old  child.  Only  13,500,000  will 
be  superior,  and  4,500,000  talented.  What  does 
this  indicate  as  to  personal  and  social  liberty! 
Is  the  whole  claim  of  freedom  invalidated! 
Even  if  we  question  the  wide  applicability  of  all 
the  psychological  tests  and  restrict  them  to  the 

3  Of .  S.  M.  Terman,  The  Intelligence  of  School  Children, 
and  The  Measurement  of  Intelligence. 

4  Yerkes  and  Yoakum,  Army  Mental  Tests. 


36 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


limits  indicated  in  the  questionnaires,  such  as 
quickness  of  response,  general  knowledge,  reac¬ 
tion  to  new  situations,  etc.,  it  remains  true  that 
we  must  limit  very  much  the  responsibility  we 
ascribe  to  people  in  general.  But  does  the 
average  mentality  destroy  liberty?  The  only 
effect  of  this  new  knowledge  is  not  to  expect  the 
intelligent  freedom  of  the  highly  developed 
group  from  the  mass  of  men.  But  the  conscious¬ 
ness  of  freedom  and  its  right  are  not  eliminated, 
and  the  average  mind  is  still  responsible  within 
the  range  of  its  knowledge.  There  must  be  a 
gradation  of  responsibility,  but  no  denial  of  the 
functioning  of  free  decisions  in  accordance  with 
the  different  types  of  mind. 

The  brain  and  free  will.  Psychology  leads  us 
back  to  the  problem  of  physiology.  Is  not  the 
mind  dependent  upon  the  brain  and  the  nervous 
system,  and  since  these  are  subject  to  natural 
laws  of  necessity,  are  we  really  free  as  soon  as 
we  examine  the  physical  basis  of  mind?  The 
old  Greek  atomists,  following  Democritus,  found 
only  mechanical  motion  in  the  brain,  and  re¬ 
duced  mind  to  such  motion.  Modern  materialism 
has  sought  to  solve  the  question  through  the 
chemistry  of  the  brain.  Its  extreme  slogan  was: 
‘  ‘  Without  phosphorus,  no  thought.  ’  ’  The  chem¬ 
ical  claim  is  still  powerful,  and  the  many 
physiological  facts  introduced  into  the  modern 
psychology  admit  the  close  connection  of  the 
brain  with  mind.  It  is  not  only  the  chemical 
actions  and  reactions,  which  are  supposed  to 
furnish  the  scientific  explanation  of  many  men¬ 
tal  phenomena  that  are  important,  but  also  the 
functioning  of  the  brain  producing  certain 


FREE  WILL 


37 


feelings,  emotions,  and  actions,  the  localization 
of  bodily  movements  in  the  brain,  etc.,  count. 
The  theory  of  emotions  advocated  by  Lange  and 
James  makes  the  physiological  action  prior  to 
the  mental.  We  are  told  that  in  reality  we  first 
cry  and  then  we  are  sorry.  Any  antecedent 
mental  movement  is  denied.  The  theory  which 
obtained  for  a  long  time  in  modern  physiological 
study  of  mind  was  that  mind  and  brain  moved 
along  parallel  lines.  Was  this  close  parallelism 
possible  without  endangering  the  mind  at  least 
to  some  extent?  And  when  the  question  of 
causality  arose,  this  query  had  to  be  answered, 
how  can  two  movements  be  so  closely  parallel 
without  dependence,  or  without  reliance  upon 
some  superior  antecedent  existence?  These 
inquiries  did  not  lead  toward  mind  but  mostly 
toward  matter.5  A  newer  group  of  physiological 
students  of  mind,  under  the  leadership  of  Pro¬ 
fessor  Watson,  call  themselves  behaviorists. 
They  reduce  everything  in  the  mind,  even  the 
most  abstruse  thought,  to  action.  The  final 
philosophy  of  action  is  not  favorable  to  the 
independence  of  mind.  The  American  school  of 
neorealistic  philosophers  reduce  sensation  to 
physiological  action,  and  deny  the  mental  worth 
of  consciousness.  Under  the  pressure  of  all  of 
these  hypotheses  the  mind  becomes  naturalized 
to  such  a  degree  that  its  surface  phenomena 
making  for  freedom  are  set  aside  in  favor  of 
the  reign  of  natural  law. 

But  there  are  other  counterbalancing  facts. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  mental  conditions  affect 
the  brain.  The  assumption  has  not  been  proved, 

5  Cf.  Pratt,  Matter  and  Spirit. 


38 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


that  only  brain  conditions  affect  the  mind;  on 
the  contrary  purely  mental  attitudes  have 
material  results.  We  cannot  make  our  brain, 
but  we  certainly  modify  it  through  our  mental 
life,  Our  ideas,  emotions,  volitions  plough  them¬ 
selves  into  the  brain  tissue.6  There  have  come 
forth  in  our  modern  life  different  groups  of 
mental  healers,  who  have  all  produced  sufficient 
results  to  make  the  claim  not  for  any  one  of 
their  separate  platforms,  but  still  for  the  broad 
fact  of  the  curative  effect  of  the  mind  upon  the 
body.  Psycho-analysis  and  psycho-therapy, 
despite  some  vagaries  that  have  crept  in,  cannot 
be  lightly  set  aside.  Of  course  the  extreme 
theories  of  Freud,7  J ung,8  and  Holt9  are  not  the 
whole  truth.  Even  the  aberrations  of  the  mind 
cannot  all  be  classified  according  to  careful 
alienists  under  the  head  of  suppressed  sex- 
thouglits,  sex-feelings  and  sex-desires.  But 
enough  has  been  accomplished  by  the  psychic 
investigators  to  justify  the  claim  of  the  origi¬ 
nating  power  and  influence  of  the  mind.  The 
student  of  the  mind  cannot  afford,  in  addition, 
to  pass  by  the  investigations  of  The  Society 
of  Psychic  Research.  If  much  of  its  material 
be  doubted  there  still  remains  sufficient  to  show 
that  there  is  evidence  for  telepathy  and  tele¬ 
kinesis.  Thought  produces  passive  and  active 
results  at  a  distance.  In  view  of  all  of  these 
considerations  the  mind  cannot  be  reduced  to 
the  physiology  of  the  brain.  It  has  its  own  life 

6  Thomson,  Brain  and  Personality. 

7  Freud,  General  Introduction  to  Psycho-analysis. 

8  Jung,  Libido. 

9Holt,  The  Freudian  Wish. 


FREE  WILL 


39 


closely  connected  as  it  is  with  the  body.  And 
consequently  as  far  as  the  mind  is  sui  generis, 
and  no  after-effect  of  matter,  it  guarantees  all 
the  phenomena  that  indicate  free  will. 

Biological  theory  and  freedom.  The  physio¬ 
logical  problem  was  already  a  biological  ques¬ 
tion.  But  there  is  a  need  not  only  to  grapple 
with  the  immediate  problem  of  brain  and  mind, 
but  there  are  great  ruling  biological  supposi¬ 
tions  that  deeply  affect  the  problem  of  freedom. 
The  two  great  claims  that  bear  upon  liberty 
are  the  claims  of  heredity  and  environment.  In 
any  fairly  full  and  honest  examination  of  our 
real  liberty  we  must  reckon  with  the  questions 
which  both  heredity  and  environment  propose 
to  us. 

The  assertion  that  heredity  is  all — controlling 
is  the  latest  position  in  the  debate,  whether 
heredity  or  surroundings  are  the  controlling 
factor  in  human  life.  The  influence  of  heredity 
has  grown  through  two  causes.  The  first  is  the 
fact,  that  in  connection  with  the  increase  of  the 
acceptance  of  the  neo-Darwinian  theory  of 
Weisman,  viz.,  that  no  acquired  characteristics 
are  handed  on  but  that  only  the  original 
elements  of  the  germ-plasm  affect  life,  the 
investigations  of  the  Austrian  monk  Mendel 
calculating  the  proportion  of  different  strains 
in  heredity10  were  more  and  more  established. 
The  second  cause  is  the  increasing  belief  in  the 
inference  of  eugenics.  Galton  in  1869  endeav¬ 
ored  to  prove  that  success  was  a  family  affair.11 

10  Cf.  For  a  brief  practical  statement,  Mieou,  Basic  Ideas  in 
Religion,  p.  89  ff. 

11  Galton,  Hereditary  Genius. 


40 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


More  and  more  the  good  and  bad  qualities  of 
men  were  supposed  to  be  the  result  of  inherited 
tendencies.  These  were  not  restricted  to  physi¬ 
cal  traits  but  they  were  also  applied  to  mental 
characteristics  and  to  moral  attitudes.12  The 
two  outstanding  examples  which  are  frequently 
cited  are  those  of  the  descendants  of  one  Juke 
and  of  Jonathan  Edwards.  The  Juke  Family, 
descended  from  a  vagabond  bom  in  rural  New 
York  in  1720,  calculated  for  seven  generations, 
showed  that  310  were  professional  paupers,  440 
were  diseased  through  evil  lives,  more  than 
half  of  the  women  were  prostitutes,  130  were 
convicted  criminals,  60  were  thieves,  7  were 
murderers,  etc.  Thus  the  record  continues  one 
of  degeneracy  and  crime.  On  the  other  hand 
Jonathan  Edwards  in  1900  had  1394  descen¬ 
dants.  Of  these  1295  were  college  graduates, 
13  presidents  of  colleges,  65  professors,  and 
many  principals  of  educational  institutions. 
60  were  physicians,  over  100  preachers,  mission¬ 
aries  and  professors  of  theology,  100  were  law¬ 
yers,  30  were  judges,  80  held  public  office,  one 
was  vice-president  of  the  United  States,  some 
were  governors,  others  leaders  in  commerce  and 
industry,  60  authors,  75  officers  in  the  army  and 
navy,  etc.  This  record  is  supposed  to  prove  the 
influence  of  good  heredity.  If  these  contentions 
are  true  and  demonstrate  the  claim  made  for 
them,  then  of  course  our  moral  frame-work  is 
made  for  us  by  our  ancestors,  and  we  cannot 
really  be  said  to  be  free.  Goodness  is  then  the 
result  of  being  well-bom. 

12  For  a  modern  treatise  see  Popenoe  and  Johnson,  Applied 
Eugenics,  Cf.  also  Holmes,  The  Trend  of  the  Race. 


FREE  WILL 


41 


But  there  are  some  facts  that  need  to  be  con¬ 
sidered  before  we  can  draw  such  a  conclusion. 
If  acquired  traits  are  not  inherited,  how  can 
mental  and  moral  characteristics  be  handed 
down?  The  only  escape  is  to  suppose  as 
Haeckel  did  that  mind  is  in  the  germ-plasm. 
But  how  can  this  be  substantiated  by  examina¬ 
tion?  Binet13  does  claim  to  have  found  actions 
in  the  didinium,  a  very  primitive  form  of  life, 
which  seem  to  indicate  deliberation  and  to 
argue  for  a  psychology  of  low  forms.  But  this 
contention  has  not  been  widely  accepted.14  The 
only  deduction  that  can  be  made  from  the  cases 
of  Juke  and  Edwards  is  that  there  is  a  social 
inheritance.  Man,  as  Professor  Conklin  claims, 
has  not  changed  much  physically  for  long  cen¬ 
turies.  His  evolution  has  been  intellectual  and 
moral.  But  has  this  been  the  outgrowth  of 
physical  evolution,  or  the  result  of  certain 
social  surroundings  through  which  the  attain¬ 
ments  of  families  and  groups  are  preserved? 
The  Jukes  became  Jukes  and  the  Edwardses 
Edwardses  through  their  social  atmosphere 
and  their  opportunities  in  life.  It  is  also  to  be 
noted  that  there  is  evidence  to  be  found  in  con¬ 
sidering  the  character  of  twins.  There  are 
two  kinds  of  twins.  The  one  consists  of  those 
who  come  from  different  ova,  and  they  show 
physical  and  mental  variations.  The  other 
kind  come  from  the  division  of  one  ovum  and 
are  physically  very  much  alike,  e.  g.,  in  color 
of  eyes,  shape  of  nose,  color  of  hair,  etc.  But 

13  The  Psychic  Life  of  Micro-Organisms,  p.  11. 

14  Cf.  The  extreme  claims  of  N.  Quevli,  Cell  Intelligence  the 
Cause  of  Evolution. 


42 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


are  they  mentally  and  morally  similar?  Do 
they  show  great  common  traits?  This  fact  has 
by  no  means  been  established.  Furthermore, 
the  whole  claim  of  heredity  must  be  counter¬ 
balanced  by  the  fact  of  variation.  Through 
variation  novelties  occur.  And  in  the  higher 
forms  of  life,  especially  in  man,  the  generaliza¬ 
tions  of  the  hereditarians  are  not  correct  when 
they  omit  the  rise  of  spontaneity.  The  type 
is  not  all  that  there  is,  but  along  side  of  the  type 
is  the  individual.  The  individual  has  peculiar¬ 
ities  that  the  type  cannot  fully  explain.  There 
are  variations  of  spontaneity  which  cannot  be 
classified  under  the  scheme  of  heredity. 

The  other  element  of  environment  dare  not 
be  passed  by.  Lamarck  was  the  advocate  of 
environment;  and  while  he  has  been  displaced 
to  a  great  degree  there  are  still  some  biological 
facts,  that  seem  best  explicable  through  its 
assumption.  When  biology  is  applied  in  the 
study  of  society  the  teachers  of  sociology  claim 
that  surroundings  ought  to  count  at  least  50 
per  cent.  A  few  years  ago  much  ado  was  made 
about  the  power  of  environment  in  the  practi¬ 
cal  study  of  the  condition  of  young  women 
seeking  employment  in  stores.  It  was  shown 
that  their  pay  was  so  small,  that  in  order  to 
meet  the  demands  of  proper  dress  and  living, 
and  without  considering  at  all  any  need  of 
amusement  or  recreation,  they  were  subject  to 
the  seduction  of  selling  their  bodies  to  keep 
alive.  The  temptation  and  its  reality  were 
portrayed  so  vividly  that  it  appeared  as  though 
there  was  no  choice  possible,  but  that  the  con¬ 
ditions  which  were  very  wrong  inevitably  must 


FBEE  WILL 


43 


lead  to  evil.  Is  this  description  of  the  power 
of  environment  accurate  ?  If  so,  then  of  course 
neither  praise  nor  blame  can  be  attached  to 
persons  for  their  actions,  and  freedom  is  a  de¬ 
lusion.  But  the  hereditarians,  strange  to  say, 
refute  the  environmentalists.  The  American 
biologist,  Professor  Woods,15  claims  that  the 
growth  of  the  power  of  choice  in  organisms 
diminishes  the  influence  of  environment.  He 
says:  “This  may  be  the  chief  reason  why 
human  beings,  who  of  all  beings  have  the 
greatest  power  to  choose  the  surroundings  con¬ 
genial  to  their  special  needs  and  natures,  are 
so  little  affected  by  outward  conditions.  The 
occasional  able,  ambitious,  and  determined 
member  of  an  obscure  or  degenerate  family  can 
get  free  from  his  uncongenial  associates.  So 
can  the  weak  or  lazy  or  vicious  (even  if  a  black 
sheep  from  the  finest  fold)  easily  find  his 
natural  haunts.’ ’  This  judgment  opposes  the 
strong  claim  of  the  advocates  of  environment, 
while  at  the  same  time  it  militates  against  the 
extreme  hereditary  hypothesis,  although  Pro¬ 
fessor  Woods  does  not  see  this  implication  of 
his  admission.  The  practical  question  again 
arises,  that  if  we  take  two  children  in  the  same 
home,  under  the  same  influences,  receiving  the 
same  education,  etc.,  do  they  turn  out  the  same? 
Is  it  not  rather  true  that  there  are  great  differ¬ 
ences  due  to  their  choices?  Consequently  the 
total  result  in  considering  the  claims  of  both 
heredity  and  environment  does  not  destroy  the 
actuality  of  choice  and  free  decision.  That  we 

15  The  Law  of  Diminishing  Environmental  Influences,  Popu¬ 
lar  Science  Monthly,  April,  1910. 


44 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


are  morally  forced  to  be  what  we  are  cannot  be 
sustained  by  the  proofs  of  the  biologists. 

Sociology  and  freedom.  Are  we  not  condi¬ 
tioned  as  individuals  by  social  forces,  and  is 
not  society  itself  a  product  of  necessary  laws, 
which  destroy  all  claims  of  liberty?  The 
sociologist  has  used  some  of  the  results  of  biol¬ 
ogy,  notably  the  power  of  surroundings,  in  his 
efforts.  He  thus  makes  man  unfree.  But 
there  are  some  direct  sociological  facts  to  be 
considered.  The  investigations  of  social  psy¬ 
chology  with  their  stressing  of  certain  social 
instincts16  tend  to  show  how  the  individual  is 
under  the  compulsion  of  common  instincts  and 
feelings.  Much  is  made  of  the  influence  of  the 
crowd-mind  and  the  mob-feeling,  through 
which  in  any  gathering  or  common  group 
opinions  and  emotions  are  borne  in  upon  men. 
Among  all  influences  the  most  potent  is  imita¬ 
tion17  which  rules  largely  in  human  endeavor 
and  moulds  us  into  certain  common  ways  of 
doing  things  and  controls  our  actions.  But  is 
the  force  of  common  social  mental  traits  so 
strong  as  to  abolish  the  decisions  and  actions  of 
the  separate  mind?  We  may  oppose  the 
common  power  of  feeling  and  thought.  There 
are  always  quite  a  number  of  individuals  who 
go  their  own  way.  It  is  only  by  our  willingness 
that  we  can  be  carried  along  in  the  common 
stream.  If  we  oppose  and  resist,  the  strongest 
social  forces  of  mind  can  have  no  power  over 
us.  Through  our  own  agreement  or  compla¬ 
cence  alone  can  we  be  absorbed  into  the  ruling 

Cf.  McDougal,  Social  Psychology. 

17  Cf.  Tarde,  Imitation. 


FREE  WILL 


45 


trend  of  feeling  and  opinion.  The  contagion 
of  common  ideas  and  emotions  does  not  destroy 
our  individual  liberty  of  choice  and  judgment. 

When  sociology  becomes  more  and  more 
accurate  it  employs  the  science  of  statistics. 
But  what  do  we  learn  from  a  study  of  social 
statistics?  After  the  data  have  been  collected 
we  find  that  there  is  a  certain  regularity  in 
actions  that  seem  purely  individual.  There  is 
a  steady  number  of  suicides,  a  definite  average 
of  births,  an  average  proportion  of  marriages, 
etc.  The  fact  that  actions  like  these,  and  even 
distinctly  moral  attitudes,  can  be  summarized 
into  figures  seems  to  indicate  that  there  are 
underlying  influences  which  shape  men.  But 
when  the  full  value  of  statistics  is  admitted,  it 
only  demonstrates  a  certain  regularity  of 
actions.  Does  this  regularity  of  ordered  lives, 
or  the  calculable  expectedness  of  crime,  suicide, 
and  similar  facts,  bring  such  pressure  to  bear 
upon  the  consideration  of  freedom  as  to  negate 
it?  Men  still  feel  their  responsibility  and 
accept  it.  The  great  students  of  criminology 
on  the  one  hand  argue  that  influences  and  en¬ 
vironment  and  heredity  make  criminals.  But 
on  the  other  hand  the  new  practice  of  prison 
reform,  probation  and  parole,  rest  upon  the 
assumption  of  the  possibility  of  change  in  the 
prisoner  by  appealing  to  his  own  power  of  will 
and  decision.  This  is  characteristic  of  other 
cases.  Whatever  our  theory  may  be,  in  the 
actualities  of  life  we  act  upon  the  presumption 
of  liberty  and  choice. 

In  addition  to  the  biological  conceptions  used 
by  sociology  it  has  also  employed  at  times  a 


46 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


philosophy  of  society  which  makes  the  indivi¬ 
dual  a  mere  number  in  the  group.  Our  whole 
life  as  separate  beings  is  virtually  denied,  and 
we  are  made  the  creatures  of  the  family,  the 
place  where  we  dwell,  the  country  that  is  ours, 
the  religion  we  profess,  etc.  Are  we  such 
socially  conditioned  men  that  our  individuality 
is  no  real  fact?  The  saner  philosophy  of 
society  does  not  destroy  the  individual  life.  It 
allows  the  balance  of  individual  choice  and 
common  social  direction.18  If  we  follow  this 
conception  of  balance  we  cannot  assume  that 
society  itself  is  the  outcome  of  natural  forces. 
The  power  and  urge  of  food,  shelter,  sex,  will 
not  be  the  only  influences  that  are  considered. 
There  will  be  a  recognition  of  great  ideas  and 
ideals  that  are  accepted  by  men.  Great 
passions  will  arise  kindled  by  eminent  leaders. 
Men  in  their  common  life  will  think  together 
and  choose  together  without  admitting  that 
they  are  the  mere  playthings  of  unconscious 
forces.  Shall  the  subhuman  energies  count, 
and  the  natural  forces  be  weighed,  as  against 
the  consciousness  of  men  as  to  their  liberty  of 
action?  In  this  apparent  conflict  of  evidence 
the  mind  which  has  discovered  the  laws  of 
nature  ought  not  to  be  discounted,  and  its  own 
right  denied,  while  what  it  has  established 
remains  firm.  Modern  science  with  its  rule  has 
created  an  unjustifiable  prejudice  against  the 
data  of  the  mind.  It  wants  to  rule  the  uni¬ 
verse  from  its  restricted  area  of  facts  and  laws. 

Causality  and  freedom.  All  the  different 

is  Baldwin,  The  Individual  and  Society. 


FREE  WILL 


47 


objections  to  freedom  find  their  focus  in  the 
metaphysical  problem  of  causality.  Can  there 
be  liberty  in  a  universe  which  is  controlled  by 
the  reign  and  power  of  cause?  From  the 
lowest  particle  of  matter  upward  there  seems 
to  be  a  continuous  chain  of  cause  and  effect. 
So  much  has  already  been  included,  by  the 
research  of  science,  in  the  successive  phenom¬ 
ena  that  touch  each  other  causally,  that 
the  unexplained  portion  of  existence  would 
appear  logically  to  fall  in  most  readily  with 
the  hypothesis  of  the  universal  and  unex¬ 
ceptional  control  of  natural  causality.  This 
philosophic  position  has  a  great  unity  and 
grows  upon  us  as  facts  accumulate.  We  do 
not  seem  to  be  able  to  really  think  a  universe 
without  causality.  When  this  view  of  things 
enters  human  life  it  necessarily  leads  to  a 
strong  fatalism.  In  modern  drama  Ibsen  in 
The  Wild  Duck  has  applied  the  power  of 
causality  working  up  through  life  to  a  family 
situation,  which  completely  controls  every  act 
and  deed,  and  fills  us  with  an  unescapable 
dread  as  we  contemplate  the  utter  human  help¬ 
lessness  over  against  the  tyranny  of  fate.  The 
novels  of  Thomas  Hardy  are  an  exposition  of 
the  causal  enchainment  of  man,  whether  we 
analyze  Tess  of  the  D’Ubervilles  or  Two  in  a 
Tower  or  the  world-drama  of  The  Dynasts. 
Everywhere  life  is  contemplated  as  completely 
conditioned  by  the  power  of  causality  issuing 
into  fate. 

But  is  this  sweeping  assumption  of  the  con¬ 
tinuity  and  control  of  causality,  deriving  its 
interpretation  from  the  energy  observed  in 


48 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


matter,  really  true  to  the  whole  situation? 
When  we  begin  with  the  minute  particles  of 
matter  and  the  ultimate  stressing  of  energy  it  is 
true  that  it  obtains  through  all  phenomena. 
But  does  the  energy  exhibited  in  the  lowest 
forms  of  matter  actually  cause  all  things  as  we 
rise  in  the  scale  from  the  simple  to  the  complex  ? 
When  we  pass  from  physics  and  chemistry  with 
their  laws  to  biology,  do  the  same  laws  of  cause 
explain  biological  facts?  We  find  a  certain 
plus  not  included  in  the  sub-biological  sciences. 
Therefore  we  frame  new  laws  for  biology. 
There  is  a  physics  and  chemistry  of  biology  but 
it  does  not  unfold  the  fact  of  life  and  the 
organism.  The  continuity  of  physical  and 
chemical  laws  within  biology  is  evident,  but 
there  is  an  addition  of  something  novel  that  has 
never  found  an  adequate  explanation  through 
the  pre-biological  facts  and  inferences.  The 
lower  does  not  produce  the  higher  by  a  mere 
continuity  of  the  causal  chain  of  the  lower. 
The  examination  of  the  mind  as  we  go  on  from 
biology  to  psychology  opens  up  another  break 
in  the  causal  continuity.  The  facts  of  life  and 
mind  cause  a  distinct  division  which  does  not 
destroy  the  connection  of  the  causality  of  what 
is  below  them,  but  proves  the  coming  in  of  new 
data  that  interfere  with  any  assumption  of  the 
absolute  reign  of  causal  necessity  and  continu¬ 
ity.  Man  as  a  living  and  rational  being  finds 
that  there  is  a  subsumption  of  the  lower  under 
the  higher.  The  complex  and  more  differen¬ 
tiated  takes  up  into  itself  the  simple  and  more 
homogeneous.  The  world  becomes  man’s  pos¬ 
session.  “That  is  to  say,  he  is  free  by 


FREE  WILL 


49 


the  help  of  his  world,  and  in  virtue  of  the 
rational  activities  which  he  performs;  even 
though  nature  also  performs  them  in  and 
through  him.  For  the  world  becomes  an 
object  of  his  experience  and  the  content  of 
his  self,  as  he  interprets  its  meaning  and  deter¬ 
mines  its  value  and  use.  And  it  is  this  rational 
recoil  upon  the  world  which  makes  it  his  object, 
and  constitutes  the  individual  freedom.  What 
was  outer  becomes  inner.  ”  19  It  is  this  process 
of  the  rational  and  free  permeation  of  the  world 
by  man’s  thought  and  action  which  is  the 
highest  disproof  of  a  blind  and  absolute  caus¬ 
ality.  Man  is  the  interpreter  of  nature  and  its 
causality  and  feels  and  knows  himself  in  his 
immediate  consciousness  as  free. 

The  difficulty  of  religion.  There  is  a  prob¬ 
lem,  which  is  not  met  by  the  general  consider¬ 
ation  of  the  dependence  of  ethics  upon  religion. 
Wherever  there  is  belief  in  supernatural  power 
there  is  some  dependence  of  man  upon  it.  To 
the  degree  then  that  man  is  so  dependent  he  is 
not  free.  But  man  as  an  individual  can  accept 
or  reject  such  dependence.  No  religion  is  com¬ 
pulsory  in  itself.  The  only  compulsion  has 
arisen  through  human  custom  or  law.  But 
there  has  been  a  real  limitation  through  religion 
wherever  men  have  been  under  the  conviction 
of  the  power  of  fate.  Back  of  all  of  the  Greek 
gods  there  was  a  tremendous  force  in  the  belief 
in  fate.  In  Brahmanism  there  is  a  unifying 
pantheism  that  virtually  destroys  individual 
initiative,  makes  man  largely  meditative,  and 


is  Sir  Henry  Jones,  A  Faith  That  Enquires,  p.  225. 


50 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


causes  stagnation  in  society,  which  is  static 
through  the  idea  that  all  life  tends  toward  the 
Absolute  and  in  its  present  form  is  the  delusive 
shadow  of  the  eternal  reality  of  rest  that  deter¬ 
mines  us.  Nevertheless  there  are  practical 
moral  rules  and  freedom  is  still  lived  even  if  it 
is  not  believed.  Buddhism  with  its  doctrine  of 
Karma,  or  reincarnation  of  men  through  their 
deeds,  has  a  moral  fatalism  of  acts,  even  though 
it  denies  the  continuance  of  the  soul.  But  with 
this  fatalism  it  combines  a  moral  theory  of  the 
suppression  of  desire  and  inculcates  mercy  and 
kindness.  The  Kismet  of  Mohammedanism 
with  its  strong  accent  upon  predestination  of 
human  life  still  enjoins  mercy  and  calls  upon 
the  decision  of  men.  The  belief  in  fate  in 
religion  is  therefore  not  practically  destruc¬ 
tive  of  the  exercise  of  freedom  while  it  does 
take  away  the  belief  of  men  in  liberty. 

Christianity  and  free  will.  The  Christian 
faith  raises  four  questions  about  free  will 
through  its  doctrines  of  providence,  sin,  grace, 
and  predestination.  There  have  been  at  all 
times  three  attitudes;  first  the  position  of  those 
who  stressed  determination  to  the  limit  of  fatal¬ 
ism;  second,  the  group  which  in  reaction  almost 
denied  providence  and  predestination  to  save 
free  will;  and  third,  those  who  mediated  be- 
ween  the  two  extremes.  Is  there  a  just  expla¬ 
nation  which  does  not  destroy  liberty  and  still 
maintains  the  value  of  all  Christian  truths'? 

The  doctrine  of  providence,  through  which 
we  assert  that  our  lives  are  in  God’s  hand,  so 
that  all  the  hairs  of  our  head  are  numbered,  and 
the  length  of  our  days  written  down  in  God’s 


FREE  WILL 


51 


book,  seems  to  take  away  our  freedom.  But 
this  is  not  really  so.  It  only  asserts  that  the 
many  things  in  onr  life  which  we  cannot  con¬ 
trol,  such  as  are  under  natural  law  or  appear  to 
be  a  matter  of  accident  or  chance,  are  really 
known  to  God,  and  are  in  the  power  of  His 
fatherly  goodness  which  seeks  onr  liberty 
through  His  provident  care  and  guidance. 

Sin  when  it  is  given  its  full  value,  as  the 
result  not  merely  of  individual  choice  and  act, 
but  also  as  the  inherited  burden  of  mankind, 
certainly  spells  our  bondage.  The  deliverance 
of  grace  accomplished,  if  we  accept  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  Paul,  without  our  co-operation,  makes 
our  goodness  apparently  wholly  the  gift  of  God. 
Thus  whether  we  are  in  sin  or  under  grace  we 
are  not  masters  of  our  spiritual  life.  But  this 
is  not  the  total  meaning  of  these  truths.  The 
slavery  of  sin,  which  is  an  experienceable  fact, 
even  though  its  guilt  is  not  naturally  recog¬ 
nized,  calls  for  freedom.  The  awfulness  of  sin 
is  stressed  so  strongly  in  orthodox  Christianity 
because  only  by  the  recognition  of  the  enslave¬ 
ment  of  men  and  human  society  through  the 
evil  of  sin  is  the  way  to  freedom  possible. 
Grace  is  the  necessary  emancipation,  which  is 
the  act  of  divine  goodness  to  make  us  free.  It 
the  power  to  awaken  in  us  the  desire  for  the 
good  and  to  give  us  the  strength  to  do  it. 
There  is  no  limitation  of  life  but  a  bestowal  of 
the  real  energy  and  effective  motive  to  do  the 
right  in  its  relation  toward  God  as  well  as 
toward  man. 

Predestination  taken  in  its  absolute  form, 
stressed  by  Augustine  and  Calvin,  makes  man 


52 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


a  piece  of  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  divine  potter. 
Man  is  molded  either  into  a  vessel  of  honor  or 


a  vessel  of  dishonor  by  divine  will  which  elects 


or  rejects  him  independently  of  his  responsible 
acts.  But  this  form  has  been  almost  univer¬ 
sally  rejected  through  the  growing  apprecia¬ 
tion  of  God’s  love  for  men.  Predestination 
means  on  its  positive  side,  in  agreement  with 
God’s  universal  will  for  the  salvatic 
that  the  redeeming  goodness  of  God 


the  attitude  of  men  takes  hold  of  their  will. 
The  natural  and  formal  freedom  is  made  a  vital 
freedom  of  the  content  of  the  good.  Thus  God 
through  Christ  predestines  to  the  liberty  of  the 
children  of  God.  The  negative  side  is  the  per¬ 
sistence  of  men  in  the  evil.  God’s  foresight  of 
this  is  not  an  act  of  His  will  to  reject.  Men 
cause  their  own  rejection.  The  divine  will  is 
no  power  to  evil.  Evil  rests  upon  the  choice 
of  men  who  will  not  see  God’s  way  for  their 
deliverance  and  liberty.  Thus  interpreted 
Christianity  makes  for  a  real,  full  freedom  of 
the  good  life  in  its  fulness. 

The  total  result  of  our  study  is  to  vindicate 
not  an  absolute  freedom  of  an  anarchistic,  illog¬ 
ical  sort,  but  an  ordered  liberty  with  limita¬ 
tions  which,  however,  do  not  destroy  it. 


REFERENCES 


James  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  Part  III, 
Chapter  I. 

Jas.  Hyslop,  Elements  of  Ethics,  Chapters  IV,  V. 

Frank  Thilly,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chapter  XI. 

John  S.  Mackenzie,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  I,  Chapter  III. 
Chas.  D’Arcy,  A  Short  Study  of  Ethics,  Part  I,  Chapter  III. 
Theo.  DeLaguna,  Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Ethics, 
Chapter  IV. 


FREE  WILL  53 

Durant  Drake,  Problems  of  Conduct,  Part  IV,  Chapter 
XXVIII. 

Henry  W.  Wright,  Self-Realization,  Part  I,  Chapter  V. 

John  Dewey,  Human  Nature  and  Conduct,  Part  IV,  Section 
III. 

W.  R.  Sorley,  Moral  Values  and  the  Idea  of  God,  Chapter 
XVII. 

Ed.  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral 
Ideas,  Chapters  IX,  XI. 

G.  T.  Ladd,  What  I  Ought  To  Do,  Chapter  V. 

Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chapter  IX. 

W.  Wundt,  Ethics,  Part  III,  Chapter  II,  3. 

Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Book  III. 

Erasmus,  De  Libero  Arbitrio  Diatribe. 

Luther,  De  Servo  Arbitrio. 

Jonathan  Edwards,  Careful  and  Strict  Enquiry  Into  the 
Modern  Prevailing  Notions  Respecting  That  Freedom  of  Will 
Which  is  Supposed  Essential  to  Moral  Agency,  Virtue  and 
Vice,  Rewards  and  Punishment,  Praise  and  Blame. 

H.  H.  Horne,  Free  Will  and  Human  Responsibility. 

Karl  Joel,  Der  Freie  Wille. 

Wm.  James,  The  Will  to  Believe. 

J.  N.  Figgis,  The  Will  to  Freedom. 

Arthur  K.  Rogers,  The  Theory  of  Ethics,  Chapter  V. 


CHAPTER  IV 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FREEDOM 

The  organ  of  freedom.  After  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  the  range  of  free  will  there  arises  the 
question,  how  the  will  comes  to  expression  in 
moral  matters  in  our  whole  mental  life.  The 
answer  that  men  readily  give  is  the  reference 
to  conscience.  Through  it  the  judgments  and 
decisions  are  made.  Choices  of  good  and  bad 
centre  in  it.  Approval  and  disapproval  of 
acts,  praise  or  blame,  penitence  and  remorse 
are  expressed  through  the  conscience.  But  to 
name  the  conscience  only  raises  a  new  problem. 
What  is  the  conscience!  Is  it  a  simple  voice 
in  us  as  the  older  moralists  thought,  or  is  it  a 
complex  experience  which  must  be  analyzed 
according  to  its  component  mental  constituents  ! 
The  latter  question  will  receive  an  affirmative 
answer  as  we  endeavor  to  consider  wliat  the 
conscience  is  and  how  it  functions. 

The  meaning  of  conscience.  There  is  a  his¬ 
tory  in  the  rise  and  use  of  the  term  “con¬ 
science.”  What  are  its  indications,  and  what 
did  men  intend  to  express  through  it!  The 
first  clear  evidence  of  the  word,  conscience,  is 
found  among  the  Greek  Stoics.  They  took  the 
term  “suneidesis,”  which  had  been  used  for 

54 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FREEDOM 


55 


consciousness  in  general,  and  applied  it  specif¬ 
ically  to  our  moral  consciousness  of  ourselves 
and  our  acts.  It  became  the  co-knowledge  of 
the  good  or  bad  within  us.  The  Romans 
similarly  used  “conscientia,”  from  which  we 
derive  our  “  conscience,  ’  ’  and  the  French  their 
word  “conscience.”  The  German  term  “Ge- 
wissen”  means  “Mitwissen”  and  expresses  the 
very  same  idea  as  all  the  other  words  derivative 
from  the  Greek.  From  these  linguistic  facts  it 
appears  that  when  the  idea  of  conscience  was 
set  apart  from  other  ideas  it  began  with  an 
emphasis  upon  the  intellect,  which  modern 
psychological  analysis  will  not  sustain.  A 
further  error  was  implied  in  the  apparent 
assumption  of  a  double  consciousness,  one  given 
to  natural  things,  the  other  to  moral  decisions. 
Thus  the  belief  arose  that  the  conscience  is 
a  definite  unity  within  us,  a  single  voice,  divine 
in  its  content  and  form,  instead  of  a  composite 
of  different  mental  functionings  concerned  with 
the  good  or  bad,  the  right  or  wrong. 

The  judgment  of  acts.  What  is  the  most 
noticeable  fact  about  conscience?  What  out¬ 
standing  feature  is  felt  when  we  speak  of  con¬ 
science?  The  very  first  element  is  the  judg¬ 
ment  of  ourselves,  our  words  and  our  acts. 
Conscience  is  a  judge  within  us,  either  freeing 
us  or  condemning  us  in  our  conduct.  It  is  not 
not  necessary  that  this  judgment  should  come 
after  the  act,  which  happens  when  we  go  ahead 
in  our  thoughts,  words  and  deeds  without 
allowing  any  estimate  to  come  to  us  of  the 
moral  value  of  what  we  are  about  to  think, 
utter  or  do.  But  if  we  pause  before  any  con- 


56 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


duct  there  is  a  premonitory  warning  which 
judges  what  we  intend  to  do  in  its  moral  bear¬ 
ings.  I  may  be  placed  in  a  quandary  in  which 
I  feel  inclined,  in  order  to  avoid  difficulties,  to 
tell  an  untruth.  The  conflict  in  the  situation 
may  not  be  of  my  own  making,  but  the  result 
of  a  condition,  as  when  e.  g.  the  telling  a  sick 
man  the  actual  state  of  his  sickness  may  be 
detrimental,  while  not  doing  so  is  deceit.  It 
is  then  that  some  judgment  is  made  within  us 
either  for  truth  or  for  concealment.  But  most 
judgments  are  clear.  I  may  be  tempted  to  take 
an  undue  profit  in  a  sale  or  to  misrepresent 
what  I  want  to  sell.  If  conscience  functions, 
and  I  allow  it  to  speak  it  will  mark  my  inten¬ 
tion  as  wrong.  In  the  same  manner  I  see  some 
person  in  imminent  danger  in  the  water.  I 
come  to  the  rescue  at  once,  and  in  the  doing  of 
the  act  or  just  after  it  I  hear  the  approval: 
4 ‘This  was  a  noble  deed.”  Thus  judgments  of 
our  conduct  are  always  going  on.  It  may 
happen  that  we  suppress  the  utterance  of  these 
judgments,  but  sooner  or  later  they  will  press 
in  upon  our  consciousness.  The  judgments  are 
strong  and  have  a  call  to  action.  The  approv¬ 
ing  decisions  invite  obedience,  the  disapprov¬ 
ing  judgments  inhibit  action.  But  we  are 
never  forced  to  follow  the  judgment  of  our  con¬ 
science.  We  can  accept  or  reject  its  rulings. 
When  conscience  is  powerful  in  us  it  comes 
with  a  compelling  appeal  but  never  with  a  com¬ 
pulsory  force.  The  submission  to  conscience 
or  the  suppression  of  its  judgment  indicates 
the  nature  of  our  conscience.  If  we  constantly 
disregard  its  promptings  and  pass  by  its  deci- 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FREEDOM 


57 


sions  we  have  a  tough  or  hardened  conscience. 
The  increase  of  this  attitude  finally  silences 
conscience  for  a  long  time  or  completely  atro¬ 
phies  it.  If  we  readily  obey  the  judgments  we 
have  a  ready  or  tender  conscience.  This  is  the 
normal,  sound  position,  and  makes  for  the 
liberty  in  the  good.  Sometimes  a  tender  con¬ 
science  may  go  beyond  the  proper  balance,  and 
become  super-sensitive  and  critical  about  our 
own  acts  or  those  of  others.  We  not  only  judge 
ourselves,  but  also  others  either  rightly  cr 
wrongly.  When  this  judgment  is  extreme,  or 
fails  to  weigh  situations  justly  and  sympathet¬ 
ically,  it  creates  a  quibbling  and  contentious 
conscience  that  loses  itself  in  details  and  minu¬ 
tiae,  and  fails  even  when  there  is  justice  in  the 
judgments.  The  judgment  in  order  to  be  true 
and  cultivated  must  be  broad,  fair,  equitable, 
and  apply  equal  decisions  to  others  and  to 
ourselves. 

The  law  back  of  the  judgment.  When  con¬ 
science  pronounces  a  judgment  the  question 
rises,  on  what  basis  is  the  judgment  given! 
Before  or  after  an  act  of  ourselves  or  others 
we  say  either:  “This  is  right,’ ’  or  “This  is 
wrong.  ’  ’  Why  can  we  make  such  a  statement  ? 
Is  there  a  standard  or  law  back  of  the  judgment 
which  gives  us  the  right  to  make  the  judg¬ 
ment?  We  accept  certain  great  principles  as 
controlling  our  judgments  of  attitudes  and  acts. 
The  earliest  formulator  of  scientific  ethics, 
Aristotle,  recognized  this  law  although  he  had 
no  definite  conception  of  conscience  nor  gave 
it  a  name.  Resting  upon  his  logic  Aristotle 


58 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


called  attention  to  the  practical  syllogism.1  In 
this  syllogism  the  judgment  is  either  the  con¬ 
clusion  or  the  minor  premise.  When  I  say: 

‘ 4  This  act  is  just  ’  ’  I  am  drawing  the  conclusion 
in  a  syllogism  even  if  I  do  not  clearly  formulate 
the  major  and  minor  premise.  I  may  use  a 
minor  premise  and  say  to  myself :  4  ‘  This  deceit 
of  mine  is  a  lie.”  The  implied  conclusion  is, 
therefore  it  is  wrong.  But  its  foundation  is  a 
major  premise  which  says,  when  definitely 
formulated:  “ Lying  is  wrong.”  When  the 
judgment  is  a  minor  premise  a  major  is  neces¬ 
sary,  and  a  conclusion  follows.  The  syllogism 
is  rarely  put  into  its  complete  form.  But  the 
necessary  implication  is  that  there  is  always  a 
major  premise  on  which  the  judgment  rests. 
This  major  premise  is  one  of  the  laws  of  con¬ 
science.  Thus  we  find  in  our  mental  life  that 
there  are  certain  standards  and  laws,  which 
we  have  accepted,  and  upon  which  our  judg¬ 
ments  of  the  moral  value  of  conduct  rest. 

The  origin  of  the  law.  The  existence  of  cer¬ 
tain  standards  and  laws  in  our  conscience  that 
may  be  traced  to  definite  principles  opens  up 
the  problem  whence  are  these  laws,  and  how 
are  they  derived?  When  we  examine  the  con¬ 
tent  of  the  moral  laws  that  controls  us  we  find 
that  it  is  derived  from  what  has  been  taught 
us.  We  grow  up  in  a  certain  family  with  its 
moral  conceptions  and  practices.  Then  we  are 
influenced  by  the  type  of  religion  we  have  and 
its  ethical  principles.  The  ruling  practices  of 
an  age  with  its  moral  trend  have  a  bearing 

1  Cf.  Sir  A.  Grant,  The  Ethics  of  Aristoitle,  Vol.  I,  Essay 
IV,  p.  263  ff. 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FREEDOM  59 


upon  us.  Thus  the  condition  of  the  morals  and 
the  ethical  attitude  of  the  society  in  which  we 
grow  up  first  begin  to  shape  us.  When  how¬ 
ever  we  come  to  our  days  of  discretion  we  will 
make  individual  choices  and  decisions  either 
affirming  or  denying  what  we  have  received  no 
matter  how  powerful  early  training  and  sur¬ 
roundings  are. 

But  the  problem  of  tracing  the  content  of 
conscience  to  its  sources  is  not  the  whole  ques¬ 
tion.  Why  do  the  moral  ideas  and  practices 
have  the  power  of  an  inner  law?  It  is  this 
formal  problem  of  conscience  which  lies  at  the 
root  of  the  origin  of  conscience.  A  very  com¬ 
mon  conception  of  today  is  that  conscience  is 
the  voice  of  society  in  man.  The  conscience 
is  supposed  to  be  the  rule  of  the  social  power 
in  the  individual,  controlling  him  in  the  inter¬ 
est  of  the  common  life,  and  saying  to  him:  “In 
the  name  of  society  I  bid  you  do  this.”  The 
moral  laws  certainly  have  large  social  relations, 
and  make  the  common  life  possible.  But  are 
we  conscious  of  this  pressure  of  society  as  in¬ 
herent  in  us?  Do  men  accept  the  right  as  the 
demand  of  society?  Is  this  its  binding 
strength?  Men  have  again  and  again  revolted 
against  the  moral  positions  of  their  age  and 
the  society  of  their  times  without  rejecting  the 
conscience.  In  fact  great  moral  leaders  have 
frequently  claimed  the  right  of  their  own  con¬ 
science,  and  have  demanded  their  ethical  free¬ 
dom  in  the  choice  of  right  and  wrong.  The 
stories  of  Confucius  and  of  Socrates  show  us 
how  men  are  not  the  mere  focus  of  their  age, 
but  through  individual  insight  into  moral  truth 


60 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


rise  above  those  about  them,  and  feel  an  urge 
which  does  not  exhibit  itself  as  social.  Fre¬ 
quently  the  laws  of  conscience  develop  in  the 
conflict  of  our  thoughts  and  emotions.  Marti- 
neau  supposed2  that  it  was  out  of  the  inner  con¬ 
flict  of  thoughts  excusing  or  accusing  each 
other  that  conscience  arose.  He  confused  St. 
PauPs  description  of  the  functioning  of  con¬ 
science3  with  its  origin.  There  are  no  psycho¬ 
logical  or  social  indications  sufficiently  definite 
to  permit  us  in  making  a  fairly  adequate  con¬ 
jecture  as  to  the  origin  of  conscience.4  We  know 
its  uses  but  somehow  its  beginnings  are  hidden. 
It  comes  to  us  with  a  certain  mystery  about 
which  religion  makes  its  assertions,  tracing  the 
moral  laws  in  their  appeal  and  power  to  a  gift 
of  God.  Ethics  does  not  seem  capable  of  solving 
this  question  with  its  resources.  It  only  knows 
of  the  impelling  power  of  the  laws  of  right, 
which  we  often  desire  to  get  rid  of  but  cannot. 
Nevertheless  we  have  the  liberty  to  overrule 
all  the  promptings  of  the  laws  of  conscience  by 
our  desires  and  actions.  We  know  and  feel  the 
force  of  the  laws  accepted  as  right,  but  we  can 
freely  disobey  them  and  subject  ourselves  to 
the  consequences  of  the  violation  of  the  moral 
order. 

The  intellectual  elements  of  conscience.  When 
conscience  began  to  be  studied  separately  the 
emphasis  was  put  strongly  on  the  intellect  in 


2  Of .  Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  Vol.  II,  p.  53,  54, 
401,  402. 

3  Romans  II:  14,  15. 

4  Rogers,  Theory  of  Ethics,  Chapter  III,  is  another  effort 
that  fails. 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FREEDOM 


61 


conscience.  But  modern  psychological  in¬ 
vestigation  has  led  students  to  stress  the  emo¬ 
tional  power.  Which  of  these  two  attitudes  is 
more  correct?  The  reply  will  appear  as  we 
attempt  to  analyse  the  parts  which  intellect  and 
emotion  play  in  conscience.  Whenever  we  pass 
a  moral  judgment  of  any  sort  it  certainly  con¬ 
tains  an  attitude  that  either  demands  thought 
or  has  thought  back  of  it.  It  is  impossible  to 
make  a  valuation  of  a  moral  act  without  some 
analytical  knowledge.  If  we  desired  to  pass 
judgment  on  a  war,  and  say:  “This  war  is 
wrong,  ’  ’  we  could  not  do  so  except  certain  facts 
were  known,  considered  and  estimated  by  us  in 
reference  to  the  war  we  wanted  to  adjudge. 
The  moral  principles  also  contain  general  state¬ 
ments,  which  are  either  first  assumptions  in 
conduct  or  generalized  abstractions  from  the 
concrete  conditions  of  life.  No  intellectually 
uncertain  or  colorless  ideas  can  form  the  basis 
of  the  maxims  and  laws  of  our  character  and 
conduct.  If  I  claim  “Justice  is  fundamental 
in  social  morality,  ”  I  am  making  a  statement 
which  has  a  meaning  in  every  single  part  of  it. 
There  are  large  and  strong  intellectual  elements 
in  it,  and  it  is  rich  in  a  far-reaching  conception. 
The  whole  functioning  of  conscience  would  be 
blind  and  impulsive  were  it  not  for  the  rational 
content.  It  is  just  this  rational  content  which 
gives  soundness  and  stability  to  conscience  and 
leads  us  as  rational  beings  to  accept  its  authority. 

As  far  as  the  material  of  our  moral  laws  con¬ 
trolling  us  comes  from  society  it  has  a  tradition¬ 
al  aspect.  But  will  the  moral  customs  of  society 
last  if  they  do  not  rest  on  an  inherent  rationality 


62 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


which  justifies  their  currency  and  permanence? 
Sometimes  reasonableness  is  sustained  by  the 
impossibility  of  the  opposite.  Hobhouse5  well 
says:  “Reason  comes  by  her  own,  not  because 
men  willingly  and  consciously  accept  her,  but 
because  unreason  carried  far  enough  produces 
misery  and  disaster.  Sufficiently  grave  depar¬ 
tures,  whether  to  the  right  hand  or  to  the  left, 
either  produce  reaction  or  lead  to  social  dis¬ 
solution.  Against  dissolute  practice,  society 
will  perhaps  erect  a  barrier  of  a  stringent 
theory,  and  save  itself  in  turn  from  the  con¬ 
sequences  of  the  theory  by  a  network  of  tacit 
understanding  forming  a  secondary  and  more 
genuine  code  of  conduct  beside  or  behind  that 
which  men  outwardly  profess.  The  price  of 
luxury  is  disorder,  the  price  of  undue  strictness 
is  insincerity,  and  both  prices  will  be  paid  until 
men  seek  to  found  conduct  on  the  dispassionate 
consideration  of  what  is  permanently  in  accord 
with  the  requirements  of  human  nature  under 
the  conditions  of  social  life.”  The  conditions 
of  social  life  fit  into  a  moral  order  which  is 
being  realized,  and  beneath  which  there  is  a 
purpose.  The  moral  development,  as  well  as 
the  development  of  nature,  when  regarded  in 
its  totality  leads  to  the  assumption  of  an  inher¬ 
ent  purpose.  For  this  cause  the  laws  of  moral 
life  in  their  individual  and  common  application, 
and  the  judgment  of  conscience,  rest  upon 
reason  which  is  practically  effective  because  it 
is  theoretically  correct. 

What  is  the  power  of  emotion?  After  we  have 


5  The  Rational  Good,  p.  168. 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FREEDOM 


63 


given  full  place  to  the  intellect,  have  we  really 
touched  the  impulsive  and  propelling  power  of 
conscience  ?  If  we  examine  a  moral  law  it  does 
not  come  to  us  merely  in  the  cold  and  dispas¬ 
sionate  form  of  an  intellectual  theorem.  There 
is  about  it  a  warmth  and  propulsion  of  feeling 
and  emotion.  This  distinguishes  a  moral  prin¬ 
ciple  in  action  from  the  mere  consideration  of  it 
apart  from  its  functioning.  We  may  discuss  an 
ethical  question  in  an  unconcerned  and  unap¬ 
plied  manner  as  we  discuss  any  problem.  But 
as  soon  as  the  moral  law  bears  upon  the  immedi¬ 
ate  conduct  it  is  accompanied  by  a  strong  inrush 
of  emotion.  When  we  consider  the  moral 
appraisement  in  judging  of  character  and  con¬ 
duct  in  its  practical  working  we  find  an  even 
stronger  emotional  tone  than  in  the  law.  The 
judgment  of  the  conscience  is  not  delivered 
like  the  usual  sentence  of  a  judge  as  the  exposi¬ 
tion  of  the  law  involved.  But  the  condemnation 
or  acquittal  comes  with  solemnity  and  power. 
It  produces  either  depression  of  feeling  or 
heightening  of  it.  We  may  suppress  the  full 
force  of  the  emotional  urge  but  it  is  present  and 
sometimes  carries  us  whither  we  did  not  expect 
to  be  carried.  A  deed  that  has  been  done  often 
leaves  behind  it  an  effect  of  emotion  that  must 
spend  itself  no  matter  how  long  it  takes.  The 
student  Raskolnikoff,  who  is  the  leading  charac¬ 
ter  in  Dostoievsky’s  ‘ 1  Crime  and  Punishment,” 
shows  how  impossible  it  is  for  him  finally  not  to 
betray  himself  and  to  reveal  the  deed  which  he 
tries  to  hide.  It  is  the  constant  emotional 
pressure  that  makes  him  restless  and  does  not 
allow  him  to  bury  sin  in  forgetfulness.  This 


64 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


power  of  emotion  like  a  mighty  stream  fre¬ 
quently  overflows  the  whole  life.  The  great 
classic  analysis  of  it  in  the  drama  is  found  in 
Macbeth,  when  both  Macbeth  and  Lady  Mac¬ 
beth  are  overwhelmed  by  the  horror  and 
inescapability  of  the  murder  they  have  com¬ 
mitted.  The  undercurrent  of  their  minds  is 
mighty  emotion.  This  emotion  has  various 
degrees  according  to  the  culpability  which  is 
felt  to  be  in  an  act.  A  minor  transgression  is 
followed  by  sorrow  or  regret.  Either  of  these 
may  be  short-lived  or  continue  for  some  time 
according  to  the  emotional  strength  that  pro¬ 
duces  the  reaction  in  us  after  the  judgment  of 
conscience.  When  an  attitude  or  action  leads 
to  a  more  severe  condemnation  it  is  succeeded 
by  remorse.  Remorse  has  tremendous  tone  of 
feeling,  and  is  often  not  overcome  very  readily. 
A  change  may  be  effected  if  after  the  experience 
of  sorrow,  or  regret,  or  remorse,  we  turn  about 
in  the  direction  of  the  freedom  of  the  good. 
This  mental  reversal  is  repentance.  It  is  the 
acceptance  of  the  full  condemnation  with  its 
emotional  burden,  the  resolution  to  reject  the 
condemned  act  and  attitude,  and  in  future  to 
choose  the  opposite  and  seek  the  good.  The  act 
approved  of  is  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of 
either  satisfaction,  or  joy,  or  peace.  It  may  also 
contain  an  impetus  to  continue  in  the  good 
through  the  current  of  the  encouraging  emotion. 
But  no  matter  how  strong  the  emotional  trend 
may  be  we  can  brace  ourselves  against  it.  It  is 
powerful  but  it  does  not  control  us  finally  with¬ 
out  our  volition.  Even  the  temporary  outburst 
of  its  strength  can  be  overcome,  and  if  it  pre- 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FREEDOM 


65 


vails  it  is  only  as  we  allow  it  to  do  so  in  the 
conflict  which  ensues  between  it  and  our  set 
desire  and  will. 

The  conscience  and  volition.  It  is  self-evident 
that  the  knowledge  and  emotion  pertaining  to 
right  and  wrong  lead  to  action  or  inhibit  it. 
But  are  there  any  further  contacts?  In  the 
study  of  volition  desire  plays  an  important  part. 
It  is  the  longing  which  seeks  to  satisfy  a  want. 
This  longing  often  emerges  into  a  motive,  and 
the  motive  brings  about  the  action.  The  motiv¬ 
ation  to  action  arising  in  desire  can  enter  into 
conscience  when  our  desires  adopt  the  moral 
laws  as  a  want  to  be  realized.  If,  e.  g.,  we  take 
the  saying  “honesty  is  the  best  policy,”  and 
change  it  from  the  diplomatic  form  into  the 
moral  law,  and  say:  “honesty  is  right,”  we  may 
make  honest  words  and  actions  our  desire.  Then 
we  begin  to  incorporate  the  moral  law  into  our 
motives.  The  promptings  and  appeals  of  con¬ 
science  become  connected  inwardly  with  the 
functioning  of  our  volition.  It  is  this  end 
toward  which  conscience  is  striving  so  that 
there  may  be  a  joyous  approval  of  judgment. 
The  inner  identification  with  the  moral  law 
makes  us  free  to  the  degree  that  the  right 
becomes  our  desire.  On  the  contrary  the  liberty 
of  a  good  life  is  hindered  as  far  as  our  desires 
remain  unmoralized.  If,  e.g.,  I  give  way  to  the 
impulses  that  crowd  in  upon  me,  especially  in 
the  first  days  of  adolescence,  and  listen  to  the 
pressure  of  sex  without  controlling  it,  it  im¬ 
plants  itself  in  my  desire.  Unless  a  contest 
takes  place  to  dislodge  the  mere  natural  instinct 
froip.  the  conscious  desire  the  impulse  will  con- 


66 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


quer.  Conscience  with  its  law  of  restraint  of  sex 
and  its  call  to  parity  will  speak  in  vain.  My 
action  will  follow  the  motive  controlled  by  the 
desire  that  is  amoral  and  becomes  immoral  with 
the  continual  rejection  of  the  appeal  of  the 
moral  law.  We  must  implant  the  moral  prin¬ 
ciples  into  the  course  of  mental  phenomena  that 
lead  to  action. 

Is  there  a  social  conscience?  The  conscience 
has  always  been  accepted  as  acting  in  and 
through  the  individual  mind.  But  in  the  last 
decades  the  assertion  has  been  made  again  and 
again,  that  there  is  and  ought  to  he  a  social 
conscience.  What  is  really  meant  by  a  social 
conscience?  It  is  frequently  forgotten  that  the 
individual  ought  to  have  a  social  conscience. 
By  this  term  we  mean,  not  that  we  ought  to 
consider  our  actions  of  right  or  wrong  as  they 
affect  other  individuals,  but  as  they  bear  upon 
social  groups  and  society  at  large.  Those  who 
are  leaders  in  the  state,  the  church,  in  politics, 
in  industry,  in  commerce,  etc.  by  their  very 
position  must  decide  moral  issues  representa¬ 
tively,  and  they  can  do  this  rightly  only  if  they 
acquire  a  moral  sense  and  judgment  that  has 
the  social  outlook.  But  in  addition  to  the 
leaders  every  one  in  society  has  a  social  influ¬ 
ence,  and  must  accept  social  obligations.  It  is 
being  realized  in  business  today  that  strictly 
speaking  there  is  no  private  transaction.  Every 
article  sold,  and  the  price  charged  for  what  is 
purchased,  have  a  connection  with  the  whole 
conduct  of  business  and  the  whole  scale  of 
prices  as  they  affect  society.  There  must  be 
an  awakening  among  all  people  to  understand 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FREEDOM 


67 


liow  their  actions  touch  the  life  of  society. 
Among  some  people  there  is  the  idea  that  liberty 
is  mere  individual  choice.  For  this  reason  they 
resent,  e.g.,  quarantine  that  is  put  upon  their 
homes  when  there  are  cases  of  contagious  dis¬ 
ease.  They  do  not  realize  the  interconnection 
of  men  in  society,  and  the  fact  that  there  must 
be  common  liberty,  and  consequently  that  there 
must  be  common  rights.  The  usual  conscience 
has  not  been  developed  to  function  socially. 

The  other  meaning  of  the  social  conscience  is 
the  common  attitude  of  society  on  moral  issues. 
Of  course  we  must  not  suppose  that  there  is 
some  unitary  super-mind  and  super-conscience 
in  society.  We  dare  not  create  social  fictions 
that  are  unreal.  But  it  is  a  fact,  that  through 
the  ideals  of  leaders,  through  common  organs  of 
public  opinion,  there  is  found  and  expressed 
what  is  in  the  minds  of  the  many.  There  is  a 
congruence  of  certain  moral  laws  and  judgments 
in  the  common  and  public  outlook.  Through 
the  merging  of  the  attitude  of  many,  and 
through  the  testing  of  the  average  conscience, 
we  arrive  at  a  common  conscience  which  judges 
social  matters.  Society  will  be  sound  as  far  as 
more  and  more  of  its  ideas  and  actions  are 
controlled,  not  by  political,  or  economic  con¬ 
siderations,  but  are  adjudged  by  a  living 
and  developing  social  conscience  with  high 
standards. 

The  authority  of  conscience.  A  very  impor¬ 
tant  element  in  the  analysis  of  conscience  is  the 
problem  of  its  authority.  Its  moral  law  comes 
to  us  and  impresses  us  with  a  feeling  that  it  is 
authoritative.  We  may  accept  or  reject  the 


68 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


rulings  of  the  authoritative  call  of  conscience, 
but  we  cannot  deny  the  claim  of  authority.  The 
authority  of  conscience  is  reasonable  and  not 
arbitrarily  compulsory.  Through  it  we  are  not 
to  be  enslaved  and  made  permanently  depen¬ 
dent,  but  it  is  the  way  to  real  liberty  of  the  good. 
Its  imperative  is  invitation  and  appeal,  even 
if  its  pronouncement  is  direct,  definite  and 
unbending.  We  may  overhear  the  call  of 
authority  but  it  will  reassert  itself. 

Connected  with  the  authority  of  conscience 
is  the  problem  of  its  infallibility.  It  cannot  be 
denied  that  we  can  do  nought  else  than  follow 
our  conscience  when  it  approves  of  an  ideal  and 
attitude.  But  this  does  not  imply  that  the  con¬ 
science  is  unerring.  It  may  not  be  faulty  in 
following  such  knowledge  as  it  has,  but  its 
knowledge  may  be  wrong.  The  conscience  of 
the  early  New  England  people  was  correct 
according  to  their  conviction  of  right  when  they 
burned  witches,  but  we  know  now  that  their 
conception  of  right  in  this  respect  and  their 
belief  in  witches  was  wrong.  When  Calvin  ap¬ 
proved  of  the  burning  of  Servetus,  he  thought 
that  his  approval  was  a  high  and  just  moral  act. 
Today  we  know  that  his  standard  was  wrong. 
Thus  conscience  is  never  infallible  in  its  content. 
One  age  condemns  the  position  of  an  age  that  is 
gone.  Different  people,  especially  those  of  the 
low  tribes,  have  consciences  that  are  devoid  of 
what  we  consider  the  very  fundamentals  of 
moral  law.  We  can  only  judge  men  as  they 
follow  their  conscience,  but  we  can  not  claim 
that  honesty  of  obedience  to  one ’s  conscience  im¬ 
plies  the  correctness  of  what  conscience  dictates. 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FREEDOM 


69 


Tlie  authority  of  the  conscience  is  not  de¬ 
stroyed  by  the  defectiveness  of  its  contents. 
From  the  crudest  beginnings  it  has  constantly 
risen  to  a  better  appreciation  of  the  good. 
Progress  has  not  been  uniform,  but  there  have 
been  periods  of  retrogression.  The  formal  au¬ 
thority  finds  it  best  content  when  conscience  is 
under  the  influence  of  two  developing  causes. 
The  first  is  the  growth  of  right  reason  applied 
to  morals.  When  men  seriously  reflect  upon 
the  good,  and  observe  the  effect  of  evil,  they 
recognize  what  makes  for  happiness  and  free¬ 
dom.  Action  does  not  always  follow  reflection, 
but  to  the  degree  that  we  allow  reasonable  con¬ 
siderations  to  guide  us  we  will  eliminate  the 
ignorance  that  in  part  prevents  higher  moral 
standards.  Enlightenment  aids  moral  progress 
and  helps  in  giving  sounder  content  to  con¬ 
science.  The  second  cause  that  elevates  con¬ 
science  is  the  content  which  a  great  religion 
furnishes.  While  low  forms  of  religion  have 
stood  in  the  way  of  ethical  advance,  the  high 
forms  have  presented  conceptions  of  such  a 
range,  and  kindled  emotions  of  such  power,  that 
conscience  is  very  much  lifted  up.  The  best 
religion  is  that  whose  ethical  content  presents 
ideals  which  it  will  take  the  centuries  to  work 
out.  This  is  the  claim  of  Christianity.  It  aims 
to  make  the  authority  of  conscience  complete 
for  liberty  and  goodness  through  its  perfect 
moral  content  and  ideal. 

Christianity  and  conscience.  It  is  only  through 
the  writings  of  Paul  that  we  are  introduced  to 
the  Christian  conception  of  conscience  in  its 
beginnings.  Christ  in  the  figurative  term  “the 


70 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


liglit  of  the  body  is  the  eye,”6  has  stated  the  fact 
of  the  conscience.  But  the  actual  word  onlv 
came  into  use  in  Christian  truth  through  Paul. 
In  the  letter  to  the  Romans  Paul  has  the  idea 
of  conscience  in  mind,  when  he  describes  the 
existence  of  the  law  in  the  mind  of  the  Gentiles 
who  do  not  have  the  revealed  law  of  Israel.  He 
well  describes  the  conflict  in  the  conscience  be¬ 
tween  thoughts  as  they  accuse  or  excuse  each 
other.7  The  actual  inner  process  of  conscience 
is  realized.  But  more  important  is  the  fact  that 
Paul8  sees  in  the  conscience  that  in  man  which  is 
to  accept  the  pure  truth.  He  emphasizes  the 
appeal  of  divine  revelation  as  saving  truth  to 
the  conscience.  This  is  for  him  the  centre  toward 
which  religious  truth  tends,  and  before  which 
it  must  approve  itself.  It  affirms  the  essential 
Christian  position  which  makes  all  of  its  truth 
ethical  in  purpose  though  not  in  immediate 
character.  The  conscience  is  conceived  of  as 
paramount;  and  neither  reason  with  its  logic 
nor  emotion  with  its  unsteadiness  are  funda¬ 
mental.  Out  of  this  attitude  we  must  judge  all 
questions  of  truth,  its  authority  and  infallibility. 
No  demand  of  dogmatic  consistency  must  stand 
in  the  way  of  the  moral  verification  of  all 
spiritual  truth  before  the  conscience. 

6  Matthew  VI :  22. 

7  Romans  II :  15. 

8  2  Corinthians  IV :  2 ;  I  Timothy  1 :  5 ;  III :  9. 


REFERENCES 

Jas.  Hyslop,  The  Elements  of  Ethics,  Chapters  VI,  VII. 
Frank  Thilly,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chapters  II,  III. 
Henry  W.  Wright,  Self-Realization.  Part  I,  Chapter  IV. 


CONSCIENCE  AND  FEEEDOM  71 

Durant  Drake,  Problems  of  Conduct,  Part  I,  Chapters  IV, 
V,  VI. 

Chas.  D’Arcy,  A  Short  Study  of  Ethics,  Part  II,  Chapters 
VIII,  XIV. 

G.  T.  Ladd,  What  I  Ought  To  Do,  Chapter  X. 

Chas.  Gray  Shaw,  The  Value  and  Dignity  of  Human  Life, 
Part  III,  Chapter  II. 

W.  Hocking,  Human  Nature  and  its  Remaking,  Part  III. 
Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chapter  V. 

W.  Wundt,  Ethics,  Part  III,  Chapter  II,  4. 

John  F.  D.  Maurice,  The  Conscience. 

Hastings  Rashdall,  Is  Conscience  an  Emotion. 


CHAPTER  V 


FBEEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 

What  is  the  problem?  A  very  real  difficulty 
arises  as  we  consider  whether  the  trend  of  life 
is  toward  evil  or  good.  The  theory  of  pessimism 
is  that  this  is  the  worst  of  all  possible  worlds. 
Its  opposite  is  optimism  which  claims  that  we 
are  in  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds.  The  great 
advocate  of  optimism  in  modern  times  is  Leibniz 
who  in  the  interest  of  religion  wrote  his  the¬ 
odicy.  In  this  treatise  he  seeks  to  prove  that 
such  evil  as  is  in  the  world  is  due  to  human 
finiteness,  and  the  nature  of  liberty.  The  world, 
Leibniz  thinks,  is  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds 
that  God  could  make  and  still  retain  freedom. 
Whether  this  position  is  tenable  or  not,  it  is 
valuable  because  it  indicates  the  problem  of  the 
relation  of  freedom  to  evil.  There  are  two  sides 
to  this  question.  The  first  is  that  the  existence 
of  the  choice  of  right  or  wrong  makes  possible 
the  wrong  choice.  This  is  the  risk  of  freedom. 
The  other  side  is  the  question,  whether  freedom 
is  worth  while  and  really  helps  the  cause  of  the 
good  if  the  whole  drift  of  affairs  is  toward  evil. 
The  first  consequence  of  the  problem  of  the  re¬ 
lation  of  freedom  to  good  or  evil  is  self-evident. 
It  is  the  second  which  gives  us  concern  and 
constitutes  the  question  of  pessimism. 

72 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


73 


The  causes  of  pessimism.  There  are  several 
great  causes  of  intellectual,  emotional,  and  voli¬ 
tional  pessimism,  disregarding  for  the  moment 
the  pessimism  of  mood.  Among  these  those 
which  characterize  our  age  are  naturalism  and 
realism.  It  would  seem  that  naturalism  ought 
to  be  the  friend  of  hope.  When  it  becomes 
tinged  with  religion  and  arrives  at  pantheism 
it  says  with  Pope:  “Whatever  is  is  good.” 
There  is  no  room  for  the  distinction  of  good 
and  evil  where  any  kind  of  pantheism  rules. 
But  the  actual  naturalism,  either  neglecting  its 
pantheistic  consequence  or  contradicting  it, 
takes  the  real  world  as  one  of  absolute  necessity. 
Man  seeking  the  outlook  of  hope  does  not  find 
it  but  is  always  subject  to  inexorable  law.  The 
desire  for  freedom  is  a  deception.  Morals  and 
religion  are  really  illusions  in  a  universe  of  mere 
forces  and  energies.  Where  men  think  and  feel 
themselves  constrained  to  accept  the  conclusions 
of  natural  science  alone  as  fundamental  and 
ultimate  they  must  abandon  moral  and  spiritual 
values.  Then  bowing  to  the  inescapable  reign 
of  iron  natural  law  they  grow  sad,  weary  and 
hopeless  when  the  cry  of  their  heart  calls  for 
goodness  and  its  liberty.  No  one  has  better 
voiced  the  hopelessness  of  naturalism  than 
Matthew  Arnold  in  his  poem  Dover  Plains. 
He  hears  faith ’s 

“Melancholy,  long,  withdrawing  roar, 

Retreating  to  the  breath 

Of  the  night-wind,  down  the  vast  edges  drear 

And  naked  shingles  of  the  world.” 


The  second  great  cause  in  our  day  is  realism. 


74 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


The  attitude  of  au  extreme  realism  has  entered 
into  all  art,  and  into  the  whole  view  and  philoso¬ 
phy  of  life.  It  claims  to  be  the  honest  portrayal 
of  facts  as  against  the  idealism  which  lifting 
its  head  into  the  clouds  forgets  that  we  are 
walking  on  the  earth.  As  a  protest  realism 
serves  to  correct  an  unreal  idealism  which  has 
lost  itself  in  the  dreams  of  romanticism.  But 
when  realism  becomes  the  ruling  outlook  and 
crowds  out  the  striving  after  the  ideal  it 
destroys  ideals.  The  destruction  of  ideals  and 
their  value  undermines  the  worth  of  morals  and 
freedom.  To  see  things  as  they  are  is  of  service 
if  we  make  the  effort  to  make  things  as  they 
ought  to  be.  Realism  however  discounts  such 
an  effort  for  betterment.  It  wants  to  dwell  in 
the  slums  it  has  discovered,  and  to  keep  the 
tig-leaf  of  decency  removed.  Through  realism 
men  learn  to  dwell  in  the  tents  of  ungodliness 
and  to  delight  in  the  examination  and  descrip¬ 
tion  of  all  that  is  ugly,  mean  and  bad.  This  vile 
world  is  the  paradise  of  realism.  It  loves  the 
shadows  of  Main  Street,  and  glorifies  the  low 
aspirations  of  Alice  Adams.1  The  decadent 
dramas  of  Strindberg,  the  free  verse  that  dwells 
in  nasty  places,  and  the  moving  picture  that 
portrays  the  worst  in  human  life  luridly,  are 
exalted.  Painting  and  sculpture  by  the  power 
of  realism  depart  from  purity  of  color  and  the 
glorious  beauty  of  the  human  form,  and  unfold 
the  riot  of  impure  color  and  exhibit  the  extrava¬ 
gance  of  form.  If  this  is  life  and  all  that  it 
contains  and  all  that  it  may  hope  to  be  then 

1  The  popularity  of  such  a  novel  as  “Babbit”  is  a  sad 
sign  of  a  most  commonplace,  decadent  realism. 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


75 


surely  there  is  no  place  for  the  hope  and  glory 
of  human  freedom.  If  realism  rests  on  facts 
and  if  its  facts  are  final  then  we  must  hang  our 
heads  in  shame  and  despair. 

Pessimism  and  human  moods.  There  is  a 
kind  of  pessimism  which  does  not  rest  upon 
naturalism  or  realism,  but  is  the  growth  of  the 
mood  of  man.  A  mood  is  composed  of  a  number 
of  emotions  which  have  attained  permanence 
and  color  the  whole  feeling  of  our  mind.  It  is 
a  settled  attitude  of  feeling  toward  all  experi¬ 
ence  and  bends  it  to  its  own  condition.  Where 
the  common  feeling  is  bright  there  is  optimism, 
but  where  it  is  gloomy  there  is  pessimism.  A 
depressed  mood  of  gloom  may  be  the  result  of 
wrong  physical  conditions  of  the  body  or  the 
consequence  of  mental  disorder.  But  there  are 
men  whose  experiences  have  soured  them  or  who 
are  hopeless  when  they  view  the  course  of 
things.  Such  men  fall  into  the  mood  that  is 
dark  and  become  pessimistic.  There  are  others 
who  assume  pessimism  and  strike  an  attitude  of 
‘  ‘  Weltschmerz.  ’  ’  With  all  these  different  types 
of  men  there  can  be  no  debate.  Their  attitude 
is  a  matter  of  taste.  Sometimes  there  is  a 
weariness  and  ennui  of  the  world  which  is  the 
result  of  a  dissipated  life  which  has  drunk  the 
wine  of  evil  indulgence  to  the  dregs.  The  mood 
which  is  pessimistic  as  the  result  of  such  a  life 
is  the  punishment  of  the  wrong  choice  of  evil. 
There  are  temperamental  pessimists  who  are 
well  represented  by  Jacques,2  when  he  approves 
of  the  fool’s  philosophy: 

2  “As  You  Like  It,  ”  Act  II,  Scene  VII. 


76 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


“  ’Tis  but  an  hour  ago  since  it  was  nine, 

And  after  one  hour  more’t  will  be  eleven, 

And  so  from  hour  to  hour,  we  ripe  and  ripe, 

And  then  from  hour  to  hour,  we  rot  and  rot, 

And  thereby  hangs  a  tale.  ” 

This  makes  a  stale  and  unprofitable  world. 

Can  we  know  and  be  glad?  We  begin  to 
come  to  the  real  issue  of  pessimism  when  we 
ask  as  our  first  question,  what  is  the  outcome 
of  knowledge!  Does  it  lead  to  hope  or  despair; 
does  it  make  us  optimistic  or  pessimistic!  At 
the  outset  there  seems  to  be  joy  in  the  attain¬ 
ments  of  the  intellect.  We  are  satisfied  as 
little  by  little  we  learn  to  know.  But  as  soon 
as  the  effort  is  made  to  go  below  the  surface  of 
truth  and  to  dig  into  its  depths  we  find  great 
hindrances.  Knowledge  which  begins  with 
curiosity  when  it  seeks  to  satisfy  itself  fully 
ends  in  doubt.  The  striving  of  the  intellect 
comes  to  an  impasse.  The  more  we  know  the 
less  we  know,  because  all  new  knowledge  when 
searched  out  leads  to  further  problems.  The 
searching  and  critical  intellect  infects  us  with 
“problemitis.  ”  The  great  classic  representa¬ 
tion  of  man  seeking  happiness  is  Goethe’s 
Faust.  One  part  of  the  search  is  the  quest 
after  knowledge.  But  neither  medicine,  nor 
law,  nor  theology  satisfy  the  deep  intellectual 
longing  of  Faust.  He  has  tried  all  of  them  and 
in  vain.  It  almost  breaks  his  heart  that  we  can 
know  nothing  rightly  and  thoroughly.  Thus 
kowledge  leads  to  despair.  It  has  not  kept  its 
promise  of  giving  joy  and  peace  and  liberty  to 
the  earnest  seekers  after  truth. 

A  short  glance  at  the  development  of  philo¬ 
sophy  in  some  of  its  connected  movements  of 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


77 


thought  confirms  the  conviction  of  the  final 
futility  of  the  intellect  to  lead  to  liberty.  The 
Greeks  began  with  assuming  some  material 
principle  as  explanatory  of  the  world.  But  the 
early  explanation  of  matter,  even  in  its  atomic 
form,  failed  to  answer  all  questions.  Then 
Anaxagoras  first  discovered  the  necessity  of 
some  sort  of  mind-stuff  to  account  for  the  order 
of  the  world.  Absolute  rest  and  existence  was 
tried  by  the  Eleatics,  and  Heraclitus  sought  to 
solve  all  the  problems  of  the  world  through 
movement.  Then  after  Socrates  endeavored  to 
help  morals  by  clear  conceptual  thinking  arose 
Plato  with  his  vision  of  ideas  and  ideals.  Aris¬ 
totle  brought  down  to  earth  the  eternal  beauty 
and  goodness  which  Plato  had  seen.  He 
showed  men  a  universe  of  causes  and  final  pur¬ 
pose,  high  thought  moving  the  world,  and  men 
with  moral  aims.  But  the  great  ethical  striv¬ 
ings  of  these  leaders  of  thought  soon  split  up 
into  advocates  of  pleasure,  Epicureans,  and  de¬ 
fenders  of  reason,  Stoics,  who  fell  back  into  a 
material  metaphysic  of  the  world.  The  end  of 
the  Greek  development  in  the  followers  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  and  in  the  students  of  all  schools, 
was  scepticism.  The  mind  had  tried  the  differ¬ 
ent  alternatives,  had  reached  great  heights,  and 
then  despaired  of  any  real  solution.  The  his¬ 
tory  of  English  thought  gives  a  leading  place 
to  three  speculators,  Locke,  Berkeley,  and 
Hume.  Locke  endeavored  to  find  the  secret  of 
the  human  understanding,  and  its  relation  to 
an  outside  world.  He  was  led  to  assert  that 
some  qualities  of  things  like  color  were  not  in 
things  but  in  the  mind.  Berkeley  developing 


78 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


the  analysis  of  the  mind  came  to  deny  all  exper¬ 
ience  of  matter.  Restricting  the  investigation 
to  immediate  knowledge  he  found  only  sensa¬ 
tions  and  ideas.  Both  were  finally  mental,  and 
x  the  mind  the  only  real  existence.  Hnme  carry¬ 
ing  the  analysis  still  further  found  only  phe¬ 
nomena  in  the  mind.  He  could  not  see  any  evi¬ 
dence  for  mind  itself,  but  only  defended 
impressions  and  notions.  Thus  the  conclusion 
reached  was  sceptical,  and  there  was  no  real 
substance,  or  cause,  or  existence,  beyond  the 
immediate  appearances  in  experience.  The 
more  keenly  the  mind  searched  after  itself  the 
more  mind  destroyed  itself  by  doubt.  The  Ger¬ 
man  development  in  the  philosophy  of  the 
nineteenth  century  began  with  the  endeavor  of 
Kant  to  fix  the  limits  of  theortical  thinking 
and  to  overcome  the  scepticism  of  Hume  by  a 
thorough  critique  of  pure  and  practical  reason. 
But  the  criticism  of  Kant  was  followed  by  the 
egocentric  idealism  of  Fichte.  Kant’s  strong 
emphasis  of  the  ego  with  its  categories  grew 
into  an  absolute  ego.  Hegel  followed  as  the  great 
defender  of  absolute  reason  as  a  movement. 
But  when  the  heights  were  reached  idealism 
failed  and  materialism  ruled  again.  Blind  will 
and  impulse  gained  a  foothold.  The  outcome 
was  confusion  and  uncertainty.  Agnosticism 
was  the  end  just  as  it  was  the  result  in  the 
common  sense  speculation  of  the  Scotch 
thinkers.  The  line  of  succession  did  not  stop 
with  Reid  but  led  to  Hamilton  with  his  philos¬ 
ophy  of  the  unconditioned,  then  on  to  Mansel 
who  in  the  interest  of  faith  doubted  the  possibil¬ 
ity  of  the  absolute ;  and  at  last  Spencer  adopted 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


79 


Mansel’s  attitude  in  liis  First  Principles  and 
argued  for  the  Unknowable.  Any  careful  stu¬ 
dent  of  the  history  of  philosophy  must  find  that 
all  ultimate  questions  have  not  been  solved,  and 
that  every  movement  of  thought  has  ended  in 
agnosticism  or  doubt.  And  agnosticism  is 
nothing  else  hut  an  inconsequental  scepticism 
unwilling  to  follow  its  own  logic. 

When  we  look  at  the  efforts  of  men  to  frame 
theories  of  the  best  way  of  teaching  the  truth 
we  are  not  very  much  encouraged.  Great  ped¬ 
agogues  have  arisen  from  time  to  time  with 
high  visions,  but  after  a  time  they  were  dis¬ 
carded.  Pedagogy  has  been  one  series  of  ex¬ 
periments.  There  has  always  been  a  contest 
between  the  old  and  the  new  methods.  Neither 
were  absolutely  right.  Change  succeeded  change 
and  small  minds  were  always  announcing  that 
the  last  word  had  been  said,  and  now  the 
golden  age  of  education  had  arrived.  Today 
the  apostles  of  the  practical  and  the  utilitarian 
and  the  vocational  hold  the  field.  But  if  we 
but  wait  they  will  pass  from  the  field  of 
endeavor  and  some  new  universal  nostrum  of 
education  will  be  announced.  Meantime  every 
sort  of  education  has  spoiled  as  many  minds 
as  it  has  helped.  Men  finally  educate  them¬ 
selves  in  spite  of  all  theories.  The  best  efforts 
of  the  mind  to  teach  the  mind  are  vain  and  in 
the  great  things  of  liberty  we  go  on  groping 
our  way,  blundering  through,  and  stumbling 
blindly  on.  All  our  pedagogy  leaves  us  in  the 
lurch  and  we  are  not  solving  the  great  disturb¬ 
ing  problems  of  our  day. 

The  intellectual  part  of  civilization  is  not 


80 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


hopeful.  The  increase  of  knowledge  has  not 
been  accompanied  by  increase  of  general  intel¬ 
ligence.3  The  ancient  Greeks  on  the  average 
were  intellectually  more  advanced  than  the 
the  average  man  today.  Along  with  the  failure 
of  the  increase  of  brain-power  has  gone  a  con¬ 
stant  addition  of  new  knowledge.  The  intellec¬ 
tual  structure  of  civilization  has  grown  too 
heavy  for  the  minds  of  men  to  bear.  Know¬ 
ledge  has  been  very  much  subdivided  and  there 
are  many  narrow  specialists  in  all  departments 
of  learning  and  in  every  profession,  but  broad 
knowledge  is  dying  out.  It  can  no  longer  be 
assimilated  because  of  its  excessive  details  in 
every  department.  If  we  take  e.  g.,  the  study 
of  history  it  is  evident  that  the  growth  of  its 
material  is  so  tremendous  that  we  can  either 
know  only  a  small  part  thoroughly  or  a  larger 
part  rather  superficially.  The  growth  of  the 
knowledge  of  civilization  is  its  own  destruction. 
If  we  are  to  have  large  knowledge  some  of  the 
present  intellectual  civilization  must  be  lost, 
and  the  slate  partly  wiped  clean.  Otherwise 
we  shall  all  become  grubbers  in  minutiae  and 
lose  the  general  knowledge,  and  with  it  the 
broad  sympathy  that  makes  for  common  respect 
of  rights  and  universal  liberty. 

When  we  weigh  all  of  these  indictments 
against  the  intellect  the  case  seems  very  ser¬ 
ious.  But  there  are  certain  contrary  consider¬ 
ations.  The  intellect  is  not  the  whole  of  human 
life.  We  cannot  and  ought  not  stake  all  of 
happiness  and  liberty  on  the  success  or  failure 
of  our  logic.  The  limitations  of  reason  must 

3  Cf.  above  page  35. 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


81 


be  clearly  recognized  and  the  impossible  must 
not  be  asked  of  it.  Ultimate  questions  may  not 
be  solved  easily  to  the  common  satisfaction  of 
men.  But  the  striving  after  them  has  not  been 
entirely  without  result,  and  we  have  at  least 
learnt  the  possibility  of  our  knowledge.  The 
periods  of  scepticism  have  been  followed  by 
times  of  renewed  search.  It  must  not  be  for¬ 
gotten  that  we  have  not  reached  the  goal,  and 
that  the  development  is  still  going  on.  In  the 
search  there  is  the  joy  of  the  work.  The  very 
effort  of  the  intellect  is  its  liberation.  In  many 
departments  of  knowledge  we  have  attained 
established  facts.  Our  knowledge  of  nature 
and  science  has  given  ns  many  data  that  have 
changed  our  whole  life  and  freed  it  from  much 
superstition  and  narrowness.  There  has  been 
no  such  complete  failure  as  the  pessimists 
would  have  us  believe.  The  difficulty  in  final 
problems  has  thrown  us  back  upon  faith  and 
strengthened  our  spiritual  life.  Experimenta¬ 
tion  in  education  has  brought  along  with  its 
changes  increasing  understanding  of  the  child 
and  has  given  larger  liberty.  Subdivision  of 
knowledge  invites  more  and  more  people  to 
think  and  makes  knowledge  more  universal. 
There  may  be  periods  of  loss  and  backwardness 
but  is  the  total  history  of  knowledge  one  of 
despair  or  one  of  progressive  advancement! 
Along  with  its  scepticism  philosophy  has  un¬ 
folded  the  intellect  and  has  often  given  us 
glimpses  of  the  world  and  of  mind  which  exper¬ 
iment  has  afterwards  established.  Atoms  were 
projected  in  Greek  thought  before  modern 
chemistry.  Heraclitus  saw  the  world  in  motion 


82 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


long  prior  to  modern  physics.  Plato  had 
visions  of  the  essentials  of  life  and  the  great¬ 
ness  in  suffering  evil  centuries  ago.  We  can 
find  not  only  errors  in  the  course  of  human 
thinking  but  also  great  permanent  truths. 
There  is  therefore  no  reason  why  we  should 
despair  of  the  value  of  real  knowledge  if  we 
know  its  place  and  function.  As  it  adds  a 
share  to  truth  it  helps  to  make  us  free,  for  all 
real  truth  makes  free. 

The  emotional  dilemma.  It  is  particularly 
in  the  sphere  of  the  emotions  that  pessimism 
makes  its  strong  attack.  Before  the  mind’s 
eye  is  called  up  the  vision  of  all  the  pain,  the 
woe,  the  misery  and  the  evil  of  the  world. 
What  a  picture  of  suffering,  sadness  and  des¬ 
pair!  Are  not  suffering,  woe,  sin,  and  evil 
paramount,  the  most  positive  facts  in  human 
life  against  which  joy,  health,  goodness  are 
utterly  insignificant  ?  But  this  appeal  must 
not  carry  us  away,  powerful  as  it  is;  for  it  does 
not  prove  that  all  is  wrong  and  evil.  We  can¬ 
not  shut  our  eyes  to  the  awful  fact  of  suffering, 
sickness  and  sin,  but  they  are  after  all  not  the 
total  of  life.  The  recognition  of  their  existence 
only  helps  to  save  us  from  a  blind  optimism  that 
finds  that  all  is  well  in  the  world  when  all  is 
not  well.  Whether  the  good  overbalances  the 
evil,  or  the  evil  the  good  cannot  he  determined 
absolutely.  It  all  depends  upon  the  point  of 
view  of  the  one  who  speculates  about  this 
subject. 

But  there  is  another  emotional  pessimism 
which  assails  the  very  centre  of  our  life.  The 
danger  of  the  life  of  sense  led  Brahmanism  to 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


83 


draw  men  away  from  the  world  of  deceptive 
and  alluring  sense,  the  world  of  externals  and 
appearance  to  the  peaceful  rest  of  the  world  of 
reality  found  in  the  absolute  existence,  the 
universal  mind.  This  tendency  of  Brahmanism 
was  further  developed  by  Buddhism.  Accord¬ 
ing  to  it  the  great  bondage  of  life  is  the  enslave¬ 
ment  caused  by  desire.  It  is  the  desire  to  live 
and  do  which  brings  about  all  evil.  Nothing 
but  distraction  of  life  follows.  We  are  carried 
hither  and  thither  and  arrive  nowhere  in  this 
world  of  “Maya,”  deception  and  illusion.  We 
must  cease  to  want  and  stop  desiring  to  live. 
Our  aim  must  be  to  find  the  great  “Nirvana,” 
the  haven  of  rest  and  peace.  Only  through  the 
cessation  of  all  wants  and  the  obliteration  of 
all  desires  and  emotions  can  we  escape  the 
“Karma,”  the  re-creation  because  of  our  deeds. 

The  religious  philosophy  of  the  East  was 
introduced  into  the  West  by  Schopenhauer. 
He  sought  to  show  by  psychological  analysis 
that  when  we  have  not  we  want.  We  are 
unhappy  in  our  wanting.  After  we  get  what 
we  want  we  are  still  unhappy  because  the  reali¬ 
zation  is  less  than  we  pictured  it  to  be.  But 
still  we  want  again.  Therefore  whether  we 
have  or  want  we  are  always  miserable.  Even 
if  the  getting  is  partially  satisfactory  the  very 
nature  of  desire  grows  through  the  getting. 
Desire  is  insatiable.  This  condition  is  the  very 
essential  of  our  life,  and  causes  pain  and 
misery.  “The  ceaseless  efforts  to  banish  suffer¬ 
ing  accomplish  no  more  than  to  make  it  change 
its  form.  It  is  essentially  deficiency,  want, 
care  for  the  maintenance  of  life.  If  we  succeed, 


84 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


which  is  very  difficult,  in  removing  pain  in  this 
form,  it  immediately  assumes  a  thousand 
others,  varying  according  to  age  and  circum¬ 
stances,  such  as  lust,  passionate  love,  jealousy, 
envy,  hatred,  anxiety,  ambition,  covetousness, 
sickness,  etc.,  etc.  If  at  last  it  can  find  entrance 
in  no  other  form,  it  comes  in  the  sad,  grey  gar¬ 
ments  of  tediousness  and  ennui,  against  which 
we  then  strive  in  various  ways.  ’  ’ 4  But  there 
is  no  real  escape  from  the  evil.  We  are  always 
tossed  about  by  “many  a  conflict,  many  a 
doubt.’ ’  4 ‘ Thus  between  desiring  and  attain¬ 

ing  all  human  life  flows  on  throughout.  The 
wish  is,  in  its  nature,  pain;  the  attainment  soon 
begets  satiety  :  the  end  was  only  apparent  ; 
possession  takes  away  the  charm;  the  wish,  the 
need,  presents  itself  under  a  new  form;  when  it 
does  not,  then  follows  desolateness,  emptiness, 
ennui,  against  which  the  conflict  is  just  as  pain¬ 
ful  as  against  want.  ’  ’ 5  How  can  we  escape 
from  the  snares  of  the  fowler,  desire?  The 
tremendous  trnth  of  this  analysis  of  desire  is 
not  answered  by  the  counterclaim,  that  there  is 
joy  in  the  striving,  and  that  some  satisfaction 
grows  out  of  the  possession  of  what  we  want. 
This  answer  is  only  relatively  true.  Striving 
is  not  pure  joy;  it  has  its  great  disappointments. 
The  seeking  of  the  satisfaction  of  desire  and 
emotion  is  not  the  same  as  the  search  after 
knowledge.  Its  efforts  have  only  a  passing- 
value  and  give  only  a  temporary  rest.  The 
solution  is  in  the  content  and  object  of  the 
desire  and  emotion.  All  objects,  like  pleasure, 

4  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  Book  IV,  par.  57. 

D  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  Book  IV,  par.  57. 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


85 


wealth,  social  power,  etc.,  have  no  permanent 
worth.  They  are  purely  relative.  But  if  the 
object  of  desire  is  moral  and  spiritual,  and 
seeks  fundamental  human  values,  as  e.  g.,  right¬ 
eousness,  truth,  there  is  no  defect  in  the  desire. 
Such  hunger  and  thirst  are  satisfied.  It  is  not 
the  wanting,  but  what  we  want  which  deter¬ 
mines  its  good  or  less  than  good  value. 

The  pessimist  questions  the  satisfaction  of 
art.  He  asserts  that  there  is  no  real  joy  in  art. 
but  only  a  great  burden.  It  is  true  that 
Schopenhauer  inconsistently  believes  that  the 
contemplation  of  art  brings  partial  deliverance. 
But  the  real  attitude  must  make  the  desire  for 
art  equally  futile.  It  has  no  solution  for 
human  restlessness.  The  great  artists  despair 
in  their  greatest  creations.  They  are  driven 
on,  and  the  driving  power  of  the  creative  in¬ 
stinct  is  painful.  Nothing  is  born  without  woe. 
When  the  best  is  reached  of  which  a  great 
artist  is  capable,  he  knows  better  than  any 
critic  that  the  best  is  bad  enough.  The  spirit 
of  discontentment  is  necessary  to  the  progress 
of  art.  Contentment  and  satisfaction  kill  the 
highest  aspirations.  The  artist  who  is  too  much 
pleased  with  himself  has  already  failed.  But 
is  this  discontent  evil!  Does  it  show  utter 
failure!  Surely  it  is  the  way  of  progress  and 
greater  attainment.  The  relative  merit  of  any 
work  of  art  does  not  make  it,  its  spirit,  and  its 
producer  subject  to  evil.  There  is  a  relative 
satisfaction.  Of  course  the  depth  of  the 
human  spirit  is  never  filled  no  matter  how 
deeply  one  drinks  of  the  refreshing  fountain  of 
art.  We  must  return  in  the  greatest  joy  and 


86 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


good  of  any  art  unfilled  again  to  ttie  source  of 
beauty,  to  beauty  eternal.6 

Are  our  actions  satisfactory?  In  tlie  concep¬ 
tion  that  life  is  an  endless  and  dissatisfied 
striving,  which  Schopenhauer  advocated,  there 
is  included  the  tendency  of  the  will  toward 
action.  The  will  itself  as  the  human  effort  to 
live  must  be  negated.  ‘Its  very  nature  just  as 
the  nature  of  desire  is  supposed  to  be  evil,  for 
it  is  closely  connected  with  desire.  Willing 
and  striving,  as  our  whole  being,  can  be  com¬ 
pared  to  an  unquenchable  thirst.  And  the 
foundation  of  all  willing  is  need,  deficiency 
and  pain.  This  is  but  a  partial  truth,  for  there 
is  no  mere  loss  in  willing,  but  despite  its  many 
failures  we  rise  through  it  to  better  things. 
If  willing  is  evil,  action  is  evil,  and  all  life  must 
be  declared  to  be  evil.  But  there  are  positive 
contents  in  activity  and  life  which  do  not  per¬ 
mit  us  to  ascribe  only  failure  to  its  efforts. 

The  necessary  trend  of  the  will  toward  the 
wrong  makes  a  stronger  appeal  for  pessimism. 
We  accept  certain  ideals  and  acknowledge 
them  to  be  good.  But  the  acceptance  of  ideals 
is  all  too  often  not  followed  by  the  appropriate 
action.  We  praise  what  we  do  not  do;  we 
blame  in  thought  what  we  frequently  do.  Our 
approval  does  not  guarantee  our  action,  and 
our  disapproval  does  not  bring  about  inhibition 
of  action.  There  is  a  drifting  of  action  and  a 
lack  of  earnest  effort  to  overcome  our  moral 
indifference  and  to  break  up  bad  habits.  The 
easiest  way  is  pursued  although  we  know  the 
better  way.  Bnt  we  are  not  ready  to  take  upon 

6  Cf.  Plato,  Symposium,  210  ff. 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


87 


ourselves  the  better  way  with  its  denials  and 
hardships.  It  is  the  old  confession:  “  Video  meli- 
ora  proboque,  deteriora  sequor.”  The  honest 
words  of  men  who  know  themselves  admit  with 
Paul:  “For  that  which  I  do  I  allow  not:  for 
what  I  would  that  I  do  not;  but  what  I  hate 
that  I  do.”  7  “For  the  good  that  I  would  I  do 
not:  but  the  evil  which  I  would  not  that  I  do.”  8 
The  confessions  of  Augustine  and  Rousseau, 
different  as  they  are,  confirm  these  statements. 
The  honesty  of  self-knowledge  is,  however,  not 
the  end.  Where  moral  laziness  is  overcome, 
and  we  do  not  admit  our  wrong  actions  with 
complacency  as  though  the  situation  could  not 
be  changed,  the  consciousness  of  our  failure  in 
action  will  lead  to  renewed  effort  to  become 
better.  The  deeper  our  feeling  about  the  rift 
between  ideal  and  deed,  the  more  hopeful  is 
the  future.  Out  of  the  recognition  of  our  real 
selves  there  will  come  new  earnest  search  for 
betterment  and  the  desire  for  some  cure  and 
help  which  can  overcome  our  moral  deficiency. 
When  morals  appear  to  be  lacking  in  the 
motive  power  of  the  ideal  then  the  question 
arises  whether  religion  is  not  the  one  thing 
needful  to  stimulate  more  consistent  action 
through  an  ideal  religiously  sanctioned  and 
strong  with  emotion.  Religion  can  lead  to  the 
liberty  which  moral  striving  seeks. 

Civilization  and  pessimism.  Is  civilization 
a  success,  or  is  it  a  failure  ?  Does  it  inspire  us 
with  hope  or  despair?  Prior  to  the  experiences 
of  the  world-war  the  examination  of  various 

7  Romans  VII:  15. 

8  Romans  VII:  19. 


88 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


civilizations  led  to  the  belief  that  past  civili¬ 
zations  had  failed  because  of  great  economic 
break-downs  in  society.  Our  own  civilization 
was  supposed  to  have  such  a  large  range  of 
opportunity  and  to  be  under  the  control  of  such 
sentiments  as  to  what  constitutes  economic 
advantage  that  any  serious  catastrophe  seemed 
impossible.  We  had  grown  so  reasonable;  we 
had  approved  so  eloquently  of  the  common  in¬ 
terests  of  mankind;  we  had  established  leagues 
of  peace  and  built  great  palaces  of  peace;  and 
we  were  being  carried  upward  by  the  inherent 
impulses  of  a  progressive  evolution  which  was 
daily  making  us  better.  A  finer  and  broader 
Christianity,  and  a  considerate  tolerance  valu¬ 
ing  what  was  good  in  every  faith  was  welding 
us  together  into  a  common  human  brotherhood. 
Then  came  the  great  disillusionment  that 
taught  us,  that  we  were  not  controlled  by  ideal 
forces,  but  that  we  were  under  the  control  and 
power  of  economic  selfishness.  The  reason¬ 
ableness  of  economic  advantage  did  not  appear. 
Men  saw  only  more  colonies,  more  commerce, 
and  more  industry  to  be  obtained  by  selfish 
nationalism  accentuated  through  lustful  mili¬ 
tarism.  The  war  was  not  caused  by  a  conflict 
of  idealisms  but  was  purely  material  in  origin 
even  though  we  had  to  give  it  a  moral  justifica¬ 
tion  as  it  proceeded.  There  was  a  clear 
demonstration  that  neither  morals  nor  religion 
had  entered  into  the  great  world  affairs  and 
relations.  Both  seemed  utterly  powerless  and 
became  the  slaves  of  militant  nations  to  defend 
their  actions  whether  right  or  wrong.  The 
aftermath  of  the  war  has  increased  jealousies 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


89 


and  hates,  and  brought  about  economic  up¬ 
heavals  and  most  unreasonable  rebellions  and 
strikes.  Civilization  is  utterly  sick  and  there 
is  apparently  no  physician  to  heal  it.  The  ad¬ 
vocates  of  progress  are  routed.  Professor 
Dewey  may  claim  :9  ‘  ‘  The  world  war  is  a  bitter 
commentary  on  the  nineteenth  century  miscon¬ 
ception  of  moral  achievement — a  misconception 
however  which  it  only  inherited  from  the  tra¬ 
ditional  theory  of  fixed  ends,  attempting  to 
bolster  up  that  doctrine  with  aid  from  the 
‘ scientific’  theory  of  evolution.  The  doctrine 
of  progress  is  not  yet  bankrupt.  The  bank¬ 
ruptcy  of  the  notion  of  fixed  ends  to  be  attained 
and  stably  possessed  may  possibly  be  the  means 
of  turning  the  mind  of  man  to  a  tenable  theory 
of  progress — to  attention  to  present  troubles 
and  possibilities.  ’  ’  What  an  utterly  weak  solu¬ 
tion  of  a  pragmatist!  Men  had  been  trying  to 
envisage  truth  in  purely  relative  terms  of  evo¬ 
lution  and  progress.  The  failure  was  the  loss 
of  great  stable  ideals  and  ends  in  morals  and 
religion  in  actual  life.  The  evil  was  the  absorp¬ 
tion  of  mankind  in  the  desires,  the  conflicts,  the 
cruelties  of  food,  clothing  and  shelter.  Science 
itself  did  not  liberate  but  became  the  servant  of 
destruction.  Socialism  was  bankrupt.  The 
morals  of  freedom  were  set  aside  for  the  liberty 
of  vagrant  and  destructive  desire.  The  analysis 
of  the  present  situation  makes  us  hopeless  of  the 
immediate  present  if  the  same  ideas  and  ideals 
persist.  The  new  attitude  demanded  and 
needed  is  a  change  by  which  we  actually  will 
permit  the  liberating  power  of  righteousness  to 

9  Human  Nature  and  Conduct,  p.  286. 


90 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


control  us.  We  liave  too  long  surrendered  to 
being  factors  in  a  movement;  we  must  become 
free  by  moralizing  all  relations.  A  better 
world  will  come  only  as  we  emancipate  our¬ 
selves  from  the  thraldom  of  material  evolution 
as  all-controlling,  and  conquer  economic  forces 
through  an  idealization  of  life  sustained  by 
compelling  religious  convictions.  If  men  will 
not  seek  this  freedom  they  will  die  in  their  sins. 
There  is  no  hope  for  a  shallow  optimism  built 
on  unreasoning  assumption  of  the  natural  good¬ 
ness  of  man  either  individually  or  socially.  A 
new  theory  of  freedom  must  be  elaborated 
which  reinterprets  the  eternal  laws  of  right  and 
applies  them  to  the  present  evils.  We  need  not 
greater  flux,  but  greater  stability  and  balance 
of  liberty.  This  attitude  will  give  promise  of 
real  progress  in  the  freedom  of  the  good. 

Religion  and  pessimism.  Is  it  necessary  to 
raise  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  religion  to 
pessimism?  Does  not  every  religion  exalt  the 
hopes  of  man,  and  lift  him  into  the  sphere  of 
the  spiritual  where  dwell  peace  and  joy  for¬ 
ever?  The  fact  remains  nevertheless  that 
there  is  a  strain  of  pessimism  in  religion.  It 
must  grapple  with  the  actuality  of  evil. 
Sorrow,  sickness,  sin,  and  death  make  men 
serious  and  sad.  It  is  religion  which  must 
enter  into  these  moods  and  experiences  of  men 
and  endeavor  to  overcome  them,  not  by  denial 
but  by  an  inner  grasp  of  their  effect  upon  the 
spirit.  While  the  outcome  may  be  hope  it  is 
a  sobered  hope  and  not  a  mere  optimism  of 
ideas.  The  strongest  pessimism  of  religion  is 
however  the  outgrowth  of  the  failure  of  the 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


91 


ordinary  objects  of  human  pursuit  to  satisfy 
the  thirst  of  the  soul.  The  book  of  Ecclesiastes 
with  its  cry:  “All  is  vanity’ ’  well  voices  the 
breakdown  of  knowledge,  love  as  passion, 
power,  ambition,  etc.  It  shows  the  course  of 
human  life  from  youth  to  age,  when  the  days 
come  of  which  we  say  that  we  have  no  pleasure 
in  them.  Life  itself  in  its  externality  cannot 
fulfill  its  promise.  The  purpose  of  this  pessi¬ 
mism  is  to  draw  men  away  from  the  secondary 
and  minor  things  of  life.  When  the  unsatis¬ 
factory  result  of  all  that  men  fight  for  and 
strive  for  in  their  ordinary  pursuits  is  realized, 
then  religion  can  create  a  desire  for  the  things 
invisible  and  eternal.  No  religion  can  thrive 
on  this — worldliness;  it  must  have  a  transform¬ 
ing  power  for  the  temporal  issues  through  an 
otlier-worldliness.  Where  the  latter  does  not  ex¬ 
ist  the  emptiness  of  life  remains  and  the  only 
reply  of  a  religion  without  a  better  hope  can  be : 
“Vanity  of  vanities;  all  is  vanity.”  Morals 
need  hope  in  the  good  that  liberty  may  be 
maintained.  If  religion  destroys  this  hope  the 
ethical  life  suffers.  Consequently  we  need  a 
religion  with  sufficient  assurance  of  the  final 
permanence  of  the  good  to  maintain  well  sup¬ 
ported  moral  aims. 

It  Christianity  pessimistic?  How  foolish  to 
ask  such  a  question,  is  the  reply  that  at  first 
comes  to  your  mind.  Has  not  Christianity 
been  the  outstanding  religion  of  hope?  It  has 
brought  new  motives  into  the  world,  and  pre¬ 
sented  men  with  the  optimism  of  love  in  its 
teaching  of  God.  Its  keynote  has  been:  “Re¬ 
joice,  and  again  I  say,  rejoice.”  Christ  has 


92 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


filled  the  world  with  a  spirit  of  the  power  and 
triumph  of  the  good.  But  there  are  teachings 
of  Christ  that  contradict  this  unqualified  opti¬ 
mism  which  so  many  find  in  Christianity. 
There  is  an  emphasis  in  the  sayings  of  Jesus 
upon  the  degeneration  of  the  world,10  which 
culminates  in  a  repeated  warning  of  eternal 
punishment.11  In  no  other  part  of  the  New 
Testament  is  there  such  a  statement  of  the 
unquenchable  fire  and  the  worm  that  shall  not 
die  as  in  the  words  of  Jesus.  He  does  not  hope 
for  a  universal  salvation  of  men,  and  such  a 
triumph  of  the  good  that  all  will  choose  it. 
The  realism  of  evil  as  conceived  by  Jesus  is 
not  set  aside  by  His  strong  teaching  of  God’s 
intention  of  love  for  man.  According  to  Him 
many  travel  on  the  way  of  destruction,  and 
few  find  the  narrow  way  of  life.12  Many  are 
called  but  few  are  chosen.13  The  great  mass 
of  men  seeing  see  not  and  hearing  hear  not  for 
their  heart  is  waxed  gross.14  Only  the  fewr 
faithful  disciples  ascertain  the  truth  because 
they  really  seek  it.  Even  among  them  there  is 
Judas  Iscariot  who  cannot  be  saved,  for  he  is 
the  son  of  perdition.  The  choice  of  most  men 
is  for  the  evil.  Hell  will  be  full  and  heaven 
with  its  many  mansions  will  not  be  over¬ 
crowded.  Men  regarded  in  the  mass  will  make 
a  sorry  mess  of  freedom.  When  we  face  these 
sayings  what  is  our  answer?  We  cannot  do 

10  Matthew  XXIV:  29  ff. 

11  Mark  IX:  43-45;  Matthew  XXIV:  51;  XXV:  30;  XII: 
32. 

12  Matthew  VII:  13,  14. 

13  Matthew  XX :  16. 

14  Matthew  XIII :  12  ff. 


FREEDOM  AND  PESSIMISM 


93 


away  with  the  words  of  Jesus  by  textual  or 
higher  criticism;  the  evidence  is  not  sufficiently 
strong  to  eliminate  them.  Sentimental  univer- 
salism  and  a  desire  to  make  men  better  that 
Jesus  makes  them  simply  disregards  the  say¬ 
ings  of  Jesus.  Is  Christianity  a  correction  of 
Jesus?  Or  shall  we  follow  Him  and  admit  that 
as  far  as  the  multitude  of  men  are  concerned 
hope  must  be  abandoned?  Is  freedom  a  failure 
through  the  blindness  of  men?  Perhaps  there 
is  a  clue  to  a  solution  if  we  put  a  pragmatic 
value  upon  the  words  of  Christ.  He  may 
desire  to  awaken  men  from  the  thraldom  of  sin 
and  evil  by  stressing  the  awfulness  of  sin  and 
its  consequences.  Because  He  loves  the  people 
He  warns  against  the  drifting  with  the  crowd 
that  does  not  seek  the  good.  The  power  of  the 
love  of  Christ  for  men  impels  Him  to  testify  so 
definitely.  The  emphasis  of  the  rescuing 
teacher  and  savior  ought  possibly  not  be  inter¬ 
preted  as  a  mathematical  statement  or  a  his¬ 
torical  fact  of  the  future.  The  freedom  with 
its  risks  must  be  appreciated  to  stimulate  men 
to  make  the  right  choice  of  liberty  in  the  good. 
Actually  the  impress  of  Christian  truth  on  the 
whole  agrees  with  the  outcome  of  the  other 
arguments  considered,  in  showing  the  possibil¬ 
ity  of  meliorism,  i.  e.,  of  becoming  better  if  we 
have  the  best  in  view.  Nevertheless  the  power 
of  evil  must  be  reckoned  with  and  there  can 
be  no  easy  optimism  as  a  fact.  Optimism  must 
be  a  belief  resting  rather  on  the  value  of  the 
good  than  on  the  immediate  action  of  men.  It 
cannot  be  made  a  self-evolving  process,  but  the 
result  of  the  free  choice  of  men  as  they  are  led 


94 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


to  recognize  the  good  and  as  they  are  willing  to 
accept  the  motives  of  ethics  and  the  sanctions 
of  religion. 


REFERENCES 

Frank  Thilly,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chapter  X. 

Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chapters  III,  IV,  VII. 
Arthur  Schopenhauer,  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  Vol.  I, 
Book  IV,  Vol.  II,  Appendix  <to  Book  IV. 

Arthur  Schopenhauer,  Parerga,  Chapters  XI,  XII,  XIV. 
Sully,  Pessimism,  A  History  and  Criticism. 

W.  Mallock,  Is  Life  Worth  Living. 

Nordau,  Degeneration. 

Lothrop  Stoddard,  The  Revolt  against  Civilization. 
Duehring,  Der  Werth  des  Lebens. 

Hartmann,  Zur  Geschichte  und  Begruendung  des  Pessimismus. 
William  MeDougall,  Is  America  Safe  For  Democracy? 

E.  A.  Ross,  The  Old  World  in  the  New. 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS 

What  do  we  mean  by  the  leading  ethical 
ideas?  In  every  science  there  are  some  great 
underlying  and  controlling  ideas  which  give 
an  insight  into  the  inner  nature  of  the  science. 
In  whatever  way  these  ideas  are  defined  and 
understood  indicates  how  the  whole  problem  of 
a  science  may  be  solved.  The  ideas  are  clothed 
into  words  whose  meaning  and  import  must  be 
studied  to  arrive  at  the  ideas.  Terms  are  fre¬ 
quently  employed  without  careful  study  and 
thus  confusion  is  caused.  It  was  in  conse¬ 
quence  of  this  difficulty  that  Locke  set  aside 
several  chapters1  on  the  use  of  words  in  his 
Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding.  And 
in  similar  manner  Bertrand  Russell  thinks  it 
worth  while  to  study  words  for  the  sake  of 
ideas.2 

What  are  the  ideas  that  recur  again  and 
again  in  the  study  of  ethics?  We  shall  find 
that  we  cannot  go  very  far  in  the  consideration 
and  discussion  of  any  question  in  morals  with¬ 
out  coming  into  contact  with  the  terms 
“ideals,”  “ends,”  “the  good,”  “right,” 
“duty,”  “virtue.”  These  are  the  recurrent 

iBook  III. 

2  The  Analysis  of  Mind,  Chapter  X,  p.  188  ff. 

95 


96 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


terms  employed  in  every  ethical  study.  It  was 
Sclileiermacher  who  at  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  century  critized  former  ethical  study 
and  called  the  attention  to  ideal,  duty  and  vir¬ 
tue  as  the  three  great  ethical  ideas.  As  ethi¬ 
cal  writers  think  of  these  terms  and  ideas  they 
will  see  the  whole  problem  of  life. 

What  are  ideals?  No  term  is  more  often 
upon  our  lips  than  the  word  “ideal.”  Where 
does  it  come  from  and  what  does  it  mean! 
We  must  go  back  to  Plato  to  find  an  answer. 
According  to  this  thinker  the  real  world  was 
not  to  be  found  in  our  direct  experiences  of 
sense.  These  were  thought  to  be  only  shadows 
in  a  cave.3  The  essential  realitv  was  in  the 
forms  and  shapes  of  thought.  These  existed 
apart  as  eternal  beings  in  the  upper  world  of 
pure  thought.  Nothing  that  we  experienced  in 
sense  was  supposed  to  have  any  reality  except 
so  far  as  it  participated  in  the  “ideas” 
(Thought-forms).  The  application  of  ideas  to 
all  things  could  not  be  sustained  in  the  long 
run.  But  the  great  ideas  of  Plato  were  ideas 
like  beauty,  truth,  courage,  temperance,  etc., 
leading  to  the  highest  idea,  the  good.  It  was 
after  all  the  permanence  of  the  ethical  and  its 
objective  existence  which  Plato  sought.  Now 
these  moral  ideas  and  spiritual  realities  have 
come  to  be  designated  as  ideals.  Ideals  are 
great  existent  spiritual  realities  that  we  are  to 
reach  up  to.  Such  conceptions  as  righteous¬ 
ness,  or  truth,  or  honesty,  call  for  an  answer. 
Are  they  mere  conventions  arrived  at  in  the 


s  The  Republic,  Book  VII,  514. 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS  97 


course  of  human  experience,  and  do  they  mean 
simply  certain  customary  practices  combined 
in  a  common  name!  Or  are  they  powers  mak¬ 
ing  for  right  in  the  world  whether  men  accept 
them  or  not!  Do  they  testify  to  an  inviolable 
moral  order  not  of  human  making!  Are  they 
evidences  of  the  essential  moral  implications  of 
the  universe!  Are  men  makers  of  ideals  or 
followers  of  them!  What  is  the  strength  of 
the  appeal  of  justice,  purity,  etc.! 

The  modern  advocates  of  development  oppose 
every  claim  of  great  objective  ideals.  They 
attack  the  value  of  independent  moral  ideals. 
Professor  Dewey  well  represents  this  attitude. 
He  claims  that  the  thought  of  the  ideal  which 
is  an  actuating  force  in  Plato  rests  upon  the 
conception  that:  “ Moral  realities  must  be 
supreme.”4  He  continues:  “Yet  they  are 
flagrantly  contradicted  in  a  world  where  a 
Socrates  drinks  the  hemlock  of  the  criminal, 
and  where  the  vicious  occupy  the  seats  of  the 
mighty.  Hence  there  must  be  a  truer  ultimate 
reality  in  which  justice  is  only  and  absolutely 
justice.  ’  ’ 5  There  is  no  sympathy  on  the  part 
of  the  pragmatist  Dewey  with  this  hope.  He 
sees  only  the  present  functioning  and  success  of 
ideals  in  human  striving,  and  claims:  “An 
ideal  becomes  a  synonym  for  whatever  is 
inspiring — and  impossible.  Then,  since  intelli¬ 
gence  cannot  be  wholly  suppressed,  the  ideal 
is  hardened  by  thought  into  some  high,  far- 
away  object.  It  is  so  elevated  and  so  distant 
that  it  does  not  belong  to  this  world  or  to  ex- 

4  Human  Nature  and  Conduct,  p.  50. 

5  Ibid.  p.  50. 


98 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


perience.  It  is  in  technical  language  trans¬ 
cendental;  in  common  speech,  supernatural,  of 
heaven  not  of  earth.  The  ideal  is  then  a  goal 
of  final  exhaustive,  comprehensive  perfection 
which  can  be  defined  only  by  complete  con¬ 
trast  with  the  actual.  Although  impossible  of 
realization  and  conception,6  it  is  still  regarded 
as  the  source  of  generous  discontent  with 
actualities  and  of  all  inspiration  to  progress. ’  ’ 7 
This  dream-world  with  its  unattainable  perfec¬ 
tion  is  rejected.  “  Sufficient  unto  the  day  is 
the  evil  thereof.  Sufficient  it  is  to  stimulate  us 
to  remedial  action,  to  endeavor  in  order  to  con¬ 
vert  strife  into  harmony,  monotony  into  a 
variegated  scene,  and  limitation  into  expansion. 
The  converting  is  progress,  the  only  progress 
conceivable  or  attainable  by  man.  Hence 
every  situation  has  its  own  measure  and  qual¬ 
ity  of  progress,  and  the  need  for  progress  is 
recurrent,  constant.”8  But  what  causes  pro¬ 
gress?  There  are  certain  driving  ideals  whose 
content  changes  but  whose  power  is  not  derived 
from  the  varying  course  of  experience.  If  pro¬ 
gress  is  going  somewhere  whither  is  it  going? 
The  denial  of  ideals  above  man  makes  a  shift¬ 
ing  morality.  Of  course  the  ideals  must  be 
incorporated  into  life,  but  where  there  is  no 
high  idealism  in  morals,  and  we  simply  call 
that  right  which  happens  to  obtain  at  any  time 
and  which  works,  we  shall  not  advance.  Our 
wagon  must  be  hitched  to  a  star  no  matter  how 


6  The  denial  of  the  coneeivability  of  the  ideal  is  a  misrepre¬ 
sentation. 

7  Ibid.  p.  260. 

8  Ibid.  p.  282. 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS  99 


far  away  the  star  is.  The  readily  attainable 
ideal  is  a  moral  failure.  Our  present  moral 
progress  is  so  uncertain  just  because  we  have 
sunk  our  ideals  into  the  slough  of  expediency. 
We  have  lost  faith  in  a  final  moral  order,  and 
making  our  morals  without  ideals  we  are  stuck 
in  the  morass  of  doubt  as  to  permanent  moral 
ideas. 

There  is  an  ideal  in  which  man  believes  con¬ 
stantly,  which  leads  to  a  better  state  of  life. 
What  helps  to  this  realization?  It  is  not  the 
outcome  of  a  mere  process  and  does  not  rely  on 
functioning  alone.  Thomas  Hill  Green  is  right 
when  he  posits  a  divine  principle  “as  the 
ground  of  human  will  and  reason;  as  realizing 
itself  in  man;  as  having  capabilities  of  which 
the  full  development  would  constitute  the  per¬ 
fection  of  human  life;  of  direction  to  objects 
contributary  to  this  perfection  as  characteris¬ 
tic  of  a  good  will.  ’  ’ 9  This  divine  principle  is 
the  ideal.  To  surrender  it  means  to  lose  the 
real  incitement  to  moral  progress.  Right 
would  not  be  right,  nor  justice  be  justice  unless 
they  had  more  than  a  temporal  basis.  Our 
understanding  and  practice  may  be  imperfect, 
but  the  perfect  beckons  us  on  as  we  believe  in 
it  amid  the  encircling  gloom.  The  pragmatist 
has  no  kindly  light,  but  only  a  relative  practice 
which  he  follows.  It  is  true  that  the  historic 
fortunes  of  an  ideal  are  not  always  fortunate. 
The  ideal  does  not  always  control  events.  Will 
its  abandonment,  or  its  transferral  into  the 
passing  thoughts  of  changing  days,  help  us? 
If  the  recognition  of  an  eternal  meaning  in 
9  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chapter  II,  p.  214. 


100 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


justice  has  had  such  a  struggle  in  mankind, 
will  the  denial  of  the  right  as  right,  as  God  is 
God,  produce  better  results?  Hobhouse  has  a 
glimpse  of  the  value  of  the  necessity  of  God  to 
make  the  ideal  permanent,  when  he  says  :10 
“When  God  has  become  the  ideal  of  goodness 
— a  position  only  reached  at  an  advanced  stage 
of  religious  development — it  would  certainly 
seem  that  the  character  attributed  to  God  must 
reflect  the  essential  elements  of  perfection  as 
conceived  by  man.”  To  bring  the  ideal  into 
life  constantly,  to  elevate  every  stage  of  moral 
advance,  is  always  necessary.  For  this  reason 
it  is  best  to  describe  ethics  under  the  convic¬ 
tion  of  the  ideal.  The  effort  must  be  to  sum 
up  our  aims  under  some  controlling  ideal  which 
finally  reaches  up  into  God.  The  positing  of 
freedom  is  an  effort  at  such  an  ideal,  and  we 
must  endeavor  to  find  its  real  content.11 

The  good  and  the  end.  What  do  we  really 
mean  by  the  term  good?  How  is  it  related  to 
the  end?  These  fundamental  queries  receive 
varying  answers,  just  as  in  the  problem  of  the 
ideal,  according  to  the  fundamental  view  we 
take  of  life.  Professor  Dewey  represents  the 
pure  developmentalists,  when  he  states:  “In 
quality,  the  good  is  never  twice  alike.  It 
never  copies  itself.  It  is  new  every  morning, 
fresh  every  evening.  It  is  unique  in  its  every 
presentation.  Por  it  marks  the  resolution  of  a 
distinctive  complication  of  competing  habits 
and  impulses  which  can  never  repeat  itself.12 

10  The  Rational  Good,  p.  15. 

11  See  below,  Chapter  IX. 

1 2  Human  Nature  and  Conduct,  p.  211. 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS  101 

The  good  is  wholly  therefore  within  the  psycho¬ 
logical  process.  There  is  no  fixed  good  and  no 
final  good  beyond  the  immediate  experience. 
Hobhouse  also  begins  with  the  good  as  within 
experience.  He  says:  “What  is  good  appears, 
generically,  as  an  element  of  experience  which 
is  in  harmony  with  feeling.  ”  13  “  Good  is  a 

harmony  of  experience  and  feeling.”14  It 
“signifies  something  which,  in  the  connection 
in  which  it  is  applicable,  moves  feeling,  and 
through  feeling  disposes  to  action.  ’ 1 15  But 
Hobhouse  is  not  content  with  the  mere  imme¬ 
diacy  of  the  good  as  feeling.  He  believes  that 
it  must  be  rationally  demonstrable.  And  the 
rational  good  is  the  fulfillment  of  vital  capacity 
as  a  whole.16  Furthermore  “the  rational  good 
is  objective,” 17  and  “the  function  of  the 
rational  impulse  in  practice  is  to  embrace  this 
world  in  a  single  system  of  purposes.”  18  Hob¬ 
house  holds  to  the  Platonic  ideal  of  harmony, 
but  not  like  Plato  through  a  balance  of  fixed 
psychological  faculties  in  man.  He  rather 
thinks  of  the  harmony  as  a  principle  in  a  devel¬ 
oping  world  of  discord.  But  this  principle 
making  for  the  good,  is  a  teleological  prin¬ 
ciple.19  There  is  a  realization  that  develop¬ 
ment  cannot  be  development  without  an  end  or 
purpose.  This  purpose  is  the  good.  And  thus 
we  have  arrived  at  the  conception  regnant  since 

13  The  Rational  Good,  p.  93. 

14  Ibid.  p.  96. 

15  Ibid.  p.  80. 

i«  Ibid.  198,  156. 

17  Ibid.  p.  99. 

is  Ibid.  p.  100. 

19  Ibid.  p.  226. 


102 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


Aristotle  that  the  good  is  an  objective  finality. 
If  this  idea  is  lost  we  can  only  know  of  change 
but  not  of  development.20 

What,  then,  is  the  good?  In  general  usage 
what  does  it  signify?  A  good  axe  is  an  axe 
that  answers  its  purpose  by  cutting  well.  A 
good  horse  is  a  horse  with  the  qualities  and 
characteristics  that  make  it  usable  because  it 
answers  the  purpose  of  a  horse.  It  was  Aris¬ 
totle  that  made  this  signification  of  good  clear 
for  all  times.  He  well  says  at  the  opening  of 
his  ethics:  “The  good  is  that  at  which  every¬ 
thing  aims.”  21  Everything  aims  at  some  good, 
but  we  must  try  to  find  some  absolute  good. 
“If  then  there  be  one  end  of  all  that  man  does, 
this  end  will  be  the  realizable  good — or  these 
ends  if  there  be  more  than  one.”22  “But  the 
best  of  all  things  must,  we  conceive,  be  some¬ 
thing  final.  If  then  there  be  only  one  final  end, 
this  will  be  what  we  are  seeking, — or  if  there 
be  more  than  one,  then  the  most  final  of 
them.  ’  ’ 23  But  it  is  by  finding  what  is  the  func¬ 
tion  of  man  as  man  that  we  shall  ascertain  this 
good.  In  this  manner  Aristotle  approaches 
the  ethical  problem  of  the  good  as  in  harmony 
with  the  final  cause  exhibited  in  the  whole 
universe.24  Despite  modern  attacks  upon  Aris¬ 
totle  he  has  not  been  surpassed  in  the  logical 
formulation  of  purpose  and  end  as  involved  in 
the  conception  of  development.  And  it  is  only 

20  Of.  Hobhouse,  Development  and  Purpose. 

21  The  Nicomachean  Ethics,  transl.  by  F.  H.  Peters,  p.  7. 

22  Ibid.  p.  13. 

23  Ibid.  p.  13. 

24  Of.  Sir  A.  Grant,  The  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  Vol.  I,  Essay 
IV,  p.  221  ft. 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS  103 


the  superficiality  of  modern  thinking  that  has 
dared  to  propose  the  mere  process  of  evolution 
as  a  solution  of  all  things,  a  process  which  is 
“going  but  we  know  not  where.” 

With  such  a  conception  of  good  the  question 
of  one  of  many  ends  in  the  moral  life  also 
receives  its  solution.  Professor  Dewey,  who 
has  not  profited  from  such  enlightenment  as 
Hobhouse  could  have  given  him,  persists  in  an 
unqualified  attack  upon  Aristotle.  Speaking 
of  the  Aristotelian  view  of  the  end  in  nature, 
he  continues:  “Such  a  view,  consistent  and 
systematic,  was  foisted  by  Aristotle25  upon 
western  culture  and  endured  for  two  thousand 
years.  When  the  notion  was  expelled  from 
natural  science26  by  the  intellectual  revolution 
of  the  seventeenth  century  it  should  also  have 
disappeared  from  the  theory  of  human 
action.  ’  ’ 27  But  it  has  not  disappeared  because 
it  is  essential  to  human  character  and  conduct. 
Hobhouse  knows  that:  “If  a  man  has  no  domi¬ 
nating  purpose  or  creed  that  effectively  directs 
his  life  as  a  whole,  he  has  as  a  rule  threads  and 
finaments  of  purpose  running  through  and  con¬ 
necting  branches  of  his  conduct. ’  ’ 28  The  ulti¬ 
mate  end  is  however  harmony  through  develop¬ 
ment.  Ethical  theory  demands  a  teleological 
view  of  reality  and  defines  the  nature  of  the 

25  Could  Aristotle  have  foisted  anything  upon  the  world,  if 
it  had  not  met  the  demands  of  human  thought.  This  kind  of 
modern  criticism  of  Aristotle  on  the  part  of  those  who  are 
devotees  of  natural  science,  and  do  not  know  other  departments 
of  life  from  within,  is  a  sad  commentary  upon  broad  knowledge 
in  America. 

26  To  the  loss  of  a  consistent  philosophy  of  the  universe. 

27  Ibid.  p.  224. 

28  Ibid.  p.  20. 


104 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


end.  In  the  pursuit  of  the  end  there  dare  not 
be  mere  abstraction.  And  the  advocates  of 
the  end  recognize  this  fact  and  are  more  consis¬ 
tent  than  those  who  have  shifting  aims  without 
a  single,  dominating  purpose  for  life.  T.  H. 
Green  speaks  for  the  idealists  when  he  says: 
“The  idea,  unexpressed  and  inexpressible,  of 
some  absolute  and  all-embracing  end  is,  no 
doubt,  the  source  of  such  devotion,  but  it  can 
only  take  effect  in  the  fulfillment  of  some  par¬ 
ticular  function  in  which  it  finds  but  restricted 
utterance.  ’  ’ 29  The  great  end  must  be  trans¬ 
lated  into  individual  deeds  and  acts.  This  is 
its  acceptance  and  interpretation.  Thus  free¬ 
dom,  which  we  make  the  end,  must  receive  con¬ 
tent  through  all  the  moral  choices  and  delibera¬ 
tions  of  man.  Nevertheless  it  remains  as  an 
end  inviting  us  to  an  ever  higher  and  better  life 
and  bestowing  upon  us  the  chance  of  real 
liberty. 

Rights  or  right?  What  is  meant  by  rights? 
In  the  eighteenth  century  the  doctrine  of  rights 
was  developed.  It  claimed  that  man  had 
inherent  rights,  such  as  the  right  of  life,  liberty 
and  happiness.  The  French  Revolution  aided 
in  adding  to  national  declarations  the  sacred 
right  of  property.  These  rights  were  regarded 
in  a  purely  individual  manner,  and  were  sup¬ 
posed  to  belong  by  nature  to  the  individual. 
They  produced  an  individualistic  and  atomistic 
view  of  life  and  conflicted  in  essence  with  the 
reality  of  common  and  social  rights.  In  addi¬ 
tion  happiness  and  liberty  are  rather  ends  than 


29  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chapter  II,  p.  216. 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS  105 


rights,  and  life  is  better  regarded  as  a  posses¬ 
sion.  The  absolute  right  of  property  is  never 
really  individual  but  rests  on  the  will  of  society, 
and  has  no  place  as  absolute  in  vital  religion. 
The  counterbalance  of  duty30  is  not  adequate  to 
meet  the  claim  of  rights  in  their  individualistic 
sense. 

The  modern  claimants  of  development  also 
believe  merely  in  rights  in  opposition  to  right. 
Hobhouse  confuses  the  issue  by  rejecting  what 
he  considers  “the  fanaticism  of  abstract  right,’ ’ 
in  the  interest  of  the  principle  of  harmony  in 
which  “there  is  no  absolute  right  short  of  the 
entire  system  of  human  well-being.  ’  ’ 31  But 
the  well-being  of  men  as  a  harmony  does  de¬ 
mand  a  right  as  supreme.  Dewey  as  usual  is 
the  radical  rejector  of  every  great  ideal.  He 
thinks  that  the  advocates  of  right  are  anti- 
empirical  and  neglect  social  conditions.32  In 
his  opinion:  “Bight  is  only  an  abstract  name 
for  the  multitude  of  concrete  demands  in  action 
which  others  impress  upon  us,  and  of  which  we 
are  obliged,  if  we  would  live,  to  take  some 
account.  Its  authority  is  the  exigency  of  their 
demands,  the  efficacv  of  their  insistencies.  ’  ’ 33 
But  what  gives  power  to  social  insistency  but 
the  ideal  of  right.  Mere  rights  could  never 
become  such  without  the  impelling  belief  of 
right  back  of  them.  To  describe  how  men  see 
rights  does  not  tell  the  why  and  wherefore. 
The  ideal  of  right  in  morals  makes  the  rights. 


so  Of.  Mazzini,  The  Duty  of  Man. 

31  Ibid.  p.  189. 

32  Ibid.  p.  324. 

33  Ibid.  p.  326. 


106 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


Right  is  the  standard  of  the  good.  It  is  the 
end  translated  into  the  idea  of  law.  Just  as 
the  functioning  conscience  has  law,34  so  there 
is  the  idea  of  a  supreme  standard  which  em¬ 
bodies  the  good.  Grotius  had  insight  into  this 
meaning  of  right,  when  he  said :  ‘  6  There  is  also 
a  third  signification  of  the  word  right,  which 
has  the  same  meaning  as  law  taken  in  its  most 
extensive  sense,  to  denote  a  rule  of  moral 
action,  obliging  us  to  do  what  is  proper. 9 9 35  If 
the  end  is  to  be  summed  up  into  freedom,  the 
right  must  be  the  law  of  liberty  that  in  all  its 
details  gives  voice  to  the  right  of  the  law. 
This  right  is  the  natural  right  in  ethics.  And 
of  this  it  can  justly  be  said:  “Now  the  law  of 
nature  is  so  unalterable,  that  it  cannot  be 
changed  even  by  God  himself.  ’  ’ 36  With  such 
a  conception  of  right  in  the  law  of  liberty,  that 
God  who  gave  us  liberty  cannot  change  its 
right,  we  receive  a  basis  for  right  that  gives  it 
proper  authority  and  worth.  The  pluralists  of 
rights  have  only  social  usage  and  usefulness 
with  their  changes  as  a  foundation.  There  is 
therefore  no  essential  right  left  for  the  rights. 
Rights  have  ceased  to  have  the  quality  of  right. 
We  are  then  compelled  to  stand  for  right,  and 
to  find  in  separate  rights  its  interpretation  but 
not  its  fulfillment,  which  is  given  only  in  its 
inherent  idea. 

What  is  duty?  When  we  have  considered 
the  right  carefully  it  leads  us  to  the  question: 
What  is  its  import?”  The  right  includes  an 

34=  See  above,  p.  57. 

35  The  Rights  of  War  and  Peace,  Book  I,  Chapter  I,  par.  IX. 

ss  Grotius,  Ibid.  Book  I,  Chapter  I,  par.  X. 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS  107 


obligation,  and  when  we  accept  the  obligation 
of  the  right  we  have  recognized  our  duty.  Our 
duty  is  what  we  owe.  “The  word,  I  need  not 
say,  expresses  that  there  is  something  which  is 
due  from  me, — which  I  owe — which  I  ought  to 
do.  Nor  perhaps  is  it  insignificant,  that  the 
tenses  of  this  verb  have  lost  their  distinction, 
and  one  alone,  and  that  the  past  is  made  to 
serve  for  all;  as  if  to  show  that  obligation 
escapes  the  conditions  of  time,  and  is  less  a 
phenomenon  than  an  essential  and  eternal  real¬ 
ity,  which,  however,  manifested  at  the  moment, 
is  not  new  to  it.  In  any  case  the  word  ex¬ 
presses  the  sense  we  have  of  a  debt  which 
others  have  a  right  to  demand  from  us,  and 
which  we  are  bound  to  pay.”  37 

But  the  sense  of  the  ought  of  duty  is  disputed 
by  the  mere  describers  of  development.  Some 
of  them  find  in  ought  simply  the  expectancy 
which  prior  experience  has  created  of  a  certain 
regularity  of  procedure.  When  we  go  into  a 
laboratory  we  know  that  if  we  mix  two  parts 
of  hydrogen  with  one  part  of  oxygen  we  ought 
to  have  water.  This  result  is  looked  forward 
to  and  ought  to  come  about.  Human  actions 
are  analyzed  in  the  same  manner.  An  honest 
deed  ought  to  be  done  because  it  lies  in  the  ex¬ 
pectancy  of  society  from  us,  and  if  our  conduct 
is  regular  it  will  follow.  But  duty  does  not 
function  in  this  impersonal  way  like  a  natural 
process.  The  element  of  its  emotional  obliga¬ 
tion  impressing  itself  upon  us  is  entirely  neg¬ 
lected  in  this  explanation.  Therefore  other 

37  Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  Vol.  II,  Book  I, 
Chapter  I,  p.  19. 


108 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


developmental  thinkers  are  silent  altogether 
about  duty. 

Duty  comes  to  us  with  a  claim.  “The  moral 
judgment  imposes  on  us  an  obligation.  It  says 
this  is  right  and  that  is  wrong,  this  is  what  you 
must,  that  what  you  must  not  do.  It  seems  to 
state  a  fact  and  also  to  impose  a  command.”38 
The  command  is  the  law  of  conscience  now 
accepted  by  us  as  right.  Out  of  it  arises  the: 
“Do  this.”  The  command  comes  out  of  our 
self.  “When  I  do  a  thing  that  is  right  because 
it  is  right  I  do  it  for  a  reason  which  I  myself 
acknowledge  as  good,  and  binding  me  because 
it  is  good.  ’  ’ 39  It  is  Kant  who  has  largely 
stressed  duty.  He  holds  that  a  moral  action, 
gets  its  value  not  from  its  object,  but  its  prin¬ 
ciple.  He  goes  so  far  as  to  say:  “A  man’s  will 
is  good,  not  because  the  consequences  which 
flow  from  it  are  good,  nor  because  it  is  capable 
of  attaining  the  ends  which  it  seeks,  but  it 
is  good  in  itself,  or  because  it  wills  the  good.”  40 
“Duty  is  the  obligation  to  act  from  reverence 
for  law.”41  The  command  of  duty  is  an  im¬ 
perative.  The  imperative  need  not  be  followed, 
but  is  accepted  if  we  are  really  reasonable. 
But  the  imperative  is  not  a  means  to  some¬ 
thing  else,  i.  e.,  it  is  not  hypothetical,  but 
categorical.  There  is  nothing  problematic 
about  it.  “This  imperative  is  categorical.  It 
has  to  do,  not  with  the  matter  of  an  action  and 
the  result  expected  to  follow  from  it,  but  simply 


38  Hobhouse,  Ibid.  p.  105. 
ss  Hobhouse,  Ibid.  p.  106. 

40  The  Metaphysic  of  Morality,  Section  I. 
44  Ibid.  Section  I. 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS  109 


with  the  form  and  principle  from  which  action 
itself  proceeds.  The  action  is  essentially  good, 
let  the  consequences  be  what  they  may.  This 
imperative  may  be  called  the  imperative  of 
morality.  ’  ’ 42  The  Kantian  emphasis  upon  duty 
has  gone  too  far  in  two  directions.  First,  it 
almost  discounts  the  good  as  an  end.  The  con¬ 
ception  of  the  good  is  cancelled  in  favor  of  duty. 
A  number  of  modern  moralists  have  followed 
Kant  in  the  effort  to  make  duty  the  one 
ethical  idea.  But  the  absoluteness  of  the  claim, 
although  it  shows  great  moral  earnestness,  is 
one-sided  and  does  not  permit  of  the  conception 
of  ethical  development.  After  all  the  Aristo¬ 
telian  concept  of  end  and  purpose  in  truer,  and 
more  efficiently  answers  the  whole  moral  de¬ 
mand.  Second,  the  stressing  of  the  imperative 
conceals  the  danger  of  elevating  the  strong  and 
compelling  appeal  of  duty  into  the  idea  of  force. 
Some  later  writers  have  used  terminology  which 
makes  duty  almost  a  power  that  makes  us  unfree. 
In  her  book  on:  4 ‘The  Good  Man  and  The 
Good,”  Mary  W.  Calkins  attempts  to  unify 
freedom  and  duty,  when  she  states :  6  1  The  expla¬ 
nation  of  the  paradoxical  combination  in  the 
moral  experience  of  the  seemingly  inconsistent 
factors  of  submission  and  freedom  lies  precisely 
herein:  in  the  fact  that  the  law  to  which  I  sub¬ 
mit  is  neither  an  inexplorable  nature-law,  or 
uniformity,  nor  yet  an  external  social  law — the 
imposition  of  another’s  will — but  is  rather,  the 
law,  the  imperative  which  I,  as  ruling  self, 
impose  on  myself,  as  compelled  self.  ’  ’ 43  The 

42  Ibid.  Section  II. 

43  p.  13. 


110 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


“compelled  self”  is  almost  too  strong  a  term, 
and  implies  bondage  to  the  “ruling  self.” 

The  better  solution  is  to  follow  the  suggestion 
of  duty  with  its  authority  in  the  same  direction 
as  we  follow  the  indications  of  the  law  of  con¬ 
science.44  Can  its  authority  be  found  in  our¬ 
selves  or  in  society?  “Suppose  the  case  of  one 
lone  man  in  an  atheistic  world;  could  there 
really  exist  any  ‘  authority  ’  of  higher  over  lower 
within  the  enclosure  of  his  detached  personality  ? 
I  cannot  conceive  it;  and  did  he,  under  such 
conditions,  feel  such  a  thing,  he  would  then, 
I  should  say,  feel  a  delusion,  and  have  his  con¬ 
sciousness  adjusted  to  the  wrong  universe.  For 
surely  if  this  sense  of  authority  means  any¬ 
thing,  it  means  the  discernment  of  something 
higher  than  we,  having  claims  on  our  self — 
therefore  no  mere  part  of  it; — hovering  over 
and  transcending  our  personality,  though  also 
mingling  with  our  consciousness  and  manifested 
through  its  intimations.  ’  ’ 45  This  higher  than 
our  self  Martineau  cannot  find  in  a  phenomenon 
or  in  the  universe  bnt  only  in  the  personality  of 
God.  When  ethics  thus  leads  beyond  itself  it 
does  not  make  duty  absolutistic  like  Kant  and 
give  it  no  final  basis,  but  it  acknowledges  our 
freedom  rightly  and  fully  even  in  the  face  of 
the  claim  of  duty.  At  the  same  time  authority 
becomes  the  authority  of  the  God  who  wills  our 
goodness  through  our  freedom.  The  balance 
between  the  authority  of  duty  and  our  liberty 
is  assured. 

What  are  virtues?  The  definition  of  virtues 

44  See  above,  p.  57. 

*5  <  ‘  Martineau,  Ibid.  Vol.  II,  Book  I,  Chapter  IV,  p.  104. 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS  111 


must  follow  duty.  Virtues  are  the  habits  that 
are  formed  by  doing  our  duties.  They  become 
the  customary  actions  of  our  doing  the  good. 
Now  what  are  these  habits  indicative  of!  Are 
they  mere  natural  adjustments  in  varying  situa¬ 
tions!  Dewey  thinks  that  he  can  bring  morals 
to  earth  be  naturalizing  virtues.  In  his  view: 
“Honesty,  chastity,  malice,  peevishness,  cour¬ 
age,  triviality,  industry,  irresponsibility  are  not 
private  possessions  of  a  person.  They  are 
working  adaptations  of  personal  capacities  with 
environing  forces.  All  virtues  and  vices  are 
habits  which  incorporate  objective  forces.  They 
are  interactions  of  elements  contributed  by  the 
make-up  of  an  individual  with  elements  sup¬ 
plied  by  the  out-door  world.  They  can  be 
studied  as  objectively  as  psychological  functions, 
and  they  can  be  modified  by  change  of  either 
personal  or  social  elements.”  46  In  other  words, 
there  is  no  ethical  ought  involved  in  our  actions 
of  a  habitual  nature.  Our  conduct  in  virtues 
or  vices  is  the  result  of  being  shaped.  We  have 
no  freedom  in  choosing  our  virtues.  Neither 
right  nor  the  good  are  involved.  Men  are 
children  of  a  process  just  like  a  process  in 
physiology.  Whither  has  the  claim  of  liberty 
of  the  pragmatist  gone  !  The  purely  naturalistic 
conception  of  habit  has  led  Dewey  to  destroy 
the  value  of  all  virtues  in  his  philosophy. 

In  order  to  see  the  right  relation  of  habit  to 
virtue  we  must  return  to  the  despised  Aristotle. 
He  says:  “The  virtues,  then  come  neither  by 
nature  nor  against  nature,  but  nature  gives  the 


46  Ibid.  p.  16. 


112 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


capacity  for  acquiring  them,  and  this  is  devel¬ 
oped  by  training.”47  Virtues  are  acquired 
through  doing.  “It  is  by  our  conduct  in  our 
intercourse  with  other  men  that  we  become  just 
or  unjust,  and  by  acting  in  circumstances  of 
danger,  and  training  ourselves  to  feel  fear  or 
confidence,  that  we  become  courageous  or 
cowardly.”48  Virtues  are  trained  powers  for 
the  good.  “The  proper  excellence  or  virtue  of 
man  will  be  the  habit  or  trained  faculty  that 
makes  a  man  good  and  makes  him  perform  his 
function  well.”49  If  we  change  the  term  fac¬ 
ulty  into  fixed  mode  of  action  we  shall  have  an 
entirely  correct  and  modern,  tenable  explana¬ 
tion  of  virtue.  There  is  great  worth  also  in  the 
definition  of  Thomas  Aquinas:50  “Virtue  de¬ 
notes  some  perfection  of  a  power.  The  perfec¬ 
tion  of  everything  is  estimated  chiefly  in  regard 
to  its  end:  now  the  end  of  power  is  action:  hence 
a  power  is  said  to  be  perfect  inasmuch  as  it  is 
determined  to  its  act.  Now  there  are  powers 
which  are  determined  of  themselves  to  their 
acts,  as  the  active  powers  of  physical  nature. 
But  the  rational  powers,  which  are  proper  to 
man,  are  not  determined  to  one  line  of  action, 
but  are  open  indeterminately  to  many,  and  are 
determined  to  acts  by  habits.  And  therefore 
human  virtues  are  habits.”  The  virtues  are 
habits  freely  formed  out  of  the  ideal  of  the 
good,  and  seek  to  make  our  life  stable  in  action. 

The  interrelation  of  ethical  ideas.  As  we 


47  Nieomachean  Ethics,  Book  II,  1,  p.  34. 

48  Ibid.  Book  II,  I,  p.  35. 

49  Ibid.  Book  II,  5  p.  45. 

50  Aquinas  Eithicus,  Quest.  LV. 


THE  LEADING  ETHICAL  IDEAS  113 


passed  from  one  to  another  of  the  ruling  ethical 
concepts  there  grew  on  us  the  problem  of  their 
relation  and  connection.  It  is  necessary  to 
obtain  a  unified  view  of  our  ethical  life  and  to 
note  how  the  one  concept  touches  the  other. 
The  ideal  is  the  end  or  purpose  which  we  choose 
to  make  our  actions  one  and  consistent.  Among 
the  many  ends  as  ideals  we  find  the  vital  one  and 
this  becomes  for  us  the  paramount  good.  It  is 
not  one  good  among  many,  but  the  one  supreme 
good  of  morals.  The  good  seeks  expression  in 
the  form  of  a  law  or  standard.  The  right  is  the 
unfoldment  of  the  good.  But  the  obligation  of 
the  right  as  it  is  accepted  by  us  is  what  we  mean 
by  our  duty.  Duty  is  the  ideal  of  the  good 
acknowledged  as  right  and  followed  as  a  call  to 
action.  Virtue  is  the  duty  of  the  good  as  it  has 
become  habit;  and  through  the  economy  of 
habit  it  makes  the  good  the  constant  action  in 
our  life. 


REFERENCES 

Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Book  I,  II,  V. 

Sir  A.  Grant,  The  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  Vol.  I,  Essay  IV. 
Frank  Thilly,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chapter  IX. 

Borden  P.  Bowne,  The  Principles  of  Ethics,  Chapter  I. 

J.  H.  Muirhead,  The  Elements  of  Ethics,  Book  IV,  Chapter  II. 
John  S.  Mackenzie,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  I,  Chapter  III. 
Theo.  Be  Laguna,  Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Ethics, 
Chapter  V. 

Henry  W.  Wright,  Self-Realization,  Part  I,  Chapters  III, 
V,  VI. 

Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics,  Chapter  XIV. 

Durant  Drake,  The  Problem  of  Conduct,  Part  II,  Chapters 
VII,  VIII. 

Mary  W.  Calkins,  The  Good  Man  and  the  Good,  Chapters  I,  II. 
Chas.  D’Arcy,  A  Short  Study  of  Ethics,  Part  II,  Chapters 
I,  IV,  V,  X. 

L.  T.  Hobhouse,  The  Rational  Good,  Chapters  IV,  V. 


114  CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 

G.  T.  Ladd,  What  I  Ought  To  Do,  Chapters  II,  III,  IV,  VII, 
VIII,  IX. 

A.  E.  Taylor,  The  Problem  of  Conduct,  Chapters  II,  III,  IV, 
VII. 

Vladimir  Solovyof,  The  Justification  of  the  Good,  Part  I, 
Chapter  V. 

Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chapters  I,  II,  VII. 

Fr.  Schleiermacher,  Grundlinien  einer  Kritik  der  bisherigen 
Sittenlehre,  Zweites  Buch. 

Arthur  K.  Rogers,  The  Theory  of  Ethics,  Chapters  I,  III, 
IV,  VI,  VII,  VIII,  IX. 


PART  II — THE  FINDING  OF  FREEDOM 


CHAPTER  VII 

FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE 

The  claim  of  pleasure.  After  our  discussion 
of  the  fundamentals  of  the  moral  life  seeking 
freedom  there  arises  the  problem,  how  we  shall 
find  freedom.  What  is  the  good  in  which  and 
through  which  freedom  can  be  realized  ?  Where 
shall  we  seek  the  content  of  freedom?  The 
'  reply  which  has  been  given  very  frequently  in 
the  history  of  morals  is,  that  pleasure  is  the 
real  end  of  life.  It  is  supposed  to  be  the  vital 
part  of  happiness.  Pleasure  is  the  dynamic  of 
action.  The  good  is  the  agreeable  and  the 
pleasurable.  The  true  choice  is  pleasant.  The 
pleasant  is  present  wherever  life  functions 
normally.  In  the  physical  and  natural  world 
it  is  an  indication  of  well-being.  In  the  mental 
life  it  is  equally  true  that  where  the  pleasurable 
exists  there  is  heightening  of  mental  life. 
Pleasure  is  the  unfailing  symptom  of  the  good 
of  freedom.  Liberty  is  joy  in  the  full  and  un¬ 
hampered  exercise  of  life.  On  the  contrary  pain 
is  the  evidence  of  some  disturbance  in  life.  It 
is  the  accompaniment  of  disease  in  the  body. 
In  the  mind  the  painful  exists  where  there  is  a 

115 


116 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


lowering*  of  life.  The  restriction  of  freedom  and 
its  nndue  limitation  always  produce  the  rest¬ 
lessness  of  the  pain  of  subjection  or  servitude. 
Does  it  not  follow  therefore  that  we  ought  to 
pursue  pleasure  and  avoid  pain?  Pleasure 
accentuates  the  life  of  feeling.  Without  feeling 
we  cannot  live.  It  is  the  closest  to  ns  and  the 
most  intimately  subjective  of  our  experiences. 
When  we  study  our  life  in  its  full  and  actual 
concrete  existence,  and  ask  what  is  the  real 
material  of  our  experiences,  we  must  admit  that 
feeling  and  sensibility  constitute  that  which 
largely  makes  life,  and  its  value  as  joy  and 
happiness  in  the  full  exercise  of  our  functions 
in  freedom. 

Ancient  hedonism.  Because  of  the  claims  of 
pleasure  we  must  inquire  how  it  has  been  inter¬ 
preted.  How  did  the  theory  of  pleasure,  or 
hedonism,  arise?  Long  before  there  was  any  the¬ 
ory  of  hedonism  men  as  they  lived  their  lives  and 
sought  the  satisfaction  of  their  senses  and  their 
feelings  were  unreflective  adherents  of  pleasure. 
In  the  unmoralized  and  half-moralized  state  of 
society  happiness  was  interpreted  as  pleasure. 
And  wherever  men  today  gravitate  back  to  a 
lower  stage,  or  live  without  careful  moral  ideals 
and  culture,  they  are  hedonists,  livers  in  pleas¬ 
ure  if  not  technical  defenders  of  it.  But  pleasure 
is  not  only  present  at  an  early  stage  as  an  end 
but  it  is  also  constantly  sought  and  found  by 
many  men.  The  first  effort  to  defend  it  as  ethi¬ 
cal  theory  is  made  by  Aristippus,  who  founded 
the  Cyrenaic  school.  Departing  from  the  Socra- 
tic  idea  that  the  pleasures  of  the  soul  are  the 
real  pleasures,  Aristippus  considers  all  pleas- 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  117 


nres  as  alike.  Pleasure  as  pleasure  is  to  be 
desired.  Since  it  is  liigdiest  where  it  is  most 
intense  we  must  seek  the  intense  pleasure. 
There  can  be  no  real  distinction  in  quality  in 
the  pleasures  of  men.  They  can  only  differ  in 
degree.  But  where  can  the  most  intense  pleas¬ 
ures  be  found!  Certainly  not  for  the  average 
man  in  the  intellect.  The  real  seat  of  pleasures 
universally  is  in  the  life  of  sensation  and  feeling. 
But  sensation  and  feeling  as  remembered  are 
not  vitally  real.  They  must  be  enjoyed  in  the 
present.  Life  consists  in  the  immediate  and 
fleeting  moment.  The  enjoyment  of  the  present 
is  happiness  and  liberty.  We  do  not  know  what 
the  future  has  in  store.  Let  us  live  as  children 
of  time.  This  is  the  sunny  side  of  life  forgetting 
the  evil.  The  classic  expression  is  found,  in 
Omar  Khayyam,  when  he  sings: 

“Some  for  the  glories  of  this  world;  and  some 
Sigh  for  the  prophet ’s  paradise  to  come ; 

Ah !  take  the  cash  and  let  the  credit  go, 

Nor  heed  the  rumble  of  a  distant  drum. 

Come,  till  the  cup,  and  in  the  tire  of  spring 
Your  winter-garment  of  repentance  fling; 

The  bird  of  time  has  but  a  little  way 
To  fly — and  lo !  the  bird  is  on  the  wing. 1  ’ 


•  But  there  is  another  form  of  Greek  hedonism 
which  modifies  the  extreme  position  of  Aristip¬ 
pus.  It  was  through  Epicurus  that  the  pleasure 
of  the  moment  was  discarded  for  lasting  pleas¬ 
ure.  He  says:  ‘‘Pleasure  is  our  first  and  kindred 
good.  From  it  is  the  commencement  of  every 
choice  and  every  aversion,  and  to  it  we  come 
back,  and  make  feeling  the  rule  by  which  to 
judge  of  every  good  thing.  And  since  pleasure 


118 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


is  our  first  and  native  good,  for  that  reason  we 
do  not  choose  every  pleasure  whatsoever,  but 
ofttimes  pass  over  many  pleasures  when  a 
greater  annoyance  ensues  from  them.  And 
ofttimes  we  consider  pains  superior  to  pleasures, 
and  submit  to  pain  for  a  long  time,  when  it  is 
attended  for  us  with  greater  pleasure.  ’  ’ 1  Some¬ 
times  a  good  is  treated  as  an  evil,  and  vice  versa 
because  of  the  final  outcome.  “It  is  not  an 
unbroken  succession  of  drinking  feasts  and 
revelry,  not  the  pleasures  of  sexual  love,  nor  the 
enjoyment  of  the  fish  and  other  delicacies  of  a 
splendid  table,  which  produce  a  pleasant  life; 
it  is  sober  reasoning,  searching  out  the  reasons 
for  every  choice  and  avoidance,  and  banishing 
those  beliefs  through  which  greatest  tumults 
take  possession  of  the  soul.  Of  all  this,  the 
beginning  and  the  greatest  good,  is  prudence.” 2 
“And  we  think  contentment  a  great  good,  not 
in  order  that  we  may  never  have  but  a  little,  but 
in  order  that,  if  we  have  not  much,  we  may 
make  use  of  a  little,  being  genuinely  persuaded 
that  those  men  enjoy  luxury  most  completely 
who  are  the  best  able  to  do  without  it;  and  that 
everything  which  is  natural  is  easily  provided, 
and  what  is  useless  is  not  easily  procured.  And 
simple  favors  give  as  much  pleasure  as  costly 
fare,  when  everything  that  can  give  pain,  and 
every  feeling  of  want,  is  removed;  and  corn  and 
water  give  the  most  extreme  pleasure  when  any 
one  in  need  eats  them.”  3  Because  life  did  not 
always  give  even  the  simple  joys  the  Epicu- 

1  Letters  of  Epicurus,  p.  129. 

2  Letters  of  Epicurus,  p.  130. 

3  Epicurean  Ethics,  Book  X,  XXVI. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  119 


reans,  as  well  as  the  Cyrenaics,  at  times  became 
pessimistic.  Then  they  only  hoped  to  be  free 
from  pain  and  fear,  and  to  cultivate  a  temper  of 
indifference  to  pleasure  and  pain.  There  was  a 
search  after  a  tranquility  of  soul  in  which, 
undisturbed  and  unassailed  by  any  change  of 
fortune,  men  could  live  at  ease  fearing  no  event 
of  life  and  having  no  dread  of  death. 

It  is  one  of  the  strange  perversions  which 
ideas  and  terms  sometimes  suffer  in  the  course 
of  history,  when  we  find  that  today  Epicurean¬ 
ism  does  not  signify  the  balanced  and  calm  con¬ 
tentment  of  Epicurus,  but  the  joy  of  the  present 
for  which  Aristippus  contended.  In  most  books 
on  ethics  the  modern  term  is  used  without  doing 
justice  to  Epicurus  himself.  Thus  Dewey  says, 
“Epicureanism  is  too  worldly-wise  to  indulge 
in  attempts  to  base  present  action  upon  precari¬ 
ous  estimates  of  future  and  universal  pleasures 
and  pains.  On  the  contrary  it  says  let  the  future 
go,  for  life  is  uncertain.  Who  knows  when  it 
will  end,  or  what  fortune  the  morrow  will  bring! 
Foster,  then,  with  jealous  care  every  gift  of 
pleasure  now  allotted  to  you,  dwell  upon  it  with 
lingering  love,  prolong  it  as  best  you  may.  ”4 
This  position  is  really  Cyrenaic.  Dewey  does 
not  represent  the  real  Epicurus,  but  only  the 
modern  perversion  of  the  term.  He  follows 
the  present  verbal  usage  and  not  the  original 
historical  facts. 

What  is  utilitarianism?  In  the  teachings  of 
Epicurus  there  are  occasional  references  to  the 
usefulness  of  his  doctrine  of  pleasure.  But  it 
belongs  to  modern  English  ethical  thought  to 

4  Ibid.  p.  205. 


120 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


have  connected  the  idea  of  utility  with  hedon¬ 
ism.  The  country  in  which  were  worked  out  the 
economic  theories  of  Adam  Smith  and  David 
Ricardo  also  produced  a  Jeremy  Bentham  and 
a  John  Stuart  Mill,  both  economist  and  philoso¬ 
pher.  The  economic  utilitarianism  affected 
English  moral  theory,  and  vice  versa.  ‘ 1  To  the 
English  Utilitarian  democracy — which  he  for¬ 
mulated  as  a  logical  deduction  from  principles 
of  ethics  and  psychology — meant,  in  fact,  the 
supremacy  of  his  own  middle  class,  and  Liberty 
meant  the  plenitude  of  opportunity  for  its 
commercial  ambitions.  ’  ’ 5 

The  first  great  formulator6  of  modern  utili¬ 
tarianism  was  Bentham.  He  begins  the  dis¬ 
cussion  of  utility  thus:  “ Nature  has  placed 
mankind  under  the  governance  of  two  sovereign 
masters,  pain  and  pleasure.  It  is  for  them  alone 
to  point  out  what  we  ought  to  do,  as  well  as  to 
determine  what  we  shall  do.  On  the  one  hand 
the  standard  of  right  and  wrong,  on  the  other 
the  chain  of  causes  and  effects,  are  fastened  to 
their  throne.  They  govern  us  in  all  we  do,  in 
all  we  say,  in  all  we  think;  every  effort  we  can 
make  to  throw  off  our  subjection,  will  serve  but 
to  demonstrate  and  confirm  it.  In  words  a  man 
may  pretend  to  adjure  their  empire:  but  in 
reality  he  will  remain  subject  to  it  all  the  while. 
The  principle  of  utility  recognises  the  subjection, 
and  assumes  it  for  the  foundation  of  that  sys¬ 
tem,  the  object  of  which  is  to  rear  the  fabric 
of  felicity  by  the  hands  of  reason  and  law.  ”7 

5  Hobhouse,  The  Kational  Good,  p.  8. 

6  Hume  was  also  utilitarian  in  tendency. 

7  An  Introduction  to  the  Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation, 
Chapter  I,  par.  I. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  121 


Pleasure  is  the  benefit,  the  good,  the  advantage, 
the  happiness  which  utility  produces.  The  ethi¬ 
cal  life  works  its  way  out  like  an  economic 
movement  of  goods.  The  terms  ought ,  right , 
wrong ,  etc.,  only  have  a  value  as  conformable  to 
the  principle  of  utility.  But  utility  does  not 
function  without  certain  sanctions,  which  en¬ 
force  conduct.  “  There  are  four  distinguishable 
sources  from  which  pleasure  and  pain  are  in  use 
to  flow:  considered  separately,  they  may  be 
termed  the  physical,  the  political,  the  moral, 
and  the  religious.”  8  The  physical  follow  from 
the  ordinary  course  of  nature,  the  political  from 
the  persons  who  are  the  sovereign  or  supreme 
ruling  power  in  the  state,  the  moral  from  each 
man’s  spontaneous  disposition,  and  the  religious 
from  a  superior  invisible  being  either  in  the 
present  or  future  life.  Pleasures  and  pains  must 
be  expected  to  issue  from  these  sanctions.  In 
order  to  appreciate  rightly  the  value  of  a  lot  of 
pleasure  and  pain,  and  to  measure  it  correctly, 
Bentham  proposed  what  has  become  known  as 
the  “hedonistic  calculus.”  He  says:  “To  a 
person  considered  by  himself ,  the  value  of  a 
pleasure  or  pain  considered  by  itself ,  will  be 
greater  or  less,  according  to  the  four  following 
circumstances : 

1.  Its  intensity. 

2.  Its  duration. 

3.  Its  certainty  or  uncertainty . 

4.  Its  propinquity  or  remoteness.”  9 

When  applied  to  a  number  of  persons  we  must 

s  Ibid.  Chapter  III,  par.  II. 

» Ibid.  Chapter  IV,  par.  II. 


122 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


add  5.  Its  fecundity .  6.  Its  purity  and  7.  Its 
extent.  In  the  calculated  balance  and  proper 
proportion  of  these  qualities  one  could  find  the 
right  way  to  estimate  and  judge  moral  values 
through  pleasure.  This  calculus  was  sup¬ 
posed  to  be  supported  by  the  practice  of  man¬ 
kind.  When  morals  come  to  the  problem  of 
motives  it  must  be  remembered  that  “pleasure 
is  in  itself  a  good:  nay,  even  setting  aside  im¬ 
munity  from  pain,  the  only  good:  pain  is  in 
itself  an  evil;  and,  indeed,  without  exception, 
the  only  evil;  or  else  the  words  good  and  evil 
have  no  meaning.  And  this  is  alike  true  of 
every  sort  of  pain,  and  of  every  sort  of  pleasure. 
It  follows,  therefore,  immediately  and  incon¬ 
testably,  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  any  sort 
of  motive  that  is  in  itself  a  bad  one.”  10  Man’s 
motives  are  good  or  bad  only  on  account  of 
/their  effects.  They  possess  no  internal  char¬ 
acter.  Any  act  that  produces  pleasure  is  good; 
any  act  from  which  pain  follows  is  bad.  If  e.  g. 
self-sacrifice  brings  pain  it  is  bad.  If  avarice 
produces  pleasure  it  is  good.  Bentham  has 
developed  in  some  respects  the  most  consistent 
and  the  baldest  system  of  utilitarian  hedonism. 

John  Stuart  Mill  with  his  careful,  logical 
mind  has  modified  Bentham.  While  he  admits 
that  the  theory  of  utility  means  nothing  else 
than  the  rule  of  pleasure,  he  frames  this  defini¬ 
tion.  “The  creed  which  accepts  as  the  founda¬ 
tion  of  morals,  Utility,  or  the  Greatest  Happi¬ 
ness  Principle,  holds  that  actions  are  right  in 
proportion  as  they  tend  to  promote  happiness, 


i°  Ibid.  Chapter  X,  par.  X. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  123 


wrong  as  they  tend  to  produce  the  reverse  of 
happiness.  By  happiness  is  intended  pleasure, 
and  the  absence  of  pain;  by  unhappiness,  pain, 
and  the  privation  of  pleasure.  ’  ’ 11  Mill  makes 
two  changes  in  the  doctrine  of  utilitarianism. 
First,  he  distinguishes  between  pleasures  in 
reference  to  their  quality.  There  are  higher 
and  lower  pleasures.  The  higher  are  intellec¬ 
tual  and  agree  better  with  the  dignity  of  man. 
It  is  better  to  be  Socrates  dissatisfied  than  a 
pig  satisfied.  Mill  resents  the  accusation  that 
human  beings  are  “capable  of  no  pleasures 
except  those  of  which  swine  are  capable.”11 
While  it  is  admitted  that  utilitarian  writers 
have  placed  the  superiority  of  mental  over 
bodily  pleasures  in  the  greater  permanency, 
safety,  uncostliness,  etc.,  i.  e.  in  their  circum¬ 
stantial  advantages,  there  is  a  standard  of 
quality.  “Of  two  pleasures,  if  there  be  one  to 
which  all  or  almost  all  who  have  experience  of 
both  give  a  decided  preference,  irrespective  of 
any  moral  obligation  to  prefer  it,  that  is  the 
more  desirable  pleasure.  If  one  of  the  two  is, 
by  those  who  are  competently  acquainted  with 
both,  placed  so  far  above  the  other  that  they 
prefer  it,  even  though  knowing  it  to  be  attended 
with  a  greater  amount  of  discontent,  and  would 
not  resign  it  for  any  quantity  of  the  other 
pleasure  which  their  nature  is  capable  of,  we 
are  justified  in  ascribing  to  the  preferred  enjoy¬ 
ment  a  superiority  in  quality,  so  far  outweigh¬ 
ing  quantity  as  to  render  it,  in  comparison,  of 


n  Utilitarianism,  Chapter  II,  p.  9. 
12  Ibid.  p.  10. 


124 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


small  account. ’  ’ 13  Those  acquainted  with  the 
pleasures  of  sense  and  of  mind  always  prefer 
the  latter (?). 14  The  second  modification  of 
Mill  is  that  the  principle  of  greatest  happiness 
is  made  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest 
number.  It  is  given  a  social  meaning  which  is 
larger  than  that  suggested  in  the  hedonistic 
calculus.  There  must  be  a  rational  balance 
between  individual  and  common  pleasures. 
The  usual  external  and  internal  sanctions  are 
accepted,  but  the  ultimate  sanction  is  found  in 
the  subjective,  conscientious  feelings  of  man¬ 
kind.  The  proof  of  utilitarianism  is  held  to  be 
realized  in  the  fact,  that  human  nature  is  so 
constituted  as  to  desire  nothing  which  is  not 
either  a  part  of  happiness,  or  a  means  of 
happiness. 

Henry  Sidgwick  still  further  rationalizes 
utilitarianism.  He  openly  demands  reason  as 
a  regulative  principle  for  the  distribution  of 
good  through  the  virtues  of  prudence,  benevo¬ 
lence  and  justice.  Nevertheless  the  ultimate 
good  is  found  in  universalistic  hedonism,  which 
may  conveniently  be  designated  by  the  single 
word,  utilitarianism.  Sidgwick  holds  that  “it 
is  an  assertion  incontrovertible  because  taut¬ 
ological,  to  say  that  we  desire  what  is  pleasant, 
or  even  that  we  desire  a  thing  in  proportion  as 
it  appears  pleasant.”  15  And  this  statement  is 
explained  through  the  assumption  that  we 
really  in  all  things  desire  pleasure,  which  is  in 
its  largest  sense  coterminous  with  happiness. 


is  Ibid.  p.  12. 

14  Cf.  The  weak  defense  of  Mill,  Ibid.  p.  12  ff. 
io  Methods  of  Eithies,  Book  I,  Chapter  IV,  par.  2,  p.  44. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  125 


For  if  “  we  ‘  sit  down  in  a  cool  hour,  ’  we  can  only 
justify  to  ourselves  the  importance  that  we 
attach  to  any  of  these  objects16  by  considering 
its  conduciveness,  in  one  way  or  another,  to  the 
happiness  of  sentient  beings.  ’  ’ 17 

Evolution  and  hedonism.  Why  did  an  evo¬ 
lutionary  conception  of  the  theory  of  pleasure 
arise?  There  are  two  reasons  which  caused 
the  utilitarian  form  of  English  ethical  hypothe¬ 
sis  to  become  evolutionary.  First,  the  biologi¬ 
cal  interest  aroused  through  Darwinism  natur¬ 
ally  was  in  sympathy  with  the  idea  of  pleasure, 
for  it  was  connected  as  a  constant  symptom 
with  physical  life  in  its  formal  functioning. 
When  evolution  sought  to  be  the  controlling 
view  of  life  it  found  ready  at  hand  an  ethical 
idea  which  fitted  in  with  its  fundamental 
assumption.  The  continuity  of  utilitarianism 
in  its  hedonic  coloring  was  thus  brought  about 
as  the  evolutionary  point  of  view  gained  in 
acceptance.  The  manner  in  which  hedonism 
could  be  adapted  to  various  modern  move¬ 
ments  of  thought  gave  it  its  vitality.  Second, 
the  stressing  of  conduct  in  hedonism  permitted 
it  to  he  made  a  part  of  the  whole  development 
of  life.  All  action  was  supposed  to  he  one,  and 
the  manner  in  which  hedonism  seemed  to  sub¬ 
stantiate  the  underlying  assumptions  of  evolu¬ 
tion  strengthened  Darwinism.  At  the  same 
time  the  opinion  came  about  that  now  in  the 
proof  of  the  full  adequacy  of  evolution  up  into 
moral  life,  ethics  itself  was  made  a  real  natural 
science  and  a  part  of  the  whole  cosmic  process. 

16  This  refers  to  possible  objective  choices  and  preferences. 

n  Ibid.  Book  III,  Chapter  XIV,  par.  5,  p.  401. 


126 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


Spencer  is  the  outstanding  advocate  among 
the  many  writers  on  evolutional  ethics.18 
Studying  movement  and  action  as  they  produce 
conduct,  Spencer  finds  “that  conduct  is  distin¬ 
guished  from  the  totality  of  actions  by  exclud¬ 
ing  purposeless  actions.  ’ ’ 19  This  distinction 
rises  by  degrees  according  as  the  adjustment 
of  acts  to  ends  are  more  efficient.  Among  men 
“the  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  are  both  more 
numerous  and  better  than  among  lower  mam¬ 
mals;  but  we  find  the  same  thing  on  comparing 
the  doings  of  higher  races  of  men  with  those  of 
lower  races. ”  20  But  the  final  purpose  of  the 
adjustments  is  the  life  of  the  species.  Since 
conduct  is  an  evolution  actions  are  good  or  bad 
as  they  are  well  or  ill  adapted  to  achieve  pre¬ 
scribed  ends.  The  process  is  a  shifting  one  and 
therefore  we  must  make  ethics  relative  and  not 
absolute.  “Instead  of  admitting  that  there  is 
in  every  case  a  right  and  a  wrong,  it  may  he 
contended  that  in  multitudinous  cases  no  right, 
properly  so  called,  can  he  alleged,  but  only  a 
least  wrong;  and  further,  it  may  be  contended 
that  in  many  of  these  cases  where  there  can  he 
alleged  only  a  least  wrong,  it  is  not  possible  to 
ascertain  with  any  precision  which  is  the  least 
wrong.  ”  21  Therefore  as  the  goal  to  the  natural 
evolution  of  conduct  is  also  the  standard  of 
conduct  in  morals,  and  as  that  conduct  is  good 
which  conserves  life,  and  that  bad  which 
destroys  it,  “ethics  has  for  its  subject-matter, 

18  Cf.  C.  M.  Williams,  Evolutional  Ethics. 

19  Data  of  Ethics,  Part  I,  Chapter  II,  par.  4,  p.  10. 

20  Ibid.  Part  I,  Chapter  II,  par.  4,  p.  13. 

21  Ibid.  Chapter  XV,  paT.  10,  p.  301. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  127 


that  form  which  universal  conduct  assumes 
during*  the  last  stages  of  its  evolution.”  22 

When  Spencer  comes  to  a  closer  grasp  with 
his  problem  in  his  Principles  of  Ethics,23  he 
arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  the  genesis  of 
moral  conduct  is  the  control  of  the  lower,  primi¬ 
tive,  presentative  simple  feelings  by  the  higher, 
later-evolved,  representative  and  compound 
feelings.  He  introduces  again  the  sanctions  of 
Bentham  reducing  them  to  three,  the  political, 
the  religious  and  the  social.  These  are  however 
called  preparatory  or  pre-moral  controls  within 
which  the  moral  control  evolves.  The  moral  con¬ 
trol  is  within  man  and  consists  of  the  necessarv 

%/ 

natural  results  of  an  action.  It  looks  to  the 
future  and  through  feeling  of  the  results  there 
arises  the  sentiment  of  duty. 

Duty  has  an  element  of  coerciveness,  but  con¬ 
duct  strives  to  be  free  functioning.  The  sense 
of  moral  obligation  will  cease  as  we  become 
really  moralized.  “ While  at  first  the  motive 
contains  an  element  of  coercion,  at  last  this 
element  of  coercion  dies  out,  and  the  act  is  per¬ 
formed  without  any  consciousness  of  being 
obliged  to  perform  it.”24  The  consciousness 
of  the  ought  ceases  and  there  is  a  simple, 
pleasurable  feeling  of  satisfaction.  When  men 
fit  in  more  fully  into  the  harmony  of  life  they 
will  act  as  spontaneously  as  they  now  see  and 
smell.  Conduct  will  become  entirely  natural, 
and  it  will  function  as  a  matter  of  course 
exactly  in  substance  as  our  glands  act,  or  as  any 


22  Ibid.  Chapter  II,  par.  7,  p.  21. 
23Vol.  I,  p.  127  ff. 

24  Ibid.  p.  129. 


128 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


purely  biological  movement  occurs.  Then  we 
will  be  almost  unconsciously  good.  We  will 
bear  fruit  as  do  the  trees,  but  not  because  they 
are  good  or  bad,  but  because  they  are  more 
highly  developed.  It  all  depends  upon  time 
until  the  upward  curve  of  conduct  will  have 
arrived  at  the  freedom  of  the  law  of  the  curve. 
We  will  be  free  in  the  balance  of  a  naturally 
evolved  human  society  in  which  there  will  be 
neither  duty,  conscience,  nor  law,  for  they  will 
not  be  needed. 

The  golden  age  of  society  will  be  brought 
about  by  the  natural  conciliation  of  egoism  and 
altruism.  They  have  always  been  dependent 
upon  each  other  and  in  the  course  of  evolution 
the  reciprocal  services  of  the  two  have  been 
increasing.  Altruism  will  rise  to  a  level  when 
the  happiness  of  others  will  become  a  daily 
need.  The  cause  of  unhappiness  will  decrease 
and  sympathy  will  increase.  “As  the  mould¬ 
ing  and  remoulding  of  man  and  society  unto 
mutual  fitness  progresses,  and  as  the  pains 
caused  by  unfitness  decrease,  sympathy  can 
increase  in  presence  of  the  pleasures  that  come 
from  fitness.  ’  * 25  Like  any  living  organism 
man  and  society  will  develop  into  health  and 
power.  The  dead  tissue  will  be  cast  off  and 
happiness  will  be  the  increasing  life.  Morality 
will  grow  just  like  Topsy  4  4  growed.  ’  ’  We  shall 
have  heaven  on  earth  merely  through  the 
natural  process  of  evolution.  All  our  hopes 
will  be  satisfied  not  through  any  choice  that  we 
make  but  purely  by  the  course  of  cosmic 
evolution. 

25  Ibid.  p.  129. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  129 


Pleasure  and  reason.  When,  after  portray¬ 
ing  the  position  of  hedonism  in  its  various 
aspects,  we  come  to  consider  what  is  its  value 
for  morals,  we  must  ask:  “Is  it  self-sufficient ?” 
The  answer  is  given  by  the  history  of  hedonism. 
It  shows  the  constant  pressure  of  the  theory 
of  pleasure  toward  reason.  It  was  not  pos¬ 
sible  permanently  to  maintain  the  Cyrenaic 
position  of  the  immediate,  present  life  of  sense 
and  feeling.  The  Epicurean  attitude  demanded 
the  calm  calculation  of  reason.  The  calculus 
of  Bentham  merged  into  the  idea  of  utility.  It 
it  true  that  Bentham,  in  a  note  of  July,  1812, 
added  at  the  beginning  of  his  work,  tried  to 
escape  from  the  consequences  of  utility,  when 
he  says:  “This  want  of  a  sufficiently  manifest 
connection  between  the  ideas  of  happiness  and 
pleasure  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  idea  of  utility 
on  the  other,  I  have  every  now  and  then  found 
operating,  and  with  but  too  much  efficiency,  as 
a  bar  to  the  acceptance,  that  might  otherwise 
have  been  given,  to  this  principle.’ ’  But  util¬ 
ity  was  the  more  powerful  idea,  and  in  the  use 
made  of  it  by  Mill  it  overshadowed  immediate 
feeling.  Man’s  dignity,  the  difference  in  qual¬ 
ity  between  actions,  the  emphasis  upon  the 
pleasures  of  reason,  all  demonstrated  the  logi¬ 
cal  necessity  of  adding  reason  to  mere  feeling. 
Sidgwick  found  it  still  more  incumbent  upon 
his  thinking  to  make  reason  regulative  and 
controlling.  The  apparent  re-assertion  of 
mere  pleasure  in  evolutional  ethics  is  counter¬ 
balanced  by  putting  pleasure  into  the  process 
of  evolution.  But  the  development  of  the  uni- 


130 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


verse  cannot  be  understood  without  the  impli¬ 
cation  of  reason  and  purpose. 

Because  hedonism  did  not  maintain  itself 
in  its  original,  pure  form,  it  raised  this  problem: 
“Why  cannot  feeling  offer  the  principles  for 
the  organization  of  ethics  as  a  science  Vy 
The  whole  procedure  of  the  hedonists  shows 
the  constant  call  upon  other  principles  than 
those  of  feeling  to  make  their  view  of  moral 
life  fairly  consistent.  It  does  not  lie  within 
the  nature  of  sense  or  feeling,  of  pleasure  or 
pain,  to  furnish  laws  for  a  scientific  statement. 
We  may  describe  their  functioning,  but  we 
do  not  obtain  ideas  from  such  a  description 
that  are  fit  to  produce  a  science  of  ethics. 
There  wull  always  be  an  inadequacy  in  the 
theory  of  pleasure  because  of  its  flowing  char¬ 
acter  to  furnish  a  foundation  for  morals.  The 
concrete  changes  in  the  life  of  feeling  do 
not  allow  a  place  for  firm  ethical  laws.  Delibera¬ 
tion  will  have  no  real  outlook  upon  the  future. 
Dewey  shows  the  inadequacy  of  his  position, 
when  he  says:  “The  present,  not  the  future  is 
ours.  No  shrewdness,  no  store  of  information 
will  make  it  ours.  But  by  constant  watchful¬ 
ness  concerning  the  tendency  of  acts,  by  noting 
disparities  between  former  judgments  and 
actual  outcomes,  and  tracing  that  part  of  the 
disparity  that  was  due  to  deficiency  and  excess 
in  disposition,  we  come  to  know  the  meaning 
of  present  acts,  and  to  guide  them  in  the  light 
of  that  meaning.  ’ ’  26  There  is  no  use  in  foster¬ 
ing  conscience  or  reason,  but  only  impulses  and 
habits.  Thus  the  pragmatic  ethics  are  evolu- 

26  Ibid.  p.  207. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  131 


tional  psychological  description,  and  they  can 
not  formulate  a  real  science  because  they  live 
within  sense,  impulse  and  feeling. 

Is  pleasure  happiness?  The  constant  assump¬ 
tion  of  the  hedonists  is,  that  pleasure  and 
happiness  are  the  same.  But  can  this  be  main¬ 
tained?  It  is  true  that  there  is  a  coloring  of 
feeling  in  happiness  and  that  happiness  in  its 
fulness  gives  pleasure.  But  there  is  a  larger 
content  in  happiness  than  that  given  by  the 
sentient  life.  Happiness  means  the  well-being 
of  the  whole  man,  and  not  simply  of  the  feeling 
man.  The  truth  of  this  fact  was  realized  by 
Plato  and  Aristotle.  While  they  both  gave 
some  place  to  pleasure,  they  found  in  happiness 
(eudaimonia)  the  satisfaction  for  the  complete 
man.  The  serious  thought  of  man  on  the 
moral  life  never  rested  with  contentment  in 
pleasure  except  when  man  followed  the  mere 
incitement  of  the  natural  life.  Epicurus  rea¬ 
lized  not  only  that  man  could  not  attain  pleas¬ 
ure  without  pain,  but  he  also  saw  that  calmness 
and  the  undisturbed  life  of  control  were  neces¬ 
sary.  This  was  virtually  the  surrender  of  the 
power  of  mere  pleasure  to  create  happiness. 
Whenever  any  man  wrote  down  his  creed  of 
life,  through  which  he  thought  to  attain  success 
and  to  solve  the  mystery  of  happiness  with  any 
fair  analysis  of  life,  and  without  being  under 
the  necessity  of  defending  an  ethical  theory,  he 
arrived  at  a  statement  which  meant  more  than 
the  gratification  of  pleasure.  The  well-known 
ideal  of  Robert  Louis  Stevenson  substantiates 
this  common  experience.  “To  be  honest,  to  be 
kind — to  earn  a  little  and  to  spend  a  little  less, 


132 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


— to  make  upon  the  whole  a  family  happier  for 
his  presence,  to  renounce  when  that  shall  be 
necessary  and  not  to  be  embittered,  to  keep  a 
few  friends,  but  these  without  capitulation, — 
and  above  all,  on  the  same  grim  condition,  to 
keep  friends  with  himself — here  is  a  task  for 
all  that  a  man  has  of  fortitude  and  delicacy.” 

The  claim  is  made  that  man,  when  he  really 
analyzes  himself,  is  always  in  pursuit  of  pleas¬ 
ure.  Is  this  the  fact?  We  may  make  pleasure 
an  end  in  life  and  subordinate  all  else  to  it; 
but  must  we  make  it  the  good  by  our  very  con¬ 
stitution  and  nature?  What  we  really  seek 
in  most  cases  is  the  attainment  of  an  object. 
We  expect  it  to  be  a  satisfaction  whether  for 
the  relative  purpose  we  have  in  mind,  or  for 
the  fulness  of  our  life.  Life  offers  us  tasks  and 
we  either  accept  or  reject  them.  Some  pursuit 

is  ours  and  whatever  it  mav  be  it  must  not 

*/ 

be  essentially  pleasure.  We  may  seek  learning 

or  position,  wealth  or  power,  helpfulness 
toward  men  and  service  for  God.  In  all  these 
searchings  it  is  not  pleasures  in  themselves 
that  we  desire.  And  even  if  we  desired  them 
does  the  good  render  pleasure  inevitably?  Are 
there  not  sufferings  of  the  good  and  just  which 
they  take  upon  themselves  in  seeking  right¬ 
eousness?  Some  of  the  highest  results  of  the 
good  must  be  reached  through  surrender  of  the 
pleasant  by  self-sacrifice.  The  right  life  does 
not  inevitably  produce  pleasure.  Society  will 
often  abuse  and  reject  the  just,  and  treat  them 
as  unjust.  It  seems  almost  like  a  prophecy 
when  Plato  says:  “They  will  say  that  in  such 
a  situation  the  just  man  will  be  scourged, 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  133 


racked,  fettered,  will  have  his  eyes  burnt  out, 
and  at  last,  after  suffering  every  kind  of  torture, 
will  be  crucified;  and  thus  learn  that  it  is  best 
to  resolve  not  to  be,  but  to  seem  just.”  27 

Another  fact  about  pleasure  is,  that  it  con¬ 
stantly  seeks  a  higher  tension.  Bentham 
rightly  emphasized  the  intensity,  the  fruitful¬ 
ness,  the  duration  of  pleasure  as  necessary  ele¬ 
ments.  The  senses  when  indulged  in,  and  the 
feelings  and  emotions  sought  for  themselves, 
always  lead  to  a  greater  demand.  It  lies  in  the 
nature  of  mere  pleasure  to  seek  an  increase. 
And  even  men  who  know  the  higher  joys  select 
the  lower  if  they  promise  more  tingling  of  the 
nerves.  Dewey,  although  he  will  not  admit 
that  love  of  pleasures  is  in  itself  demoralizing, 
must  confess:  “But  pleasure  has  often  become 
identified  with  special  thrills,  excitations,  tick¬ 
lings  of  sense,  stirrings  of  appetite  for  the 
express  purpose  of  enjoying  immediate  stimu¬ 
lation  irrespective  of  results.  ”  28  It  is  this 
tendency  which  grows  on  man  when  he  chooses 
pleasure.  He  sinks  to  a  low  level,  and  the 
freedom  which  pleasure  promises  him  is  a 
deception.  The  free  life  is  never  one  con¬ 
trolled  by  any  sort  of  pleasure  as  the  good. 
Pleasure  will  dominate  and  enslave,  and  not 
liberate  men,  when  it  becomes  the  object  of  life. 
Freedom  is  only  found  in  pleasure,  when  pleas¬ 
ure  is  an  accompaniment  of  a  happy  life,  and 
not  when  it  is  desired  as  the  solution  of  liberty. 

Individual  or  social?  What  do  we  think  of 
this  contrast?  Must  the  individual  exclude  the 

2"  Kepublic  Book  II,  361  E. 

28  Ibid.  p.  158. 


134 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


social,  or  must  the  social  submerge  the  individ¬ 
ual?  Both  are  facts  of  life,  and  both  must  be 
accounted  for.  If  this  is  true,  then  every  ethi¬ 
cal  theory  of  the  good  must  be  tested  by  the 
question:  “How  does  it  conciliate  the  individ¬ 
ual  and  social  rights  V’  The  outlook  upon 
life  with  pleasure  as  an  end  is  fundamentally 
individualistic.  As  an  individual  I  must  seek 
and  enjoy  pleasure.  No  one  else  can  enjoy  for 
me.  The  sentient  life  is  necessarily  subjective. 
If  pleasure  is  the  end  I  must  have  pleasure. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  pleasure 
which  regards  others.  It  is  essentially  selfish. 
And  thus  men  interpret  it  practically.  They 
are  only  willing,  from  the  angle  of  pleasure  to 
share  pleasure  if  there  is  no  detraction  from 
their  individual  enjoyment.  It  is  not  possible 
from  the  consideration  of  pleasure  as  such  to 
surrender  and  sacrifice.  The  joy  of  these  acts 
only  comes  as  we  give  up  pleasure  as  the 
primal  aim  of  life.  The  greatest  good  of  the 
greatest  number  does  not  logically  follow  from 
the  choice  of  pleasure.  The  altruistic  is  not 
included  in  the  egoistic.  Benevolence  is  no 
legitimate  child  of  pleasure.  The  difficulty 
with  the  hedonists  is  that  they  constantly  shift 
the  meaning  of  pleasure  and  include  under  it 
many  things  which  do  not  rightly  belong  to  it. 

It  is  self-evident  that  the  world  cannot  exist 
in  the  conflict  of  individual  pleasure  against 
individual  pleasure.  Much  evil  is  being  created 
by  this  attitude.  But  if  pleasure  be  fully 
socialized  it  means  the  giving  up  of  some  indi¬ 
vidual  pleasure,  and  then  we  cannot  with 
justice  demand  pleasure  as  the  end  of  the  indi- 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  135 


vidual  life.  But  is  the  common  life  satisfied 
with  pleasure  as  the  end?  It  is  through  reason 
that  we  seek  the  happiness  of  the  greatest  num¬ 
ber.  When  Spencer  places  the  altruistic  senti¬ 
ment  alongside  of  the  egoistic  he  is  correct. 
Both  function  in  human  life.  But  is  the 
altruistic  sentiment  the  outcome  of  pleasure? 
Altruism  rests  upon  the  instinct  of  sympathy, 
if  with  some  psychologists  we  admit  sympathy 
to  be  a  mere  instinct.  But  whatever  our  deci¬ 
sion,  is  sympathy  as  it  acts  for  the  common 
good,  useful  because  it  is  essentially  a  pleas¬ 
ure?  We  cannot  affirm  this,  even  if  sympathy 
may  be  accompanied  or  followed  by  pleasurable 
feeling  growing  out  of  the  nobility  of  its  direc¬ 
tion.  Society  may  be  fused  to  a  degree  by  feel¬ 
ing  but  the  spirit  of  the  crowd  is  not  made 
moral  by  the  feeling  of  pleasure.  Some  of  the 
cruelties  of  the  mob  spirit  are  pleasure.  There 
is  more  danger  in  pleasure  for  the  social  com¬ 
plex  than  for  the  individual.  The  enslavement 
of  the  crowd  through  its  choice  is  very  severe 
and  leads  to  destruction.  Make  pleasure  in  its 
sentient  nature  the  end  of  society  and  society 
will  lose  civilization. 

The  end,  the  ideal,  the  good,  the  right  and 
pleasure.  Can  any  moral  theory  be  accepted  if 
it  fails  in  meeting  the  inherent  demands  of  the 
great  ethical  ideas?  To  raise  this  question  is 
really  to  answer  it.  How  does  hedonism  meas¬ 
ure  up  to  the  end,  the  ideal,  the  good  and  the 
right?  The  end  and  aim  of  the  ethical  implies 
no  mere  description  of  the  natural  functioning 
of  man.  But  pleasure  never  rises  above  the 
unfoldment  of  what  men  do  as  purely  natural 


.136 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


beings  when  they  lack  in  moral  development. 
The  ideal  is  not  that  which  is  but  that  which 
ought  to  be  brought  about.  The  ideal  is  to 
transform  the  actual.  It  is  just  this  feature 
which  makes  ethics  a  normative  science.  But 
hedonism  dethrones  ethics  from  its  place,  and 
endeavors  to  deny  the  value  if  not  the  actuality 
of  the  ideal.  When  we  merely  portray  the 
actions  of  pleasure  we  do  not  show  what  man 
may  and  ought  to  pursue.  He  follows  pleasure 
without  an  ideal.  Pleasure  he  shares  with  the 
animal  world,  and  it  does  not  belong  to  ideal 
existence  as  an  end. 

The  good  is  the  ideal  to  be  fulfilled.  If  it  is 
to  remain  the  good  it  must  claim  to  be  the 
highest  good  (summum  bonum).  Now  it  is 
clear  that  hedonism  can  never  give  us  a  highest 
good.  In  its  nature  it  is  quantitative  and  can 
only  promise  a  maximum  amount  of  pleasure. 
Its  good  is  relative.  Even  when  quality  is 
added,  as  by  Mill,  the  quality  simply  modifies 
the  quantity,  and  does  not  change  the  defect  of 
the  purely  relative  character  of  the  good.  Life 
in  much  of  its  experience  is  relative.  But  to 
accept  this  relativity  as  final,  and  to  lower  the 
good  to  the  readily  attainable,  takes  away  the 
worth  of  the  good.  The  balance  of  possible 
pleasures  in  the  individual  and  common  life  is 
a  compromise  which  cannot  be  escaped  from. 
But  will  the  good  be  the  highest  upon  a  com¬ 
promise?  The  hedonistic  proportionalism  is 
an  enemy  to  the  ethical  power  of  the  ideal  of 
the  good. 

What  do  the  hedonists  make  of  the  right? 
They  cannot  find  a  firm  standard  and  law  of 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  137 


the  right.  Their  terminology  only  allows  for 
the  lesser  wrong.  No  motive  is  right  or  wrong 
in  itself,  for  only  the  consequences  count.  Law 
can  only  mean  the  statement  of  the  average. 
There  can  be  no  incorporation  of  the  good  into 
a  real  right.  Right  is  a  flowing  term.  Thus 
the  way  in  which  men  learn  through  error  is 
made  the  right,  as  it  obtains  in  society  from 
time  to  time.  It  is  this  hedonism  of  the  right 
which  made  the  economic  life  of  the  world  so 
unreliable  in  its  moral  aspect.  The  biologism 
of  the  evolutionary  moralist  can  not  help  us. 
It  has  no  room  for  the  right.  Development, 
selection,  adaptation  is  all  that  it  knows.  As 
far  as  this  theory  expresses  present  moral  con¬ 
ditions,  and  to  the  degree  that  it  has  helped  to 
make  them,  it  finds  its  own  punishment  in  the 
loss  of  the  sense  of  a  right  to  which  men  must 
bow  to  be  free.  We  seek  deliverance  through 
gratification  of  pleasure  and  desire,  and  find 
only  anarchy  and  revolution  in  society  as  the 
result.  Hedonism  has  aided  in  suppressing 
the  strong  sense  of  right  without  which  neither 
the  individual  nor  society  can  have  a  vital 
liberty  worth  while. 

Duty  and  pleasure.  How  can  we  explain 
duty  which  is  obligation  if  we  accept  hedonism? 
This  question  has  troubled  the  hedonists. 
According  to  their  conception  duty  can  only 
be  explained  on  the  natural  foundation  of  the 
impetus  of  pleasure.  But  pleasure  simply 
occurs,  but  duty  is  asked  for.  It  implies  an 
ought.  When  the  law  “thou  shalt”  or  “thou 
shalt  not”  is  made  our  own  in  duty  we  have 
more  than  a  mere  “is.”  The  psychological 


138 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


aspect  of  duty  can  explain  it  in  part  as  far  as 
it  touches  feeling,  though  even  here  it  cannot 
tell  why  the  feeling  is  imperative.  Psychologi¬ 
cal  hedonism  does  not  give  us  a  full  descrip¬ 
tion  of  what  happens  when  we  follow  duty. 
Above  all  it  is  not  ethical.  Hobhouse  has 
clearly  indicated  the  failure  of  Mill,  when  he 
says:  “Mill  held  to  the  sense  of  Moral  Obliga¬ 
tion  as  a  real  psychological  force,  but  whether 
it  had  a  rational  justification  was  not  so  easy 
for  him,  on  his  principles,  to  determine.  The 
sense  of  obligation  he  held  to  be  built  up  by 
educative  processes  and  the  laws  of  Associa¬ 
tion  on  the  basis  of  a  substratum  of  sympathy 
or  Social  feeling  which  he  took  to  be  natural. 
Given  sufficient  strength  in  these  feelings  and 
forces,  there  is  at  any  rate  no  contradiction  in¬ 
volved  in  the  supposition  that  the  altruistic 
action  which  Mill  wishes  to  explain  might 
become  more  pleasurable  and  the  violation  of 
its  rules  a  source  of  greater  pain  to  a  man  than 
any  selfish  consideration.  Social  and  1  unselfish  ’ 
action  becomes  psychologically  possible  on 
MilPs  view,  but  whether  it  becomes  rationally 
imperative  is  another  question.  On  MilPs 
account  all  action  is  at  bottom  founded  on 
desire.  The  stronger  desire,  and  that  is  for 
Mill  the  most  intensely  realized  anticipation  of 
pleasure,  must  prevail.  If  a  man  already  finds 
his  greatest  pleasure  in  promoting  the  general 
happiness  no  question  of  obligation  arises. 
But  if  he  feels  nothing  of  the  kind,  or  if  he 
halts  between  two  decisions,  in  what  sense  can 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  139 


we  tell  him  that  he  ‘  ought  ’  to  decide  for  one 
course  rather  than  the  other.  ’  ’ 29 

The  hedonists  of  the  modern  type  found  it 
necessary  to  introduce  external  sanctions  after 
the  leadership  of  Bentham.  But  why  do  we 
need  any  external  forces  if  there  is  a  purely 
natural  sequence  in  life  which  ends  either  in 
pleasure  or  pain?  The  external  sanctions  can¬ 
not  however  readily  be  accounted  moral.  To 
become  moral  they  must  be  internally  accepted. 
Therefore  the  ultimate  sanction  is  of  necessity 
internal.  But  are  the  external  sanctions  the 
real  causes  of  the  internal  feeling  of  obligation? 
It  is  an  unproved  assumption  that  the  physical, 
the  social,  and  even  the  religious  sanctions 
create  the  peculiar  sense  of  moral  obligation. 
After  all  there  is  the  ineradicable  feeling  of  its 
immediacy  which  has  never  been  solved  by  any 
proposal  of  the  external. 

Another  problem  is  raised  by  the  idea  of 
Spencer  that  the  inner  coerciveness  of  duty  is 
a  passing  phase  of  life.  It  will,  in  his  opinion, 
give  way  to  a  moral  life  that  needs  no  duty, 
when  conduct  has  arrived  at  the  highest  stage 
of  balance  between  egoism  and  altruism.  Then 
there  will  be  no  necessity  for  men  to  be  told 
their  duty  or  to  feel  and  know  it.  Duty  will 
have  become  almost  unconscious  habit.  But 
is  it  possible  at  any  time  for  duty  to  pass  away 
as  long  as  moral  progress  takes  place?  It  is 
true  that  when  duties  are  encased  in  virtues 
they  do  not  seem  so  compelling  as  in  the  forma¬ 
tive  stage  of  virtues.  Nevertheless  virtues 

29  Ibid.  p.  197. 


140 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


need  to  be  re-vivified  again  and  again  by  the 
sense  of  duty.  As  we  grow  in  the  moral  life 
we  recognize  more  duties  and  it  is  only  thus 
that  we  develop  new  virtues.  Will  moral  pro¬ 
gress  ever  cease?  Men  may  hope  this  but  we 
have  not  yet  arrived  within  any  hailing  dis¬ 
tance  of  this  hope.  There  is  a  rise  and  a  fall 
in  individual  and  social  moral  life,  and  the  line 
is  not  directly  upward.  Furthermore  will  the 
inner  law  ever  cease,  even  when  it  becomes  a 
delight?  If  the  highest  duty  is  love  will  it  not 
always  come  to  us  with  its  “thou  shalt?” 

Virtue  and  hedonism.  As  virtue  is  habit, 
cannot  the  motive  of  pleasure  very  naturally 
form  virtue?  Mill  claims  that  hedonism 
“maintains  not  only  that  virtue  is  to  be  desired, 
but  that  it  is  to  be  desired  disinterestedly,  for 
itself.”30  But  he  must  admit  that,  after  all, 
utilitarian  moralists  believe  that  actions  and 
dispositions  are  only  virtuous  because  they  pro¬ 
mote  another  end  than  virtue.  In  fact  with 
pleasure  as  the  aim  and  ideal  how  can  virtue 
be  disinterested  logically,  no  matter  what  Mill 
may  claim?  The  habit  of  virtue,  according  to 
the  hedonists,  is  a  purely  natural  production 
brought  about  by  the  chain  of  causes  and  effects 
tending  to  pleasure.  Virtue  cannot  have  its 
real  content  because  it  is  not  the  habit  of  the 
good  and  right.  The  loss  of  a  real  highest  good 
has  impaired  the  meaning  and  value  of  virtue. 

When  the  advocates  of  pleasure  come  to 
denominate  virtues  they  always  stress  pru¬ 
dence.  From  the  days  of  Epicurus  to  Sidg- 


30  Ibid.  Chapter  IV,  p.  54. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  141 


wick  this  is  the  great  virtue  of  hedonism.  And 
there  is  a  consistency  in  this  emphasis  upon 
prudence.  In  obtaining  the  greatest  sum  of 
pleasure  we  must  use  a  wise  and  careful  dis¬ 
crimination  in  casting  up  our  accounts  for  and 
against.  We  may  be  stupid,  foolish,  careless, 
intellectually  deficient  in  finding  pleasure,  but 
our  fault  is  nothing  greater.  Prudence  is  a 
low  type  of  virtue  of  the  calculating  order 
which  seeks  to  live  along  the  line  of  least  resis- 
tence.  Sidgwick  desires  to  derive  a  sort  of 
benevolence  in  our  social  relations.  Consis¬ 
tently  this  benevolence  can  be  naught  else  but 
a  prudent  attitude  in  view  of  society.  Justice 
is  to  serve  as  the  balance  between  prudence  and 
benevolence.  But  such  justice  is  only  high 
policy  and  shrewd  diplomacy.  It  cannot  have 
in  it  the  strength  of  eternal  right.  Thus  hedo¬ 
nism  again  fails,  where  it  has  the  greatest  psy¬ 
chological  chance,  in  giving  us  any  adequate 
foundation  for  virtue. 

The  philosophy  of  hedonism.  What  is  the 
ruling  philosophy  that  underlies  all  the  differ¬ 
ent  types  of  hedonism?  Apparently  its  immed¬ 
iate  character  is  that  of  psychologism.  Its 
world  is  that  of  the  feelings  and  senses  of  man. 
But  the  psychologism  is  not  of  the  idealistic 
but  of  the  naturalistic  kind.  Even  in  the  case 
of  Mill  there  exists  a  phenomenalism  that  has 
no  real  place  for  cause,  and  the  life  of  the  mind 
in  itself.  Materialism  is  generally  connected 
with  hedonism.  Epicureanism  pointed  the  real 
way.  After  the  high  idealism  of  Plato  and  the 
realistic  idealism  of  Aristotle  it  revamped  the 
old  materialism.  Despite  his  many  moral 


142 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


maxims  Epicurus  believed  in  a  world  of  all¬ 
controlling  matter.  He  bad  no  hope  of  immor¬ 
tality  of  the  soul  for  which  Plato  had  contended. 
Bentham  is  at  heart  a  materialist.  The  mater¬ 
ial  side  of  English  economic  life  was  taken  up 
into  the  thinking  of  its  hedonistic  moralists. 
With  the  coming  of  philosophy  of  a  purely 
material  evolution  a  new  support  was  furnished 
to  hedonism.  Spencer  may  seem  idealistic 
when  he  borrows  from  Hamilton  and  Mansel 
the  attitude  of  agnosticism.  But  his  agnostic¬ 
ism  is  after  all  different.  It  favors  a  self- 
developing  universe,  in  which  there  is  a 
procession  from  the  homogeneous  to  the 
heterogeneous  through  the  dissipation  of 
energy  and  the  integration  of  matter.  Life  is 
only  the  adjustment  of  the  inner  to  the  outer. 
Psychology  is  in  essence  biology,  and  that  of  a 
material  sort.  All  of  these  positions  of  the 
great  leaders  in  hedonism  demonstrate  that  it 
can  only  have  a  naturalistic  and  materialistic 
philosophy  as  its  real  basis.  Pleasure  as 
pleasure  can  fit  in  with  no  really  ideal  world 
but  only  with  one  that  lives  on  the  level  of 
sense,  and  has  nature  and  matter  as  its  finality. 

Christianity  and  hedonism.  Is  there  any 
need  to  ask  for  the  relation  of  Christianity  to 
hedonism  if  its  philosophy  is  materialistic? 
Does  this  not  settle  the  question?  It  is  true 
that  Christian  moral  teaching  warns  against 
what  it  calls  “the  world.”  A  part  of  this 
“world”  is  the  life  of  pleasure.  The  lust  of  the 
eves  and  the  lust  of  flesh  is  condemned.31  Man 


311  John  II:  16. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PLEASURE  143 


is  not  to  seek  the  tilings  that  perish  with  the 
using  of  them.  His  world  is  not  merely  eco¬ 
nomic  and  biological.  But  while  Christianity 
warns  men  against  the  power  and  sufficiency  of 
life  as  pleasure,  it  is  not  drab  and  gloomy.  As 
far  as  pleasure  is  not  evil  it  is  not  rejected. 
Christ  does  not  condemn  the  joys  connected 
with  normal  life.  He  goes  to  a  wedding.32 
His  enemies  call  him  a  wine-bibber.33  The 
picture  of  His  stay  with  His  disciples  is  that 
of  the  bridegroom.34  The  mere  laws  that  for¬ 
bid  in  Judaism  Christ  does  not  accept.  He  has 
come  to  give  freedom  to  man,  and  therefore  the 
Sabbath  was  made  for  man  and  not  man  for 
the  Sabbath.35  Restriction  has  no  value  in  it¬ 
self  according  to  the  teaching  of  Jesus  and  of 
His  immediate  followers.  To  the  extent  that 
pleasure  belongs  to  life  Christianity  does  not 
destroy  it.  Only  when  it  assumes  the  first  and 
controlling  place,  and  is  entranced  by  the  pre¬ 
sent  as  the  final  life  is  it  opposed.  A  sane  and 
fair  Christianity  offers  the  full  life,  in  which 
all  minor  joys  are  summed  up  into  the  high  and 
lasting  happiness  of  a  life  in  Christ.  Such  a 
life  is  the  fulfillment  of  the  best  desires  and  the 
guarantee  and  gift  of  a  real  and  vital  liberty. 

32  John  II. 

33  Matt.  XI:  19. 

34  Matt.  IX:  15 

35  Mark  II:  27. 


REFERENCES 

James  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chapter  I. 
Frank  Thilly,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chapters  VI,  VIII. 

J.  H.  Muirhead,  The  Elements  of  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chapters 
I,  III. 


144  CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 

Chas.  D’Arcy,  A  Short  Study  of  Ethics,  Part  III,  Chapters 
II,  III,  IV. 

Theo.  De  Laguna,  Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Ethics, 
Chapters  VII,  XI,  IV,  XIII,  XVII. 

Benj.  Rand,  The  Classical  Moralists,  V. 

Mary  W.  Calkins,  The  Good  Man  and  the  Good,  Chapter  V. 

Henry  W.  Wright,  Self-Realization,  Part  II,  Chapter  II. 

Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics,  Chapter  XV. 

Chas.  Gray  Shaw,  The  Value  and  Dignity  of  Human  Life, 
Part  II,  Chapters  II,  III,  IV,  V. 

Jas.  Mantineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  Vol.  II,  Book  II, 
Branch  I,  Chapters  I,  II. 

A.  E.  Taylor,  The  Problem  of  Conduct,  Chapter  VII. 

Vladimir  Solovyof,  The  Justification  of  the  Good,  Part  I, 
Chapter  VI. 

R.  D.  Hicks,  Stoic  and  Epicurean,  Chapters  V,  VI,  VII. 

Walter  Pater,  Marius  the  Epicurean. 

Letters  of  Epicurus;  Epicurean  Ethics. 

Jeremy  Bentham,  An  Introduction  to  the  Principles  of 
Morals  and  Legislation. 

John  Stuart  Mill,  Utilitarianism. 

H.  Sidgwick,  Methods  of  Ethics. 

Herbert  Spencer,  Data  of  Ethics. 

Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Ethics. 

C.  M.  Williams,  Evolutional  Ethics. 

Arthur  K.  Rogers,  The  Theory  of  Ethics,  Chapter  II. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON 

What  does  reason  promise?  Is  there  in  rea¬ 
son  the  essential  element  which  will  answer  to 
the  ethical  demand  !  It  is  through  reason  that 
we  as  human  beings  are  differentiated  from  the 
rest  of  creation.  The  life  of  sensation  and  feel¬ 
ing  ties  ns  up  with  the  animal  world  below  us. 
As  sentient  beings  we  cannot  assert  our  pecu¬ 
liar  place  as  men.  Since  morals  are  distinc¬ 
tively  a  human  sphere  of  action  they  cannot 
exist  without  reason.  The  logic  of  reason, 
which  alone  makes  any  group  of  facts  a  science, 
is  needed  if  our  ethical  life  is  to  receive  a  scien¬ 
tific  treatment.  No  theory  of  morals  is  at  all 
possible  except  through  reason.  As  soon  as 
we  become  conscious  of  our  responsibility  we 
must  think  and  use  reason.  The  unthinking 
life  will  never  become  moralized.  The  fact  is 
that  we  make  so  little  progress  in  the  ethical 
life  because  we  give  so  little  thoughtful  atten¬ 
tion  to  it.  If  hedonism  found  it  necessary  to 
demand  that  reason  be  regulative,  shall  not 
reason  be  our  ideal!  When  we  rightly  employ 
reason  we  come  to  the  solid  basis  of  things, 
which  must  appeal  to  every  human  being  as 
far  as  reason  prevails.  There  is  a  unifying, 
steadying  and  stabilizing  power  in  reason.  It 
gives  power  and  permanence  to  life.  When  we 

145 


146 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


search  carefully  and  thoroughly  into  facts  to 
find  the  real  reason  back  of  them,  we  are  look¬ 
ing  for  the  immutable  and  finally  explanatory. 
Reason  as  it  enters  the  moral  life  endeavors 
to  obtain  the  unvarying  and  eternal,  the  fixed 
and  everlasting  laws  of  right  in  the  world  of 
change  and  flux.  It  lifts  us  into  the  pure  ideals 
of  all  virtues,  and  makes  duty  glorious  because 
it  tends  to  give  it  its  constant  value  and  its 
unchangeable  worth. 

The  ancient  advocates  of  reason.  If  we  ab¬ 
stract  the  Eastern  development  of  India  where 
reason  submerged  desire  in  the  absoluteness  of 
reason  as  being,  we  find  that  the  Western 
impulse  toward  reason  in  morals  came  from 
Socrates.  His  purpose  was  to  lead  men  to  vir¬ 
tue  through  helping  them  to  think  clearly.  By 
aiding  men  to  find  the  consistent  and  definite 
concept  of  the  good  in  its  various  relations 
Socrates  labored  to  make  the  Greeks  virtuous, 
and  to  overcome  the  destructive  individualism 
of  the  Sophists  who  had  no  definite  standards 
of  right.  His  principle  was,  that  no  man  erred 
willingly,  but  only  through  the  lack  of  right 
knowledge.  Plato  developed  the  world  of 
ideas  in  the  interest  of  the  good.  For  him  the 
highest  virtue  was  wisdom,  which  dwelt  in  the 
head.  Justice  was  the  balancing  virtue  but 
not  the  highest  individually.  Aristotle,  with 
his  conception  of  the  active  reason,  which 
came  to  man  from  without  like  some  peculiar 
divine  gift,  naturally  exalted  the  intellectual 
virtues  above  all  others.  The  moral  supremacy 
of  reason  was  the  special  Greek  vision.  Rea¬ 
son  was  the  Greek  way  of  salvation. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  147 


This  quality  of  the  Greek  character  found  its 
strongest  expression  in  the  school  of  the  Cynics. 
They  held  that  man  became  master  of  himself, 
independent  of  circumstances  and  self-suffic¬ 
ient  through  reason  alone.  Wisdom  is  happi¬ 
ness.  It  dwells  within  and  is  shown  in  the 
singleless  of  virtue.  Pleasure  leads  to  a  life  of 
folly  and  makes  man  a  slave  of  mere  accidents 
and  of  fickle  fortune.  The  wise  man  has  over¬ 
come  these  attacks  of  pleasure,  and  lives  in 
that  which  is  the  essential  good  of  man,  namely 
reason.  For  him  there  is  no  evil  with  the  one 
virtue  of  wisdom.  All  men  without  reason  are 
slaves.  The  man  of  reason,  like  a  king,  des¬ 
pises  the  people  of  passion.  It  is  this  attitude 
of  pride  and  superiority  which  has  given  rise 
to  our  modern  use  of  cynicism.  The  Cynic 
cannot  attain  to  the  perfect  life  of  passionless 
reason  without  reducing  all  wants  to  the  mini¬ 
mum.  Through  hard  labor  he  must  climb  to 
the  heaven  of  peace  by  self-denial.  Thus  there 
will  come  a  calmness  of  mind  and  life  that 
pierces  through  all  human  illusions,  is  strong 
by  its  indifference  to  all  changing  experiences, 
and  has  conquered  death  itself.  This  confident 
assurance  made  the  Cynics  extravagant  and 
reckless  over  against  the  customs  of  society. 
They  glorified  nature  itself  as  reason,  and  re¬ 
jected  the  ways  of  politeness  and  even  decency, 
in  the  interest  of  the  immediate  demands  of 
nature.  The  protest  against  the  artificialities 
and  luxuries  of  society  led  them  to  actions 
that  far  exceeded  the  dreams  of  Rousseau  in 
his  day  when  he  demanded  a  return  to  nature. 

The  life  conformable  to  nature  received  a 


348 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


deeper  and  saner  interpretation  through  the 
Stoics.  The  fundamental  tenets  of  this  school 
were  first  stated  by  Zeno.  Of  him  Diogenes 
Laertius  says:  “Zeno  was  the  first  writer  who, 
in  his  treatise  on  the  Nature  of  Man,  said  that 
the  chief  good  was  confessedly  to  live  according 
to  nature;  which  is  to  live  according  to  virtue, 
for  nature  leads  us  to  this  point.”  1  “For  our 
individual  natures  are  all  parts  of  universal 
nature;  on  which  account  the  chief  good  is  to 
live  in  a  manner  corresponding  to  nature,  and 
that  means  corresponding  to  one’s  own  nature 
and  to  universal  nature;  doing  none  of  those 
things  which  the  common  law  of  mankind  is  in 
the  habit  of  forbidding;  and  that  common  law 
is  identical  with  that  right  reason  which  per¬ 
vades  everything,  being  the  same  with  Jupiter, 
who  is  the  regulator  and  chief  manager  of  all 
existing  things.  ’  ’ 2  The  Roman  followers  of 
Zeno,  Epictetus,  and  Marcus  Aurelius,  also 
begin  with  the  stressing  of  reason  as  funda¬ 
mental  in  the  world.  Epictetus  not  only  makes 
reason  supreme  in  man,  but  also  essential  in 
God.  He  says:  “God  is  beneficial.  Good  is 
also  beneficial.  It  should  seem,  then,  that  where 
the  essence  of  God  is,  there  too  is  the  essence  of 
good.  What  then  is  the  essence  of  God, — flesh. 
By  no  means.  An  estate?  Fame?  By  no  means. 
Intelligence?  Knowledge?  Right  reason? 
Certainly.  Here,  then,  without  more  ado,  seek 
the  essence  of  the  good.  ’  ’ 3  Therefore  the  chief 
concern  of  a  wise  and  good  man  is  reason  and 

1  Lives  and  Opinions  of  Eminent  Philosophers,  Book  VII, 
LIII. 

2  Ibid.  Book  VII,  LIII. 

3  Discourses,  Book  II,  Chapter  VIII. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  149 


his  own  reason.  It  is  this  submission  to  reason 
which  developed  two  qualities.  First  the  con¬ 
ception  that,  since  we  are  a  part  of  the  whole 
of  nature  governed  by  reason,  we  can  experience 
nothing  but  our  destiny.  Marcus  Aurelius  says : 
“  Whatever  may  happen  to  thee,  it  was  prepared 
for  thee  from  all  eternity;  and  the  implication 
of  causes  was  from  eternity  spinning  the  thread 
of  thy  being,  and  of  that  which  is  incident  to 
it.  ’  ’ 4  In  like  manner,  Seneca,  whatever  the 
inconsistencies  of  his  life,  accepts  the  universe 
and  strives  toward  a  calm  life.  The  second 
result  is  an  element  of  severity  toward  our¬ 
selves.  We  must  consider  all  things  external 
as  things  indifferent  and  valueless  as  long  as  we 
attain  the  control  of  reason  with  its  denials  of 
the  life  of  sense.  The  Stoics  were  not  mere 

individualists.  Because  the  life  of  everv  one 

«/ 

was  merged  into  the  world-reason,  all  men  were 
destined  for  the  city  of  the  world.  But  this  city 
was  a  supreme  city  of  reason  on  high  in  which 
eternal  law  lived.  All  cities  and  governments 
could  but  follow  the  eternal  pattern  of  everlast¬ 
ing  reason.  This  ideal  of  world  citizenship  in 
the  ideal  city  turned  the  optimism  of  the  Stoics 
into  a  certain  melancholy.  Man  was  to  become 
apathetic  in  view  of  the  insignificance  of  all 
temporal  and  transitory  things.  No  one  has 
characterized  this  spirit  better  than  Walter 
Pater.  “I  find  that  all  things  are  now  as  they 
were  in  the  days  of  our  buried  ancestors,  all 
things  sordid  in  their  elements,  trite  by  long 
usage,  and  yet  ephemeral.  How  ridiculous, 
then,  how  like  a  countryman  in  town,  is  he  who 

4  Meditations,  Book  X,  5. 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


150 

wonders  at  aught!  Doth  the  sameness,  the 
repetition  of  the  public  shows,  weary  thee? 
Even  so  doth  that  likeness  of  events  make  the 
spectacle  of  the  world  a  vapid  one.  And  so 
must  it  be  with  thee  to  the  end.  For  the  wheel 
of  the  world  hath  ever  the  same  motion,  upward 
and  downward,  from  generation  to  generation. 
When,  then,  shall  time  give  place  to  eternity  ?”  5 
“To  cease  from  action — the  ending  of  thine 
effort  to  think  and  to  do — there  is  no  evil  in 
that ....  Thou  climbest  into  the  ship,  thou 
hast  made  thy  voyage  and  touched  the  shore; 
go  forth  now!  Be  it  into  some  other  life;  the 
divine  breath  is  everywhere,  even  there.  Be  it 
into  forgetfulness  forever;  at  least  thou  wilt  rest 
from  the  beating  of  sensible  images  upon  thee, 
from  the  passions  which  pluck  thee  this  way 
and  that,  like  an  unfeeling  toy,  from  those  long 
marches  of  the  intellect,  from  thy  toilsome 
ministry  to  the  flesh.  ’  * 6 

Modern  intuitionism.  What  is  meant  by 
intuitionism,  and  what  is  its  claim  for  reason? 
The  intuitionists  in  morals  are  those  thinkers 
who  hold  that  man  has  in  himself  the  funda¬ 
mental  principles  of  the  moral  life.  These  can 
be  found  by  looking  within  ourselves  and  elicit¬ 
ing  the  elements  of  morality  through  reflection 
and  reason.  Among  the  earliest  English  rep¬ 
resentatives  of  intuition  is  Samuel  Clarke.  In 
his  “Discourse  upon  Natural  Religion”  he 
asserts  that  there  are  “eternal  and  unalterable 
relations,  respects,  or  proportions  of  things, 
with  their  consequent  agreements  or  disagree- 

•r>  Marius  the  Epicurean,  I,  p.  205. 

e  Ibid.  I,  p.  206. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  151 


ments,  fitnesses  or  unfitnesses. ’ ’  7  “And  now, 
that  the  same  reason  of  things,  with  regard  to 
which  the  will  of  God  always  and  necessarily 
does  determine  itself  to  act  in  constant  con¬ 
formity  to  the  eternal  rules  of  justice,  equity, 
goodness,  and  truth,  ought  also  constantly  to 
determine  the  wills  of  all  subordinate  rational 
beings,  to  govern  all  their  actions  by  the  same 
rules,  is  very  evident.”8  “All  rational  crea¬ 
tures  ought  to  take  care  that  their  wills  and 
actions  are  governed  by  the  eternal  rule  of  right 
and  equity.  ” 9  It  was  supposed  that  this  rule 
could  be  found  by  man  and  was  clear  and 
definite.  The  advocates  of  the  rule  of  common 
sense  in  philosophy  followed  the  deistic  attitude 
of  Clarke.  Richard  Price  says:  “It’s  a  very 
necessary  previous  observation,  that  our  ideas 
of  right  and  wrong  are  simple  ideas,  and  must 
therefore  be  ascribed  to  some  power  of  immedi¬ 
ate  perception  in  the  human  mind.  ’  ’ 10  The 
mind  has  a  power  of  immediately  perceiving 
right  and  wrong.  “It  is  undeniable,  that  many 
of  our  ideas  are  derived  from  our  intuition  of 
truth,  or  the  discernment  of  the  natures  of 
things  by  the  understanding.  This  therefore 
may  be  the  source  of  our  moral  ideas.  ”  11  If  we 
follow  this  source  we  shall  arrive  at  the  con¬ 
clusion,  that  “morality  is  eternal  and  immuta¬ 
ble.”12  Morals  are  as  unchangeably  fixed  and 
as  eternally  true  in  their  given  laws  as  a  triangle 

7  I.  I,  2. 
s  Ibid.  I,  3. 
a  Ibid.  I,  3. 

io  A  Review  of  the  Principal  Questions  in  Morals,  Chapter  I. 
n  Ibid.  Chapter  I. 

12  Ibid.  Chapter  I. 


152 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


or  circle  is  what  it  is  unchangeably  and  etern¬ 
ally.  Thomas  Reid  argues  for  a  moral  sense 
which  he  compares  to  our  external  senses.  The 
external  senses  give  us  the  first  principles  of 
the  material  world.  “The  truths  immediately 
testified  by  our  moral  faculty,  are  the  first 
principles  of  all  moral  reasoning,  from  which 
all  our  knowledge  of  our  duty  must  be  deduced. 
By  moral  reasoning,  I  understand  all  reasoning 
that  is  brought  to  prove  that  such  conduct  is 
right,  and  deserving  of  moral  approbation;  or 
that  it  is  wrong;  or  that  it  is  indifferent,  and, 
in  itself,  neither  morally  good  or  ill.”  18  All 
of  the  intuitionists  of  this  type  believed  that 
somehow  man  had  the  ten  commandments 
written  within  him.  They  assumed  that  the 
interpretations  of  the  moral  law  of  their  times 
were  immutable.  Inner  reflection  was  called 
upon  as  witness  without  the  consideration  of  the 
prior  education  which  the  mind  had  received. 

The  great  classical  opponent  of  all  innate 
ideas  was  John  Locke.  When  he  comes  to  treat 
of  the  problem  of  innate  moral  ideas  he 
says:  “Concerning  practical  principles,  that 
they  come  short  of  an  universal  reception;  and 
I  think  it  will  be  hard  to  instance  any  one 
moral  rule  which  can  pretend  to  so  general  and 
ready  an  assent  as  ‘What  is,  is/  or  to  be  so 
manifest  a  truth  as  this,  ‘That  it  is  impossible 
for  the  same  thing  to  be,  and  not  to  be.  ’  Where¬ 
by  it  is  evident,  that  they  are  farther  removed 
from  a  title  to  be  innate;  and  the  doubt  of  their 
being  native  impressions  of  the  mind  is  stronger 

13  Essays  on  the  Active  Powers  of  Man,  Essay  III,  Chapter 
VI. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  153 


against  these  moral  principles  than  the  other.  ’  * 14 
He  denies  that  there  is  historical  proof  that 
faith  and  justice  are  owned  by  all  men  as  moral 
principles.  Moral  rules  are  not  self-evident 
but  need  a  proof.  “  Another  reason  that  makes 
me  doubt  of  any  innate  principles,  is,  that  I 
think  there  cannot  any  one  moral  rule  be  pro¬ 
posed  whereof  a  man  may  not  justly  demand  a 
reason;  which  would  be  perfectly  ridiculous  and 
absurd,  if  they  were  innate,  or  so  much  as  self- 
evident;  which  every  innate  principle  must 
needs  be,  and  not  need  any  proof  to  ascertain 
its  truth,  nor  want  any  reason  to  gain  it  appro¬ 
bation/ ?  15  Locke  indicated  the  essential  weak¬ 
ness  of  the  intuitionist  position.  After  a 
careful  analysis  of  the  contents  of  our  moral 
life  we  cannot  hold  that  moral  principles  are 
born  in  us,  and  that  we  need  only,  in  the  manner 
of  Socrates,  develop  our  native  knowledge.  But 
the  truth  of  the  contention  of  intuition  is  the 
effort  to  explain  why  morals  come  to  us  with  the 
formal  power  of  their  permanence.  No  matter 
how  we  are  educated  by  experience,  conscience, 
right,  duty,  the  good  appeal  not  only  through 
their  a  posteriori  content,  but  also  through  their 
a  priori  character.  The  peculiar  force  and  influ¬ 
ence  of  moral  ideas  is  not  explicable  through  the 
external  sources  which  furnish  their  material. 
We  have  capabilities  of  moral  development  that 
are  not  created  by  what  enters  into  us.  As  soon 
as  anything  is  accepted  as  just  or  true  it  has 
an  impulsive  force  which  other  experience  does 

An  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  Book  I, 
•Chapter  II;  Vol.  I,  p.  64 — Ed.  Fraser. 

15  Ibid.  Book  I,  Chapter  II,  4  Vol.  I,  p.  68 — Ed.  Fraser. 


154 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


not  have.  Our  interpretation  of  the  just  and 
true  may  be  wrong,  but  as  long  as  we  think 
any  action  to  be  just  or  true  we  cannot  escape 
its  hold  upon  us. 

Kant  and  his  successors.  What  has  been  the 
value  and  the  idea  of  the  German  development 
of  philosophical  morals  from  Kant,  through 
Fichte  to  Hegel?  We  must  reckon  with  this 
influence  to  understand  moral  rationalism.  Kant 
began  with  an  emphasis  upon  the  good  will. 
But  the  good  will  is  the  rational  will.  When 
we  pass  from  the  fundamental  Metaphysic  of 
Morality  to  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  we 
see  that  the  outcome  of  the  metaphysics  of 
morals  is  to  subordinate  the  will  to  universal 
reason.  This  appears  in  man  as  a  rational  being. 
The  sense  and  obligation  of  the  moral  impera¬ 
tive  grow  out  of  the  real,  nouomenal  life  of  man 
as  contrasted  with  the  life  of  sense  and  external¬ 
ity  that  subjects  man  in  the  phenomenal  world 
to  necessity.  Man  feels  and  ascertains  through 
practical  reason  that  he  is  greater  than  the 
knowledge  of  science.  Man  thus  exists  as  an 
end  in  himself,  and  not  merely  as  a  means.  This 
principle  is  elemental.  “Its  foundation  is  this, 
that  rational  nature  exists  as  an  end  in  itself. 
Man  necessarily  conceives  of  his  own  existence 
in  this  way,  and  so  far  this  is  a  subjective  prin¬ 
ciple  of  human  action.  But  in  this  way  also 
every  other  rational  being  conceives  of  his  own 
existence,  and  for  the  very  same  reason;  hence 
the  principle  is  also  objective,  and  from  it,  as 
the  highest  practical  ground,  all  laws  of  the  will 
must  be  capable  of  being  derived.  The  practical 
imperative  will  therefore  be  this:  Act  so  as  to 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  155 


use  humanity,  whether  in  your  own  person  or  in, 
the  person  of  another,  always  as  an  end,  never 
as  merely  a  means.”16  With  this  principle  in 
view  we  must  determine  our  action  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  idea  of  certain  laws.  These  laws 
become  embodied  in  the  categorical  imperative 
which  may  be  stated  thus:  “Act  in  conformity 
ivith  that  maxim,  and  that  maxim  only,  which 
you  can  at  the  same  time  tvill  to  he  a  universal 
law.”11  “The  universality  of  the  law  which 
governs  the  succession  of  events,  is  what  we 
mean  by  nature ,  in  the  most  general  sense,  that 
is,  the  existence  of  things,  in  so  far  as  their 
existence  is  determined  in  conformity  with 
universal  laws.  The  universal  imperative  of 
duty  might  therefore  be  put  in  this  way:  “Act 
as  if  the  maxim  from  which  you  act  were  to 
become  through  your  tvill  a  universal  law  of 
nature.”  18  The  imperative  derives  its  strength 
from  the  universal  reason.  Kant  in  asserting 
the  realism  of  will  as  fundamentally  in  unison 
with  a  rational  universe  of  mind  is  no  mere 
individualist  of  reason.  In  contradiction  to  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  with  its  categories  of 
mind  as  found  in  the  individual,  the  practical 
reason  is  the  universal  reason  which  determines 
the  peculiar  constitution  of  human  nature. 

Fichte,  the  apostle  of  German  national  free¬ 
dom,  was  impelled  by  high  ideals  of  national 
independence,  which  rested  on  his  moral  con¬ 
ceptions.  He  takes  the  ideas  of  Kant,  fills  them 
with  enthusiasm,  and  translates  the  intellect 

16  The  Metaphysic  of  Morality,  Section  II. 

Ibid.  Section  II. 

is  Ibid.  Section  II. 


156 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


into  the  terms  of  an  absolute  logic  of  power  to 
freedom.  There  is  an  impulsion  in  man  to  do 
certain  things  utterly  independent  of  external 
purposes.  This  impulsion  is  man’s  moral 
nature  as  surely  as  he  is  a  rational  being.  The 
ultimate  ground  of  the  moral  nature  is  when 
man  finds  himself  as  willing.  This  finding  leads 
man  to  the  real  ego,  which  is  the  original  and 
objective  actuality.  The  Ego  as  absolute  is 
actual  self-determining  of  itself  through  itself. 
It  is  not  personality  but  similar  to  moral  world- 
order;  and  it  must  abstract  all  foreign  and  minor 
elements  in  willing  through  individuals.  The 
outcome  will  he  absolute  intelligence.  “The 
contemplating  intelligence  posits  the  above  de¬ 
scribed  tendency  to  absolute  activity  as  itself , 
or  as  identical  with  itself.  The  intelligence  of 
the  absoluteness  of  real  activity  thus  becomes 
the  true  essence  of  the  intelligence,  and  is 
brought  under  the  authority  of  the  conception, 
whereby  alone  it  first  becomes  true  freedom: 
absoluteness  of  the  absoluteness,  absolute  power 
to  make  itself  absolute.  Through  the  conscious¬ 
ness  of  its  absoluteness  the  Ego  tears  itself  loose 
from  itself,  and  posits  itself  as  independent.  ’  ’ 19 
When  we  lose  ourselves  in  this  rare  atmosphere 
of  the  absolute  Ego  we  are  on  the  peak  of  the 
intellect  as  in  itself.  We  have  not  climbed  as 
high  into  abstraction  as  Plotinus,  who  rises 
from  mind  to  mere  being  in  itself;  but  we  are 
nevertheless  above  and  beyond  all  determinate¬ 
ness.  The  universal  Absolute  is  freedom  and 
life. 

19  The  Science  of  Ethics,  Chapter  II,  Genetical  Description 
of  the  Consciousness  of  our  Original  Being. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  157 


Hegel  also  starts  out  in  his  moral  reflections 
with  positing  freedom  through  intelligence.  He 
thinks  that  freedom  belongs  to  will  as  weight 
to  bodies.  But  this  freedom  as  practical  begins 
with  the  I  itself.  It  goes  beyond  the  I  into  the 
indeterminateness.  The  will  is  the  intellect  in 
its  movement,  as  the  possibility  of  abstraction 
from  every  aspect  in  which  the  I  finds  itself  or 
has  set  itself  up.  Then  it  must  return  upon 
itself.  “The  I  is,  first  of  all,  as  such  pure 
activity,  the  universal  which  is  by  itself.  Next 
this  universal  determines  itself,  and  so  far  is 
no  longer  by  itself,  but  establishes  itself  as 
another,  and  ceases  to  be  universal.  The  third 
step  is  that  the  will,  while  in  this  limitation, 
i.  e.,  in  this  other,  is  by  itself.  While  it  limits 
itself,  it  yet  remains  with  itself,  and  does  not 
lose  its  hold  of  the  universal.  This  is,  then,  the 
concrete  conception  of  freedom,  while  the  other 
two  elements  have  been  thoroughly  abstract 
and  one-sided.” 20  This  abstract  will  existing 
for  itself  is  personality.  Personality  possesses 
abstract  right.  It  is  the  absolute  free  being  of 
pure  self-conscious  isolation.  “The  moral 
standpoint  is  the  standpoint  of  the  will — in  its 
existence  for  itself,  an  existence  which  is  in¬ 
finite.”21  The  ethical  system  is  the  idea  of 
freedom  developed  in  a  present  world.  It  is 
thus  that  the  absolute  reaches  down  into  life, 
and  takes  it  up  into  the  absolute  will  as  reason. 
The  passing  to  and  from  from  absolute  to  con¬ 
crete  never  rests  until  the  opposition  is  resolved 
by  taking  all  that  is  immediate  and  personal 

20  Philosophy  of  Right,  Introd.  7,  Addition. 

21  Ibid.  Second  Part,  par.  105. 


158 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


into  the  Unique  and  Absolute  Individuality, 
which  is  God  as  thought  itself  in  Action. 

Can  reason  reject  feeling?  Is  the  claim  of 
reason  as  the  really  ethical  to  the  exclusion  of 
feeling  justified?  We  realized  that  the  life  of 
the  senses,  feelings  and  emotions  was  not  suf¬ 
ficient;  but  shall  we  reach  the  solution  of  the 
striving  after  freedom  through  reason?  The 
rationalist  disparages  the  life  of  sensibility 
altogether.  He  would  reduce  morals  to  the 
movement  and  power  of  mere  concepts,  and 
satisfy  us  with  the  essence  of  bloodless  cate¬ 
gories.  But  the  elimination  of  all  that  is  sen¬ 
tient  and  belongs  to  feeling  makes  an  unreal 
life.  Is  man  a  creature  of  reason  alone?  The 
fulness  of  life,  its  liberty  and  joy  demand  more 
than  reason.  The  action  toward  which  life 
always  tends  is  not  the  outcome  of  the  intellect 
alone;  it  has  back  of  it  the  force  of  feeling  and 
the  impetus  of  emotion.  The  senses  in  them¬ 
selves  cannot  be  indicated  to  be  evil.  Conse¬ 
quently  any  theory  which  does  away  with  them 
is  defective  attractive  as  it  may  seem  through 
its  exalted  ideals. 

The  failure  of  hedonism  was  its  manifoldness 
in  pleasure  and  its  lack  of  a  real  unity  for  the 
ethical  aim.  Rationalism  has  the  unity  but  it 
has  been  obtained  at  the  loss  of  the  manifold; 
all  particulars  in  life  are  overlooked.  A  uni¬ 
versal  to  be  true  to  its  idea  must  really  embrace 
the  particulars.  The  complex  must  be  summed 
up  into  a  simplicity  that  does  not  deny  the  com¬ 
plex.  Rationalism  is  too  simple  for  the  real¬ 
ness  of  life.  It  is  formal  but  cannot  connect 
the  material  with  its  formal  logical  scheme. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  159 


The  logic  of  reason  lias  absorbed  the  concrete¬ 
ness  of  life.  Classification  through  the  idea 
has  forgotten  what  is  to  be  classified.  The  con¬ 
tent  of  the  life  of  feeling  is  needed  to  make 
rationalism  worth  while.  As  Kant  said:  4 ‘Con¬ 
cepts  without  percepts  are  blind.  ” 

Can  reason  without  feeling  give  us  the  bal¬ 
ance  between  the  individual  and  social1?  On 
the  one  hand  rationalism  exalts  the  individual 
mind.  Kant  finds  the  end  in  every  individual. 
No  one  is  to  be  used  as  a  means.  But  when  this 
right  of  the  individual  is  to  be  universalized 
the  demand  is  made  that  we  recognize  all  other 
individuals  as  ends  in  themselves.  On  this 
basis  society  is  simply  an  addition  of  individ¬ 
uals.  There  is  no  room  for  humanity  through 
the  multiplication  of  the  individual  alone.  No 
explanation  is  given  how  we  can  pass  to  the 
recognition  of  others.  Furthermore  no  group 
and  no  social  forms  can  have  an  ethic  on  the 
basis  of  rational  individualism.  After  all  are 
men  fused  by  reason!  Are  the  social  unities 
produced  by  reflection  and  by  rational  consid¬ 
erations!  It  is  a  fact  that  we  may  pause  and 
give  arguments  for  social  unities,  but  the  real 
forces  are  no  utilitarian  considerations.  Great 
sentiments,  and  ruling  feelings  carry  men  upon 
the  social  stream.  The  ideas  of  society  may  be 
realized  by  the  leaders,  and  men  rejoice  to  hear 
the  social  impulses  explained  to  them,  but  in 
actuality  the  ideas  and  reasons  do  not  make  the 
social  complex.  We  do  not  argue  ourselves 
from  the  individual  into  the  social.  We  are  in 
the  social  relationships  before  we  find  ourselves 


160 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


as  individuals.  This  fact  is  contrary  to 
rational  individualism. 

On  the  other  hand  rationalism  has  a  univer- 
salism  in  which  the  individual  is  lost.  Nature 
as  a  rational  whole,  as  conceived  of  by  the 
Cynics  and  the  Stoics,  makes  us  only  parts  of 
the  total.  The  absolute  Ego  of  Fichte,  the  all- 
embracing  I  of  Hegel,  leave  no  adequate  place 
for  real  personality.  With  the  suppression  of 
the  separate  ego  liberty  is  eliminated.  The  re¬ 
puted  freedom  of  the  allness  is  no  freedom  for 
the  part.  We  are  slaves  of  universal  reason.  It 
may  live  through  us  and  in  us  but  we  are  really 
no  concrete  existences  unless  we  are  related  to 
the  total.  Thus  the  universalism  of  reason 
destroys  the  individual,  as  the  individualistic 
rationalism  fails  in  conceiving  the  universal. 
Kant  gravitates  between  both  and  can  build  no 
bridge  between  them. 

Reason  and  asceticism.  Is  life  to  be  repres¬ 
sion  and  not  expression?  Do  surrender  and 
sacrifice  form  the  great  and  final  good?  Are 
we  only  good  as  we  give  up  our  life?  Rational¬ 
ism  if  consistent  must  stand  for  sacrifice,  re¬ 
pression  and  abandonment  in  life.  Its  ideal  is 
neither  control  nor  limitation  of  the  sentient, 
but  its  complete  prohibition.  The  most  con¬ 
sistent  and  logical  asceticism  is  found  in  the 
Orient  in  the  religions  of  India.  They  can  give 
no  solution  of  a  good  life,  and  no  hope  of  salva¬ 
tion,  except  as  man  destroys  every  want  and 
desire.  By  contemplation  men  are  urged  to 
enter  into  the  impassive  life  of  absolute  reason 
and  being.  They  are  bidden  to  mortify  every 
wish  and  every  feeling  and  emotion.  The 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  161 


Western  asceticism  has  not  gone  to  this  extreme 
limit.  The  activistic  spirit  of  the  West  has 
not  allowed  men  in  great  numbers  to  follow  the 
passive  attitude  of  the  resigned  and  calm  East. 
There  have  been  some  Western  ascetics,  like 
Madam  Guyau,  who  have  become  Quietists. 
For  them  life  was  all  stillness  and  cessation. 
But  the  power  of  Western  asceticism  was  par¬ 
tial  abandonment  of  the  life  of  sense  and  feel¬ 
ing.  It  sought  not  complete  suppression,  but 
simply  great  restraint  from  the  beating  of 
images  upon  the  eye,  from  the  intrusion  of 
sounds  upon  the  ear,  and  from  the  invasion  of 
odors  upon  the  nose.  Feelings  and  emotions 
were  crowded  back.  But  is  even  the  moderate 
sacrifice  final?  The  meaning  of  sacrifice  is  the 
saving  of  life.  It  is  no  end  in  itself.  Repres¬ 
sion  is  worthy  of  man  and  good  when  expression 
leads  to  the  loss  of  the  greater  and  fuller  life. 
But  freedom  from  the  possible  enslavement  of 
sense  and  feeling  ought  not  to  be  purchased  by 
the  loss  of  all  sentience.  This  is  to  seek  free¬ 
dom  through  destruction.  It  is  the  way  of 
despair.  But  perhaps  the  milder  asceticism  of 
the  Puritan  is  valuable.  We  need  the  call  of 
the  Puritan,  especially  in  our  age,  which  has 
gone  astray  in  indulgence.  Puritanism  is 
largely  a  castigation  for  excess.  Often,  if  the 
castigation  is  too  severe  it  leads  to  new  excess. 
But  prohibition  of  sentience  may  at  times  be 
temporarily  necessary;  it  may  be  the  only  way 
of  restraint  where  sense  and  appetite  cause 
individual  and  common  evil  in  societv:  but  pro¬ 
hibition  increasingly  stressed  in  life  is  punish¬ 
ment  and  imprisonment.  The  life  of  moral 


162 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


freedom  is  not  finally  furthered,  either  through 
self-imposed  laws,  or  restrictions  imposed  upon 
men  by  society.  Asceticism  denies  that  the 
bodily  life  can  ever  be  made  moral.  For  it  only 
mind  is  good,  and  all  matter  is  evil.  The  Hindu 
looks  upon  the  body  as  the  great  obstacle  and 
hindrance  to  be  gotten  rid  of.  Plato,  with  all 
his  Greek  appreciation  of  harmony  and  beauty, 
lives  only  in  the  world  of  ideas.  His  interest 
is  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul  alone.  The 
body  is  the  prison-house  of  the  soul  in  which  it 
is  kept  captive  for  a  time.  The  soul  is  eternal, 
the  body  the  passing  tenement.  It  is  this  atti¬ 
tude  of  asceticism  which  has  had  a  double 
deleterious  effect.  First,  it  has  always  con¬ 
demned  the  body,  and  stood  in  the  way  of  that 
bodily  care  and  consideration  of  health,  which 
constitutes  a  part  of  human  happiness.  If  the 
body  is  a  miserable  thing  why  should  we  give 
it  any  attention.  Let  it  die  as  soon  as  possible 
in  filth  or  through  disease!  The  ascetic  does 
not  believe  that  cleanliness  is  next  to  godliness. 
Such  a  sentiment  is  of  the  evil  one;  dirt  and 
destruction  of  the  body  are  essential  to  saint- 
ship.  Second,  the  condemnation  of  the  bodily 
life  by  the  ascetic  has  led  to  the  disregard  of 
the  sacredness  of  the  natural  life.  Therefore 
men  have  dealt  with  the  body  and  its  demands, 
as  far  as  rationalism  ruled,  in  a  spirit  of  aban¬ 
don.  The  urge  of  the  body  was  present  and  it 
was  followed  without  moral  ideals  controlling. 
The  condemnation  of  the  body  did  not  produce 
its  sanctification  but  the  reaction  of  indulgence. 
Thus  rationalism  brought  about  its  very 
opposite. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  163 


Does  reason  give  us  the  highest  good  and  the 

right?  To  what  extent  can  rationalism  answer 
the  claim  of  the  summum  bonum?  Is  its  ideal¬ 
ism  adequate?  Whither  does  its  conception  of 
right  and  law  lead?  The  rationalists  have  al¬ 
ways  held  that  in  distinction  from  the  hedon¬ 
ists  they  had  solved  the  problem  of  the 
highest  good.  But  what  is  the  highest  good? 
It  is  reason  in  its  abstraction  and  universalism. 
There  is  the  framework  of  the  good  but  nothing 
appears  within  the  frame.  The  ideal  is  the 
ideal  and  reaches  up  into  the  universal  and 
absolute.  Reason  becomes  more  and  more 
abstract  as  it  rises.  The  process  inherent  in  its 
contentless  trend  toward  the  inconceivable  and 
formless  is  like  a  series  approaching  zero.  No 
better  statement  of  this  tendency  has  been  given 
than  by  Plotinus.  He  says:  “Intellect,  how¬ 
ever,  is  able  to  see  either  things  prior  to  itself, 
or  things  pertaining  to  itself,  or  things  affected 
by  itself.  And  the  things  indeed  contained  in 
itself,  are  pure;  but  those  prior  to  itself  are 
purer  and  more  simple;  or  rather  this  must  bo 
asserted  of  that  which  is  prior  to  it.  Hence, 
that  which  is  prior  to  it,  is  not  intellect,  but 
something  more  excellent.  For  intellect  is  a 
certain  one  among  the  number  of  beings;  but 
that  it  not  a  certain  one,  but  is  prior  to  every¬ 
thing.  Nor  is  it  being;  for  being  has,  as  it 
were,  the  form  of  the  one.  But  that  is  formless, 
and  is  even  without  intelligible  form.  ’  ’ 22  Thus 
intellect  arrives  at  mere  colorless  unity. 
Where  this  exists  there  can  be  no  right  nor 
wrong,  no  good  nor  bad.  This  fact  in  rational- 

22  Enneades,  On  the  Good,  or  the  One.  XV,  III. 


164 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


ism  has  been  thoroughly  worked  out  by  Brad¬ 
ley  in  his  non-contradiction  as  the  absolute.23 
We  are  caught  in  our  own  logic  and  are  not  free. 

The  rationalists  speak  of  the  right  as  right 
and  of  the  absolute  law.  The  Cynic  and  Stoic 
ideal  is  to  live  according  to  the  right,  which  is 
the  law  of  nature.  But  where  do  we  find  the  law 
of  nature  with  its  contents?  The  Cynics  were 
consistent  when  they  fell  into  indulgence  of  the 
body  as  against  the  artificialities  of  their  time. 
They  followed  the  laws  of  bodily  life.  But 
these  could  not  be  the  laws  of  reason.  There¬ 
fore  the  Stoics  with  their  praise  of  apathy 
thought  the  law  of  right  was  the  absolute  rea¬ 
son  of  the  universe.  What  is  this  reason?  If 
we  observe  the  order  and  purpose  of  the  uni¬ 
verse  we  find  only  natural  laws.  There  is  an 
end  but  in  the  mere  process  and  development 
of  the  universe  apart  from  man  there  are  no 
traces  of  morals  or  freedom.  All  that  we  can 
find  of  a  moral  order  exists  in  the  history  of 
man  and  in  his  apprehension  of  the  power  that 
makes  for  righteousness.  But  this  moral  order 
is  frequently  violated.  It  does  not  have  the 
absoluteness  which  rationalism  claims.  Ration¬ 
alism  can  never  discover  the  real  final  good  or 
Jaw.  Its  processes  end  in  the  fog  of  the  invis¬ 
ible  mountain  peaks.  All  that  it  can  do  is  to 
insist  on  the  formal  necessity  of  right  and  law, 
and  then  point  beyond  itself  to  religion  which 
by  faith  sees  the  invisible.  The  apex  of  rational¬ 
ism  is  only  doubt  and  agnosticism.  The  aero¬ 
planes  it  sends  out  disappear  and  do  not  return. 

23  Appearance  and  Reality,  Book  II,  Chapter  XVII,  XXV. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  165 


But  it  is  valuable  in  stressing  the  ideal,  the 
highest  good,  the  right,  the  law,  although  it 
cannot  lead  into  the  promised  land. 

Duty  and  reason.  Is  it  not  the  distinguish¬ 
ing  advantage  of  rationalism  that  it  furnishes 
a  noble  interpretation  of  duty?  Has  not  the 
emphasis  upon  the  obligation  of  the  right  in 
eternal  principles  given  the  necessary  impetus 
to  moral  life?  When  we  discussed  duty24  it 
appeared  that  Kant  in  the  true  spirit  of  the 
rationalist  stressed  the  priority  of  duty.  But 
duty  cannot  be  maintained  merely  as  duty  and 
as  good  in  itself  without  showing  how  this 
goodness  enters  into  the  full  life  of  various 
duties.  Duty  for  duty’s  sake  is  a  noble  aspira¬ 
tion,  and  strengthens  the  moral  fibre.  But  in 
its  abstractness  it  is  simply  a  formula.  It  is 
like  a  tautology,  as  A  is  equal  to  A.  Kant 
endeavored  to  make  duty  realistic  by  advising 
men  to  choose  that  as  a  maxim,  which  can  be 
universally  implied.  We  are  e.  g.  to  speak  the 
truth  because  truthfulness  is  useful  and  neces¬ 
sary  for  all,  and  can  become  a  general  law. 
This  escape  from  the  bare  theoretical  descrip¬ 
tion  of  duty  is  however  no  credit  to  the  high 
aspirations  of  reason.  It  is  simply  utilitarian¬ 
ism  in  another  guise.  The  considerations  of 
use  derived  from  a  sort  of  common  sense  reflec¬ 
tion  are  to  give  content  to  abstract  duty.  A 
shallow  rationalism,  derived  not  from  high 
principles  of  reason,  but  from  a  knowledge  of 
what  obtains  among  men  and  what  is  found 
generally,  marks  the  effort  of  Kant.  The  im¬ 
port  of  making  that  our  maxim  which  can 

24  Cf.  above,  p.  106  ff. 


166 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


become  universal  is  not  passing  from  universal 
reason  to  tlie  particular,  but  using  the  partic¬ 
ular  and  concrete  and  interpretating  it  as  a 
universal  without  showing  the  cogency  of  the 
principles  of  reason.  And  such  reflection  is 
not  usual  with  men  when  duty  functions.  It  is 
only  the  philosopher  thinking  upon  duty,  who 
would  argue  thus  when  he  sees  man  merely  as 
a  thinking  being.  This  attitude  destroys  the 
categorical  imperative  of  duty  on  which  Kant 
dwells.  If  we  find  the  maxims  of  duty  by  calm 
deliberation  then  the  imperative  quality  is 
gone,  and  the  categorical  has  become  a  hypo¬ 
thetical.  Thus  when  the  rationalist  desires  to 
make  his  conception  of  duty  workable  he  con¬ 
tradicts  the  universal  power  of  duty  which  is 
the  cornerstone  of  his  system. 

Another  defect  of  the  rationalistic  idea  of 
duty  is  the  over-emphasis  of  duty  in  its  com¬ 
pelling  force.  When  the  men  who  defend  rea¬ 
son  as  alone  sufficient  in  moral  life  remain  with¬ 
in  the  circle  of  their  concepts  they  exalt  duty 
almost  into  the  place  of  a  compulsory  influence. 
Reason  is  portrayed  as  functioning  with  such 
logicality  and  cogency  that  man  must  follow. 
The  practical  reason  is  raised  into  an  absolute 
law  for  action.  It  almost  seems  as  though  man 
had  no  power  to  be  unreasonable  in  action  as 
he  often  is.  This  tendency  is  due  to  the  neglect 
of  the  other  factors  in  human  life  beside  reason. 
The  preachments  of  duty  are  a  fine  tonic  for 
the  ethical  life  if  they  stimulate  us  to  action 
which  is  reasonable.  But  the  urgency  of  duty 
must  not  be  so  explained,  as  to  destroy  our  sense 
of  freedom  with  its  responsibility. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  167 


How  does  reason  explain  virtue?  Is  it  not 

true  that  the  rationalists  have  a  high  valuation 
of  virtue  in  itself?  Do  they  not  put  it  upon  an 
absolute  basis?  Because  they  stress  virtue  for 
its  own  sake  they  make  it  appear  very  strong. 
“  ’Tis  certain  indeed,  that  virtue  and  vice  are 
eternally  and  necessarily  different,  and  that  the 
one  truly  deserves  to  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake, 
and  the  other  ought  by  all  means  to  be  avoided, 
though  a  man  was  sure  for  his  own  particular, 
neither  to  gain  nor  lose  anything  by  the  prac¬ 
tice  of  either.  ”  25  This  choice  of  virtue  for  it¬ 
self  without  considering  consequences  is  under¬ 
standable  as  a  protest  against  the  hedonists, 
for  whom  there  is  nothing  good  nor  bad  except 
through  consequences  of  pleasure  or  pain.  But 
the  error  of  the  rationalist  in  this  protest  is, 
that  virtue  and  vice  do  have  consequences. 
And  if  man  chooses  a  virtue  as  the  embodiment 
of  the  good  he  has  a  purpose  in  mind.  Virtue 
is  not  so  arbitrarily  dissociable  from  the  ideal. 
The  ideal  is  not  only  the  motive  at  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  action,  but  also  the  purpose  at  the  end. 
Of  course  we  are  not  to  be  calculators  of  results 
through  prudence  as  the  hedonist  thinks,  but 
on  the  other  hand  we  do  count  the  value  of  vir¬ 
tue  in  reference  to  the  consequences  of  the  good. 

The  same  error  that  characterized  the  hedon¬ 
ists  in  restricting  themselves  largely  to  pru¬ 
dence  as  the  virtue,  also  marks  the  rationalists 
in  making  wisdom  the  one  virtue.  The  Stoics 
only  admitted  one  virtue  and  altogether  missed 
the  understanding  of  the  varying  and  different 
virtues.  It  is  true  that  in  all  virtues  there  is 

25  Clarke,  Discourse  upon  Natural  Religion,  I,  7. 


168 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


an  element  of  wisdom.  We  cannot  be  just, 
truthful,  pure,  etc.,  no  matter  what  motives 
make  us  thus,  without  also  being  wise  in  these 
virtues.  Nevertheless  all  the  virtues  cannot  be 
derived  from  wisdom.  Their  rationality  is  not 
that  feature  which  really  makes  them  virtues. 
The  limitation  of  virtue  to  wisdom  indicates 
that  reason  alone  is  not  adequate  to  explain  the 
nature  of  virtue  and  the  existence  of  virtues. 

Through  the  Greek  influence  the  intellectual 
in  virtue  has  been  exaggerated.  Plato  made 
wisdom  paramount.  Aristotle  put  the  intellec¬ 
tual  side  of  life  above  the  purely  ethical.  As 
God  is  thought  in  action,  man  rises  above  the 
ordinary  virtues,  like  courage,  temperance, 
friendship,  etc.  through  pure  mind.  Now 
this  attitude,  even  though  not  carried  to 
this  extreme,  produces  aristocratic  pride.  The 
good  in  morals  are  the  best  in  society,  and 
morals  are  aristocratic.  But  the  aristocracy 
of  the  ethical  life  is  not  the  superiority  of  intel¬ 
lect.  The  more  intelligent  are  not  the  salt  of 
the  earth  because  of  their  mind.  The  intelli¬ 
gentsia  of  an  age  are  not  the  same  as  the  moral 
idealists  of  the  age.  Those  who  consider  them¬ 
selves  wise  because  of  the  intellect  alone 
despise  the  rest.  The  small  group  of  intellec¬ 
tuals  often  live  for  themselves ;  and  their  boast¬ 
ful  self-estimation  entangles  them  in  an  over¬ 
estimate  of  their  worth  that  enslaves.  There 
is  no  liberation  through  intellect  alone.  The 
aristocracy  of  the  intellectuals,  when  not  used 
in  helpful  service,  becomes  undemocratic. 
Therefore  the  intellectualists  not  only  miss 
their  own  freedom,  by  confusing  a  certain  seep- 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  169 


ticism  with  freedom  of  thought,  but  they 
endanger  the  common  liberty  of  society.  While 
the  freedom  of  society  needs  leadership  of  high 
thought  and  moral  purpose,  thought  alone  will 
not  create  such  leadership.  There  is  fre¬ 
quently  an  aloofness  from  the  democratic  move¬ 
ment  of  the  age  on  the  part  of  intellectuals. 
When  they  do  participate  they  are  likely  to 
gravitate  into  radicalism,  which  confuses  lib¬ 
erty  with  revolution,  and  is  always  stronger  in 
destructive  criticism  than  in  helpful,  construc¬ 
tive  criticism.  The  mind  of  man  without  heart 
and  will  will  never  give  us  the  utopia.  Those 
who  live  the  academic  life  must  be  especially 
careful  not  to  seek  truth  in  the  intellect  alone. 
The  realities  of  life  must  speak  to  us  if  we  are 
to  approach  the  problem  of  liberty. 

The  philososphy  of  rationalism.  What  is  the 
underlying  philosophy  of  the  rationalists! 
Whither  does  their  view  of  the  world  lead! 
There  is  a  strong  attractiveness  about  the 
rationalist  position.  It  is  idealism,  and  satis¬ 
fies  the  strivings  of  those  who  look  for  high 
things.  The  intellect  seems  the  best  in  man, 
and  has  so  much  in  history  to  confirm  its  value 
for  mankind.  But  we  must  not  confuse  the 
idealistic  in  life  with  the  idealism  of  the  ration¬ 
alist.  When  the  good  is  made  purely  reason  it 
lowers  the  worth  of  all  the  rest  of  life.  Ideal¬ 
ism  makes  a  promise  which  it  cannot  keep.  It 
offers  us  our  full  self-fulfillment  and  holds  out 
to  us  the  hope  of  vital  liberty.  When  we  begin 
to  live  the  life  of  reason  in  ourselves  we  do  find 
that  knowledge  makes  free  as  far  as  it  leads  us 
into  the  truth.  But  we  cannot  advocate  reason 


J  70 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


without  following  its  logic,  and  logic  is  inevi¬ 
table.  It  does  not  consider  the  freshness  and 
fulness  of  life  hut  only  demands  consistency. 
It  carries  us  forward  to  the  bitter  end  if  we 
follow.  This  inherent  logic  of  reason  will  not 
permit  us  on  the  foundation  of  reason  alone  to 
remain  within  ourselves.  The  tendency  of 
reason  is  toward  the  universal  and  absolute. 
We  cannot  be  Stoics  and  not  submit  to  world- 
reason.  Kant,  his  categories,  and  his  apper¬ 
ception  of  the  ego,  contain  in  germ  the  position 
of  Fichte  and  of  Hegel.  Such  is  the  process  of 
reason  that  takes  us  captive.  The  final  out¬ 
come  is  the  absolutism  of  reason.  Through  it 
we  are  led  to  an  Absolute  of  impersonal  nature 
and  an  existence  in  which  the  distinctions  of 
good  and  bad  are  lost.  We  become  enslaved 
through  the  absolutism  of  the  idea  in  a  world 
of  mind  without  a  personal  God,  a  society  in 
which  individuals  are  submerged  as  mere  parts, 
and  a  state  that  is  completely  sovereign  as  the 
expression  of  reason.  Intellect  has  thus  given 
us  empty  apples  of  Sodom.  Its  boasted  free¬ 
dom  has  become  a  slavery.  Idealism  of  the  in¬ 
tellect  alone  is  a  deception.  It  claims  to  rescue 
us  from  materialism  and  then  makes  us  doubly 
slaves  of  the  absolute. 

Christianity  and  reason.  Is  Christianity 
fundamentally  favorable  to  reason?  Does  its 
inherent  spirit  have  a  direction  toward  reason? 
It  is  evident  that  as  a  religion  it  cannot  be  a 
mere  philosophy  unless  it  abandons  a  part  of 
its  truth.  The  supernatural  in  any  religion  is 
superrational  in  the  philosophic  sense.  And 
Christianity  is  not  without  its  mystic  super- 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  171 


naturalism.  But  we  approach  more  closely  to 
the  problem  when  we  ask:  “What  are  the 
teachings  of  Christianity  as  to  restraint  and 
repression  in  life?”  Is  it  fundamentally 
ascetic?  The  attitude  toward  pleasure,  which 
it  does  not  completely  reject,  is  a  partial  ans¬ 
wer.26  Nevertheless  we  must  consider  certain 
truths  that  stress  surrender.  The  straight  gate 
and  the  narrow  way  are  made  the  way  of  life.27 
He  that  saveth  his  life  shall  lose  it,  and  he  that 
loseth  his  life  shall  find  it.28  The  very  desires 
of  life  must  be  given  up.  “If  thy  right  eye 
offend  thee,  pluck  it  out  and  cast  it  from  thee: 
for  it  is  better  for  thee  that  one  of  thy  members 
should  perish,  and  not  that  thy  whole  body 
should  be  cast  into  hell.  And  if  thy  right  hand 
offend  thee,  cut  it  off,  and  cast  it  from  thee:  for 
it  is  profitable  for  thee  that  one  of  thy  members 
should  perish,  and  not  that  thy  whole  body 
should  be  cast  into  hell.”29  Paul,  following  this 
attitude  of  Christ’s  teaching,  strives  to  bring 
his  body  into  subjection.  He  thinks  it  is  advis¬ 
able  not  to  marry,  hut  finally  it  is  better  for 
those  who  cannot  contain  themselves  to  marry 
than  to  burn.30  Christianity  forbids  the  love 
of  the  world.  But  all  of  these  negative  com¬ 
mands  for  life  are  in  the  interest  of  a  larger 
life.  They  are  not  rationalistic  in  the  real 
sense.  The  aim  is  to  save  the  spiritual  life 
hut  not  because  it  is  rational.  The  life  of  the 
spirit  must  not  be  lost  for  the  sake  of  the  whole 

26  Cf.  above,  p.  142. 

27  Matthew  VII:  13. 

28  Cf.  Mark  VIII:  35. 

29  Matthew  V :  29  ff. 

30  I  Corinthians  VII :  9. 


172 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


man.  Therefore  certain  desires  must  be  sup¬ 
pressed  if  they  imperil  the  complete  life  and 
the  final  liberty  of  man. 

Original  Christianity  despite  these  warnings 
is  not  essentially  ascetic.  This  appears  clearly 
in  the  Christian  attitude  toward  the  body.  The 
body  is  not  evil  in  itself.  In  later  post-apos¬ 
tolic  Christianity  Platonic  influences  and  orien¬ 
tal  ideas  helped  to  bring  about  the  undervalua¬ 
tion  of  the  body,  and  caused  asceticism.  But  in 
the  early  days  the  body  was  held  to  be  the  tem¬ 
ple  of  the  Holy  Spirit.31  It  was  to  be  sanctified 
and  not  eliminated.  The  soul  was  not  the 
total  man.  But  God  was  to  keep  us  body,  soul 
and  spirit.  The  hope  of  the  future  was  not  a 
spirit  life  without  the  body.  The  new  body  of 
the  hereafter  was  to  be  a  spiritual  body  differ¬ 
ent  from  this  mortal  body.  It  was  to  be 
changed  into  glory  and  immortality.32  But  the 
desire  was  not  to  be  without  a  body  and  to  be 
unclothed  and  naked  in  spirit.  A  new  body 
was  to  be  given  to  man.  The  old  body  was 
sown  into  the  ground  to  be  raised  in  newness  of 
life.  The  old  temple  and  tabernacle  of  the 
soul  would  be  broken  down,  but  God  would 
give  a  new  temple  and  a  new  tabernacle33  of 
life  in  the  glorified  body  which  was  to  be. 
Such  hopes  as  these  are  not  rationalistic  ascet¬ 
icism.  Man  was  never  to  be  mere  spirit,  but 
in  all  eternity  body  and  spirit.  Consequently 
the  teachings  of  Christianity  in  their  pure  form 
are  not  spiritual  in  the  sense  of  reason  and 

31  I  Corinthians  III:  16  ff. 

33  I  Corinthians  XV :  43,  44. 

33  2  Corinthians  V :  1. 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  REASON  173 


mind,  to  the  detriment  of  the  body.  There  is 
no  oriental  undervaluation  of  the  reality  of  all 
life.  The  ideal  is  a  liberated  body  free  from 
present  enchainments  of  sickness  and  death, 
connected  with  a  liberated  spirit.  Thus  man 
would  enter  into  the  full  liberty  of  a  child  of 
God. 


REFERENCES 

James  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chapter 
II. 

Theo.  De  Laguna,  Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Ethics, 
Chapters  IX,  XI,  II,  XII. 

Henry  W.  Wright,  Self-Realization,  Part  II,  Chapter  III. 

J.  H.  Muirhead,  The  Elements  of  Ethics,  Part  III,  Chapter  II. 

Chas.  D  ’Arcy,  A  Short  Study  of  Ethics,  Part  III,  Chapter  I. 

Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics,  Chapter  XVI. 

Chas.  Gray  Shaw,  The  Value  and  Dignity  of  Human  Life, 
Part  III,  Chapter  VI. 

Jas.  Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  Vol.  II,  Book  II, 
Branch  II. 

Vladimir  Solovyof,  The  Justification  of  the  Good,  Part  I, 
Chapter  II. 

Benj.  Rand,  The  Classical  Moralists,  IV,  VII,  VIII,  XV, 
XXI,  XXXV,  XXXVI,  XXXVII. 

R.  D.  Hicks,  Stoic  and  Epicurean,  Chapters  I,  II,  III,  IV. 

E.  Vernon  Arnold,  Roman  Stoicism. 

Discourses  of  Epictetus. 

Meditations  of  Marcus  Aurelius. 

Kant,  The  Metaphysic  of  Morals. 

Kant,  The  Critique  of  Practical  Reason. 

Fichte,  The  Science  of  Ethics. 

Fichte,  The  Vocation  of  Man. 

Hegel,  The  Philosophy  of  Right. 


CHAPTER  IX 


FREEDOM  THROUGH  PERSONALITY 

What  of  the  will?  It  is  evident,  after  our 
effort  to  find  freedom  either  through  pleasure 
or  reason,  that  both  fail.  What  is  the  deepest 
cause  of  their  inadequacy  in  addition  to  the 
criticisms  passed  upon  them?  The  answer  that 
readily  suggests  itself  is,  that  both  fall  short  of 
their  claim  because  they  make  the  will  second¬ 
ary.  In  hedonism  the  will  almost  disappears. 
It  is  attached  to  the  chain  of  causes  and  * 
effects  that  terminate  in  pleasure  or  pain. 
In  rationalism  will  is  called  good  for  the  sake  - 
of  its  rationality.  Even  Kant  cannot  really 
give  the  will  its  place  in  morals  despite  his  high 
estimate  of  the  reality  in  will.  This  is  due  to 
the  fact,  that  will  is  after  all  in  its  essence  prac¬ 
tical  reason.  And  yet  ethics  deals  with  will 
and  action  as  fundamental  in  character  and 
conduct.  There  can  be  no  ideal  of  ethical  life 
without  a  free  will.  Freedom  is  the  beginning 
and  goal.1  Does  this  not  indicate  that  if  we 
would  approach  the  problem  of  freedom  aright, 
and  begin  to  find  freedom,  we  must  start  out 
with  the  will  and  coordinate  it  with  all  of  our 
functionings  that  affect  character  and  conduct  ? 

How  then  do  our  deliberations  and  choices, 


i  Cf.  above,  p.  28  ff. 


174 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


175 


our  motives  and  determinations,  our  decisions 
and  actions,  eventuate  for  the  moral  life  of 
freedom?  Wliat  comes  from  character  to  con¬ 
duct  through  will  and  action,  and  what  returns 
to  character  from  conduct  and  its  action? 
Whenever  we  will  and  act  in  certain  directions 

we  form,  a  unitv  of  action.  This  is  the  outcome 

•/ 

of  prior  decisions  and  actions  crystallized  into 
character.  But  in  turn  what  we  do  either  con-  * 
firms  the  unity  of  direction  as  it  proceeds  from 
our  character,  or  disturbs  and  reshapes  it,  and 
starts  a  new  line  of  direction.  Through 
motives  from  within,  as  desires,  wants,  in¬ 
stincts,  dispositions,  habits,  and  through  con¬ 
duct  from  without  we  form  and  organize  a 
certain  determinateness  of  life.  But  this  deter¬ 
minateness  is  the  result  of  our  choices  freely 
made  and  if  rightly  made  leads  to  liberty  of 
life.  If  we  pause  to  examine  how  determinate¬ 
ness  occurs  and  how  it  organizes  our  life  we 
shall  be  assured  that  we  are  dealing  with 
immediate  realities.  I  am  appealed  to,  e.  g.  to 
make  a  contribution  to  some  good  cause  of 
charity  or  education.  The  direction  of  my 
action  will  be  to  respond  if  there  have  preceded 
other  actions  of  generous  giving.  My  answer 
to  the  present  appeal  will  strengthen  the  past 
and  existing  determinateness.  If  I  have  not 
responded  in  the  past,  but  shut  up  my  heart  to 
every  request  of  generosity  I  will  either  not 
give,  or  if  new,  strong  motives  enter  in,  I  may 
change  my  former  course  of  action  and  begin 
a  different  line  of  determinateness.  This  same 
procedure  appears  when  I  am  tempted  to  do 
wrong.  Under  a  trying  situation  it  seems 


176  CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 

easier  to  tell  an  untruth  than  to  adhere  to  the 
truth.  My  free  decision  is  in  unity  with  pre¬ 
vious  attitudes  and  actions  either  for  or  against 
the  truth.  Thus  through  volition  I  am  always 
acting  out  past  volitions,  confirming  them 
anew,  or  reversing  former  positions  and 
actions.  A  conflict  arises  in  my  mind  as  to 
two  courses  of  action,  neither  of  which  are  in 
themselves  wrong.  How  shall  the  conflict  be 
settled?  I  am,  e.  g.  in  a  quandary  whether  I 
shall  use  my  vacation  for  pure  recreation,  or 
for  some  work  which  is  excluded  by  my  ordi¬ 
nary  daily  tasks.  The  determination  will  be 
for  work  or  pure  recreation  according  to  the 
ruling  direction  of  my  will.  While  I  may 
weigh  the  pro  and  contra  of  the  advantage  of 
rest  as  necessary,  or  the  value  of  work  as  joy 
and  profit,  after  all  the  decision  will  mostly  he 
in  accord  with  the  controlling  purposes  which 
have  made  past  actions  and  formed  prior  char¬ 
acter.  The  living  study  of  this  functioning  of 
will  as  determinateness,  but  as  our  determin¬ 
ateness,  is  the  elemental  and  fundamental  fact 
for  finding  the  ideal  of  moral  action  and  ethical 
life. 

Will  and  personality.  While  we  begin  with 
the  will  and  its  actions,  we  cannot  stop  with  it. 
In  the  analysis  of  character  and  conduct  with 
their  decisions  and  directions  we  must  not  for¬ 
get  that  volitions  and  actions  are  not  the  whole 
of  life.  How  do  they  coordinate  with  ideas, 
feelings  and  emotions?  And  what  term  shall 
we  choose  to  designate  the  totality  of  character 
and  conduct  in  their  actual,  concrete  function¬ 
ing?  Whatever  we  determine  to  say  or  do  can 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


177 


have  no  meaning  without  the  content  of  some 
ideas  or  the  presence  of  some  reasons.  Voli¬ 
tion  in  itself  is  impossible  without  knowledge. 
This  knowledge  is  often  not  the  abstract  rea¬ 
son  or  logic  which  the  rationalists  have  in 
mind.  It  is  the  direct  and  living  knowledge 
growing  out  of  experience.  When  it  becomes 
formulated  into  certain  principles  and  subject 
to  certain  laws  it  furnishes  the  intellectual 
material  of  our  character  and  conduct.  Con¬ 
duct  can  never  be  really  ethical  only  because  it 
is  highly  evolved,  or  very  complex,  or  largely 
differentiated.  The  ultimate  difference  be¬ 
tween  all  sub-human  action  and  human  action 
as  moral  conduct  lies  in  the  fact  of  man’s 
knowing  what  he  does  and  assuming  responsi¬ 
bility  for  what  he  does.  To  make  action  the 
exclusive  fact  and  dissociating  it  from  reason 
leads  into  mere  energy  and  destroys  freedom. 
Action  to  be  moral  action  must  come  from 
within  and  must  always  have  ideas  and  ideals 
animating  it. 

The  conjunction  of  knowledge  with  character 
and  conduct  is  not  yet  the  whole  of  life. 
Knowledge  in  mind  and  in  action  is  not  possible 
without  the  life  of  the  senses.  They  must  he 
regarded  not  only  as  the  source  of  external 
experience,  but  also  as  giving  a  certain  tone 
and  color  to  all  experience.  Our  life  is  either 
heightened  or  lowered,  elevated  or  depressed, 
expanded  or  contracted,  pleasurable  or  pain¬ 
ful  in  the  raw  material  of  experience.  The 
nature  of  experience  in  its  sense-coloring  enters 
intimately  into  our  character  and  conduct. 
But  no  less  than  the  sentient  life  is  the  life  of 


178 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


feeling  and  emotion.  Moral  action  is  no  cold, 
impassionate  procedure  of  conduct  through 
knowledge.  It  is  warm  and  human  with  many 
a  feeling.  The  impetus  of  feeling  is  never 
absent.  Corresponding  to  the  tone  of  the  senses 
from  without  is  the  tone  of  feeling  within.  Ap¬ 
proval  or  disapproval  of  actions,  satisfaction  or 
reproof  of  what  we  have  said  or  done,  within  us, 
always  have  some  color  of  feeling.  No  consider¬ 
ation  of  ethical  life  is  just  without  allowing  for 
the  large  place  of  feeling  which  is  the  constant 
undercurrent  of  action.  Similarly  there  are 
emotions  of  joy  or  sorrow,  happiness  or  dis¬ 
tress,  and  many  others,  constantly  present. 
The  portrayal  of  human  life  and  character  in 
drama  and  novel  gains  its  hold  upon  us  because 
it  unfolds  the  living  emotion  in  the  lives  of  men. 
It  is  real  while  the  academic  description  which 
loses  sight  of  emotion  gives  us  only  the  dry 
and  dead  bones  of  action  and  character. 

What  shall  we  call  the  unity  of  determina¬ 
tions  with  ideas  and  feelings,  emotions  and 
sensations?  The  most  usable  term  is  that  of 
personality .  But  we  must  clearly  have  in 
mind  that  we  employ  this  term  with  no  notion 
of  a  fixed  substance.  It  is  not  the  usual  defini¬ 
tion  of  personality  which  we  mean,  namely, 
the  unity  of  self-consciousness  and  self-deter¬ 
mination.  This  current  notion  begins  with 
the  fact  of  mere  human  awareness  and  con¬ 
sciousness  and  fuses  it  with  the  will.  There 
is  no  room  for  the  life  of  sentience,  feeling  and 
emotion.  The  whole  concept  smells  of  the  oil 
of  the  study.  It  is  abstract  and  unreal.  What 
we  call  personality  in  its  immediate  sense  is 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


179 


tlie  unity  of  determinateness  in  action,  with 
knowledge,  and  with  all  of  feeling.  Our 
endeavor  is  to  designate  a  sum  of  concrete 
phenomena  of  moral  action  in  their  living  con¬ 
nectedness  and  unity.  But  we  must  further 
define  and  differentiate  this  meaning  of  per¬ 
sonality. 

Personality  and  individuality.  What  is  the 
real  difference  between  personality  and  individ¬ 
uality!  Are  they  not  different  points  of  view  of 
regarding  the  individual!  In  common  usage 
individuality  and  personality  are  often  made  to 
cover  the  same  idea,  without  even  allowing  for 
the  different  shades  in  their  designations.  The 
current  philosophic  definition  which  places  the 
accent  in  the  unity  of  consciousness  and  de¬ 
termination  upon  the  self  in  defining  personal¬ 
ity  aids  the  prevalent  loose  usage  in  reference 
to  personality  and  individuality.  A  closer 
analysis  will  justify  a  definite  differentiation. 
What  is  an  individual!  An  individual  is  a 
single  being  in  distinction  from  the  group.  It 
is  the  one  as  separate  from  the  many,  the  single 
existence  as  distinct  from  the  type.  There  is 
no  merely  generic  in  all  nature,  but  the  generic 
exists  along  with  the  individual.  In  classify¬ 
ing  specimens  of  rock  in  geology  we  find  cer¬ 
tain  forms  of  crystallization.  But  the  general 
feature  of  the  geometrical  form  in  a  rock  spec¬ 
imen  has  also  peculiar  variations.  There  is 
no  mere  existence  of  the  purely  generic  through 
which  we  unify  and  group  separate  specimens 
as  coming  under  a  general  class.  A  flower  or 
a  plant  belongs  not  only  to  a  class,  but  also 
shows  individual  features.  An  American 


180 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


Beauty  rose,  e.  g.  has  those  common  qualities 
and  characteristics  through  which  we  recog¬ 
nize  and  place  it  as  an  American  Beauty  rose. 
But  still  one  rose  is  no  mere  mechanical  copy 
of  another.  Rose  differs  from  rose,  and  rose¬ 
bush  varies  from  rose-bush.  The  generic  and 
typical  does  not  destroy  the  individual.  This 
fact  is  still  more  marked  in  the  animal  world. 
We  can  clearly  and  distinctly  note  the  species, 
but  a  closer  study  of  any  one  animal  shows  us 
that  one  differs  from  the  other  in  the  same 
species.  Two  Holstein  cows  are  not  absolutely 
the  same.  There  are  variations  despite  a 
common  stock  and  a  common  heredity.  Com¬ 
mon  traits  appear  in  the  same  breed  of  dogs, 
and  yet  e.  g.  one  shepherd  dog  is  not  like 
another  even  if  both  come  from  the  same  male 
and  female.  When  we  come  to  man  there  is  a 
still  more  marked  individuality.  The  common 
instincts,  such  e.  g.  as  acquisitiveness,  comba¬ 
ting,  fear,  etc.;  the  general  dispositions,  as  e.  g. 
rivalry,  domination,  conformity;  the  generic 
temperaments,  bright  or  gloomy,  joyous  or 
depressed,  active  or  passive;  the  usual  feelings 
and  emotions; — in  short  all  of  the  marked 
general  human  characteristics  of  mind — are  so 
combined  and  varied  from  one  man  to  another 
as  to  constitute  an  individual  with  separateness 
of  quality.  The  common  features  of  race  and 
nation  do  not  eliminate  individuality.  The 
higher  the  development  of  man  the  more  out¬ 
standing  is  the  individuality.  But  withal  it 
remains  a  given  fact.  Each  individual  with 
differing  capacities  and  powers  has  both  the 
possibility  and  the  limitation  of  his  individu- 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


181 


ality.  We  cannot  pass  beyond  onr  imparted 
talents;  we  can  only  cultivate  them  more  or  less. 
But  there  is  no  ethical  value  in  individuality 
as  such.  An  individual  has  qualities  that  may 
be  made  good  or  may  tend  to  evil.  What  we 
are  as  individuals  does  not  of  itself  make  us 
just,  true,  righteous.  Every  individual  dispo¬ 
sition  has  its  handicaps.  Often  the  greater  the 
individual  the  greater  the  disadvantages  that 
accompany  the  advantages.  Great  individuals 
like  great  mountains  often  cast  large  shadows. 
Consequently  it  is  entirely  wrong  when  educa¬ 
tion  posits  as  its  end  the  developing  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual.  Individualism  is  not  in  itself  moral 
freedom.  To  live  out  our  lives  with  what  is  in 
them  is  not  to  be  good.  Liberty  is  not  guaran¬ 
teed  by  merely  becoming  what  is  in  us  as  pos¬ 
sibility  and  capacity. 

There  is  a  usage  of  personality  which  does 
not  altogether  disregard  its  difference  from 
individuality.  The  statement  is  sometimes  made 
about  those,  who  impress  themselves  upon 
others  through  leadership  of  some  sort,  that 
they  possess  personality.  What  is  meant  by 
this  characterization!  Two  individuals  may 
have  equal  talents.  The  equality  of  talents  of 
the  intellect  will  not  make  two  men  equally 
leaders.  There  may  be  in  one  more  strength 
of  sympathetic  feeling  and  more  emotional 
imagination.  These  added  to  intellect  make 
him  stronger.  But  finally  the  quality  which  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  constitute  some  one  a 
personality  with  power  to  attract  and  lead  is 
will.  All  other  advantageous  qualities  of  mind, 
and  all  favorable  physical  features,  will  not 


182 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


compensate  for  tlie  absence  of  a  determinateness 
of  will.  A  weak  will,  a  wavering  volition,  will 
not  draw  and  control  others.  But  while  this 
conception  of  personality  approaches  the  truth, 
it  is  still  deficient.  It  makes  personality  a 
natural  gift,  a  given  unity,  a  fixed  possession. 

The  vital  idea  of  personality  is  a  unity  of 
determinations  with  ideas  and  feelings  that  is 
not  given  by  nature.  It  is  shaped  and  created 
in  man  by  the  direction  of  his  choices.  Person¬ 
ality  is  the  outcome  of  what  men  through  action 
make  their  real  determinateness  of  will,  resting 
upon  ideas,  and  warm  with  feeling.  Its  real 
meaning  implies  the  free  unfolding  of  ideals  in 
conduct  as  they  proceed  from  character.  But 
character  is  no  mere  existence,  but  a  living, 
active  force  for  action  and  a  result  of  choice  and 
action.  Thus  personality  is  a  moral  product  of 
freedom  and  the  content  of  freedom.  When  the 
choices  and  actions  are  directed  toward  the 
wrong  there  is  the  result  of  a  fixed  character 
and  certain  determinate  actions.  But  we  cannot 
justly  call  this  making  of  an  evil  determinate¬ 
ness  of  life  a  good,  moral  personality.  In  other 
words,  personality  must  include  more  than  the 
result  of  the  psychological  process  of  determina¬ 
tion,  idea,  and  feeling  in  unity.  It  has  a  value, 
and  this  value  is  the  good.  A  real  personality 
in  the  moral  sense  is  a  good  personality.  An 
evil  personality  does  not  really  exist  in  the 
moral  meaning  which  we  attach  to  personality. 
The  idea  of  personality  audit sjoo  wer  for  free- 
domjyjn^  through  evil  choice sT  rHie  "same 
psychological  Functiohlngs^afe  not  the  same 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


183 


morally.  Personality  is  the  expression  of  the 
good  in  freedom.2 

Does  personality  answer  the  social  demand? 

One  of  the  defects  of  both  pleasure  and  reason 
was  their  impossibility  of  furnishing  a  real  basis 
for  the  inter-relation  of  individual  and  social 
life.  Can  the  ideal  of  personality  offer  a 
solution?  What  is  designated  personalism  in 
modern  philosophy  would  seem  to  negative  this 
question.  It  is  not  as  extreme  as  individualism3 
in  its  accent  of  the  single  being  as  everything, 
but  nevertheless  it  cannot  in  most  of  its  presen¬ 
tations  very  readily  pass  beyond  the  individual 
without  difficulty.4  This  is  due  to  its  conception 
of  personality  as  given,  and  its  failure  to  see  in 
it  as  far  as  man  is  concerned  a  creative  and 
developing  unity.  It  is  of  course  evident  that 
choices,  determinations,  ideas,  feelings,  fusing 
into  oneness,  do  occur  within  the  individual 
mind  and  make  the  individual  personality. 
Personality  does  not  deny  individuality,  but 
functions  in  and  through  it.  But  it  finds  further 
expression  in  the  determinateness  making  for 
personality  in  social  relations  and  forms. 

How  personality  leads  from  individuality  to 
the  social  complex  has  been  outlined  by  H. 
Scott  Holland  in  “Property  and  Personality ” 
(Property,  its  Rights  and  Duties  by  Various 
Writers,  p.  197): 

2  Brightman,  The  use  of  the  word  “Personalism;  ”  The 
Personalist,  Vol.  Ill,  No.  4,  p.  24  ff. 

3  Cf.  Warner  Fite,  Individualism. 

4  This  is  the  defect  in  all  philosophic  statements  up  to  the 
present  time.  It  started  with  Boethius  who  claimed  that 
‘ 1  person  is  the  individual  subsistence  of  a  rational  nature  ’  \ 
(Persona  est  Naturae  rationalis  individua  substantia.) 


184 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


“Individuality,5  then,  is  really  representative, 
is  corporate,  is  social,  by  the  very  principle  of 
its  like.  It  can  only  be  understood  as  the  unit 
of  a  society.  And  this  only  leads  us  deeper 
down  into  the  root-conception  of  personality 
which  finds  expression  in  personality.  Person¬ 
ality  lies  in  the  relation  of  person  to  person. 
A  personality  is  what  it  is  only  by  virtue  of  its 
power  to  transcend  itself  and  to  enter  into  the 
life  of  another.  It  lives  by  interpenetration, 
by  intercourse,  by  communion.  Its  power  of  life 
is  love.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  solitary, 
isolated  person.  A  self-contained  personality 
is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  What  we  mean  by 
personality  is  a  capacity  for  intercourse,  a 
capacity  for  retaining  self-identity  by  and 
through  identification  with  others — a  capacity 
for  friendship,  for  communion,  for  fellowship. 
Hence  the  true  logic  of  personality  compels  us 
to  discover  the  man’s  personal  worth  in  the 
inherent  necessity  of  a  society  in  which  it  is 
realized.  Society  is,  simply,  the  expression  of 
the  social  inter-communion  of  spirit  with  spirit 
which  constitutes  what  we  mean  by  personality. 
Fellowship  and  Individuality  are  correlative 
terms.” 

Some  of  the  choices  and  actions  of  man, 
together  with  his  ideas  and  feelings,  are  not 
individual.  They  are  the  expression  of  the 
social  connection  of  an  individual.  This  means 
more  than  the  fact  that  most  individual  choices 
and  acts  have  a  social  direction,  and  that 
apparently  individual  virtues  are  after  all 
social  relationships.  In  the  mind  of  the  indi- 

5  Individuality  ought  not  to  be  identified  with  personality. 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


185 


vidual  there  exists  a  social  determinateness, 
although  this  must  not  be  interpreted  as  giving 
authority  to  morals.  If  I  act  as  a  member  of  a 
social  group,  e.  g.  a  director  of  a  corporation  or 
a  committee-man  of  a  labor  union,  my  decisions, 
actions,  feelings,  ideas  are  the  group  expression. 
The  group  acts  through  me  and  I  represent  the 
group  mind.  Thus  my  actions  as  social  help  to 
make  or  unmake  the  personality  of  the  group. 
This  is  apparent  not  merely  in  the  free  forms 
of  association  in  society,  but  especially  in  the 
social  forms  of  family,  church  and  state.  When 
an  attack  is  made  upon  my  sister  I  do  not  oppose 
it  merely  as  an  individual,  but  largely  as  a 
member  of  a  family.  The  family  acts  through 
me.  Out  of  this  family  relation  of  some  actions 
grew  the  early  practice  af  blood-revenge.  And 
the  family  feeling  was  the  concomitant  of  the 
tribal  feeling  of  unity  of  blood.  The  physical 
fact  found  an  outlet  and  an  interpretation  in 
the  moral  actions  by  which  men  accepted  and 
asserted  the  social  blood  relationship.  These 
actions  coming  forth  from  the  individual  are 
not  individual  but  social  in  idea,  feeling  and  act. 
When  I  confess  a  truth  as  member  of  a  church, 
or  cooperate  in  its  great  undertakings,  what 
the  church  believes  or  does  lives  in  and  through 
me.  The  state  has  its  history  and  its  life,  and 
at  certain  times  this  tradition  of  history  and  life 
calls  for  certain  actions  from  me.  I  simply  act 
out  the  social  implications  of  the  state.  I  think 
and  act  as  a  member  of  the  state  to  which  I 
belong  and  in  which  I  was  born  and  reared. 
All  such  actions  are  a  part  of  a  larger  social 
personality. 


186 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


It  would  not  be  possible  for  the  social  to 
find  expression  through  individual  lives  unless 
there  was  a  unity  of  determinations,  ideas  and 
feelings  which  constitute  the  social  personality. 
This  is  no  fiction,  but  is  just  as  real  as  the 
creative  formation  of  personality  in  the  indi¬ 
vidual.  Mind  is  more  than  connection  with  a 
single  body.  The  social  complex  as  well  as 
nature  shows  its  presence.  The  same  psycho¬ 
logical  functionings  of  choice  and  action  live 
in  the  group.  In  our  days  when  the  family  is 
suffering  through  economic  conditions,  and 
through  moral  disregard,  we  forget  that  a  real 
family  has  its  life  and  character.  It  is  made  by 
the  common  actions  and  ideals  that  influence 
and  make  the  spirit  of  a  family.  A  church  has 
its  peculiar  genius  and  is  constantly  making 
men  spiritually,  as  it  is  being  made  through 
the  church-choices,  actions,  ideals  and  emotions. 
It  therefore  possesses  all  the  essential  elements 
of  personality.  A  state  has  its  living  unity  of 
action  in  consistency  with  its  past  determina¬ 
tions.  Like  the  family  and  the  church  it  has  a 
personality.  All  of  these  social  forms  possess 
personality  in  reality  when  they  function 
toward  the  good,  and  develop  liberty. 

Personality  and  the  ideal.  No  matter  how 
much  pains  we  may  take  to  make  clear  what 
is  meant  by  personality  in  ethics,  the  question 
still  remains:  “How  does  it  satisfy  the  great 
ethical  concepts  ?”  Is  it  more  adequate  than 
either  pleasure  or  reason?  The  ideal  which  is 
to  meet  the  end  and  purpose  of  freedom  in  the 
moral  sense  must  be  the  highest  good.  There 
dare  be  no  mere  maximum  or  an  empty  abstrac- 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


187 


tion.  Personality  in  its  determinations  and 
choices  at  one  with  ideas  and  feelings  tends  to 
freedom.  But  this  freedom  is  not  the  mere  for¬ 
mal  freedom.  It  fulfills  the  hope  of  individual 
and  common  life  and  secures  happiness.  The 
whole  man  is  satisfied  in  his  moral  aspirations 
when  he  grows  more  and  more  to  he  a  personal¬ 
ity  as  the  liberty  of  action  in  the  good  develops. 
When  social  choices  produce  the  balance  of 
happiness  through  a  liberty,  that  is  not  desire 
nor  power,  but  a  full  and  good  life,  then  the 
social  personality  meets  the  ideal.  But  in  what 
concrete  way  can  such  personality  strive  toward 
the  ideal  and  find  the  highest  good? 

Personality  must  be  enkindled  through  per¬ 
sonality.  No  impersonal  power  or  end  can  bring 
the  satisfaction  of  happiness  in  liberty.  We  are 
constantly  brought  nearer  to  the  good  when  we 
possess  the  example  and  the  direct  influence  of 
the  good  as  it  comes  to  us  through  some  other, 
better  personality.  In  our  actual  life  all  the 
rules  and  all  the  laws  are  not  really  effective. 
The  awakening  and  stimulating  power  toward 
the  good  is  exercised  through  our  contact  with 
a  real,  growing  personality.  The  touch  of  a 
strong,  just,  happy,  free  personality  upon  our 
lives  shapes  the  ideal  in  us.  We  then  begin  to 
strive  to  become  in  our  way  and  out  of  our 
choices,  not  mere  imitators,  but  creators  of  free¬ 
dom  and  happiness  for  our  lives.  But  in 
addition  to  those  living  personalities  that  effect 
us,  we  possess  the  lives  of  outstanding  person¬ 
alities  in  history.  Not  the  great  conquerors, 
but  the  great  saints  of  all  times,  whether  they 
be  called  such  or  not,  raise  us  beyond  the  limi- 


188 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


tations  of  our  day.  Directly  or  indirectly  the 
influence  of  truly  great  lives  still  function  in 
mankind.  Just  as  personality  in  individual 
life  is  thus  developed  through  other  personali¬ 
ties,  so  also  in  social  life  there  exist,  beside  the 
forces  of  evil,  the  influences  of  the  groups  and 
social  forms,  which  are  meeting  their  purpose 
of  happiness  in  liberty,  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
make  them  attractive.  While  there  is  no  abso¬ 
lute  or  abstract  perfection  anywhere  there  are 
the  more  free  and  the  more  good  social  groups 
and  forms,  that  stand  out  beyond  others.  The 
traditions  of  the  past  do  not  actually  give  us 
a  golden  age,  but  they  show  us  in  each  age 
conditions  and  actions  in  society  that  call  for 
emulation.  The  moral  continuity  in  history  is 
never  absolutely  broken.  The  moral  order 
keeps  on  just  because  of  the  influence  of  person¬ 
ality  in  social  forms  and  in  the  groupings  and 
associations  of  society. 

But  the  upward  curve  toward  freedom  is  not 
complete  with  the  best  that  personality,  indi¬ 
vidual  and  social,  can  give  us  both  in  the  past 
and  the  present.  There  is  an  urge  in  personality 
which  drives  the  ethical  beyond  and  above 
itself.  Where  can  we  find  the  absolute  good 
that  makes  the  relative  good  of  all  human 
personality?  Ethics  has  never  given  the 
answer,  but  religion  has.  We  shall  find  the 
highest  good  as  ideal  and  power  in  God.6  But 
this  God  cannot  be  an  absentee  creator.  He 
dare  not  be  made  an  IT,  a  whole,  a  universe  as 
totality.  The  only  God,  through  whom  ethics 

6  Christ  held  that  God  alone  was  absolutely  good.  Matthew 
XIX:  17. 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


189 


can  find  the  highest  good  of  personality,  must 
be  personality  with  all  its  freedom  in  infinite 
perfection  as  an  active  reality.  The  God  who 
is  personality  can  also  not  be  a  mathematical 
unit.  In  Him  there  would  be  no  force  for  good 
through  the  conception  of  mere  unity.  Where 
can  we  find  the  kind  of  God  who  will  answer 
the  individual  and  social  demand  of  person¬ 
ality?  History  testifies  that  this  highest  good 
was  brought  to  the  world  through  Christianity. 
Its  God  always  deals  with  men  either  as  Father, 
or  Son,  or  as  Spirit.  The  unity  comes  to  us 
religiously  and  morally  in  personal  form.  In 
God’s  life  there  is  also  the  unity  of  more  than 
individual  life.  There  is  an  inner  relationship.7 
Chesterton  has  expressed  this  fact  in  a  telling 
way,  when  he  said:  4 ‘ There  is  society  in  God.” 
God  is  the  answer  when  thus  conceived  for 
individual  and  common  life.  Less  than  such  a 
God  we  cannot  have  if  the  summum  bonum  is  to 
mean  anything.  But  the  interpretation  and 
concreteness  of  God  comes  to  us  through  Christ. 
He  is  the  living  personality  that  was  and  is 
among  men.  He  says:  “He  that  hath  seen  me 
hath  seen  the  Father.  ’ 9  8 

Right,  duty  and  personality.  The  ideal  must 
be  translated  into  the  standard  of  right.  This 
standard  as  law  must  be  accepted  by  duty  as 
obligation.  But  how  is  personality  to  be  related 
to  right  and  duty?  The  law  of  right,  if  freedom 
is  the  ideal,  must  be  the  law  of  liberty.  Where 
do  we  find  the  law  of  liberty?  In  the  early 

7  Fairbaim,  The  Place  of  Christ  in  Modern  Theology,  p.  394. 
Cf.  also  Beckwith,  The  Idea  of  God,  p.  273  ff. 

s  John  XIV:  9. 


190  CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 

Christian  Church  James9  identified  this  law, 
as  the  royal  law,  with  the  law  of  love.  When 
we  connect  with  this  the  highest  Christian 
conception  of  God  as  Love,  we  shall  readily 
correlate  right  with  the  snmmum  bonum.  God 
the  personality  lives  His  life  within  the  Godhead 
and  out  toward  man  and  society  as  Love.  He 
that  lives  in  love  lives  in  God,  as  God  is  love.10 
Thus  the  highest  good  has  the  law  of  love,  as 
the  law  of  liberty,  in  its  very  nature  and  being.11 
The  right  can  be  nothing  else  than  love,  and 
the  law  as  the  ideal  of  perfection  can  be  nothing 
else  than  love,  if  the  highest  good  is  God  as 
Love.  Here  is  an  unfailing,  living  and  concrete 
connection  which  takes  right  and  law  from  the 
sphere  of  the  abstract  and  impersonal,  and 
puts  it  into  the  sphere  of  the  real  and  actual. 
Personality  in  God  thus  sets  the  ideal  as  the 
actual  standard  and  demand  for  all  personality. 

But  how  does  duty,  as  it  appears  in  separate 
duties,  find  its  fulfillment  in  Love  ?  Duty,  which 
regarded  as  the  mere  ought  becomes  harsh  and 
severe,  is  freed  and  made  joyous  if  we  are  to 
owe  naught  else  than  love.  There  is  no  other 
way  of  going  beyond  ourselves  and  fulfilling 
our  duty,  while  we  remain  really  free  and 
become  enlarged  in  our  life,  than  if  we  live  in 
and  for  others  through  love.  Love  is  the  great¬ 
est  socializing  motive.  It  does  the  right  and 
does  not  feel  its  burden.  The  individual  de¬ 
velops  under  it  and  finds  the  most  free  kind  of 

0  James  I:  25;  II:  8. 

30  1  John  IV:  16. 

n  Browning,  the  poet  of  optimism,  is  also  the  poet  of  love. 
He  sings:  “But  love  is  victory  the  prize  itself.’ ’ 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


191 


happiness.  Social  complexes  can  best  be  strong 
and  free  within  themselves  through  love.  With 
love  as  a  motive  they  will  properly  coordinate 
with  all  society. 

There  are  three  spheres  of  love  as  duty. 
The  commandment  which  bids  us  love  our 
neighbor  as  ourselves,  allows  the  right  kind  of 
self-love.  This  is  different  from  selfishness, 
and  the  assertion  of  mere  self-preservation. 
Joseph  Butler  thought  that  he  could  solve  this 
problem  by  making  cool  and  reasonable  self-love 
a  second  principle  beside  conscience.  He  says: 
“If  passion  prevails  over  self-love,  the  conse¬ 
quent  action  is  unnatural;  but  if  self-love  pre¬ 
vails  over  passion,  the  action  is  natural.  It  is 
manifest  that  self-love  is  in  human  nature  a 
superior  principle  to  passion.  This  may  be 
contradicted  without  violating  that  nature;  but 
the  former  cannot.  So  that,  if  we  will  act  con¬ 
formably  to  man’s  nature,  reasonable  self-love 
must  govern.12  The  notion  of  Butler  is  defective, 
because  he  identifies  the  moral  self-love  with 
reason,  and  because  he  stresses  self-interest  that 
begets  prudence  too  largely.  The  real  self-love, 
as  duty,  has  the  ideal  of  the  developing  person¬ 
ality  in  the  self,  and  unfolds  duties  out  of  the 
consideration  of  the  highest  good,  but  not  in  a 
merely  natural  way  through  the  care  of  the  self. 

The  second  sphere  of  duty  as  love  is  toward 
our  neighbor.  This  includes  all  duties  which 
touch  other  lives  in  their  essence.  All  men  are 
regarded  as  personalities  with  their  rights  and 
privileges,  not  for  the  reason  that  another  posi¬ 
tion  is  impossible;  and  because  we  cannot  live 

12  Sermons,  II,  par.  16. 


192 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


among  men  if  we  do  not  do  so.  This  would  be 
a  life  of  compulsion  under  the  pressure  of 
society.  The  joyous  way  is  the  inner  identifica¬ 
tion  of  ourselves  with  our  duties  through  the 
spirit  of  love.  Duties  accepted  and  assumed  in 
this  spirit  leave  us  inwardly  free.  The  law  of 
“Thou  shall  love”  is  a  yoke  as  long  as  it  is 
unpersonalized  and  a  demand  which  we  pass 
by  or  resist.  But  the  ideal  of  the  right  in  love 
coming  from  the  highest  good  is  freedom  when 
translated  into  living  action.  This  same  duty 
is  the  highest  formulation  that  can  be  given  to 
all  social  groups  and  forms  and  associations  in 
their  common  purposes  and  deeds. 

The  third  sphere  of  love,  as  duties  toward 
God,  is  generally  omitted  in  the  usual  ethics. 
But  if  God  is  the  summum  bonum,  it  naturally 
follows  that  the  acceptance  of  Him  as  ideal 
and  end,  and  the  entering  upon  right  as  His 
expression  of  love,  relates  us  to  God.  We  can¬ 
not  but  have  duties  and  try  to  fulfill  them 
toward  Him,  unless  we  cancel  the  highest  good 
and  the  ideal.  To  love  God  with  our  utmost 
power  is  only  the  motive  of  reaction  toward 
His  personality  by  our  personality.  The  duties 
toward  God  are  only  hard  if  He  is  not  to  us  what 
He  wants  to  be,  viz;  the  liberating  personality 
in  whom  is  the  source,  the  joy  and  the  happiness 
of  our  life.  This  attitude  is  no  mysticism  but 
the  moral  relationship  of  our  personality  toward 
that  of  God. 

Personality  and  virtue.  What  possibilities 
for  the  proper  interpretation  of  virtue  are  there 
in  the  fact  of  personality?  As  personality  is 
being  constantly  formed  by  our  determinations, 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


193 


these  naturally  fuse  into  certain  stable  habits, 
When  the  content  of  the  habits  answers  to  the 
demands  of  the  good,  and  habits  are  the  crystal- 
ization  of  the  right,  and  the  formed  actions  of 
duty,  we  have  virtue  in  its  reality.  The  whole 
manner  of  the  development  of  personality  tends 
towards  virtue.  In  the  manifold  relations  of 
actual  life  there  must  be  many  virtues,  all  of 
them  expressing  the  good  in  habit.  The  richness 
and  fulness  of  the  life  of  freedom  through  per¬ 
sonality  offers  the  opportunity  for  the  variety 
and  manifoldness  of  virtues. 

Can  personality  meet  the  demands  for  a  unity 
in  this  differentiation  of  virtue'?  The  hedonists 
had  a  unity  in  prudence,  but  it  did  not  essen¬ 
tially  express  the  deepest  nature  of  virtue,  and 
was  insufficient  as  the  explanation  of  the  source 
of  the  inner  nature  of  virtue.  The  rationalists 
adopted  wisdom  as  the  one  virtue.  Wisdom 
was  higher  than  prudence,  but  it  also  was  not 
the  real  inner  power,  nor  vital  source  of  the 
virtues.  The  ideal  of  personality  is  the  trans¬ 
lation  of  love  as  duty  into  love  as  virtue.  It 
does  not  claim  that  this  is  the  only  virtue  as 
the  Stoics  supposed  wisdom  to  be.  But  the 
contention  in  favor  of  the  personalistic  view  is, 
that  love  can  explain  the  inmost  character  of 
virtue  and  furnish  us  with  an  adequate  and 
vital  motive  for  every  virtue.  Love  is  ideal  in 
its  rationality,  effective  in  its  emotion,  purpose¬ 
ful  in  its  action.  If  we  take  some  leading  virtues 
we  shall  see  how  love  actuates  the  different 
virtues.  Justice  seems  far  removed  from  love. 
But  can  justice  reach  its  highest  perfection 
without  love?  The  highest  justice  as  a  cold 


194 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


proposition  of  rendering  to  every  one  the  right 
which  is  due,  can  become  the  greatest  injustice. 
The  Romans  knew  this  when  they  said :  1 1  Sum- 
mum  jus,  snmma  injuria.”  It  is  through  the 
conception  of  love  functioning  in  justice  that 
the  end  sought  is  best  attained.  Justice  with¬ 
out  love  is  without  equity,  and  becomes  hard, 
unbending,  and  severe  to  the  degree  of  destroy¬ 
ing  liberty.  Truth  does  not  seem  to  need  love. 
And  yet  truth  may,  like  justice,  defeat  its  very 
end  without  love.  All  that  is  so,  is  not  the  same 
as  the  virtue  of  truthfulness.  Truthfulness 
needs  the  spirit  of  love  to  make  it  a  liberating 
power.  No  virtue  can  be  named  which  will  not 
be  the  more  virtue  through  love  as  its  inner 
vision,  motive,  and  purpose.  Consequently  our 
ideal  of  personality  has  the  best  solution  for 
concrete  virtues  and  habits,  whose  deepest 
nature  is  love. 

The  historical  approach  to  personality.  While 
personality  has  been  expanded  in  our  discussion 
beyond  its  common  usage,  is  it  an  entirely  new 
proposal?  Are  there  no  historic  antecedents  to 
lead  up  to  it?  Are  there  no  thinkers  and  philoso¬ 
phers  that  rest  their  outlook  upon  life  on  some 
sort  of  personalism?  Long  before  the  idea  of 
personality  in  its  individualistic  form  gained 
currency  it  was  upon  the  threshold  of  Western 
thought.  Plato  sought  the  solution  of  moral 
life  through  harmony.  He  strove  to  balance 
temperance,  courage  and  wisdom  through 
justice.  The  idea  of  the  absolute  good  was  to 
dwell  relatively  in  the  whole  man.  But  justice 
led  him  to  demand  the  state.  And  the  social 
was  necessary  for  the  completion  of  justice 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


195 


through  which  the  harmony  of  virtues  became 
assured.  There  is  an  effort  to  gain  a  totality 
which  Plato  could  not  secure,  because  his  high¬ 
est  good  was  impersonal.  Because  Plato  divided 
man  up,  he  could  not  secure  adequate  unity 
through  the  loose  connection  of  virtues  in  the 
ideal  of  harmony.  Aristotle  saw  in  the  ethical 
life  the  functioning  of  the  whole  man.  He  found 
the  real  estimate  of  will.  The  bridge  between 
the  individual  and  social  was  constructed  upon 
the  conception  that  ethics  was  a  part  of  politics, 
because  man  was  naturally  a  political  animal. 
But  Aristotle  failed,  as  had  Plato,  not  only 
because  he  did  not  find  the  whole  of  man 
through  his  theory  of  the  middle  road,  but  also, 
and  that  mainly,  because  he  widened  the  gap 
between  the  ethical  and  the  intellectual.  Aris¬ 
totle  was  searching  for  real  personality  and 
could  not  find  it.  The  first  strong  impulse  came 
through  Christianity.  In  the  modern  world 
Leibniz  with  his  theory  of  monads  sought  to 
solve  the  problem,  but  drifted  into  individual¬ 
ism.  A  strong  appreciation  is  found  in  Kant, 
when  he  says:  “The  idea  of  personality  that 
awakens  our  veneration,  places  before  our  eyes 
the  exaltation  of  our  nature  in  accordance  with 
its  destiny.  At  the  same  time  it  shows  us  the 
deficiency  of  the  fitness  of  our  action  in  view 
of  it,  and  consequently  overthrows  self-opin- 
ionateness.  These  facts  are  naturally  and 
easily  observable  by  the  most  common  human 
reason.’  ’ 13 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Kant  did  not  develop 
the  idea  of  personality  in  its  social  bearing,  but 

is  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  Part  III,  par.  27. 


196 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


this  could  hardly  be  expected  in  his  individual¬ 
istic  age.  In  Goethe’s  Faust  we  find  the  struggle 
of  man  to  find  himself  through  knowledge,  love, 
and  power.  But  the  personality,  which  was  for 
Goethe  the  end  of  all  human  ways,  became  a 
mere  individualistic  cultural  attainment.  Thus 
the  moral  content  was  lost.  Personalism  was 
not  without  its  advocates  in  later  thought. 
Lotze  saw  its  worth.  Bowne  was  its  advocate 
for  many  years,  and  in  the  University  of 
Southern  California  personalism  has  found 
lodgment.14  In  ethics  it  has  been  advocated  in 
its  individual  form  by  Charles  Gray  Shaw  and 
by  Henry  Wright.  The  eudaemonism  of  James 
Seth  is  also  personalistic.  It  has  been  at  the 
background  of  various  other  modern  positions, 
and  only  needs  fuller  elaboration  than  has 
been  accorded  by  a  whole  group  of  modern 
philosophers.15 

Personality  and  Christianity.  What  is  the 
attitude  of  Christianity  toward  this  ideal  of 
personality?  Is  it  favorable  or  unfavorable? 
The  teaching  of  Christ  came  into  a  world  with 
social  divisions.  The  Greek  notion  was  that  of 
Plato,  that  society  in  its  best  form  demanded 
three  classes,  the  philosophers  to  govern,  the 
warriors  to  fight,  and,  as  the  lowest  class,  the 
laborers  to  provide  food  and  shelter.  The  non- 
Greek  world  was  that  of  the  barbarians.  The 
Romans  were  either  freemen  or  slaves.  The 
Jewish  leaders  regarded  the  Gentile  world  as 
beyond  the  pale,  and  the  common  people  of  the 

14  Cf.  The  Journal  ‘‘The  Personalist.  ’  ’ 

15  Cf.  Baldwin,  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology, 
Vol.  II,  p.  284;  Hastings,  Cyclopedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics, 
Vol.  IX,  p.  773. 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


197 


country  were  looked  down  upon  by  Pharisee 
and  Sadducee.  The  whole  mode  of  appreciation 
was  through  classes  and  by  race  or  nation. 
Christ  taught  the  supremacy,  first  of  all,  of  the 
soul  as  personality.  He  said:  “What  shall  it 
profit  a  man  if  he  gain  the  whole  world  and 
lose  his  own  soul!”  16  Man  as  man  was  rescued 
from  the  social  enslavement  of  ancient  society. 
This  step  was  necessary  as  the  beginning  of  the 
rescue  of  personality. 

But  Christ  did  not  merely  save  the  personality 
of  the  individual  from  the  social  bondage,  but 
He  also  gave  content  to  personality  through  His 
own  life  and  teaching.  He  was  the  incarnate 
ideal  bringing  God,  the  highest  good,  into  con¬ 
crete  and  actual  human  life.  From  Him  came 
the  final  interpretation  of  right  character  and 
its  influence  upon  men  through  the  power  of  His 
own  personality.  But  He  did  not  stop  with 
this  individual  power  for  liberty. 

Christ  is  the  representative  of  mankind. 
The  universal  lives  in  Him,  and  He  is  the  second 
Adam,  the  beginner  of  a  new,  spiritual  man¬ 
kind.17  This  socially  universal  import  of  Christ 
gives  a  genuine  value  to  the  moral  purpose  in 
His  life.  The  core  of  freedom  was  for  Him  the 
life  in  the  Father.  The  highest  good  was  His 
reality  morally.  The  way  to  liberty  in  His  life 
was  the  way  of  obedience.  His  sacrifice  became 
a  power  for  the  ethical  life,  because  He  showed 
men  that  the  content  of  goodness  was  freedom 
in  God  and  in  God’s  ways.  In  the  ethical 
liberation  of  men  the  great  hindrance  was  sin. 

1  <5  Mark  VIII:  36. 

i"  Romans  V :  .14  ff. 


198 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


“Whosoever  committeth  sin  is  the  servant  of 
sin.”  18  From  this  bondage  man  mnst  be  freed. 
The  way  of  freedom  through  Christ  is  to  die 
to  sin.19  The  reverse  is  the  resurrection.  A 
new  life  must  arise20  which  is  given  through 
the  “Son  that  makes  us  free.”  21  The  possibility 
to  overcome  evil  and  to  grow  in  righteousness, 
as  permanent  life  of  liberty,  has  come  to  the 
world  in  Christ.  All  men  can  thus  attain  the 
character  and  conduct  that  is  essentially  the 
liberty  of  the  children  of  God. 

Christ,  not  only  thus  affects  the  growth  of 
freedom  through  new  individual  personalities, 
but  He  also  has,  as  one  of  His  main  ideals,  the 
Kingdom  of  God.  While  the  Kingdom  of  God 
may  be  individually  appropriated,22  it  is  the 
social  ideal  of  Christ.  The  Kingdom  of  God 
is  the  society  in  which  the  will  of  God  is  done. 
As  this  will  is  good  and  seeks  man’s  freedom, 
it  is  no  arbitrary  imposition  of  law,  but  only  an 
invitation  to  liberty.  And  wherever  this  will 
enters  society  it  creates  the  real  personality. 
Vital  content  is  given  to  social  forms  and  to  the 
associations  of  men  in  the  ideal  of  God’s  will, 
the  will  of  the  highest  good  of  love.  If  we  take 
a  single  instance  we  shall  see  how  society  could 
become  morally  personalized  through  the  King¬ 
dom,  by  means  of  the  unity  of  the  will  of  God 
for  our  freedom.  Society  places  a  large  em¬ 
phasis  upon  the  economic  need.  It  makes  it  the 
first  and  controlling  interest,  and  around  it 

is  John  VIII:  34. 

is  Romans  VIII :  10. 

20  Romans  VIII :  11 ;  VI :  4. 

21  John  VIII:  36. 

22  Matthew  XIII:  44,  45,  46. 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


199 


cluster  contentions  of  classes  and  wars  of 
nations.  But  when  Christ  met  the  economic 
temptation,  as  Messiah  of  His  people,  He  said: 
“Man  shall  not  live  by  bread  alone,  hut  by 
every  word  that  proceedeth  out  of  the  mouth 
of  God.”23  The  people  were  not  allowed  by 
Him  to  make  Him  king  because  they  were  filled 
with  bread.24  The  economic  national  temptation 
did  not  allure  Him.  He  was  no  divider  of 
goods25  and  no  adjuster  of  material  economic 
conflict.  Men  were  bidden  to  depart  from  the 
prevailing  practice  of  asking :  ‘  ‘  What  shall  we 
eat  or  What  shall  we  drink?  or  wherewithal 
shall  we  be  clothed  ?  ”  26  The  first  interest  was 
to  be  that  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  the  power 
of  His  righteousness27  upon  earth.  In  the  para¬ 
ble  of  the  laborers  in  the  vineyard28  there  is, 
beside  the  spiritual  lesson,  an  economic  con¬ 
dition  which  utterly  contradicts  the  thought  of 
haggling  for  wages.  The  men  who  trust  the 
lord  of  the  vineyard  are  best  oft.  The  bar¬ 
gainers,  the  seekers  after  their  own  returns, 
lose.  But  the  situation  is  possible  because  the 
lord  of  the  vineyard  is  good.  Business  is  done 
not  upon  the  basis  of  suspicion  and  outwitting 
one  another,  but  upon  the  foundation  of  the 
trustworthiness  of  a  good  master.  The  moral 
implication  is  a  state  of  society  such  as  we  do 
not  have  but  which  would  come  about  in  the 
economic  order  by  the  freedom  of  the  ideal  of 

23  Matthew  IV :  4. 

24  John  VI:  13,  26. 

23  Luke  XII :  13  ff . 

26  Matthew  VI:  31. 

27  Matthew  VI:  33. 

28  Matthew  XX :  1  ff . 


200 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


the  Kingdom  of  God.  This  ideal  would  be  the 
personality  of  economic  society  found  in  God’s 
will.  It  is  true  that  this  sort  of  ethics  is  not 
the  description  of  what  human  nature  and  con¬ 
duct  is,  but  what  it  ought  to  he  and  can  be  if 
the  ideal  of  personality  in  its  fulness  be  adopted. 
Ethics  is  a  normative  science29  and  must  not 
lose  itself  in  the  slough  of  the  present.  To 
depress  it  to  psychology  is  to  make  it  natural¬ 
istic.30  To  remain  ethics  it  must  be  personalistic. 
Consequently  our  final  definition  of  ethics  is  the 
science  of  character  and  conduct,  whose  end  is 
the  freedom  of  love  through  personality. 

29  Cf.  above  p.  4. 

so  This  is  the  fundamental  error  in  such  ethics  as  that  of 
Dewey,  Human  Nature  and  Conduct. 


REFERENCES 

Jas.  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chapter  III. 
Henry  W.  Wright,  Self-Realization,  Part  II,  Chapters  IV, 
V,  VI. 

W.  R.  Sorley,  Moral  Values  and  the  Idea  of  God,  Chapter  V. 
Vladimir  Solovyof,  The  Justification  of  the  Good,  Part  III, 
Chapters  I,  II. 

Rudolph  Eucken,  Main  Currents  of  Modem  Thought,  D.  5. 
Personality  and  Character. 

Kant,  Critique  of  Practical  Reason. 

Charles  Gray  Shaw,  The  Value  and  Dignity  of  Human  Life. 
Charles  Gray  Shaw,  The  Ground  and  Goal  of  Human  Life. 
P.  B.  Jevons,  Personality. 

Borden  P.  Bowne,  Personalism. 

C.  C.  J.  Webb,  God  and  Personality. 

C.  C.  J.  Webb,  Divine  Personality  and  Human  Life. 

J.  R.  Illingworth,  Personality  Human  and  Divine. 

John  Laird,  Problems  of  the  Self. 

E.  U.  Merrington,  The  Problem  of  Personality. 

John  W.  Buckham,  Personality  and  the  Christian  Ideal. 
Felix  Adler,  An  Ethical  Philosophy  of  Life. 

G.  P.  Adams,  Idealism  and  the  Modem  Age;  “The  Self 
and  the  Community,”  p.  197  ff. 


THROUGH  PERSONALITY 


201 


Arthur  George  Heath,  The  Moral  and  Soeial  Significance  of 
the  Conception  of  Personality. 

W.  H.  Walker,  The  Development  of  the  Doctrine  of  Person¬ 
ality  in  Modern  Philosophy. 

A.  Trendelnburg,  A  Contribution  to  the  History  of  the  Word 
Person,  (Monist,  July  1910). 

Hans  Dreyer,  Personalismus  and  Realismus. 

Max  Scheler,  Personalismus. 


PART  III— THE  FUNCTIONING 
OF  FREEDOM 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 

Virtues  or  duties.  Approaching  to  the  actual 
functioning  of  freedom,  and  to  some  of  its 
practical  questions,  the  problem  confronts  us, 
whether  the  point  of  view  shall  be  that  of 
virtues  or  duties?  Which  of  the  two  best  ex¬ 
press  the  ideal  of  personality?  In  a  certain 
sense  they  are  in  the  unity  of  the  whole  ethical 
life.  Duties  must  become  virtues,  and  virtues 
are  duties  formed  into  habit.1  But  the  accent 
upon  duties  even  in  practical  ethics  favors  the 
position  of  the  rationalists,  and  is  apt  to  give 
a  legal  and  unfree  aspect  of  the  moral  life. 
Because  we  have  adopted  the  conception  of  the 
ideal  as  the  best,  it  is  in  keeping  with  our 
conception  to  regard  the  ethical  development 
from  the  angle  of  the  incorporation  of  the  ideal 
of  freedom  through  personality.  The  virtues 
are  the  habits  through  which  the  good  comes 
to  men,  and  it  forms  the  stable  ways  in  which 
freedom  functions. 

Many  efforts  have  been  made  to  properly 

1  Cf.  above  p.  113. 


202 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


203 


classify  the  different  virtues,  but  no  effort  has 
been  really  successful.  No  scheme  has  included 
all  possible  virtues.  The  best  method  is  to 
adopt  such  a  plan  as  brings  to  view  the  leading 
attitudes  and  problems  in  individual  and  social 
life.  Under  this  procedure  the  great  virtues 
will  be  discussed.  Because  after  all  life  is  a 
unity  no  absolute  line  of  demarcation  can  be 
drawn.  The  virtues  of  individual  life  will  reach 
over  into  the  common  life.  The  virtues  in  which 
freedom  in  love  goes  out  toward  others  in  the 
basic  social  virtues  demands  the  consideration 
of  the  individual  starting  point.  The  virtues  of 
the  social  forms  have  also  an  individual  bearing. 
When  we  treat  of  purity,  temperance,  courage 
as  individualistic  virtues  we  cannot  but  see 
that  they  affect  others  also.  Truthfulness  is  a 
virtue  in  relation  to  others,  but  it  also  has  an 
individual  meaning  in  the  ethical  life.  Justice 
is  the  outstanding  virtue  of  the  state,  but  it  is 
likewise  an  other-regarding  virtue  from  man 
to  man.  Consequently  as  we  study  the  undi¬ 
vided  life  of  freedom,  and  its  outgoings  in  love, 
and  the  social  life  we  shall  see  some  virtues  in 
different  light  as  freedom  applies  differently 
in  individual  and  social  life. 

Is  the  ethical  life  a  pure  development?  A 

fundamental  question  in  individual  and  com¬ 
mon  moral  life  is,  whether  this  life  unfolds  in 
an  unhampered,  natural  manner?  Do  we  pass 
from  freedom  to  freedom  in  love?  The  prev¬ 
alence  of  the  ideas  of  evolution  has  led  many 
to  look  upon  the  growth  of  the  moral  life  as  a 
mere  problem  of  how  conduct  in  relation  to 
society  became  more  differentiated  and  more 


204 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


complex.  But  the  development  of  freedom  is 
not  a  simple  upward  curve  with  no  depression. 
It  is  rather  a  rise  and  a  fall  with  some  upward 
tendency.  Moral  life  like  all  life  is  a  conflict. 
The  world  of  sense  and  of  things  that  appeal  to 
sense  needs  some  limitation.  Things  cannot  be 
followed  implicitly  and  without  question. 
There  must  be  control,  as  will  appear  especially 
in  the  virtue  of  temperance.  While  repression 
must  not  be  final  it  is  in  part  essential.  Not 
all  that  physical  life  offers  can  be  accepted 
without  qualification.  But  the  problem  lies 
deeper  than  the  mere  restriction  of  the  sen¬ 
tient  life.  There  is  a  tendency  of  man  not  to 
follow  the  good,  but  to  choose  the  evil.  In  the 
whole  life  there  is  a  doubleness.  Opposed  to 
the  striving  upward  are  forces  that  would  drag 
us  down.  These  are  not  merely  due  to  our 
sentient  and  bodily  life.  The  animal  nature  is 
not  the  only  source  that  may  lead  us  wrong. 
There  are  mental  wrongs  and  vices,  like  pride, 
prejudice,  selfish  ambition,  etc.,  that  can  not  be 
ascribed  to  the  physical  life. 

The  Christian  explanation  is  that  man  is 
prone  to  sin,  the  transgression  of  the  law  of 
liberty,  through  selfishness.  This  is  not  the 
soul  clinging  merely  to  earth;2  it  is  the  soul 
gone  wrong  in  itself.  For  this  cause  Christ 
has  a  moral  value  for  us  through  His  death. 
Paul  notes  a  great  contrast  between  “the  flesh” 
and  “the  spirit.”  The  flesh  is  not  the  animal 
nature  as  such.  It  is  all,  both  physical  and 
mental,  that  stands  opposed  to  the  life  of  the 
spirit.  The  contrast  is  not  metaphysical  but 

2  Goethe  held  to  this  naturalistic  view. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


205 


religious  and  moral.  It  is  a  great  oversight  in 
the  usual  philosophical  ethics,  when  this  fact 
is  passed  by.  We  cannot  understand  the  posi¬ 
tive  and  constructive  part  of  ethical  life,  if  we 
disregard  the  overcoming  of  the  evil.  Even 
when  our  moral  development  is  strongly  dir¬ 
ected  toward  the  good  its  maintenance  always 
necessitates  the  suppression  of  wrong  and  evil. 

The  power  of  a  cause.  Can  the  individual 
life  thrive  if  it  remains  within  itself?  Does  its 
liberty  mean  a  life  given  only  to  its  own  care, 
comfort  and  interest?  To  live  only  for  oneself 
and  within  oneself  is  not  to  live  a  real  life. 
Even  our  own  development  is  thwarted  if  we 
do  not  look  beyond  ourselves.  No  single  life 
is  self-sufficient.  Its  sources  will  dry  up  unless 
they  flow  out  beyond  the  self.  To  live  in  the 
self  alone  is  to  die.  This  truth,  observable  in 
the  physical  world  and  in  nature,  is  doubly  true 
in  the  ethical  life.  It  is  Christ  who  has 
stressed  this  truth  for  all  times,  when  He  said: 
“For  whosoever  will  save  his  life  shall  lose  it, 
but  whosoever  shall  lose  his  life — the  same 
shall  save  it.  ’ 9  3 

The  individual  life  needs  attachment  not 
only  to  other  lives,  but  above  all  to  some  great 
cause.  We  must  lose  ourselves  in  the  effort  to 
establish  some  ideal  which  is  larger  than  we. 
Liberty  comes  through  the  enlargement  of  life 
in  a  great  cause.  We  may  work  for  some 
philanthropy;  we  may  give  ourselves  to  estab¬ 
lishing  liberty  for  the  oppressed  of  any  sort; 
we  may  dwell  upon  some  moral  reform;  we  may 
live  for  some  religious  task; — in  all  of  these 

s  Mark  8 :  35. 


206 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


possible  causes  we  grow  ourselves.  Liberating 
others,  and  being  absorbed  in  a  vital  idealism, 
we  become  more  free  ourselves. 

These  freely  chosen  attachments  develop  in 
us  the  virtue  of  loyalty.  Royce  thought  that 
he  could  make  all  moral  life  the  outgrowth  of 
loyalty.4  But  he  overstated  the  case  and  in  his 
Hegelian  universalism  lost  other  values. 
Nevertheless  loyalty  is  valuable  as  the  free 
choice  by  which  we  bind  ourselves  to  be 
true  and  faithful  to  a  chosen  cause,  institution 
or  friend.5  It  is  a  bondage  only  when  our 
loyalty  neglects  to  observe  justice  and  truth  in 
a  cause.  If  I  defend  the  interest  of  wrongly 
limited  labor,  as  I  suppose,  and  then  use  every 
sort  of  means  fair  or  unfair,  and  approve  of 
every  action  just  or  unjust,  as  long  as  labor  is 
helped,  I  am  surrendering  justice  and  liberty. 
Such  an  attitude  makes  a  good  cause  bad.  My 
loyalties  must  be  morally  justifiable.  The  same 
is  true  if  my  loyalty  is  given  to  an  institution 
or  a  friend.  If  my  loyalty  to  my  college,  which 
I  have  chosen,  leads  me  to  overlook  what  is 
defective  in  it,  and  to  defend  even  its  wrong 
actions,  I  enslave  myself  and  morally  degrade 
myself.  My  loyalty  should  help  me  to  remedy 
the  evil,  but  not  to  stand  by  and  destroy  the 
value  of  loyalty  through  criticism.  The 
church  to  which  I  belong  may  take  a  wrong 
course.  It  is  not  right  for  me  to  say,  “My 
church  right  or  wrong,’ ’  as  some  men  do  with 
their  country.  It  is  my  church  to  aid  in  mak¬ 
ing  it  right  if  it  be  wrong.  But  the  remedy 

4  Cf.  Philosophy  of  Loyalty. 

5  Loyalty  may  also  extend  to  ideals,  like,  e.  g.,  truth. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


207 


does  not  lie  in  denying  tlie  loyalty  by  idle  and 
destrnctive  criticism.  My  friendship  for  some¬ 
one  onght  to  move  me  to  cover  np  the  faults  of 
my  friend  and  help  him  to  overcome  them;  but 
not  to  glorify  them  as  virtues. 

The  virtue  of  loyalty  needs  as  a  counterbal¬ 
ance  the  virtue  of  tolerance.  Tolerance  is  an 
individual  as  well  as  a  social  virtue.  It  allows 
to  others  the  same  right  and  choice  of  loyalties 
as  I  claim  for  myself.  The  heart  of  tolerance 
is  the  willingness  to  permit  others  to  have 
attachments  to  causes  and  to  truths  that  differ 
from  my  own.  It  is  not  indifference  to  my  con¬ 
victions  or  loyality,  or  surrender  of  any  posi¬ 
tion  to  which  I  adhere,  but  the  granting  of 
liberty  of  conviction  and  loyalty  to  all  men. 
Tolerance  must  not  be  accepted  merely  as  a 
sad  but  necessary  condition  is  society,  which  in 
our  judgment  would  be  better  if  all  men  be¬ 
lieved  and  did  as  we  do.  Through  it  liberty 
must  be  preserved  for  all  in  their  opinions, 
attachments  and  convictions.  Intolerance 
exists  in  all  the  spheres  of  life  where  men  would 
enforce  loyalty  to  secure  uniformity,  rather 
than  to  allow  differences  for  the  sake  of 
freedom. 

Freedom  and  vocation.  How  can  freedom 
and  an  orderly  course  of  life  in  a  vocation  be 
combined?  If  freedom  meant  ever  new  and 
disconnected  choices,  if  it  implied  a  series  of 
unrelated,  arbitrary  decisions,  then  the  ordered 
course  of  life  in  a  vocation  would  be  out  of  the 
question.  But  the  real  liberty  of  man  morally 
is  only  found  in  a  regulated  life  with  its  accept¬ 
ance  of  one  great  unitary  purpose,  to  which 


208 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


man  knows  and  feels  liimself  called.  There 
may  exist  a  number  of  minor  occupations  in  a 
life  that  forms  its  avocations  as  a  diversion  from 
the  main  aim  of  the  vocation.  But  the  avoca¬ 
tions  dare  not  crowd  out  the  vocation.  Only 
where  we  find  ourselves  in  a  place  of  work  and 
endeavor,  freely  chosen,  can  we  unfold  our  life 
and  grow  in  every  direction.  Without  this 
development  there  can  be  no  unfolding  of  per¬ 
sonality  within  us.  The  way  of  freedom  is  the 
way  of  the  vocation  that  we  make  our  own. 

But  is  the  mere  selection  of  a  place  to  fill  in 
the  world  sufficient?  Must  we  not  inquire  into 
the  moral  character  of  a  vocation,  and  try  to 
work  out  its  ethical  obligations?  Freedom 
cannot  exist  where  personality  suffers  either 
through  immoral  or  unmoral  practices  and 
conditions  in  a  vocation.  It  is  self-evident  that 
all  kinds  of  activity  which  are  considered  crim¬ 
inal,  or  which  violate  the  law  of  liberty  in 
society,  are  no  vocations  in  the  true  sense. 
Every  one  must  also  examine  the  manner  in 
which  a  vocation  is  carried  on.  The  best  call¬ 
ings  can  be  prostituted  by  wrong  purposes  and 
actions.  There  is  no  greater  danger  to  the 
moral  life  than  the  constant  and  subtle  power 
of  the  perversion  of  the  standards  of  justice, 
truth,  honesty,  etc.,  through  legally  unpunish¬ 
able  but  nevertheless  ethically  destructive 
actions.  There  can  be  no  genuine  ethical  life 
under  such  conditions.  A  single  transgression, 
however  great,  is  often  far  less  evil  than  a 
whole  life  of  questionable  vocational  practices. 

But  are  there  not  differences  in  vocations, 
not  of  a  social  kind,  but  of  a  moral?  While 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


209 


many  occupations  can  be  carried  on  honestly 
according  to  general  maxims,  there  are  some 
which  offer  moral  difficulties  in  themselves. 
When  our  country  had  not  yet  passed  the  Vol¬ 
stead  Act  the  selling  of  spirituous  liquors  was 
not  an  occupation  that  could  be  altogether  de¬ 
fended.  The  dealer  in  liquor  might  have  been 
careful  and  straightforward  in  his  business; 
but  still  was  he  not  catering  to  a  want,  that 
even  under  limitations,  produced  much  evil, 
and  led  men  to  unfree  habits  of  indulgence 
dangerous  to  themselves  and  to  society! 
There  are  a  number  of  occupations  dealing 
with  the  amusement  of  men  that  need  moral 
examination.  While  not  all  people  can  find 
recreation  and  be  amused  by  high,  intellectual 
pleasures  of  literature  and  art,  but  need  less 
cultivated  amusements  of  the  senses,  it  is  still 
true,  that  there  are  thousands  spending  lives 
that  cater  to  what  is  merely  sentient  to  the 
downward  level  of  the  sensual,  the  degrading 
and  impure  in  certain  types  of  vaudeville, 
music  and  dances.  All  taste  and  morals  are 
lowered  for  the  individual  and  society  through 
the  abuse  of  giving  a  life  to  such  indiscriminate 
practices  of  entertainment  as  invalidate  the 
liberty  in  the  pure,  noble  and  good. 

But  there  are  other  vocations  rightly  so- 
called  that  have  not  yet  been  moralized.  Many 
practices  that  are  traditional  in  some  kinds  of 
business  cannot  stand  the  test  of  a  vital  moral 
standard.  As  an  example  we  can  direct  atten¬ 
tion  to  all  of  the  occupations  that  center  upon 
money,  securities,  investments,  and  find  a  focus 
in  the  great  exchanges  of  stock  or  produce. 


210 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


Unnatural  values  are  created  by  speculation, 
corners  in  products  are  established,  stocks  are 
depressed  with  the  purpose  of  gaining  control 
of  a  corporation,  and  other  similar  practices 
are  indulged  in,  which  are  unmoralized  actions 
not  rejected  by  those  in  the  business.  It  is  an 
interesting  historical  fact,  which  ought  to 
make  us  thoughtful,  that  some  of  the  great 
thinkers  and  leaders  of  the  world  have  ques¬ 
tioned  the  right  of  taking  interest.  Aristotle 
contended  that  money  was  non-productive  and 
only  a  medium  of  exchange.  Luther  held  that 
there  was  injustice  in  taking  interest  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  New  Testament.  He  saw  an  inequal¬ 
ity  in  the  risk  assumed  by  the  borrower  alone. 
Ruskin  and  Morris  with  their  ideals  of  a  better 
social  order  rejected  interest.  Perhaps  some 
of  the  arguments  of  these  thinkers  are  not 
tenable,  but  they  indicate,  what  is  felt  very 
acutely  today;  namely,  that  the  whole  practice 
in  dealing  with  money  is  largely  unmoralized, 
and  needs  real  moral  standards  to  make  it  a 
vocation  that  is  truly  ethical. 

In  the  problem  of  the  vocation  the  question 
may  be  asked,  whether  all  occupations,  that  are 
not  inherently  objectionable,  cannot  be  im¬ 
proved  by  the  professional  outlook!  Is  not 
the  profession  the  highest  type  of  vocation  in 
the  moral  sense  ?  Says  Tawney6  who  thinks  that 
industry  should  be  turned  into  a  profession,  “A 
Profession  may  be  defined  most  simply  as  a 
trade  which  is  organized,  incompletely,  no 
doubt,  but  genuinely,  for  the  performance  of 
function.  It  is  not  simply  a  collection  of  indi- 

«  The  Acquisitive  Society,  p.  92. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


211 


viduals  who  get  a  living  for  themselves  by  the 
same  kind  of  work.  Nor  is  it  merely  a  group 
which  is  organized  exclusively  for  the  economic 
protection  of  its  members,  though  that  is  nor¬ 
mally  among  its  purposes.  It  is  a  body  of 
men  who  carry  on  their  work  in  accordance 
with  rules  designed  to  enforce  certain  stand¬ 
ards  both  for  the  better  protection  of  its  mem¬ 
bers  and  for  the  better  service  of  the  pub  lie.’  ’ 
These  ends  rest  upon  an  ethical  foundation. 
It  is  not  merely  the  technical  knowledge 
required  in  a  profession,  the  free  use  of  the 
intellect,  and  the  individual  independence,  that 
make  a  profession,  but  above  all  the  moral 
motive.  The  three  well-known  professions 
illustrate  this  fact.  The  interest  of  law, 
rightly  conceived  and  practiced,  is  to  uphold 
justice;  the  aim  of  medicine  is  to  use  every 
means  to  make  the  physical  life  sound  and  to 
save  it;  the  purpose  of  the  ministry  is  to  aid  in 
making  men  good  through  the  power  of  reli¬ 
gion.  These  professions  were  the  first  to  frame 
codes  of  ethics  to  maintain  the  standard  of 
their  profession,  and  to  keep  it  regulated  by 
moral  and  humanitarian  ends.7  All  the  occu¬ 
pations  of  men  must  seek  this  attitude.  Other 
groups  like  engineers,  newspaper  men,  etc.  are 
coming  to  frame  codes.  We  must  raise  all 
kinds  of  work  to  a  real  moral  value  by  making 
it  a  profession  in  spirit  and  attitude. 

What  shall  guide  us  in  the  choice  of  a  pro¬ 
fession  or  a  vocation  in  life?  Many  persons 
choose  their  permanent  labor  in  the  world  in  a 

7  Cf.  James  Mickel  Williams,  Principles  of  Social  Psychology, 
p.  225  ff. 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


919 

1  mU 


very  careless  manner.  They  do  not  bring  to 
bear  upon  it  any  moral  considerations.  We 
ought  not  to  be  led  into  a  vocation  simply 
through  family  traditions,  although  the  conti¬ 
nuity  of  some  great  work  has  been  assured  in 
the  world  where  men  have  followed  the  voca¬ 
tion  of  their  fathers.  Nevertheless  the  tradi¬ 
tional  aspect  dare  not  be  controlling  if  real 
liberty  that  makes  a  man’s  vocation  his  own 
moral  choice  is  to  be  upheld.  Gain  and  income 
are  totally  unmoral  motives  and  may  become 
immoral  in  the  determination  of  our  life’s 
work.  We  ought  to  begin  with  as  careful  a 
testing  of  our  capacities  as  is  possible  through 
modern  and  scientific  means.  Then  some  value 
must  be  given  to  the  disinterested  advice  of 
parents,  teachers,  and  elders.  But  the  real 
end  of  the  choice  is  given  in  the  Christian  idea. 
According  to  this,  men  ought  to  seek  that  voca¬ 
tion  in  which  their  own  highest  self-fulfillment 
is  joined  to  the  best  service  they  can  render  to 
mankind.  The  good  is  personal  and  common 
liberty  in  love.  And  then  finally  the  religious 
conception  finds  its  apex  in  the  ideal  of  seeking 
the  glory  of  God  in  all  of  the  work  and  the 
tasks  of  our  life.  With  this  as  the  final  direc¬ 
tive  the  moral  fulfillment  of  a  vocation  reaches 
its  height. 

Work  and  freedom.  The  choice  of  a  voca¬ 
tion  leads  to  the  moral  side  of  work.  Does 
human  labor  conduce  to  moral  development 
and  freedom,  or  is  it  a  burdensome  necessity 
that  we  cannot  escape  from?  In  labor  and  by 
work  we  may  suffer  and  feel  restrained  unless 
we  use  it  joyfully,  as  the  opportunity  through 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


213 


whicli  we  can  express  ourselves.  Wherever 
work  is  accepted  as  the  chance  for  the  func¬ 
tioning  of  all  that  is  in  us  it  is  liberating.  We 
master  and  overcome  the  things  about  us  in 
labor  and  make  them  serviceable  for  mankind. 
We  conquer  the  forces  of  nature  and  make  our¬ 
selves  more  free  in  a  world  of  laws.  Our  life 
goes  out  when  we  touch  human  lives  to  help 
them  to  greater  liberty.  If  we  do  spend  our¬ 
selves  in  our  tasks  we  do  not  lose  ourselves, 
but  gain  control  over  our  own  powers.  For 
this  reason  work  is  moral  and  idleness  immoral. 
But  we  can  make  work  oppressive  and  enslav¬ 
ing  so  that  it  loses  its  power  to  moralize  us. 
When  men  labor  to  such  an  extreme  that  their 
work  becomes  their  master,  driving  them  to 
ever  more  intense  exertion  and  filling  them 
with  cares  and  worries,  they  abuse  work. 
Work  needs  play  to  keep  it  sound.  For  this 
reason  play  is  a  moral  factor  for  the  health  of 
work,  and  the  maintenance  of  man’s  liberty  in 
his  labor. 

There  are  three  groups  of  men  who  fail  in 
moralizing  work.  The  first  consists  of  those 
who  want  to  labor  hard  and  successfully  and 
severely  for  a  short  period,  in  order  that  they 
may  obtain  means  to  spend  the  rest  of  their 
lives  in  the  enjoyment  of  idleness  and  pleasure. 
It  is  not  well-deserved  rest  after  long  years 
that  they  intend  to  have;  but  they  seek  to  throw 
off  work  in  middle  life,  because  they  have 
accepted  it  as  a  necessary  evil  to  be  cast  aside 
as  soon  as  possible.  The  second  group  are 
willing  to  bow  under  the  yoke  of  labor  all  their 
lives,  and  endure  its  hardships,  so  that  their 


214 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


children  may  not  be  compelled  to  labor.  With 
a  wrong  conception  of  what  they  owe  their  pos¬ 
terity,  they  enslave  themselves,  and  create  for 
their  children  conditions  which  are  not  really 
liberating,  bnt  lead  into  many  temptations  and 
into  much  evil.  The  third  group,  which  is  the 
largest,  attempts  to  escape  from  the  tasks  of 
life  by  seeking  returns  through  the  games  of 
chance  without  labor.  There  is,  it  is  true,  a 
risk  and  a  dealing  in  uncertain  futures  in  many 
occupations  in  life.  But  these  chances  are  in¬ 
cident  to  work  and  do  not  displace  it.  But 
gambling  is  immoral,  not  because  in  the  long 
run  men  lose  and  fail  in  it,  but  for  the  reason 
that  it  fastens  itself  on  human  life  like  an  un¬ 
quenchable  desire.  Men  lose  the  power  over 
themselves  and  become  thoroughly  unreason¬ 
able,  destroying  their  lives  through  indulgence 
in  the  fascination  of  chance.  Whatever  is  tem¬ 
porarily  gained  through  gambling  has  an  im¬ 
moral  effect,  because  the  money  obtained  is  not 
moralized  through  the  self-expression  of  man 
in  labor. 

What  should  be  the  end  of  work?  The 
common  notion  too  often  followed  is,  that  the 
purpose  of  work  is  to  secure  money.  As  far 
as  money  is  necessary  for  living  it  is  just  to 
look  to  it.  But  when  it  is  pursued  for  the  sake 
of  itself,  or  for  power,  it  demoralizes  men.  The 
increase  of  returns  hoped  for  in  itself  produces 
attachment  to  wealth  as  such.  Among  the 
most  severe  warnings  of  Christ  are  those 
against  the  insidious  influence  of  wealth  as 
Mammon.8  The  end  of  work  is  for  the  sake 


8  Matthew  VI :  24. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


215 


of  life,  and  secondarily  for  the  sake  of  living. 

What  right  has  the  individual  to  his  earn¬ 
ings?  Are  they  absolute?  All  that  any  one 
honestly  secures  as  the  result  of  work  possesses 
the  character  of  his  personality.  Property  is 
the  right  of  a  man  to  his  own.  It  expresses  a 
certain  security  and  a  certain  economic  free¬ 
dom,  through  which  the  individual  and  his 
immediate  family  have  the  opportunity  of  an 
enlarged  life.  Individual  property  became  im¬ 
portant  when  men  began  to  have  more  rights 
as  separate  from  their  tribe.  In  the  modern 
world  individual  possessions  meant  freedom  as 
against  the  mediaeval  tenure  of  land.  Early 
individualism  in  property  was  liberating.  But 
are  the  conditions  the  same  in  the  present  in¬ 
dustrial  world?  Is  the  sacredness  of  private 
property  final?  There  has  been  an  increasing 
conviction  that  unrestrained  individualism  has 
worked  to  the  loss  of  the  liberty  of  many  men 
through  the  increase  of  the  power  of  a  few. 
The  reason  why  all  sorts  of  socialistic  ideas 
have  gained  a  hearing,  is  the  evil  which  has 
attended  the  use  of  property  in  great  amounts 
by  mere  individualists  of  property.  The 
attacks  have  been  partly  just  and  partly  unjust. 
“But,  however  varying  in  emphasis  and 
method,  the  general  note  of  what  may  conven¬ 
iently  be  called  the  Socialist  criticism  of  prop¬ 
erty  is  what  the  word  Socialism  itself  implies. 
Its  essence  is  the  statement  that  the  economic 
evils  of  society  are  primarily  due  to  the  unreg¬ 
ulated  operation,  under  modern  conditions  of 
industrial  organization,  of  the  institution  of 


216 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


private  property.  ’  ’ 9  This  claim  is  overstated. 
But  its  truth  is  the  abuse  of  individual  rights 
in  property.  Excessive  individualism  is  for¬ 
cing  socialism  upon  the  world,  and  with  it  a 
restriction  of  what  man  has  a  right  to  have  and 
hold  in  the  interest  of  his  liberty  of  life.  The 
common  liberty  has  been  injured  and  society 
is  seeking  redress.  It  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  safety  of  property  and  its  title  rest 
upon  the  will  of  society.  The  Christian  ideal 
is  against  the  absolute  right  of  property.  All 
men  are  considered  stewards  of  what  God  has 
given  them.  He  is  the  owner  finally  and  not 
men.  They  are  only  the  administrators  and 
must  give  account  of  what  has  been  entrusted 
to  them.  Men  are  to  use  what  they  have  for 
the  common  good  and  for  the  praise  of  God. 
This  is  no  defense  of  individualism  in  the  use 
of  property.  It  may  be  individually  owned 
for  a  time,  but  it  ought  to  be  used  socially. 

The  virtues  which  are  connected  with  work 
are  accuracy,  care,  patience,  purposefulness., 
We  ought  to  use  what  we  obtain  with  thrift , 
which  is  the  proper  care  of  our  own  without 
waste,  and  with  frugality.  The  latter  is 
opposed  to  a  luxurious  life.  The  virtue  of 
generosity  as  a  fundamental  attitude  becomes 
liberality  in  distributing  of  our  own.  It  is 
largess  in  giving.  The  virtue  which  ought  to 
be  the  proper  response  to  generous  giving  is 
gratitude . 

The  bodily  life.  What  are  the  moral  prob¬ 
lems  that  are  related  to  our  bodily  life?  Be¬ 
cause  we  do  not  reject  the  physical  as  in  itself 

9  Tawney,  The  Acquisitive  Society,  p.  53. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


217 


evil  we  must  endeavor  to  meet  the  question 
how  the  physical  life,  which  in  itself  is  neutral, 
can  be  moralized.  All  the  functionings  of  our 
body  have  laws  that  make  for  health  and  well¬ 
being.  Our  first  positive  group  of  virtues  must 
be  those,  like  cleanliness,  purity,  etc.  They 
can  only  rest  upon  a  right  knowledge  and 
understanding  of  what  our  body  is  and  means 
for  us.  We  should  train  ourselves  in  those 
habits  of  right,  sane  care  of  the  body,  which 
enable  us  best  to  use  it  and  control  it,  instead 
of  being  hemmed  in  and  limited  by  it,  because 
we  have  disregarded  and  abused  it.  The  full 
development  of  the  body  through  proper  cul¬ 
ture  and  exercise  is  not  merely  a  physical 
necessity,  it  ought  to  be  a  virtue.  The  neglect 
of  the  body  is  as  bad  as  its  abuse.  No  interest 
in  the  growth  of  our  mind  can  excuse  ethically 
the  overlooking  of  our  bodily  life.  But  the 
overtraining  of  the  body,  and  the  emphasis 
upon  the  kind  of  exercise,  especially  through 
athletics,  that  makes  the  body  suffer  without 
cause,  is  an  aberration  of  a  right  attitude 
toward  the  physical. 

The  positive  value  of  the  body  demands  as 
the  first  great  virtue  the  attitude  of  control  and 
restraint  embodied  in  temperance.  Temper¬ 
ance  means  moderation  and  limitation  in  food 
and  drink.  This  is  its  primal  definition.  The 
desire  for  food  to  remain  healthy,  and  to  ans¬ 
wer  the  demands  of  hunger,  needs  the  habit  of 
control.  When  men  simply  follow  the  sugges¬ 
tions  of  appetite  which  is  often  unnaturally 
developed,  without  reason  and  consideration, 
they  become  creatures  of  their  stomach.  Then 


218 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


they  gorge  themselves  with  a  dozen  different 
kinds  of  food,  that  tickle  the  palate  and  satisfy 
abnormal  taste,  so  that  they  may  experience 
the  feeling  of  comfortable  distention.10  They 
live  to  eat  instead  of  eating  to  live.  Temper¬ 
ance  is  the  virtue  that  overcomes  such  an  abuse 
of  food. 

When  we  approach  the  problem  of  drink , 
which  is  really  the  problem  of  drinking  intoxi¬ 
cating  liquors,  temperance  is  not  attained  by 
mere  moderation.  The  terrible  results  of  alco¬ 
holism,  its  disorganizing  effects  upon  men,  its 
power  to  undermine  all  self-control  and  liberty, 
its  result  of  making  men  silly  and  irrespon¬ 
sible,  its  destructive  consequences  upon  society 
— all  of  these  and  many  other  evil  consequences 
should  lead  a  rational  being  like  man  to  inter¬ 
pret  temperance  in  drink  as  prohibition. 
Even  the  moderate  users  suffer,  and  encourage 
those  who  destroy  themselves  and  their  homes 
through  drink.  The  unnatural  desire  of  today 
for  drink,  helped  by  the  nervous  strain  of  the 
age,  is  threatening  to  overthrow  all  order  and 
law  for  mere  gratification  of  unregulated 
thirst.  The  Christian  attitude  is  the  willing¬ 
ness  to  abstain  if  any  one  suffers  through  our 
apparent  liberty.11  The  claim  that  the  right  to 
drink  is  individual  liberty,  degrades  liberty  to 
the  privilege  of  indulging  desire,  no  matter 
what  the  results.  Such  a  conception  of  liberty 
is  in  essence  moral  anarchism,  and  leads  to  in¬ 
dividual  and  social  dissolution  if  consistently 
applied. 

10  Cf .  Hyde,  The  College  Man  and  the  College  Woman,  p.  68  ff . 

11  Homans  XIV:  14  ff. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


219 


But  temperance  has  a  wider  application  than 
the  question  of  food  and  drink.  The  problem, 
of  drink  leads  to  the  examination  of  the  use  of 
stimulants  in  human  life.  What  ought  to  be 
our  habits  in  reference  to  tea,  coffee,  tobacco, 
etc.  ?  Whenever  mild  stimulants  are  physi¬ 
cally  beneficial,  or  at  least  not  distinctly  harm¬ 
ful,  they  may  be  used.  But  we  ought  to  be 
willing  to  subject  every  habit  that  we  are  about 
to  form  to  a  fair  test,  and  not  merely  follow 
the  crowd.  Some  habits  are  positively  de¬ 
structive.  Among  these  is  the  use  of  drugs 
and  narcotics,  which  break  down  life  com¬ 
pletely  for  the  sake  of  a  brief  intoxication  of 
dreams  and  sense  delights.  The  use  of  tobacco 
should  be  far  more  limited  especially  in  the 
years  of  growth,  and  in  many  lives  ought  to 
be  avoided  altogether.  The  wrong  consists  in 
so  forming  a  habit  in  the  use  of  stimulants  that 
we  are  under  their  dominance.  Any  one  who 
cannot  resist  a  stimulant,  and  has  lost  control 
over  it,  has  surrendered  his  freedom  to  his 
desire.  The  essential  evil  in  using  any  stimu¬ 
lant  is  our  subjection  to  habit.  If  we  cannot 
at  any  time  give  up  a  stimulant  we  are  unfree. 

In  the  usual  restricted  sense  temperance  does 
not  apply  to  the  control  of  individual  sex4ife, 
but  in  a  wider  application  the  morals  of  sex 
belong  to  it.  With  it  are  connected  the  related 
virtues  of  purity,  modesty,  and  shame.  Purity 
is  the  attitude  of  mind  which  controls  thoughts, 
words  and  acts,  so  that  they  are  clean.  It 
makes  sex  a  sacred  trust  of  nature  given  to  us, 
but  not  an  opportunity  for  indulgent  imagina¬ 
tion  and  passion.  Modesty  may  be  restraint 


220 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


of  our  whole  demeanor  in  life,  but  it  is  specifi¬ 
cally  the  control  of  dress  and  manners  in  the 
direction  of  the  privacy  of  our  sex-life,  and  the 
avoidance  of  everything  that  leads  to  the 
seductiveness  and  allurement  of  sex.12  Shame 
can  be  a  reaction  of  guilt  after  we  have  com¬ 
mitted  the  sexually  immodest  and  wrong  act. 
But  it  can  also  be  a  preventative  virtue  through 
which  we  recognize  the  protection  of  the  physi¬ 
cal.  Animals  have  no  shame.  Shame  is  the 
testimony  of  the  rise  of  human,  rational  nature 
above  the  animal  world.13  But  we  can  turn  all 
of  these  virtues  into  vices  by  simply  abandon¬ 
ing  ourselves  to  the  fact  of  sex  without  govern¬ 
ing  it.  Then  we  are  liable  to  sink  below  the 
animal  because  we  dwell  with  prurient  delight 
upon  the  desires  of  sex,  and  allow  them  to  hold 
our  mind  and  life  captive. 

Before  marriage  temperance  in  sex  means 
abstention  from  all  sex-relation.  There  is  a 
very  erroneous  opinion  secretly  handed  on,  and 
sometimes  encouraged  by  physicians,  that  sex- 
hunger  like  all  hunger  ought  to  have  its  legiti¬ 
mate  satisfaction.  This  position  is  strengthened 
today  by  the  theories  of  Freud,  which  identify 
sex  with  the  subconscious.  Repression  of  sex 
is  almost  made  a  danger  directly  or  indirectly 
through  this  theory.  In  order  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  sexual  disease  there  has  been  public 
recommendation  of  preventative  medicine. 
While  the  intention  of  such  a  governmental 
measure  is  honest,  the  result  is  to  increase 

12  The  moral  problem  of  the  dance  is  whether  it  arouses 
passion.  Its  dangers  are  very  much  multiplied  in  the  dance 
hall  with  its  promiscuous  crowd. 

Solovyof,  The  Justification  of  the  Good,  p.  26  ff. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


221 


indulgence  in  sex  gratification.  The  whole  sub¬ 
ject  of  sex  has  been  too  prominent  in  discussion. 
It  is  right  that  the  wrong  ideas  so  often  handed 
on  in  the  secret  and  frequently  vile  communica¬ 
tions  from  youth  to  youth  should  be  met.  But 
the  way  is  that  of  legitimate,  wise  and  tactful 
education,  and  not  indiscriminate  publication. 
A  former  age  may  have  been  prudish,  but  we 
are  too  brutally  frank.  Thus  we  injure  the 
finer  virtues,  and  destroy  the  protection  which 
culture  has  erected  in  the  interest  of  purity. 
We  make  the  sacredness  of  sex  an  interesting 
subject. 

The  other  great  virtue  which  begins  in  the 
bodily  life  is  courage.  Courage  is  not  the  un¬ 
reasoning  braving  of  danger,  and  the  unthinking 
assumption  of  risk  of  life.  It  knows  the  danger 
and  the  risk  and  is  willing  to  incur  it  for  the 
sake  of  the  good.  Simply  to  throw  oneself  in 
the  way  of  danger  and  to  gamble  with  one’s 
life  is  foolhardiness.  But  the  legitimate  under¬ 
going  of  danger  with  a  resolute  will  is  courage. 
There  are  gradations  of  courage.  It  began  to 
be  estimated,  first  of  all,  in  the  unsettled,  primi¬ 
tive  conditions  and  in  war.  But  this  kind  of 
courage  ought  to  pass  away.  The  glorification 
of  courage  in  war  still  receives  too  much  praise 
as  though  it  were  the  best  type.  A  higher  kind 
of  courage  is  that  displayed  by  discoverers, 
who  incur  great  risks  in  the  interest  of  science 
and  for  humanity.  But  the  relative  value  of 
risk  in  relation  to  the  good  must  be  considered. 
Peary  and  Shackleton  displayed  as  much  cour¬ 
age  in  their  efforts  in  polar  expeditions,  as  did 
Livingstone  and  Stanley  in  entering  the  jungles 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


099 

of  Africa.  But  the  latter  had  a  higher  moral 
motive  and  result.  The  saving  of  an  endangered 
life  by  a  quick,  impulsive  act  of  courage  is  very 
noble.  But  even  greater  is  the  quiet,  sustained 
effort  to  help  men,  whether  by  dangerous  experi¬ 
ment  in  the  laboratory,  or  by  attendance  upon 
cases  that  involve  great  risk,  and  all  similar 
instances.  There  is  no  applause  to  be  gained, 
and  no  heroic  light  about  such  actions.  Courage 
can  go  beyond  bodily  risk  when  it  becomes 
moral  courage,  which  fearlessly  stands  for 
truth,  and  seeks  no  glamor  of  approval. 

The  mental  life.  Is  there  any  need  to  speak 
and  treat  of  the  moralizing  of  the  mind!  Is 
not  the  relation  far  removed  from  the  tempta¬ 
tions  of  the  body!  If  rationalism  were  the 
solution  of  the  moral  problem,  then  to  be  reason¬ 
able  would  mean  to  be  good.  But  the  two  are 
not  synonymous.14  All  the  operations  of  our 
mind  must  be  fused  into  the  freedom  of  person¬ 
ality.  The  virtue  through  which  we  grasp 
ourselves  in  our  moral  worth  and  dignity  is  the 
virtue  of  honor.  Honor  is  the  right  self-estima¬ 
tion  by  which  we  do  the  noble  and  good  acts, 
and  do  not  dare  to  soil  ourselves  with  anything 
unworthy  of  our  character.  It  must  be  valued 
as  the  protection  of  our  free  character,  and 
ought  never  degenerate  into  pride.  Pride , 
mostly  attended  by  boastfulness,  is  to  glory  in 
ourselves;  but  our  honor  is  not  so  much  our 
merit  and  glory  as  a  precious  possession  and 
trust  to  be  jealously  guarded  and  preserved.  It 
ought  always  to  be  counterbalanced  by  humility. 
In  the  ancient  world  humility  was  regarded  as 

14  Cf.  above,  Chapter  VIII. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


223 


weakness  and  meanness.  Aristotle  praises  the 
high-minded  man,15  who  carries  himself  with  a 
conscious  sense  of  his  dignity  and  with  a  just 
pride.  But  Christianity  has  taught  us,  that  in 
view  of  the  greatness  and  illimitableness  of 
truth,  and  because  of  our  imperfection  even 
when  we  are  at  our  best,  we  need  to  remain 
conscious  of  our  short-comings,  failures  and 
defects.  Humility  is  not  the  destruction  of 
right  self-confidence  and  just  self-assurance, 
but  the  opposite  to  pride  with  its  untrue  and 
exaggerated  estimate  of  the  self.  Diffidence  is 
not  synonymous  with  humility.  The  humble 
mind  knows  its  worth,  but  as  it  has  an  infinite 
ideal  of  truth  and  goodness  it  realizes  its  own 
place.  The  mind  in  search  of  science  must  be 
careful,  accurate,  honest  and  sincere.  Honesty 
and  sincerity  in  seeking  the  truth,  and  in  direct¬ 
ing  our  purposes  are  as  essential  as  honor  and 
humility.  Their  lack  destroys  the  opportunity 
of  learning  more  and  more  of  the  truth  through 
the  attitude  of  open-mindedness.  And  as  truth 
makes  us  free,  it  follows  that  whatever  hinders 
the  truth  hinders  our  freedom,  and  whatever 
allows  the  approach  of  truth  and  new  truth 
aids  our  liberty. 

The  life  of  the  mind  can  also  be  moralized 
by  a  right  appreciation  of  art.  The  truly 
beautiful  favors  the  increase  of  the  good.  Aris¬ 
totle  held  that  the  beautiful  had  a  purifying 
power.  Through  the  beautiful  Plato  reached 
up  to  the  idea  of  the  absolutely  beautiful.  Art 
can  cleanse  us,  if  it  is  pure  in  intent  and  execu- 

ir>  Cf.  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Book  IV,  3,  p.  213  ff. 


224 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


tion.  The  sense  of  tlie  beautiful  does  lift  us  up 
to  God.  There  is  a  marvelous  power  for  good 
in  the  enjoyment  of  the  glory  and  beauty  of 
nature.  In  its  presence  we  become  calm  and 
free  when  we  look  up  to  the  shining  stars,  or 
look  out  upon  the  colors  of  sunrise  and  sunset. 
The  green  fields  and  towering  hills,  the  fra¬ 
grance  and  varied  color  of  the  flowers,  the 
many-colored  plumage  of  the  birds  and  their 
songs,  the  wonderful  arches  of  the  trees,  the 
brightness  of  the  day  and  the  shadows  of  the 
night, — all  these  and  many  other  phenomena  of 
nature  are  rich  in  power  to  uplift  and  liberate. 
When  man  uses  art  he  can  awaken  all  that  is 
good,  or  he  can  prostitute  art  to  evil.  There 
lias  been  a  tendency  in  modern  art  to  degenerate 
into  a  realism  that  dwells  in  the  mean  and  ugly. 
It  often  glorifies  the  passion  of  sex  as  right  in 
its  vile  naturalism.  Art  must  be  delivered 
from  this  trend  to  be  really  good.  Not  all  that 
exists  can  be  the  subject  of  art,  if  art  is  to 
liberate  man  and  to  aid  in  unfolding  his 
character. 

The  power  over  life.  If  we  assume  that  we 
are  free  is  not  our  life  in  our  control?  We  can 
sustain  and  keep  it,  and  we  can  ruin  it.  Do  we 
possess  the  right  to  end  it  when  we  please? 
Is  suicide  morally  justifiable?  We  must  of 
course  exclude  all  those  cases  of  suicide  which 
are  caused  by  disease.  It  is  necessary  to  ex¬ 
amine  with  care  into  the  responsibility  of  those 
who  commit  suicide.  But  where  the  indications 
are,  that  suicide  has  been  deliberate,  what  shall 
be  our  estimate?  Hume16  argued  that  we  have 

16  Essay  ‘  ‘  Of  Suicide.  ’  ’ 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


225 


the  liberty  to  take  our  lives  because  it  is  in 
our  power.  As  God  has  not  restrained  us 
physically  from  taking  our  own  life,  thus  thinks 
Flume,  He  virtually  allows  us  to  take  it  if  we 
see  lit  to  do  so.  Therefore  we  have  no  binding 
command  from  God.  If  we  become  useless  to 
our  relatives  and  friends  we  relieve  them  by 
our  suicide,  continues  Hume.  Finally  he  con¬ 
tends,  that  if  we  no  longer  have  the  desire  to 
live,  and  if  our  lives  seem  to  be  of  no  value  we 
can  end  them.  But  this  whole  argument  con¬ 
fuses  the  formal  liberty  with  the  moral  right. 
We  owe  our  lives  to  God,  and  destruction  is  the 
abandonment  of  the  entrusted  good.  We  may 
be  a  burden  to  our  own,  but  part  of  life  consists 
in  bearing  each  others’  burdens,  so  that  the 
spirit  of  love  may  increase  under  trial.  We 
may  see  no  use  of  an  active  kind  in  our  life,  but 
suffering  often  perfects  men,  and  leads  them 
to  a  noble  freedom  of  soul.  The  manner  in 
which  we  bear  ills  in  a  spirit  of  patience  and 
cheerfulness,  instead  of  attempting  to  escape 
from  them,  is  an  incitement  to  others.  Sufferers 
can  be  a  great  moral  asset  in  the  development 
of  the  finer  and  kindlier  qualities  of  life.  It  is 
a  terrible  thing  when  an  evil  life  ends  in  suicide. 
The  motives  are  cowardice  and  despair.  When 
men  are  unwilling  to  take  upon  themselves  the 
punishment  of  their  evil  deeds,  they  cannot  be 
rescued  through  a  spirit  of  repentance.  If  they 
commit  suicide  they  may  get  away  from  visible 
punishment,  but  religion  holds  that  there  is  no 
real  escape.  The  atheistic  attitude  alone  can 
counsel  suicide. 


226 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


The  question  sometimes  arises  whether  there 
are  not  peculiar  conditions  that  justify  us  in 
ending  our  life  ?  If  a  young  woman  is  attacked 
and  is  liable  to  be  outraged  shall  she,  if  it  be 
possible,  take  her  life  to  save  her  purity?  There 
is  no  moral  guilt  in  anything  to  which  one  is 
forced.  Therefore  the  young  woman  in  such 
a  case  ought  to  struggle  and  seek  to  save  her 
life.  Of  course  awful  conditions  may  tempo¬ 
rarily  craze  the  mind,  and  then  despair  leads  to 
death.  Was  Themistocles  justified  in  killing 
himself  rather  than  harming  his  country  by 
betraying  it  to  the  Persians?  Can  we  exonerate 
Frederick  the  Great,  because  in  the  Seven 
Years  ’  War  he  always  carried  poison  with  him, 
which  he  intended  to  take,  if  the  enemy  at  any 
time  should  capture  him?  All  of  these  attitudes 
caused  by  war  are  not  justifiable.  They  en¬ 
deavor  to  change  the  fortunes  of  war  by  an  act 
that  seems  patriotic,  but  is  cowardly  and 
deceptive.  War  destroys  morals  and  glorifies 
deception;  consequently  men  have  been  willing 
to  condone  and  even  praise  such  acts  under  the 
perverted  moral  standards  of  war.  But  a 
real  morality  cannot  excuse  them  even  if  it  can 
understand  them. 


REFERENCES 

James  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  Part  II,  Chapter 
I. 

John  S.  Mackenzie,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chapter  V. 
Borden  P.  Bowne,  Principles  of  Ethics,  Chapter  VIII. 
Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics,  Chapter  XIX. 

Henry  W.  Wright,  Self-Realization,  Part  IV,  Chapter  I. 
Durant  Drake,  Problems  of  Conduct,  Part  II,  Chapter  X; 
Part  III,  Chapters  XV,  XVI,  XVII. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE 


Mary  W.  Calkins,  The  Good  Man  and  the  Good,  Chapter  VII. 
Ed.  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral 
Ideas,  Chapter  XXXV. 

Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chapters  III,  IV,  V,  VI,  VII. 
W.  Wundt,  Ethics,  Part  II,  Chapter  I. 

H.  H.  Tweedy,  Christian  Work  as  a  Vocation. 

Irving  Wood,  Modern  Christian  Callings. 

L.  T.  Hobhouse,  H.  Rashdall,  A.  D.  Lindsay,  Vernon  Bartlett. 
A.  J.  Carlyle,  H.  G.  Wood,  H.  Scott  Holland,  Property:  its 
Right  and  Duties. 


CHAPTER  XI 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 

The  kindly  virtues.  If  we  begin  to  look  over 
the  whole  range  of  virtues  which  affect  onr 
relations  to  each  other,  with  what  group  shall 
we  open?  It  is  clear  that  the  law  of  liberty 
being  love,  the  virtues  which  most  directly 
express  it  as  establishing  freedom,  ought  to  be 
fundamental.  The  unity  of  love  is  differentiated 
into  various  forms  and  is  found  in  different 
habits  of  the  good.  Of  these  'kindness  marks 
a  disposition  and  attitude  through  which  we 
deal  with  men  in  a  spirit  of  winning  love. 
Kindness  is  the  virtue  that  regards  all  others 
as  objects  of  quiet  and  considerate  affection. 
It  seeks  to  smooth  the  rough  ways  of  life  and 
to  bind  men  together  in  the  little  exasperations 
of  life.  Through  it  words  and  deeds  take  on 
the  character  of  helpfulness  by  creating  the 
atmosphere  in  which  love  can  live.  If  manners 
are  to  be  genuine  and  honest  they  must  be 
moved  by  kindness.  Because  life  is  lived  from 
day  to  day  in  the  single,  and  often  apparently 
small,  words  and  deeds  we  need  the  habit  of 
kindness  to  transfigure  and  make  it  large  and 
free.  Closely  connected  with  kindness  is  gentle¬ 
ness.  Gentleness  is  opposed  to  wrath  and  quick 
anger.  It  is  the  disposition  in  which  under 
provocation  we  do  not  lose  our  temper,  but  deal 

228 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


229 


in  all  situations  with  men  as  those  to  whom  we 
owe  a  soft  answer  and  a  kindly  act.  Through 
it  we  accustom  ourselves  to  allay  threatening 
storms  and  to  prevent  outbreaks  of  passion 
that  result  in  hatred.  Gentleness  is  the  great 
preventative  virtue  in  human  intercourse,  and 
it  keeps  life  sweet  and  free.  Kindness  and 
gentleness  were  not  unknown  and  unrecognized 
in  the  ancient  world.  But  with  the  advent  of 
Christianity  two  other  virtues  arose  which 
belong  to  the  same  group  as  kindness  and 
gentleness.  The  first  virtue  is  meekness.  The 
opposite  of  meekness  is  forcefulness  which  over¬ 
comes  and  subdues.  The  meek  mind  would 
rather  resign  all  rights  than  to  obtain  them  by 
suppression  and  force.  It  wins  its  way  by 
apparent  withdrawal  from  conflicts  between 
men.  No  one  will  be  pushed  to  the  wall  through 
it,  because  it  will  not  use  strength  to  fight  down 
others.  It  is  not  too  proud  to  fight  but  it  is  too 
good  and  gentle.  Silently  and  quietly  it  wins 
men.  Christ  promises  that  the  meek  shall  finally 
rule  the  earth.1  Meekness  when  genuine  is  not 
an  assumed  inferiority,  nor  a  pretensive  humil¬ 
ity,  but  rather  an  expression  of  the  love  that 
bears  and  hopes  all  things.  Connected  with  it 
as  the  second  outstanding  virtue  is  the  attitude 
of  non-resistance.  This  is  meekness  that  suffers 
and  does  not  strike  back.  It  denies  that  com¬ 
bativeness  is  necessary  among  men.  To  over¬ 
come  the  evil  it  turns  the  left  cheek  when  the 
right  has  been  smitten.  Such  action  is  not  the 
outcome  of  weakness  and  cowardice  but  of  self- 
controlled  strength  and  courage.  The  real 

i  Matthew  V :  5. 


230 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


virtue  of  non-resistance  is  the  habit  of  not 
returning  evil  for  evil,  but  to  suffer  it.  The 
suffering,  when  retaliation  is  possible,  is  borne 
to  win  the  opponent,  and  to  establish  the  good 
among  men  even  if  it  must  be  at  a  loss  and 
with  pain. 

All  of  these  virtues  have  been  severely  at¬ 
tacked  by  the  modern  philosopher  Nietzsche. 
In  the  interest  of  power  and  physical  prowess 
the  philosopher  of  the  superman  rejects  all  those 
qualities  which  are  contrary  to  struggle  and 
force.  He  thinks  that  the  weak  have  given  men 
in  Christianity  a  self-protective  morality  of  the 
decadent.  Life  is  energy  and  power.  Nietzsche 
has  boldly  expressed  the  modern  temper  of  force 
and  power  of  man  as  against  man.  He  argues 
for  a  realistic  world  of  contest  and  fight.  But 
whither  has  this  kind  of  a  world  led  us  ?  What 
have  been  the  results  of  the  practice  of  force 
in  economic  life,  in  political  problems,  and  in 
international  relations?  A  world  and  a  society 
torn  apart  by  bitterness  and  hatred.  The 
stronger  always  stands  ready  to  overcome  and 
defeat  the  strong.  Battle  is  followed  by  battle, 
strike  succeeds  strike,  and  the  end  is  not  in  view. 
The  use  of  force  is  making  a  miserable  and  sad 
world  which  is  destroying  itself  physically, 
economically  and  politically.  The  virtues  of 
kindness,  gentleness,  meekness,  non-resistance 
have  been  called  impracticable.  They  are  so 
in  the  present  world  of  force.  But  the  present 
world  of  force  is  demonstrating  that  it  cannot 
liberate  but  only  destroy  society.2  Is  force 

2  Cf.  Benjamin  Kidd,  The  Science  of  Power. 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


231 


really  practicable  because  men  practice  force! 
As  the  results  show  that  force  is  not  succeeding, 
ethics  recommends  to  men  to  become  reasonable 
and  adopt  the  kindly  attitude,  which  is  only 
unreasonable  in  a  world  controlled  by  evil 
passions. 

The  actualities  of  life  and  our  common  exper¬ 
ience  lead  us  to  the  recognition  of  the  fact,  that 
we  often  fail  to  reach  the  ideal.  It  is  true  that  in 
many  things  we  all  offend.  Love  expresses  itself 
in  certain  healing  virtues  that  do  not  condone 
the  wrong,  but  seek  to  win  men  for  the  right. 
There  are  particularly  two  attitudes  of  love 
toward  the  wrong,  mercifulness  and  the  forgiv¬ 
ing  spirit.  Mercy  seeks  to  stoop  down  in  gentle 
graciousness  to  those  on  evil  ways  who  have 
done  the  wicked  deeds.  It  does  not  come  with 
any  air  of  superiority,  nor  does  it  exhibit  a 
patronizing  spirit.  Entering  with  sympathy 
upon  the  difficulties  and  temptations  of  a  life 
mercy  strives  to  effect  a  change  which  mere 
requital  and  harsh  justice  cannot  bring.3  In 
opposition  to  the  uncompromising  attitude  of 
relentless  condemnation  and  judgment  it  seeks 
betterment  of  men  and  society  through  the 
effort  to  cure  and  help  those  who  have  gone 
wrong.  Mercy  is  forgiving.  Forgiveness  is  the 
virtue  through  which  the  general  disposition 
of  mercy  enters  upon  the  individual  faults  and 
sins.  According  to  Christ  there  can  be  no  end4 
to  our  willingness  to  forgive  if  we  are  not  to 
forfeit  divine  mercy.  But  forgiveness  is  not 

3  Cf.  Portia’s  description  of  mercy  in  Shyloek. 

4Cf.  Matthew  XVIII:  21  ff. 


232 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


merely  the  temporary  expression  of  release  over 
against  one  that  has  done  ns  wrong.  It  deals 
with  individual  acts  but  all  its  separate  cases 
of  forgiving  are  the  outcome  of  a  willingness 
to  do  so.  The  memory  of  a  wrong  cannot  be 
effaced,  but  it  dare  not  be  nursed  and  harbored. 
There  are  certain  conditions  that  enter  into 
forgiveness  and  mercy.  Forgiveness  can  do 
positive  harm  if  it  becomes  a  quick  and  unques¬ 
tioning  cancellation  of  wrong.  An  illustration 
of  this  error  is  found  in  the  attitude  of  parents 
who  are  so  sentimental  about  their  children  that, 
in  their  ready  condoning  of  a  child’s  sin,  they 
strengthen  the  child  in  the  wrong  because  the 
forgiveness  is  so  easy.  There  must  be  clear 
evidence  that  the  wrong  is  recognized,  repented 
of,  and  rejected  in  the  will,  if  forgiveness  is 
to  be  bestowed  upon  a  wrongdoer.  As  far  as 
possible  the  assurance  must  be  obtained  that 
forgiveness  is  sought  not  to  escape  the  conse¬ 
quences  of  a  deed,  but  out  of  a  real  sense  of  the 
evil  in  a  deed.  A  second  condition  in  forgiving 
others,  is  that  their  wrong  affects  us  alone. 
If  the  sin  goes  beyond  us  and  has  disturbed 
the  moral  order  widely  we  have  no  right  to 
forgive  individually  a  wrong  that  must  be 
righted  in  the  common  life.  When  a  wave  of 
criminality  sweeps  over  a  land  I  may  be  dis¬ 
posed  very  mercifully  toward  some  one,  who 
lias  committed  a  crime  against  me.  Neverthe¬ 
less  I  dare  not  for  the  common  good  hide  such 
a  deed.  Common  liberty  and  order  demand  that 
such  a  wrong  shall  be  punished.  If  the  criminal 
is  really  repentant  he  is  willing  to  undergo  the 
punishment,  and  to  get  into  a  new  attitude  of 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


233 


life  by  having  satisfied  the  moral  rectification 
in  society.  Forgiveness  must  never  degenerate 
into  sentimental  disregard  of  the  wrong,  but  it 
should  only  counteract  a  spirit  of  hate  and 
revenge.  Its  end  is  to  heal  men  and  society 
and  to  re-establish  right  and  justice. 

One  of  the  constant  questions  in  the  applica¬ 
tion  of  love  to  life  is  that  of  charity.  There  is 
a  very  old  and  persistent  notion  that  charity 
is  identical  with  giving  alms.  Men  supposed 
that  the  bestowing  of  alms  not  only  helped  the 
needy  one,  but  also  laid  up  merit  for  the  giver. 
Because  of  the  idea  of  merit,  no  matter  what 
the  effect  of  the  charity,  it  became  harmful 
rather  than  helpful.  After  the  conception  of 
thoughtful  and  organized  charity  was  given  to 
the  world  by  Chalmers  a  new  era  began.  We 
have  learnt  that  the  giving  of  aid  is  the  least 
that  can  be  done.  The  right  purpose  of  charit3r 
is  to  try  to  make  it  unnecessary  by  overcoming 
its  causes.  There  must  be  careful  knowledge 
to  avoid  creating  pauperism,  and  encouraging 
vagabondage  and  trampdom.  But  the  whole 
problem  is  not  solved  by  the  organized  method 
which  is  necessary  for  society.  Into  it  must 
enter  the  direct  interest  and  care  of  the  poor, 
needy  and  neglected,  by  individual  work.  We 
cannot  delegate  charity  simply  to  organization. 
Often  the  greatest  benefit,  namely,  the  personal 
touch,  is  lost  in  the  official  machinery  of  charity. 
The  poor  resent  being  treated  like  cases.  If 
charity  is  to  liberate  it  must  come  from  a  motive 
.  to  develop  character.  The  sphere  of  charity 
covers  all  the  good  that  can  be  done  wherever 
good  is  needed  by  any  one  in  distress.  There 


234 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


is  a  clanger  in  our  day  of  making  charity  a 
substitute  for  justice.  Men  of  great  riches 
organize  it  as  a  business.  While  such  work 
meets  some  of  the  great  needs  of  the  world  it 
ought  not  to  become  a  sport  of  wealth,  or  close 
our  eyes  to  the  examination  of  the  sources  of 
wealth  and  their  moral  justification  because 
wealth  has  become  charitable. 

In  the  ancient  world  friendship  was  given  a 
large  place  in  ethics.  Aristotle  devotes  more 
space  to  it  than  to  any  other  virtue.  Under  it 
he  includes  love  and  its  various  manifestations. 
Friendship  was  the  great  social  virtue.  Since 
Christianity  taught  us  to  put  the  emphasis  upon 
love  friendship  has  taken  a  secondary  place. 
It  is  not  extended  so  much  to  attitudes  between 
groups,  as  to  the  relation  between  individuals. 
But  it  is  still  of  high  moralizing  value.  The 
foundation  of  friendship  must  rest  upon  honesty 
and  sincerity  between  friends,  and  a  common 
purpose  in  life.  Some  worthwhile  cause  or  ideal 
must  unite  real  friends.  The  mere  social  attrac¬ 
tion  is  inadequate.  Friendship  requires  differ¬ 
ence  of  individuality,  but  not  too  great  a 
disparity.  Friends  must  find  in  each  other 
complementary  qualities.  The  social  standing 
and  rank  does  not  debar  friendship  especially 
among  the  young,  when  friendships  that  last 
are  most  often  formed.  Nevertheless  there  can¬ 
not  be  too  great  a  social  cleft  between  friends. 
With  the  better  estimation  of  woman  friend¬ 
ship  can  exist  between  those  of  different  sex, 
although  it  has  been  most  helpful  between  those 
of  the  same  sex.  A  friend  stands  for  a  friend, 
defends  him,  speaks  well  of  him,  and  without 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


235 


any  selfish  purpose  aids  him  in  his  moral  un¬ 
folding.  The  best  types  of  a  tender  and  fine 
friendship  are  found  in  the  stories  of  Jonathan 
and  David,  and  of  Damon  and  Pythias. 

In  the  modern  world  there  has  arisen  an 
organized  form  of  friendship  in  fraternities. 
If  men  unite  for  some  beneficial  and  social  end, 
and  use  their  being  together  for  the  satisfaction 
of  mutual  helpfulness  or  sociability,  there  is  a 
moral  aid  to  be  derived.  But  whenever  a  com¬ 
mon  association  encourages  modes  of  initiation 
and  enjoins  secrecy  by  oath  in  imitation  of  the 
ceremonies  for  adolescents  in  the  lower  tribes 
it  perpetuates  unnecessary  lower  social  atti¬ 
tudes  that  do  not  advance  modern  life  morally. 
Wherever  the  sociability  behind  closed  doors 
becomes  immoral,  or  wherever  association  be¬ 
comes  a  destructive  political  or  a  persecuting 
agency,  all  moral  right  of  existence  has  been 
forfeited.  The  life  of  fraternities  is  inimical  to 
democracy  when  it  develops  snobbishness  or 
separatism  among  larger  groups.  It  is  equally 
a  prostitution  of  the  right  purpose  of  a  frater¬ 
nity,  if  its  exalts  philanthropism  to  take  the 
place  of  religion,  or  develops  a  certain  kind  of 
indefinite,  universalistic  faith  that  acts  as  a 
substitute  for  historic  religion.  Those  that 
make  fraternities  a  religion  deceive  themselves, 
and  do  not  find  the  satisfaction,  either  in  mysti¬ 
cism  or  ethics,  which  a  real  world-religion 
offers.  Christianity  with  its  claim  for  finality 
cannot  legitimately  suffer  any  inferior  substi¬ 
tute,  that  fails  in  making  Christ  all-controlling 
and  does  not  ask  for  love  without  restriction. 

Truth  and  freedom.  What  makes  truth  so 


236 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


important  in  tlie  moral  life*?  Wherefore  is  it 
basic?  If  we  stop  but  a  moment  to  consider 
wbat  truth  does  we  shall  readily  find  an  answer. 
Any  kind  of  real  truth  has  in  it  a  power  of 
deliverance  from  ignorance  and  error.  Ignor¬ 
ance  and  error  keep  man  from  freedom.  Truth 
as  overcoming  them  bears  within  itself  the 
power  to  free  men.  Christ  has  well  stressed 
this  in  relation  to  spiritual  truth,  when  He  says : 
“Ye  shall  know  the  truth  and  the  truth  shall 
make  you  free.  ’ 7  5  But  the  freeing  energy  of 

s  John  VIII:  32. 

truth  is  apparent  in  every  kind  of  truth, 
scientific,  literary,  artistic,  social,  moral,  and 
religious.  For  this  reason  society  needs  truth 
to  live  together  rightly  and  freely.  Truth  begets 
the  confidence  between  men  without  which  they 
cannot  lead  a  common  life.  Our  words  and 
actions  are  the  forces  that  either  bind  us 
together  or  rend  us  asunder.  We  can  be  united 
in  an  assured  and  reliable  social  life  only  where 
truth  obtains.  Without  it  no  business,  no  com¬ 
merce,  and  no  industry  can  thrive.  It  lies  at 
the  foundation  of  all  intercourse  in  work  or 
social  life.  The  destruction  of  truth,  therefore, 
affects  not  merely  our  own  lives,  but  also  the 
possibility  of  a  trustworthy  common,  human  life. 

The  virtue  which  is  most  intimately  con¬ 
nected  with  truth  is  wisdom.  Wisdom  is  truth 
in  solution.  The  great  mistake  of  the  rational¬ 
ists  is  to  make  wisdom  purely  intellectual.  Its 
knowledge  is  the  living  and  practical  knoAvledge 
that  needs  both  emotion  and  volition  besides 
intellect.  The  amount  of  knowledge  of  a  tech- 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


237 


nical  sort  does  not  insure  wisdom.  There  are  a 
great  many  learned  fools  who  miss  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  life.  Wisdom  is  the  full,  rounded 
virtue  in  which  the  truth  of  the  living  moral 
relations  of  man,  and  his  spiritual  import,  is 
preserved.  It  is  more  than  calculating  prudence. 
What  is  right  in  prudence  receives  a  higher 
worth  in  wisdom,  which  has  a  strong  aggressive 
motive,  and  is  not  hampered  by  the  timidity 
and  time-serving  attitude  of  prudential  con¬ 
siderations.  Tactfidness  is  a  child  of  wisdom, 
as  well  as  sound,  moral  common  sense.  But 
both  of  these  receive  a  depth  and  impetus 
through  wisdom,  which  they  do  not  possess  of 
themselves. 

The  way  of  truth  is  not  at  all  times  simple 
and  easy.  There  arise  conflicts  in  conditions 
and  situations  which  put  us  to  the  test,  as  to 
ivhether  truth  is  always  possible.  If,  e.  g.,  I  am 
put  in  trust  of  certain  securities,  and  this  fact 
becoming  known  to  a  burglar,  I  am  confronted 
with  a  pistol,  and  asked  to  reveal  the  where¬ 
abouts  of  the  securities,  what  shall  I  do?  Is  it 
best  to  tell  the  truth  and  betray  my  trust,  or 
shall  I  mislead  the  burglar,  and  save  my  life 
and  the  securities?  A  more  frequent  case  is 
that  which  occurs  in  the  life  of  a  physician, 
when  a  very  sick  person  asks  about  the  chances 
of  recovery.  Shall  the  doctor  tell  the  truth  and 
possibly  shock  the  patient  if  the  chances  are 
poor,  or  shall  a  wrong  but  cheerful  statement 
be  made  if  necessary  at  the  expense  of  truth? 
The  first  case  is  typical  of  situations  in  which 
evil  creates  a  conflict  of  duties.  It  is  well  to 
remember  that  a  burglar  has  no  right  to 


238 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


demand  the  truth  from  any  one  when  he  seeks 
to  commit  a  crime.  But  even  in  such  a  condi¬ 
tion  where  we  do  not  owe  the  truth  it  is  not 
right  to  lie  because  it  is  the  easiest  escape.  Of 
course  the  preservation  of  our  life  is  incumbent 
upon  us,  and  as  an  attack  compels  a  defense 
the  most  effective  defense  is  allowable.  In  the 
second  instance,  that  of  the  physician,  it  is 
often  possible  to  tell  no  direct  untruth  and  still 
to  keep  the  patient  cheerful  and  hopeful.  The 
past  character  of  a  man  will  determine  his 
ability  to  meet  such  problems  in  consistency 
with  the  truth.  The  general  rule  is  to  keep  to 
the  truth  always,  and  so  to  school  ourselves  as 
to  meet  even  the  exigencies  of  conflict  with  the 
least  loss  of  truth.  The  manner  in  which  many 
people  help  themselves  in  a  dilemma  shows  that 
they  lack  the  finer  sense  of  truth,  and  find  many 
occasions  for  lying,  because  they  fear  to  tell 
the  truth,  and  use  frequent,  inexcusable  lies 
under  the  specious  plea  of  necessity. 

The  direct  opposite  of  the  truth  is  a  lie,  which 
may  be  defined  as  an  intentional  untruth  with 
the  purpose  to  deceive.  We  may  make  state¬ 
ments  that  do  not  correspond  with  facts.  If 
such  statements  grow  out  of  ignorance  and  are 
unintentional,  we  are  not  at  fault  though  they 
are  not  the  truth.  Only  then  do  words  and  acts 
become  a  lie  when  we  know  the  truth,  and  with¬ 
hold  or  prevert  it  with  a  purpose.  Often  we 
tell  a  partial  truth  when  we  know  the  whole,  or 
we  stress  certain  features  to  the  neglect  of 
others.  We  apply  to  sober  fact  the  inventive 
power  that  makes  a  good  story.  All  of  these 
attitudes  are  misrepresentations ,  even  though 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


239 


they  are  not  complete  reversals  of  the  truth. 
More  harm  is  done  generally  by  half-truths 
than  by  whole  lies.  It  is  the  same  spirit  of 
lying  through  which  we  judge  others ,  and 
stress  their  faults  to  the  damage  of  their  char¬ 
acter.  Truth  seeks  in  love  to  find  the  good  in 
all  men.  Unfair  criticism  of  others,  and  harsh 
judgment  rise  from  milder  gossip  to  the  severe 
form  of  totally  wrong  slander.  Almost  as 
frequent  as  the  lie  of  the  misrepresentation  of 
others,  is  the  modern  abuse  of  the  oath.  Per¬ 
jury  has  ceased  to  be  regarded  as  a  great  sin. 
Men  take  an  oath  very  lightly,  and  do  not  con¬ 
sider  its  tremendous  import  upon  human  soci¬ 
ety.  Its  establishment  was  to  guarantee  the 
full  truth  when  important  issues  involving  life 
or  property  were  at  stake.  Much  injustice  has 
been  done  through  perjury.  The  deepest  rea¬ 
son  why  is  has  become  so  common  is  that  men 
have  lost  the  religious  sense,  and  do  not  fear 
the  God  of  all  truth. 

There  is  a  relation  between  truth  and  current 
propaganda  that  calls  for  moral  consideration. 
When  men  assert  their  convictions,  whether  in 
matters  of  social  and  political  or  of  religious 
import,  they  have  a  right  to  proclaim  and  labor 
for  the  spread  of  their  views.  But  such  de¬ 
fense  of  ideals  is  different  from  modern  propa¬ 
ganda  that  is  found  in  many  quarters.  The 
free  proclamation  of  truth,  out  of  which  follows 
the  freedom  of  speech  and  utterance,  seeks  to 
have  the  truth  prevail  in  the  conflict  of 
opinions.  But  propaganda  wants  the  side  for 
which  it  stands  to  succeed.  It  is  based  on 
party  spirit,  and  is  not  willing  to  hear  the  truth 


240 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


of  other  men.  Partisan  in  origin  and  desirous 
of  power  it  works  for  the  triumph  of  its  own 
position  and  not  for  the  sake  of  pure  truth. 
Some  of  the  advocates  of  free  speech  want 
liberty  simply  to  propagate  doctrines  for  the 
destruction  of  society.  Whole  groups  are  only 
fed  the  pabulum  of  their  party,  and  are  made 
zealots  that  help  toward  the  destruction  of 
tolerance.  Even  the  public  press  often  fails  to 
aid  the  truth.  It  has  become  in  many  instances 
the  mouthpiece  of  a  propaganda.  But  where 
this  is  not  so  directly  the  case  the  very  concep¬ 
tion  of  what  is  news  tends  to  injure  the  full 
truth.  The  object  of  an  American  newspaper 
is  to  satisfy  the  taste  of  the  public  for  some 
interesting  and  exciting  news.  From  the  lesser 
curiosity  to  the  highest  sensationalism  the  pur¬ 
pose  is  to  serve  the  public  by  writing  a  telling 
story.  Facts  are  not  assembled  and  sifted  as 
they  would  be  by  an  impartial  historian,  but 
the  high  lights  and  the  dramatic  incidents  are 
told  often  out  of  all  relation  to  all  the  facts  in 
their  actual  connection.  News  in  the  daily 
press  possess  the  character  of  the  novel  and 
drama  while  they  purport  to  be  the  relation  of 
facts.  This  situation  makes  it  almost  impos¬ 
sible  for  the  public,  because  of  its  perverted 
taste,  to  receive  and  know  the  truth  when  it  is 
most  necessary  to  know  it.  The  press  is  largely 
in  the  hands  of  powerful  interests  and  serves 
them  and  their  political  and  social  interests. 
This  adds  to  the  loss  of  truth  and  it  makes  the 
press  even  more  the  servant  of  propaganda, 
and  not  the  organ  of  free  public  opinion  and  the 
servant  of  truth  in  its  full  character. 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


241 


Another  conflict  arises  between  truth  and 
prejudice.  All  men  have  and  hold  certain  pre¬ 
suppositions.  No  one  is  entirely  free  from 
fixed  and  controlling  ideas  and  ideals  which 
color  all  the  positions  taken.  Every  one  has 
some  philosophy  of  life.6  But  while  all  of  us 
are  thus  men  of  certain  views  it  is  essential  that 
we  remain  open  to  other  views.  We  may  have 
certain  opinions  hut  we  must  not  become  opin¬ 
ionated.  Prejudice  closes  our  minds  to  other 
positions  than  our  own.  It  is  a  perversion  of 
the  right  to  our  own  convictions  and  ideas. 
The  fact  of  the  rule  of  prejudice  has  aided  in 
dividing  society.  Too  many  are  men  of  a 
slogan,  and  the  slogan  makes  unfree.  The  con¬ 
stant  aim  of  true  education  ought  to  be  to 
deliver  us  from  the  spirit  of  prejudice, 
through  which  without  adequate  knowledge  we 
are  pre- judging  others  and  their  ideas,  beliefs 
and  attitudes. 

Truth  has  a  very  important  hearing  upoq 
freedom  of  thought  and  research.7  If  truth  be 
hampered  it  often  cannot  be  found.  There 
must  be  the  guarantee  of  real  liberty  to  enable 
the  finding  of  new  truth.  It  is  a  common 
human  experience  that  the  pathfinders  of  truth 
are  often  persecuted  and  rejected  and  yet  only 
by  true  liberty  can  the  progress  of  knowledge 
be  advanced.  Freedom  to  think  and  search 
must  not,  however,  he  identified  with  so-called 
free  thought.  Free  thought  is  the  attitude  of 
a  group  of  men  who  deny  theism,  and  are  inimi¬ 
cal  to  all  religious  positions,  because  they  do 

6  Hibben,  A  Defense  of  Prejudice. 

7  Of.  John  Stuart  Mill  ’s  Essay  on  Liberty. 


242 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


not  understand  its  psychology  and  history. 
But  genuine  freedom  must  come  gradually  in 
the  course  of  education.  If  there  is  no  proper 
preparation  the  result  is  confusion  and  doubt. 
The  best  method  for  the  freedom  of  thought  is 
criticism,  which  seeks  not  merely  to  remove  the 
unestablished,  but  also  to  make  sure  and  clear 
the  real  facts,  and  to  defend  the  proper  infer¬ 
ences  through  constructive  effort. 

Justice  and  freedom.  What  is  the  relation 
of  justice  to  the  ethical  problem!  What  does 
it  mean  for  liberty!  Justice  is  the  virtue  that 
renders  to  every  one  what  rightly  belongs  to 
him.  It  also  holds  the  balance  between  all,  and 
properly  correlates  individuals  and  groups  in 
society.  Without  it  men  cannot  live  and  do 
their  work  freely.  It  is  the  protection  of  just 
liberty,  and  preserves  it  from  becoming  either 
anarchistic  or  restricted.  Aristotle  distin¬ 
guished  between  punitive  justice  and  distribu¬ 
tive  justice.  The  former  is  the  problem  of  the 
state.  The  latter  is  the  striving  after  the  right 
allotment  to  each  and  all  of  their  proper  deserts 
and  rights.  Justice  is  not  possible  on  a  dead 
level  of  equality;  it  rather  demands  equability. 
Because  proportionality  is  essential  to  justice, 
it  can  only  fulfill  its  aim  when  it  is  not  absolute, 
but  includes  equity  and  the  fair  consideration 
of  each  separate  case  and  instance  with  all  its 
details  and  limits.  When  thus  applied  it  is 
the  inner  cement  of  human  society  and  makes 
it  fundamentally  moral. 

What  is  the  relation  of  justice  to  righteous¬ 
ness !  Righteousness  is  the  virtue  that  em¬ 
bodies  right  anl  lives  for  it.  It  is  more  con- 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


243 


prehensive  and  lies  deeper  than  justice.  The 
ideal  of  righteousness  leads  to  the  execution  of 
justice.  There  is  a  religious  attitude  in  it,  and 
it  has  regard  to  our  relation  to  God  as  well  as 
men.  It  belongs  to  the  nature  of  God  Himself. 
When  men  are  desirous  of  it  they  seek  the 
power  not  ourselves  that  make  for  righteous¬ 
ness.  For  this  reason  Christ  calls  those 
blessed,  who  hunger  and  thirst  after  righteous¬ 
ness.8  Justice  will  receive  its  strongest  im¬ 
petus  where  righteousness  with  all  that  is  im¬ 
plies  becomes  the  ideal,  that  is  more  and  more 
incarnate  in  our  longing  and  habit. 

If  justice  is  to  become  a  real  power  there 
must  be  a  real  'knowledge  of  men  about  each 
other.  Nothing  hinders  justice  so  much  as  the 
lack  of  proper  understanding  of  the  position 
and  need  of  different  men  and  of  the  varying 
groups  of  society.  With  right  understanding 
there  must  he  combined  the  power  of  imagina¬ 
tion  by  which  we  can  place  ourselves  in  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  others.  The  mere  dry  light  of  know¬ 
ledge  is  not  sufficient,  and  men  often  lack  in 
understanding  each  other  just  because  there  is 
a  want  of  imagination.  Imagination  will  be 
easy  where  sympathy  is  present  as  a  living 
motive.  But  the  problem  of  justice  requires  a 
wider  range  than  from  man  to  man.  It  must 
become  general  and  universal.  To  do  this 
justice  must  grow  out  of  and  be  sustained  by 
public  opinion.9  Whatever  men  think  and  feel 
about  common  issues  creates  public  opinion.  It 
is  the  idea  and  conception  of  the  average  mind, 

8  Matthew  V :  6. 

9  Walter  Lippmann,  Public  Opinion. 


244 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


no  matter  whether  it  be  voiced  on  the  platform 
or  through  the  press.  Public  opinion  if  rightly 
informed  desires  what  is  just.  While  the  voice 
of  the  people  is  not  invariably  the  voice  of  God, 
there  is  a  strong  impress  of  the  moral  order 
among  men,  which  calls  for  justice.  But  pub¬ 
lic  opinion  must  be  kept  sound  and  sane. 
There  are  constant  efforts  by  all  kinds  of  jin¬ 
goes  and  wild  propagandists  to  stir  up  the 
crowd  feeling  unjustly  and  to  arouse  the  mob 
spirit.  The  real  necessity  is  a  continuous  train¬ 
ing  of  the  common  mind  about  the  affairs  that 
concern  it  in  a  spirit  of  impartiality  and  fair¬ 
ness.  The  organs  of  public  opinion  must 
become  educative  rather  than  impulsive  in  their 
efforts. 

One  of  the  great  hindrances  of  justice  is  the 
manner  in  which  men  interpret  it  in  their  own 
interest.  There  is  a  readiness  to  demand  jus¬ 
tice  as  soon  as  the  act  of  justice  renders  my 
own  to  me.  The  angle  from  which  we  often 
look  at  justice  is  that  of  individual  gain,  benefit 
or  protection.  This  makes  justice  selfish  while 
its  aim  is  to  seek  what  belongs  to  all  rather 
than  what  merely  belongs  to  me.  There  ought 
to  be  a  common  sense  and  desire  that  justice 
be  meted  out  to  all  who  do  wrong,  and  that  it 
bless  all  who  do  right.  It  may  happen  that  full 
justice  will  impose  a  hardship  on  me,  limit  me, 
and  control  me  in  my  desires  and  wishes.  If 
I  seek  and  pursue  justice  I  will  gladly  allow 
this  limitation,  for  it  guarantees  the  general 
right  and  liberty.  The  satisfaction  of  justice 
only  for  myself  will  finally  so  contract  and  in¬ 
jure  common  justice  so  that  in  the  end  I  will 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


245 


lose  the  advantages  of  justice  for  myself.  Jus¬ 
tice  for  me  cannot  be  maintained  unless  justice 
for  all  be  conserved. 

The  necessity  of  justice  for  all  is  unrealized 
today  in  the  conflict  between  groups  and  tbeir 
interests  especially  in  the  economic  issues. 
Millions  of  men  are  deprived  of  what  is  due 
them  through  a  conception  of  justice,  which 
separate  industrial  groups  contend  for  as  their 
right.  The  controlling  leaders  of  industry  can 
only  apparently  understand,  e.  g.,  the  excesses 
of  collective  bargaining,  the  evils  of  the  closed 
shop,  etc.  They  see  and  know  their  responsi¬ 
bility  toward  their  corporation  and  their  stock¬ 
holders.  Their  sense  for  order  is  strong 
against  those  who  destroy  property  and  cruelly 
take  lives  in  a  strike.  But  there  seems  to  be  no 
appreciation  of  what  the  opposing  group  con¬ 
ceives  to  be  justice.  Still  less  is  the  public 
considered  with  its  claims  of  justice.  The 
laboring  group  is  only  led  to  know  of  all  the 
misdeeds  of  capital,  and  never  of  its  virtues. 
It  looks  upon  all  who  employ  it  as  grasping 
and  unjust.  The  attitude  is  to  be  that  of 
watching,  and  fighting  as  soon  as  there  is  a  loss 
of  what  seems  just  in  the  eyes  of  those  who 
desire  large  wages,  without  considering  the 
whole  status  of  business.  Capital  is  accused  of 
being  intrenched  in  government,  and  of  using 
military  power  to  suppress  the  laborer.  There 
is  mostly  injustice  to  be  warded  off  through 
organized  power.  Class  consciousness  is  fos¬ 
tered  to  the  extreme.  All  that  labor  demands 
is  just,  all  that  capital  wants  is  unjust.  This 
attitude  of  warfare  creates  deception  and  in- 


246 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


creases  injustice.  The  common  liberty  of  men 
is  impaired.  The  remedy  is  the  cultivation  of 
a  sense  of  justice  beyond  selfish  interests.  If 
this  cannot  be  accomplished  society  will  destroy 
itself  despite  all  industrial  progress.  There 
must  be  a  removal  of  all  those  leaders  in  indus¬ 
try  and  labor  who  live  by  agitation,  in  order 
that  real  agreements  in  justice  can  be  made 
between  men  on  the  basis  of  mutual  willingness 
to  understand  each  other  and  to  work  together, 
rather  than  to  claim  a  victory  in  their  conduct 
of  warfare  of  class  against  class. 

A  difficulty  is  encountered  by  justice  because 
of  the  power  of  nationality.  There  has  been  so 
strong  a  development  of  national  feeling  in  the 
last  centuries  as  to  crowd  back  the  common 
ideal  of  humanity.  Nationalism  has  enlarged 
the  rights  of  the  single  nation,  and  cultivated 
the  attachment  to  the  national  language  and 
customs  in  a  manner  that  exaggerates  the  place 
and  claim  of  the  single  nation.  Suspicions 
and  jealousies  are  kept  alive  between  nation 
and  nation.  The  children  of  a  nation  are 
taught  history  in  such  a  way  as  to  exalt  one’s 
own  nation,  to  describe  its  actions  as  always 
right,  and  to  show  the  evil  in  the  nation  that  is 
the  enemy.  Nationalism  encroaches  even  upon 
religion  and  narrows  down  its  universal,  human 
outlook  and  sympathy  to  the  interest  of  one 
tongue  and  nation.  This  is  a  survival  that 
ought  to  have  no  place  in  the  modern  world. 

Still  more  powerful  against  broad  justice  is 
the  consciousness  and  feeling  of  race.  The 
racial  forces  are  mighty  undercurrents  in  life 
that  often  carry  along  men  against  their  better 


BASIC  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 


247 


judgment.  Racial  prejudice  is  hindering  the 
common  understanding  and  liberty  of  mankind. 
There  are  two  outstanding  examples  of  racial 
feeling.  The  first  is  the  anti-Semitic  move¬ 
ment.  In  a  spirit  of  unjust  discrimination  all  the 
faults  and  none  of  the  good  qualities  of  the  Jew 
are  stressed.  Because  of  successful  qualities  in 
competition,  bold  and  aggressive  methods  of 
business,  pushing  attitudes  in  social  intercourse 
that  mark  the  lower  classes,  there  is  deep- 
seated  antipathy  and  sometimes  a  strong  oppo¬ 
sition  to  the  Jew.  Sins  that  are  common  are 
attributed  to  him  alone,  and  he  is  made  the 
scapegoat.  Past  history  is  ransacked  to  dem¬ 
onstrate  his  wrong  actions.  All  modern  radi¬ 
cal  movements  are  traced  to  him  because  he  has 
powerful  intellectuals.  There  is  no  attempt  to 
understand  and  to  do  justice.  The  second  case 
is  purely  American.  It  is  our  attitude  toward 
the  Negro.  With  all  the  growing  attempts  to 
repair  the  wrong  of  past  slavery  there  is  still 
a  failure  to  render  full  and  adequate  justice. 
While  it  is  clear  that  there  can  never  be  a  racial 
intermingling  of  white  and  black  there  can  be 
larger  opportunity  and  privilege  for  the  Negro. 
But  whenever  this  is  given  there  is  a  reaction. 
A  similar  prejudice  is  constantly  fostered 
toward  the  yellow  races.10  Racial  distinctions 
are  exaggerated.  Christianity  claims  that  God 
made  of  one  blood  all  nations  and  peoples.11 
It  would  have  no  distinction  in  the  great  finali¬ 
ties  of  life. 

An  important  problem  is  the  relation  of  jus- 

10  Lothrop  Stoddard,  The  Rising  Tide  of  Color. 

11  Acts  XVII:  26. 


248 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


tice  to  law  as  enacted  positively  by  the  state. 
If  the  law  is  to  serve  justice  it  ought  to  be  the 
expression  of  the  moral  conviction  of  a  people. 
At  no  time  will  the  positive  law  measure  up  to 
the  ideal  standard.  When  men  endeavor  to 
make  and  enforce  a  law  which  does  not  have 
the  common  sentiment  and  opinion  back  of  it 
the  law  is  not  kept.  The  result  is  the  lowering 
of  respect  for  law  and  the  increase  of  injustice. 
A  strong  minority  ought  never  to  force  a  law 
upon  a  majority.  But  on  the  other  hand  the 
morally  more  thoughtful  and  advanced  minor¬ 
ity  must  lead  the  more  sluggish  majority. 
Ethics  cannot  lower  its  demand  to  meet  the  de¬ 
fects  of  existing  laws.  To  assure  the  real  lib¬ 
erty  it  dare  not  abate  any  of  its  ideal  attitudes. 

REFERENCES 

James  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  Part  II,  Chap¬ 
ters  II,  I. 

Henry  W.  Wright,  Self-Realisation,  Part  IV,  Chapters  II, 
III. 

Durant  Drake,  Problems  of  Conduct,  Part  III,  Chapter  XIX. 

Mary  W.  Calkins,  The  Good  Mian  and  the  Good,  Chapter  IX. 

L.  T.  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evolution,  Part  I,  Chapter  III. 

Ed.  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral 
Ideas,  Chapters  XXIII,  XXX,  XXXI. 

Vladimir  Solovyof,  The  Justification  of  the  Good,  Part  III, 
Chapter  VIII. 

Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chapters  VIII,  IX,  X.  XI; 
Book  IV,  Chapter  II. 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  FAMILY 

What  is  the  value  of  the  family?  Among  all 
of  the  social  forms  of  personality  none  is  more 
fundamental  than  the  family.  It  is  basic  to  all 
society  and  fundamental  to  its  moral  well-being. 
Today  it  is  being  admitted  by  students  of  early 
society  that  there  is  no  evidence  to  prove,  that 
the  family  did  not  always  exist.  It  is  the 
primitive  form  of  society.  Before  industry 
passed  through  the  great  modern  revolution, 
caused  by  the  invention  of  machinery,  the 
family  was  a  large  centre  of  industrial  activity. 
While  this  is  no  longer  the  case,  it  is  still  neces¬ 
sary  that  the  habits  for  industry  and  all  occu¬ 
pations  in  life  must  receive  their  beginnings  in 
the  home.  The  most  essential  qualities  in  all 
work,  as  e.  g.  carefulness,  cleanliness,  accuracy, 
thoroughness,  etc.,  are  best  formed  in  the 
family.  Without  the  family  the  fruits  and 
results  of  civilization  would  not  have  been 
handed  on.  Through  it  civilization  must  be 
transferred  from  generation  to  generation. 
“It  must  be  remembered  that  civilization  con¬ 
sists  in  part  of  material  things  and  in  part  of 
ideas,  attitudes,  customs,  and  so  on.  The 
latter  set  of  phenomena  make  up  by  far  the 
larger  part  of  civilization.  Now,  even  material 

249 


250 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


tilings,  as  part  of  culture,  are  not  passed  along 
automatically:  their  uses  must  be  explained, 
the  implied  techniques  learned.  As  to  spiritual 
culture,  including  language  itself,  there  is  no 
way  for  it  to  be  passed  on,  in  a  society  without 
writing,  except  through  verbal  explanation  and 
teachings  and  the  direct  observation  by  the 
learner  of  what  is  being  said  and  done.  It  is 
evident  that  a  large  part  of  what  the  individual 
receives  in  this  way,  especially  during  the 
highly  important  formative  years  of  early 
childhood,  is  brought  to  him  through  the 
medium  of  the  family. The  culture  of  man 
ahvays  carries  with  it  in  the  customs  and  ideas 
certain  moral  conceptions.  For  these  the  fam¬ 
ily  is  the  early  school.  Connected  with  the 
moral  training  of  the  family  is  the  religious 
attitude.  From  the  earliest  time  the  home  was 
also  the  place  of  religious  teaching  and  culture. 
In  many  religions  there  were  special  gods  of 
the  home  and  hearth.  Religion  in  the  family 
consisted  not  only  in  ceremonies  and  practices, 
but  also  in  certain  moral  rules  and  maxims. 
No  world  religion,  least  of  all  Christianity,  has 
abolished  the  religion  in  the  home  as  necessary 
both  for  religious  life  and  for  moral  culture. 

The  spirit  of  the  family.  What  is  the  essen¬ 
tial  spirit  in  the  personality  of  the  family? 
What  is  to  be  its  peculiar  contribution  for  indi¬ 
vidual  and  social  life?  The  family  is  the  insti¬ 
tution  of  love.  In  it  there  is  the  place  for  the 
unfolding,  first  of  all,  of  the  kindly  virtues. 
The  affection,  that  ought  to  dwell  in  the  family 


i  Alexander  A.  Goldenweiser,  Early  Civilization,  p.  239. 


THE  FAMILY 


251 


as  the  essential  attitude  between  all  its  mem¬ 
bers,  is  the  milieu  in  which  kindness,  gentle¬ 
ness,  forbearance,  etc.  can  develop.  But  these 
virtues  as  expressions  of  love  can  lead  to  the 
other  virtues.  The  spirit  of  love,  for  which  the 
foundation  must  be  laid  in  the  home,  can  be 
made  the  controlling  disposition  only  through 
the  early  habits  of  childhood.  There  are  cer¬ 
tain  very  elemental  qualities  that  mark  the 
family,  and  condition  its  influence  upon  the  life 
of  freedom. 

The  family  life  is  one  in  which  society 
touches  us  or  ought  to  touch  us  with  the  least 
restraints.  It  is  true  that  the  first  virtue  of 
child-life  is  obedience.  But  its  meaning  is  con¬ 
trol  and  guidance  into  moral  liberty.  While 
its  reasons  are  not  always  apparent  to  the  child 
it  tends  toward  freedom.  Through  it  men  are 
led  into  the  habits  of  the  moral  order.  Where 
obedience  has  been  lacking,  or  where  cruelty 
has  destroyed  its  loving  justice,  an  individual¬ 
ism  develops  that  cannot  give  moral  freedom. 
Obedience  justly  growing  in  love  is  the  easiest 
way  and  the  most  free  way  of  leading  human 
life  into  the  world  of  moral  relations.  In  no 
other  social  form  than  the  family  is  the  same 
liberty  and  its  right  control  possible  in  the 
same  spirit  of  affection. 

The  family  life  is  one  of  close  intimacy.  In 
the  family  we  cannot  but  become  familiar  with 
each  other.  The  familiarity  reveals  us  to  each 
other.  Nowhere  can  one  so  truly  find  what  a 
man  is  as  in  his  own  family.  This  fact  neces¬ 
sarily  demands  that  we  must  have  the  best  sort 
of  character.  If  family  intimacy  breeds  con- 


252 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


tempt  for  each  other  it  shows  great  moral  defic¬ 
iencies.  Consequently  mutual  regard  and 
respect,  that  must  make  familiarity  good,  ought 
to  be  present  and  rest  upon  genuine  ethical 
honor.  A  good  family  life  puts  us  on  our 
mettle  to  be  what  we  claim.  Therefore  the 
virtues  of  sincerity,  honesty,  truthfulness  are 
needed.  We  cannot  hide  our  real  selves  in  the 
family.  If  any  one  leads  a  double  life  beyond 
the  family  the  very  foundations  of  the  home 
are  undermined.  Straightforwardness,  open¬ 
ness  with  each  other,  confidences  without 
secrecy,  can  alone  maintain  the  free,  loving 
spirit  of  the  home. 

The  life  of  the  home  is  one  as  between  equals 

in  the  relation  of  husband  and  wife,  and 

/ 

between  brothers  and  sisters.  The  relationship 
of  man  and  wife  ought  to  be  one  of  admiring, 
justly  estimating  regard,  and  intimate  fellow¬ 
ship  of  genuine  affection  and  love.  The  close¬ 
ness  of  the  two  guiding  lives  in  the  home  must 
be  one  of  association  in  liberty.  Individual 
development  and  common  life  ought  to  inter¬ 
penetrate  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  the  free 
individual  and  the  free  family  in  love.  The 
children,  in  relation  to  their  parents  in  obed¬ 
ience,  ought  to  be  taken  up  more  and  more  into 
companionship  by  their  parents,  provided  this 
privilege  is  not  abused  and  turned  into  famil¬ 
iarity  without  respect.  This  danger  can  be 
avoided  where  the  parents  have  a  character 
that  of  itself  inspires  honor  and  respect.  The 
life  of  brothers  and  sisters  as  they  grow  up  to¬ 
gether  makes  possible  mutual  consideration. 
It  teaches  us  that  we  are  not  alone  in  the  world, 


THE  FAMILY 


253 


and  that  liberty  must  be  the  right  of  every  one. 
Natural  selfishness  that  wants  all  and  is  not 
willing  to  share  cannot  exist  in  the  home.  It 
must  be  overcome  by  the  spirit  of  love  as  lib¬ 
erty.  Thus  the  family  becomes  the  first  school 
of  justice,  fairness  and  considerateness.  In  the 
same  manner  children  cannot  live  together 
without  truthfulness.  The  necessity  of  truth 
toward  each  other,  and  toward  the  parents,  can 
be  borne  in  upon  their  lives.  Thus  all  the 
basic  social  virtues  find  their  starting  point  in 
the  family.  In  it  they  can  be  formed  and  made 
habits  under  the  most  helpful  and  favorable 
circumstances  at  a  time  when  habits  are  cap¬ 
able  of  being  moulded. 

Courtship  and  engagement.  What  ought  to 
be  the  relation  of  the  sexes  to  each  other  in  the 
days  of  courtship  and  engagement?  How  can 
these  days  of  approach  and  the  finding  of  one  ’s 
mate  be  made  ethical?  Courtship  and  engage¬ 
ment  are  so  largely  controlled  by  the  customs 
of  an  age  that  young  people  often  simply  fol¬ 
low  the  custom,  and  give  little  thought  to  the 
moral  implications  in  making  a  choice  that  will 
affect  their  whole  future.  Formerly  courtship 
and  engagement  were  controlled  in  large  meas¬ 
ure  by  the  parents.  There  was  constant  sur¬ 
veillance.  The  defect  of  this  custom  was  the 
difficulty  of  young  people  really  learning  to 
know  each  other.  It  forbad  the  free  associa¬ 
tion  through  which  characters  might  test  each 
other  without  interference.  The  present  atti¬ 
tude  is  one  of  the  utmost  liberty.  Restraint 
has  been  removed,  but  at  the  same  time  advice, 
guidance,  and  the  experienced  wisdom  of  the 


254 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


elders  are  rejected.  Is  the  present  liberty  real 
freedom,  or  has  it  cast  aside  what  is  valuable 
in  parental  advice,  care  and  guidance?  Are 
happier  results  following  under  the  uncon¬ 
trolled  modern  method  of  courtship  and  engage¬ 
ment?  The  liberty  which  the  sexes  today 
possess  has  been  hurt  by  the  loss  in  many 
cases  of  the  restraint,  modesty,  and  refinement 
usual  in  polite  intercourse.  Respect  for  each 
other  is  often  broken  down  by  undue  familiar¬ 
ity,  and  through  the  permission  of  privileges 
that  should  only  be  granted  after  marriage. 
Engagements  in  this  day  of  uncontrolled  liberty 
are  dealt  with  in  many  cases  as  not  binding. 
They  ought  to  be  the  plighting  of  a  troth  not 
to  be  broken  except  under  the  most  unusual 
and  compelling  circumstances.  But  the  easy 
and  thoughtless  manner  in  which  engagements 
are  often  made  results  in  their  underestimation. 
On  the  other  hand  an  engagement  is  valued  in 
some  of  our  country  districts  as  almost  equal 
to  marriage.  In  fact  undue  privileges  are 
taken,  and  physical  intimacies  and  intercourse 
are  allowed  to  the  detriment  of  the  real  mean¬ 
ing  of  marriage.  Such  liberties  are  not  liberty, 
but  uncontrolled  and  premature  surrender  to 
mere  passion.  They  do  not  make  for  mutual 
respect  and  honor. 

Marriage.  In  what  manner  shall  marriage 
be  interpreted?  What  is  its  function  and 
place?  There  are  three  conceptions  about  the 
estate  of  marriage.  The  first  is  the  biological 
which  considers  marriage  to  be  the  mating  of 
male  and  female.  It  stresses  all  of  the  physical 
facts  in  marriage,  and  demands  that  the  best 


THE  FAMILY 


255 


eugenic  relations  be  obtained  before  and  during 
marriage,  in  order  to  insure  the  maintenance 
and  improvement  of  the  human  race  biologi¬ 
cally.  The  second  view  is  that  of  the  attain¬ 
ment  of  individual  happiness.  According  to  it 
we  are  to  find  in  marriage  the  satisfaction  of 
the  romance  of  life  in  the  ideality  and  poetry 
of  love.  It  dwells  upon  the  need  of  loving  com¬ 
panionship  and  its  elevating  power.  The  third 
position  is  the  social.  With  a  regard  for  and 
consideration  of  what  marriage  means  for  soc¬ 
iety,  its  continuance  and  welfare,  it  asks  that 
we  make  marriage  socially  effective  and  ser¬ 
viceable.  There  is  some  truth  in  all  of  these 
three  views.  We  cannot  escape  valuing  the 
social  import  of  marriage.  It  is  bound  up  with 
the  whole  social  complex  and  its  life.  But  soc¬ 
ial  considerations  are  not  the  only  ones  to  be 
weighed.  The  theory  of  individual  happiness 
has  its  right.  We  ought  never  to  lose  the  lib¬ 
erty  of  individual  life.  As  far  as  marriage 
heightens  the  development  of  individual  life 
and  adds  to  its  joy  it  deserves  its  place.  But 
finally  the  first  and  fundamental  meaning  of 
marriage  is  the  union  of  man  and  wife  for  the 
perpetuation  of  mankind.  The  moral  problem 
is  to  make  this  purpose  serviceable  to  real  per¬ 
sonality,  individual  and  social.  In  the  bonds 
of  marriage  there  should  be  the  proper,  just 
and  sane  rendering  of  the  marital  due.  (Debi- 
tum  conjugale).  For  the  sake  of  the  creative 
joy  of  continuing  life,  and  for  the  experience  of 
fatherhood  and  motherhood,  man  and  wife 
should  not  withhold  from  one  another  physi¬ 
cally.  But  usually  the  denial  of  intercourse, 


256 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


and  the  straining  of  the  marital  tie  through 
cold  abstention,  is  not  the  great  danger.  There 
is  rather  a  temptation  to  indulge  in  passion  for 
its  own  sentient  satisfaction.  There  may  be  a 
loss  of  the  end  of  marriage  because  of  mere 
sensual  gratification.  Through  such  abuse 
marriage  is  degraded  to  legalized  indulgence  in 
animal  passion  as  such.  This  appears  clearly 
when  efforts  are  made  to  avoid  the  birth  of 
children,  which  is  the  biological  and  moral  jus¬ 
tification  for  physical  contact.  Formerly  Amer¬ 
ica  was  notorious  for  its  many  abortions.  To¬ 
day  there  is  the  escape  of  birth-control.  Birth- 
control  has  its  worth  for  the  state  to  the  degree, 
that  the  increase  of  the  criminal  class,  and  the 
handing  down  of  really  inheritable  disease, 
make  it  necessary.  But  it  is  becoming  so 
widely  known  through  inconsiderate  propa¬ 
ganda,  that  men  and  women  are  taught  to  in¬ 
dulge  in  mere  animal  passion  without  risking 
the  birth  of  children  both  in  marriage  and  out¬ 
side  of  marriage.  Consequently  it  is  morally 
dangerous  and  degrading,  as  it  shows  the  way 
to  the  sensual  for  indulgence  without  responsi¬ 
bility. 

The  whole  physical  side  of  marriage  needs 
the  intellectual,  moral  and  spiritual  fellowship 
to  keep  man  and  wife  human  beings.  While 
marriage  is  no  Platonic  friendship,  there  must 
be  the  agreement  and  congeniality  of  two  char¬ 
acters  to  avoid  their  being  sunk  into  animality. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  monogamy  is  essential, 
as  the  only  form  that  can  maintain  the  moral 
freedom.  The  practice  of  polyandry  of  the 
lower  tribes  has  passed  away  among  civilized 


THE  FAMILY 


257 


people.  But  polygamy  has  sought  a  revival  in 
the  form  of  plural  marriages.  The  plural 
marriage  even  under  the  most  favorable  con¬ 
ditions  encourages  man  to  uncontrolled  passion, 
and  puts  woman  necessarily  in  an  inferior 
place,  by  destroying  the  intimacy  of  moral  life 
between  one  man  and  one  woman.  It  has  been 
historically  established  that  only  in  the  union 
between  one  man  and  one  woman  can  moral 
freedom  be  maintained. 

The  Christian  teaching  about  marriage  begins 
with  the  recognition  that  man  and  woman  are 
to  become  one  flesh,2  and  endorses  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment  idea.  Paul  in  view  of  the  temptations  at 
Corinth  advises  that  it  is  better  to  marry  than 
to  burn.3  Personally  he  prefers  to  remain 
unmarried  for  the  sake  of  his  work.  But  Chris¬ 
tianity,  protecting  woman  as  the  weaker  vessel, 
does  not  stop  with  the  admission  of  the  biologi¬ 
cal  side  of  marriage.  It  presents  the  ideal  of 
the  love  of  Christ  and  the  Church  toward  each 
other,  as  typifying  the  relation  of  man  and 
wife.4  As  the  Church  looks  up  to  Christ  so  the 
wife  is  to  look  up  to  her  husband.  There  is  no 
demand  of  submission  to  mere  domination,  but 
only  the  request  of  reliance  upon  the  husband, 
and  obedience  in  love  to  his  guidance.  The 
husband  is  to  “love  his  wife  as  Christ  loved 
the  Church  and  gave  Himself  for  it.”  The 
greater  duty  of  love  is  incumbent  upon  the 
husband,  for  he  is  to  love  to  the  giving  of 
himself  for  his  wife.  This  is  the  moral  reversal 
of  the  physical  condition  in  marriage,  in  which 

2  Mark  X :  7,  8. 

3  I  Corinthians  VII :  9. 

*  Ephesians  V :  24  if. 


258 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


the  wife  gives  herself,  and  bears  the  heavy 
physical  burdens.  It  is  this  ideality  which  lifts 
the  marriage  np  into  the  highest  moral  and 
spiritual  sphere. 

Divorce.  Under  what  conditions  can  marriage 
be  severed?  The  tremendous  and  threatening 
increase  of  divorces  in  America  makes  this  a 
very  serious  problem.  Ethics  is  not  primarily 
concerned  with  the  kind  of  legislation  that 
should  be  passed  to  restrict  divorces.  It  is 
troubled  about  the  fact  that  marriage  is  entered 
into  lightly  and  unadvisedly,  carelessly  and 
inconsiderately.  The  ease  of  divorce  is  depreci¬ 
ated  because  of  the  moral  injury  inflicted  by  it, 
and  the  evil  effect  upon  the  children  of  the  home. 
It  is  self-evident  that  the  best  legislation  will 
not  cure  the  low  moral  valuation  of  the  binding 
power  of  marriage  until  there  is  an  advance  in 
the  general  moral  consciousness  about  divorce. 
The  proposal  seriously  made  to  overcome  the 
risks  of  marriage  through  trial-marriages  can¬ 
not  be  entertained.  Such  trial-marriages  will 
lead  to  indulgence,  and  will  lack  the  moral  force 
and  obligation  that  is  needed  to  make  marriage 
morally  effective.  The  causes  for  which  divorce 
is  allowable  have  been,  according  to  Christian 
ideals,  adultery5  and  cruel  dissertion.6  The 
latter  is  supposed  to  have  adultery  in  view. 
Therefore  the  only  cause  valid  in  Christian 
ideals  is  adultery.  Perhaps  there  might  be 
added  conditions  of  cruelty  and  persecution 
that  break  down  life.  But  incompatibility  of 
temper  and  similar  causes  today  allowed  among 

5  Maitthew  XIX :  9. 

s  I  Corinthians  VXI :  15. 


THE  FAMILY 


259 


us  are  insufficient.  A  wrong  conception  of  indi¬ 
vidual  liberty  lias  destroyed  the  real  liberty  of 
the  common  life  in  marriage.  Where  hard  bur¬ 
dens  must  be  borne  the  very  submission  in  a 
patient  spirit  helps  us  to  rise  above  them. 
Liberty  must  often  be  attained  not  by  escape 
from  difficulties  but  through  an  inner  conquest 
of  them.  Divorce  should  only  be  sought  when 
conditions  in  marriage  make  the  moral  life 
really  impossible.  No  mere  considerations  of 
ease,  comfort,  and  individual  pleasure  are 
ethical  reasons  to  justify  divorce. 

The  evil  of  prostitution.  What  must  be  the 
ethical  judgment  about  the  sin  of  prostitution! 
There  can  be  no  condoning  of  prostitution 
whether  engaged  in  by  the  unmarried  or 
married.  As  far  as  the  man  is  concerned  it 
makes  him  a  slave  of  passion,  and  increases 
his  animality.  All  indulgence  outside  of  the 
married  estate  is  destructive  of  the  dignity  and 
liberty  of  the  moral  life.  But  the  greatest 
wrong  of  prostitution  is  the  degradation  to 
which  it  brings  woman.  For  her  the  selling  of 
her  body  to  gratify  the  lust  of  the  unrestrained 
male  means  the  abandonment  of  her  life  as 
moral.  She  sacrifices  her  whole  character  and 
becomes  a  sensual  piece  of  flesh.  Man  accepts 
her  no  longer  as  a  personality  but  only  a  con¬ 
venience  for  his  passion.  The  wrong  standards 
of  society  allow  the  man  to  escape.  There  is 
a  double  standard  which  condemns  woman,  puts 
all  the  disgrace  upon  her,  and  permits  man  to 
remain  seemingly  and  outwardly  respectable 
although  he  is  the  aggressor.  For  this  reason 
there  can  be  no  acceptance  of  any  proposal  to 


260 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


legalize  prostitution.  Wherever  it  has  been 
tried  it  only  offered  an  excuse  for  an  evil  that 
can  legitimately  have  no  excuse.  Even  under 
the  taboo  prostitution  is  an  awful  sin;  to  legalize 
it  would  be  a  new  invitation  to  men,  who  are 
responsible  for  its  existence  and  continuance. 
Free  love  offers  an  escape  from  prostitution,  but 
morally  it  is  only  a  safer  type  of  prostitution. 

The  single  life.  What  is  the  moral  justification 
of  the  single  life?  Under  what  conditions  can 
it  he  lived  morally?  There  are  those  who  ought 
never  to  marry  on  account  of  physical  reasons. 
Where  any  one  clearly  knows  this  hindrance, 
and  still  marries,  entailing  misery  and  sickness 
upon  life  to  he  born,  there  is  guilt  and  wrong 
in  marriage.  Some  individuals  are  under  special 
and  peculiar  limiting  conditions,  imposed  upon 
them  through  the  care  of  their  immediate  fam¬ 
ily,  who  justly  refrain  from  marriage,  because 
they  could  not  fulfill  their  prior  duties  that  no 
one  else  can  assume.  A  great  mission  and  call 
in  life  may  so  fill  the  mind  and  heart  of  an  indi¬ 
vidual  that  marriage  is  not  thought  of.  Christ 
spoke  of  men  who  were  eunuchs  for  the  sake  of 
the  kingdom  of  heaven.7  Paul  did  not  marry 
because  he  thought  that  he  could  better  fulfill 
his  mission,  and  care  for  the  cause  of  the  Lord 
in  single  life.8  Men  and  women  can  still  devote 
themselves  to  such  labor  of  mercy  or  religion 
and  not  marry.  But  the  celibate  life  must  not 
be  made  a  rule  for  any  office  or  class.  It  should 
he  the  free  choice  of  individuals  who  can  remain 

?  Matthew  XIX :  12. 

8  I  Corinthians  VII :  7. 


THE  FAMILY 


261 


unmarried,  and  be  pure  in  the  suppression  of 
passion. 

But  there  are  many  who  remain  single  for 
reasons  that  are  not  morally  defensible.  When 
men  and  women  abstain  from  marriage  because 
they  want  to  live  with  certain  economic  com¬ 
forts,  and  possess  the  luxuries  of  life,  they  have 
no  adequate  excuse.  The  love  of  ease,  and 
individual  gratification  through  the  soft  things 
of  life,  are  demoralizing.  If  a  wrong  intellec- 
tualism,  or  a  selfish  conception  of  liberty,  turns 
men  away  from  the  married  estate,  the  results 
are  not  liberating.  The  man  or  woman  who 
deliberately  avoids  marriage  to  remain  free,  will 
find  that  in  later  life  the  risks  of  great  physical 
and  mental  disturbances  are  incurred.  The 
character  is  liable  to  become  self-centred  and 
unhappy;  the  outlook  upon  life  mean  and  small; 
oddities  of  conduct  will  appear  that  contract 
life  into  unsatisfying  habits.  The  way  of  escape 
for  those  who  have  lacked  a  chance  for  marriage 
is  to  give  themselves  to  the  care  of  some  rela¬ 
tives,  or  to  find  their  freedom  in  the  work  of 
some  noble  cause. 

The  freedom  of  woman.  What  should  be  the 
right  and  freedom  of  woman  in  the  light  of  our 
modern  advance?  The  answer  to  this  question 
depends  upon  settling  the  problem  as  to  the 
real  mission  of  woman.  There  are  two  opposite 
attitudes  that  combat  each  other.  The  first  is 
the  position,  that  woman  is  destined  only  for 
the  home,  that  her  function  is  to  be  the  home¬ 
maker.  In  the  execution  of  this  destiny,  some 
demand  of  woman,  that  she  should  assume  the 
work  of  the  home  with  all  its  little  cares  and 


262 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


narrowing  minutiae.  Tlie  women  who  lead  this 
sort  of  life  make  themselves  slaves  and  drudges. 
Different  homes  will  of  course  grant  different 
possibilities  according  to  the  economic  liberty 
which  they  allow.  But  in  no  case  should  the 
home  with  all  its  labor  interfere  with  the  intel¬ 
lectual  and  moral  growth  of  woman.  The  truth 
of  the  home-making  mission  of  woman  will  be 
lost  if  woman  assumes  the  bulk  of  the  burdens 
of  the  family  life.  Connected  with  the  home  as 
the  ideal  for  woman  is  the  duty  of  motherhood. 
It  is  this  obligation  which  largely  justifies  the 
attachment  of  woman  to  the  home.  Motherhood 
is  a  fundamental  privilege  and  also  an  elemental 
burden  of  woman.  It  ought  not  to  be  evaded 
for  any  selfish  reason,  for  through  it  woman 
fulfills  a  noble  service.  But  the  duty  of  mother¬ 
hood  does  not  include  the  whole  responsibility 
for  the  education  of  the  child.  This  must  be 
shared  in  by  the  father  if  the  moral  training  of 
the  child  is  to  be  strong  as  well  as  gentle. 

In  direct  opposition  to  woman  as  destined 
exclusively  for  the  home  is  the  conception  of 
her  full  freedom  to  a  vocation.  The  preparation 
for  a  useful  life  in  a  freely  chosen  occupation 
is  demanded  in  modern  life  because  woman 
does  not  know  whether  she  shall  be  called  to  a 
home  and  to  motherhood.  But  a  woman’s  voca¬ 
tion  ought  not  to  rest  merely  upon  her  equality 
with  man.  It  ought  to  satisfy  her  peculiar 
physical  and  mental  ability  and  limitation. 
Formerly  the  limitation  of  woman  was  over¬ 
emphasized,  but  the  modern  success  of  woman 
in  many  different  callings  has  established  her 
large  rights.  On  the  other  hand  there  has 


THE  FAMILY 


263 


arisen  a  type  of  woman  who,  untrue  to  her  best 
nature,  has  pressed  into  occupations  that  have 
impaired  her  womanliness.  We  need  a  more 
balanced  conception  than  exists  through  the 
reaction  of  emancipation  against  the  former 
denial  of  the  rights  of  woman.  The  radical 
advocates  ought  to  remember  that  the  Nora  of 
Ibsen’s  Doll’s  House  is  not  the  last  word.  A 
woman  cannot  be  a  plaything  of  man;  but  does 
this  justify  escape  from  the  home  and  neglect 
of  it  for  the  sake  of  a  vocation?  A  thoughtful 
sequel  to  Nora  is  Rosalie  in  Hutchinson’s  “This 
Freedom.  ’  ’  Rosalie  reaps  the  sad  consequences 
of  the  modern  emancipated  woman  in  the 
aberrations  of  her  children. 

What  is  the  early  Christian  position  in  refer¬ 
ence  to  woman?  Christ  does  not  choose  any 
woman  among  the  twelve,  but  He  deals  with 
woman  in  utter  freedom,  as  we  see,  e.  g.,  in  the 
woman  that  is  a  sinner,9  and  in  the  Samaritan 
woman  at  the  well.10  Women  minister  unto 
Him,  and  He  first  shows  Himself  to  women  after 
the  resurrection.  His  tenderest  friendships  is 
with  Mary  of  Bethany.  In  the  early  Church 
women  prophesy.11  Paul  believes  that  in  Christ 
there  is  neither  male  nor  female.12  But  he 
advocates  the  limitation  of  woman  in  the  public 
worship,  and  wants  her  to  keep  silent  and  ask 
any  questions  that  may  be  in  her  mind  of  her 
husband  at  home.13  Woman  is  to  have  her  head 
covered  in  the  public  assemblies.  While  the 

9  Luke  VII:  37  ff. 

10  John  IV:  1  ff. 

11  I  Corinthians  XI :  5 ;  Acts  XXI :  9. 

12  Gal.  HI:  28. 

is  I  Corinthians  XIV :  34,  35. 


264 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


man  is  nothing  without  the  woman,  nor  the 
woman  without  the  man  in  the  Lord,  still  the 
man  is  the  head  of  the  woman,  as  Christ  is  the 
head  of  the  man.  The  glory  of  the  man  is  Christ, 
the  glory  of  woman  is  man.14  This  limita¬ 
tion  of  woman  was  intended  for  Corinth  where 
women  were  rather  too  free  and  bold.  A  social 
gradation  which  puts  woman  below  man  is 
implied,  but  this  differentiation  does  not  affect 
the  equality  of  soul.  It  only  touches  the  outer 
customs  of  the  church  and  leads  Paul  to  a 
principle  of  the  headship  of  man. 

The  right  of  the  child.  What  is  the  legitimate 
place  of  the  child  ?  How  shall  its  moral  freedom 
be  regarded!  There  has  been  great  progress 
in  the  proper  appreciation  of  the  child  and  of 
child-life  in  our  days.  We  have  begun  to  apply 
the  ideal  of  Christ15  in  definite  manner;  and  we 
are  learning  to  understand  Paul,  when,  with  all 
admonition  to  the  child  to  be  obedient,  he  coun¬ 
sels  parents  not  to  be  cruel,  and  not  to  provoke 
their  children  to  wrath.16  The  day  of  harsh  and 
undue  severity  toward  the  child  has  passed  ex¬ 
cept  where  there  is  backwardness  of  moral 
status.  The  child  is  being  studied  to  understand 
its  real  nature  and  mind.  Everything  is  being 
done  in  home  and  school  to  give  the  child  the 
best  conditions  of  health  and  the  best  opportun¬ 
ities  of  education.  It  is  only  the  greed  of  selfish 
economic  interest  in  industry  that  is  holding  to 
child-labor  because  it  is  cheap.  The  pressure 
of  the  law  must  still  be  used  against  the  moral 
delinquency  of  profiteering  manufacturers. 

14  Cf.  I  Corinthians  XI. 

1 5  Matthew  XIX:  14. 

16  Ephesians  VI :  4. 


THE  FAMILY 


265 


But  perhaps,  with  all  the  care  now  given  the 
child  and  with  all  the  liberty  that  is  allowed, 
the  real  freedom  of  the  child  that  will  make  it 
a  personality  has  not  been  attained.  Parents 
have  become  indulgent  to  the  extreme,  and  long 
before  the  child  knows  what  best  to  choose  it 
is  permitted  to  have  its  own  way.  Over  against 
the  excessive  discipline  of  a  former  age  we  have 
scarcely  any  discipline  at  all.  Thus  the  child 
becomes  selfish  and  fails  to  understand  common 
rights  of  liberty.  To  gain  the  attention  of  the 
child  in  education  we  have  almost  turned  the 
school  into  a  playground.  From  the  Montessori 
school  upward  the  child  is  supposed  by  some 
innate  tact  to  discover  itself,  and  to  be  capable 
as  a  born  democrat  to  govern  itself  without  any 
interference  by  elders.  Interest  is  the  charm, 
the  open  sesame  of  education.  Duty  has  been 
relegated  to  the  scrap-heap.  The  result  is  a  life 
that  cannot  meet  the  real  issues  and  will  fail 
in  the  test  of  experience  because  it  has  not 
learnt  the  control  of  freedom  and  its  law  of  love. 
The  child  has  to  be  chastened  so  gently  that  it 
does  not  know  that  it  is  being  punished.  All 
corporal  punishment  is  tabooed,  and  yet  sweet 
reasonableness  is  not  producing  saints.  Self- 
willed  ideas  of  desire  take  the  place  of  moral 
freedom;  and  we  have  youth,  often  drunk  with 
the  intoxication  of  its  unrestrained  rights  and 
liberty,  that  has  lost  its  moral  background. 
The  modern  liberty  of  the  child  will  destroy 
vital  liberty  unless  we  return  to  some  sense  and 
practice  of  the  truth,  that  it  is  good  for  youth 
to  bear  its  yoke.  Control  in  freedom  is  only 
learnt  when  the  child  is  controlled  to  freedom. 


266 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 

REFERENCES 


Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics,  Chapter  XXYI. 

Borden  P.  Bowne,  Principles  of  Ethics,  Chapter  IX. 

L.  T.  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evolution,  Part  I,  Chapters  IV, 
V. 

Ed.  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral 
Ideas,  Chapters  XXV,  XXVI,  XL,  XLI,  XLII,  XLIII. 

Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Book  IV,  I. 

W.  Wundt,  Ethics,  Part  IV,  Chapter  II. 

Chas.  Gore,  The  Question  of  Divorce. 

G.  E.  Howard,  The  Question  of  Matrimonial  Institutions. 
W.  Goodsell,  The  Family  as  a  Social  and  Educational 
Institution. 

John  Stuart  Mill,  On  the  Subjection  of  Women. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


THE  CHURCH 

Why  treat  of  the  church?  What  necessity 
is  there  for  considering  the  church  in  a  general 
ethic!  Does  the  usual  text-book  on  morals 
do  so!  There  is  no  discussion  at  all  in  most 
hooks  on  ethics  about  the  church.  But  this  is 
a  real  oversight.  Wherever  there  is  religion 
there  is  some  organization  of  it.  Durkheim 
says  correctly:  “Never  was  there  a  religion 
without  a  church.”  Religion  particularly 
among  the  lower  tribes  is  social.  Individual 
religion  is  a  later  development,  and  it  has  never 
crowded  out  the  social  form.  In  any  fairly  full 
study  of  social  ethics  the  church  can  no  more 
be  omitted  than  the  family  and  the  state. 

As  religion  has  a  bearing  upon  morals1  its 
social  form  must  raise  some  ethical  questions. 
As  far  as  the  church  develops  man  ethically  it 
must  receive  attention  in  any  moral  estimate 
of  man.  Freedom  of  character,  which  leads 
it  to  function  for  the  good,  lies  within  the  task 
of  the  church.  An  effort  must  be  made  to 
evaluate  the  church  ethically.  What  is  its 
service  for  morals!  To  what  degree  does  it 
meet  the  ideal!  These  practical  questions  about 


i  Cf.  above  Chapter  II. 


267 


268 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


the  present  worth  and  work  of  the  church  lead 
us  to  search  for  its  fundamental  ethical  place. 
Our  problem  today  is  to  find  the  fundamental 
moral  issues  of  the  Christian  church. 

The  church  and  truth.  Why  do  we  associate 

the  church,  first  of  all,  with  truth  ?  The  church 

is  the  institution  of  truth.  As  the  family  is  the 

the  moral  centre  for  the  kindly  virtues,  so  the 

church  is  the  centre  for  truth.  But  we  must 

define  what  is  meant  by  truth.  There  is  truth 

ascertained  and  found  by  man  as  he  searches 

and  discovers  the  usual,  natural  facts  about  the 

universe  and  himself.  But  there  is  also  truth 

that  is  concerned  with  spiritual  and  moral 

realities.  Man  has  always  accepted  such  truth 

in  religion  as  a  gift  and  bestowal.  Consequently 

all  religion  claims  revelation  of  spiritual  truth. 

This  truth  aims  to  satisfv  man ’s  soul.  It  is  not 

%/ 

truth  for  the  intellect  as  such,  not  for  the 
emotions  and  volitions  in  themselves,  for  it 
serves  neither  science  nor  art  as  an  end.  The 
truth  of  religion  is  the  final,  ultimate  necessity 
for  man’s  spirit  and  spiritual  life.  In  Chris¬ 
tianity  Christ  asks  to  be  accepted  as  the  way 
of  religion  and  the  reality  of  life  because  He  is 
the  truth.2  The  religious  satisfaction  in  truth 
is  to  be  obtained  in  Christ,  the  personality,  the 
fulfillment  of  religion  and  the  motive  of  freedom 
in  ethics. 

In  striving  to  know  the  moral  service  of 
religious  truth  we  are  led  to  admit  its  super¬ 
naturalism.  If  the  truth  of  religion  abandons 
its  supernaturalism,  with  its  peculiar  authori¬ 
tative  claim,  it  becomes  speculation,  and  its 


2  John  XIV:  6. 


THE  CHURCH 


269 


systematic  efforts  are  only  philosophy.  It  is 
the  belief  in  the  divine  character  of  the  truth  of 
religion  which  differentiates  it  from  other  truth, 
and  therefore  gives  it  a  peculiar  power  for  the 
moral  life.  Real,  vital  religious  truth  is  the 
enemy  of  superstition.  What  low  forms  of 
religion  held  and  did,  and  what  magic  practiced 
and  in  part  handed  on  from  age  to  age,  con¬ 
stitute  the  remnants  of  traditional  belief  and 
practice  which  we  call  superstition.  Super¬ 
stition  is  in  conflict  with  the  growth  of  know¬ 
ledge,  and,  despite  the  appearance  of  order,  has 
in  reality  a  disordered,  disjointed  world  gov¬ 
erned  by  the  arbitrary  caprice  of  a  distorted 
supernaturalism.  Rationalism  has  never  liber¬ 
ated  men  in  the  mass  from  superstition.  Some 
times  even  the  most  intelligent  men  hold  to 
strange  superstitions  contradicting  their  gen¬ 
eral  rationality.  The  spirit  of  man  longs  for 
some  divine  tokens,  and  will  often  seek  them  in 
the  strangest  quarters  and  in  the  most  illogical 
way.  The  escape  from  superstition  and  the 
ethical  freedom  in  religious  truth  is  best  guar¬ 
anteed  through  a  supernaturalism  that  does  not 
deny  or  destroy  the  just  results  and  fair  infer¬ 
ences  of  the  searching  mind  of  man. 

The  church  must  have  progressive  truth  to 
preserve  a  just  supernaturalism.  As  mankind 
passes  from  age  to  age  the  treasure  of  truth 
which  the  church  possesses  must  be  re-inter¬ 
preted  again  and  again.  It  must  satisfy  the 
changing  mental  outlook  of  men,  and  their 
temper  and  mood  in  different  times.  Even  the 
common  people  have  a  different  state  of  mind 
in  the  various  periods  of  history.  If  the  reli- 


270 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


gious  truth  of  the  church  is  to  avoid  becoming 
superstition  it  cannot  assume  a  final  statement 
of  the  faith  in  the  forms  of  thought  or  culture 
of  any  past  age.  A  church,  which  rejects  all 
that  is  modern,  because  it  has  clothed  its  con¬ 
ceptions  in  the  garments  of  the  scientific  and 
philosophic  terms  that  have  been  outlived, 
serves  ignorance  and  obstructs  the  free  pro¬ 
gress  of  truth.  Nothing  serves  so  much  to 
create  the  impression  that  religion  needs  ignor¬ 
ance,  as  the  attitude  that  will  not  rethink  its 
faith  in  each  age,  but  simply  lives  on  inherited, 
undigested  ideas  that  are  memorized  and 
repeated.  There  must  be  a  continuous  read¬ 
justment  by  the  church  of  its  supernaturalism 
to  progress,  not  by  destroying  the  supernatural 
but  by  seeing  it  in  a  new  light. 

But  the  progressive  adjustment  of  religious 
truth  ought  not  to  degenerate  into  radicalism. 
The  spirit  of  man  needs  a  continuity  and  cer¬ 
tainty  in  his  faith.  These  radicalism  cannot 
furnish,  for  it  has  no  sense  of  history,  and  wants 
to  reconstruct  the  whole  world  anew  in  every 
age.  Through  it  the  very  roots  of  supernatur¬ 
alism  are  constantly  being  uprooted.  Progress 
cannot  identify  itself  with  radicalism,  and 
therefore  needs  the  balance  of  a  sane  conserva¬ 
tism.  Not  all  that  is  new  is  true,  and  not  all 
that  is  old  is  wrong.  There  are  certain  per¬ 
manent  characteristics  of  man,  and  he  possesses 
certain  ineradicable  spiritual  and  moral  needs. 
To  meet  these  a  church  must  hold  to  some  con¬ 
servative  content  of  truth  which  it  cannot 
abandon  in  essence  without  a  loss,  no  matter 


THE  CHURCH  271 

how  it  brings  this  unchanging  content  to  men 
in  varying  forms. 

But  have  we  not  missed  the  whole  underlying 
meaning  of  religion  by  stressing  the  relation  of 
the  church  to  truth!  Is  not  religion  essentially 
emotion!  This  peculiar,  prevailing  idea,  that 
rests  on  certain  inferences  form  primitive  reli¬ 
gion,  and  upon  a  selection  of  certain  outstanding 
features  in  American  forms  of  religious  life, 
disrupts  man’s  inner  spiritual  life.  Its  atomism 
fails  to.  note  that  there  never  has  been  a  religion 
without  a  set  of  beliefs  and  convictions.  Super¬ 
naturalism  is  not  merely  for  the  heart  but  also 
for  the  head.  It  is  active  but  also  meditative. 
The  truth  of  the  church  is  for  the  whole  man, 
and  therefore  it  cannot  be  freed  from  intellec¬ 
tual  elements.  Religion  to  be  lived  must  be 
understood,  otherwise  it  becomes  mere  imitation 
or  unthinking  traditionalism.  Men  have  always 
had  some  forms  of  belief  and  therefore  some 
creeds.  Creeds  are  as  universal  as  religion. 
What  we  believe  must  clothe  itself  into  certain 
ideas  and  be  stated  in  certain  words.  The  con¬ 
tention  for  a  creedless  religion  deceives  itself, 
for  a  religion  without  convictions  and  some 
statement  of  its  faith,  whether  definitely  for¬ 
mulated  or  not,  is  impossible  psychologically, 
and  cannot  be  found  historically.  The  truth 
believed  must,  however,  be  believed  freely,  and 
must  be  freely  confessed  and  spread.  The 
ethical  danger  of  a  creed  is  not  its  existence, 
but  its  intolerant  abuse.  The  effort  should 
never  be  made  to  impose  it  on  any  one  without 
willing  acceptance  after  full  and  free  conviction. 
The  inherited  creeds  must  be  interpreted  his- 


272 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


torically  and  used  as  guides  intelligently.  They 
dare  not  be  made  masters  of  our  faith,  but  only 
notable  formulations  of  the  past,  which  express 
the  substance  of  what  we  are  convinced  of  as 
our  own  belief.  Whenever  a  church  endeavors 
to  enforce  its  creed,  and  assents  to  persecution 
of  whatever  kind,  it  destroys  the  free  appeal 
of  truth.  Religious  truth  like  all  truth  must 
wTin  through  its  own  merit  and  not  through  force 
or  through  false  authority.  Freedom  is  the 
very  atmosphere  of  truth. 

The  nature  of  the  church's  work.  What  shall 
the  church  do  with  the  truth  that  it  holds! 
What  is  its  purpose!  The  truth  for  which  the 
church  stands  puts  the  obligation  upon  the 
church  to  perpetuate  and  to  spread  it.  Because 
there  is  a  value  for  freedom  in  spiritual  truth 
it  must  be  handed  on  through  the  agency  of 
the  church.  The  justification  of  the  church 
ethically  in  extending  itself  rests  upon  the 
moral  results  of  its  truth.  It  is  this  test  which 
Christ  desires  to  have  applied  to  all  teachers 
and  teaching,  when  He  says:  “By  their  fruits 
ye  shall  know  them. 9 9 3  The  ethical  outcome 
of  doctrine  is  its  defense  and  the  strength  of 
its  appeal.  The  mere  mystical  satisfaction  has 
its  place  but  it  is  not  adequate,  because  religious 
truth  tends  toward  the  conscience.  A  church 
has  a  moral  right  of  existence,  and  a  justifica¬ 
tion  of  its  work  if  it  holds  to  a  definite  body  of 
truth.  The  better  the  ethical  progress  brought 
about  by  the  work  of  the  church,  the  larger 
its  right  to  live.  It  does  happen  that  a  good 
faith  does  not  produce  its  logical  results,  be- 


s  Matthew  VII :  20. 


THE  CHURCH 


273 


cause  of  individual  sin,  or  through  limiting  and 
distorting  national  characteristics.  On  the  con¬ 
trary,  a  faith  ethically  inferior  will  not  bring 
about  the  defects  of  its  position,  because  those 
that  hold  it  may  be  under  the  past  influence  of 
a  better  truth,  or  may  follow  a  superior  morality 
about  them  in  a  society  shaped  by  higher  stan¬ 
dards.  Whenever  in  history  a  certain  side  of 
truth  seemed  neglected  it  offered  opportunity 
for  a  new  group  to  stress  the  truth  that  was 
overlooked.  But  finally  no  church  can  ade¬ 
quately  live  through  the  emphasis  upon  a  single 
great  element  of  truth.  There  must  be  the 
balance  of  the  whole  body  of  truth.  An  excess 
often  rights  itself  in  history.  Extreme  predes¬ 
tination  has  passed  away  in  part  through  its 
ethical  defect.  Exclusive  emotionalism  seems 
to  have  had  its  day  because  it  lacked  the  fullest 
appeal  to  conscience. 

The  church  may  use  any  means  to  win  men 
to  its  truth,  but  if  it  wants  the  moral  results 
for  character  it  must  use  the  method  most  effec¬ 
tive  for  ethical  growth.  Character  is  not  formed 
by  quick  changes.  It  must  grow  gradually  into 
personality  through  the  habits  of  the  good  led 
by  the  ideal.  This  implies  that  moral  progress 
is  educative.  Consequently  that  church  will 
produce  the  best  ethical  advance  that  uses  the 
best  education  for  morals  and  religion.  The 
child  must  receive  the  ideals  and  be  led  to  know 
the  right  according  to  its  capacity.  From  the 
age  of  childhood  into  youth,  and  onward,  the 
work  of  the  church  in  all  its  departments  will 
be  genuinely  helpful  for  the  moral  unfolding, 
as  far  as  it  is  educative.  Education  is  not  only 


274 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


a  specific  task  alongside  of  the  other  work  of 
the  church,  but  it  ought  to  be  the  controlling 
spirit  of  all  that  the  church  does.  The  message 
of  the  church  dare  not  he  simply  emotional,  or 
a  call  to  action.  The  basis  must  be  instruction. 
Christ  recognized  this  when  He  enjoined  His 
disciples  to  bring  in  the  nations  by  teaching 
them.4  Missionary  operations  will  be  of  no  final 
avail  without  impartation  of  truth  by  education. 
The  moral  demand  upon  the  church  is  for 
thoughtful  development,  through  the  training 
that  creates  personality,  in  the  freedom  of  the 
truth  that  is  known  and  grows  into  the  life 
of  man. 

The  church  must  also  include  in  its  work  the 
right  expression  of  love.  Its  truth  always  seeks 
to  produce  love.  The  God  of  Christianity  is 
Love,  anl  love  is  the  law  of  liberty  in  the 
Christian  moral  conception.  The  genuine  spirit 
of  love  must  lead  the  church  to  every  kind  of 
activity  that  love  demands.  No  matter  what 
general  work  may  be  carried  on  outside  of  the 
church,  it  ought  to  engage  in  all  the  spheres  of 
rescue,  prevention  and  true  charity.  Into  them 
it  should  put  the  strength  and  power  of  its 
motive  of  love  as  superior  in  purpose  and  out¬ 
look.  But  the  higher  motive  dare  not  neglect 
the  best  methods  and  plans  of  the  present.  High 
motives  do  not  excuse  deficient  execution  and 
wrong  method.  The  church  has  often  begun 
work,  like  charity  organization,  and  then  has 
allowed  it  to  pass  into  the  free  use  of  society. 
The  philanthropy  of  the  present  day  has  had  its 
inspiration  in  the  church,  even  if  it  is  not 

4  Matthew  XXVIII:  20. 


THE  CHURCH 


275 


credited  to  the  cliurcli.  Most  of  those  who  give 
themselves  to  modern  philanthropy  receive  their 
inspiration  through  the  church.  The  life  that 
makes  for  mercy  flows  out  from  the  church, 
but  it  waters  and  fructifies  many  fields  beyond 
the  borders  of  the  church. 

The  social  work  of  the  church.  Is  there  any 
specific  task  incumbent  upon  the  church  in  the 
great,  modern  questions  of  society!  If  the 
church  has  any  value  for  man  in  all  his  attitudes 
it  must  have  some  social  message.  To  make  it 
effective  in  its  special  nature  certain  dangers 
must  be  avoided.  First  there  dare  not  be  one¬ 
sided  emphasis  upon  the  social.  There  is  much 
modern  sociology  which  thinks  that  man  can 
only  be  dealt  with  as  a  social  being.  It  puts 
such  emphasis  upon  the  mass  that  the  individ¬ 
ual  is  only  a  number  in  a  group.  There  is  truth 
in  the  social  outlook.  Plato  could  only  define 
justice  through  the  Republic.  Aristotle  made 
man  a  political  animal.  But  man  is  also  an 
individual.  In  the  balance  between  the  social 

and  individual  lies  the  solution.  Personalitv 

«/ 

is  both  individual  and  social.  The  church  can¬ 
not  adopt  most  of  the  philosophy  of  modern 
social  thought,  but  it  must  develop  the  truth 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God  to  find  its  social  task. 

Second,  the  error  of  most  modern  social  phil¬ 
osophy  is  the  exclusive  point  of  view  of  the 
external.  The  social  problem  is  supposed  to 
he  the  question  of  the  economic  needs  of  man. 
Their  right  adjustment  is  interpreted  as  the 
end  of  mankind.  But  man  will  never  be  helped 
merely  from  without.  A  new  social  order  means 
a  new  moral  order.  The  church  that  is  wise 


276 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


will  not  overlook  the  value  of  the  outer.  It 
uses  it  in  its  charity  and  work  of  mercy,  where 
the  bodily  need  is  not  overlooked.  But  the 
bodily  is  only  the  occasion  to  reach  into  the 
conscience  and  soul  of  man.  The  church  will 
not  succeed  in  helping  society  if  it  loses  itself 
in  the  mere  external  tasks  of  social  betterment. 

Third,  much  social  progress  is  demanded 
through  legislation.  The  church  will  never 
oppose  any  law  that  makes  for  a  better  society 
through  restraint  of  the  forces  of  evil.  But  law 
cannot  produce  righteousness.  Men  must  have 
a  new  conscience  to  do  good,  and  not  an  increase 
of  legislation.  Therefore  the  church,  working 
upon  the  conscience  of  man,3  ought  never  to 
deceive  itself  that  it  is  helping  society  by  enter¬ 
ing  the  field  of  legislation.  To  make  a  law  to 
produce  good  is  the  process  of  impatience  and 
shortsightedness.  It  contradicts  the  facts  in¬ 
volved  in  the  betterment  of  society.  A  law 
that  does  not  come  out  of  a  moral  enlighten¬ 
ment  only  produces  transgression.  Life  that 
is  good  comes  out  of  a  new  motive. 

With  the  avoidance  of  these  dangers  the 
social  obligation  of  the  church  is  not  fulfilled. 
It  is  the  business  of  the  church  to  recognize 
that  there  is  a  social  life,  that  this  social  life  is 
very  defective,  and  that  it  needs  the  large 
awakening  of  the  social  conscience.  To  remain 
aloof  from  the  great  evils  of  modern  society  is 
as  wrong  as  to  neglect  the  individual  life.  The 

5  ‘  ‘  The  Church ’s  pronouncements  on  social  and  economic 
questions  must  be  such  and  such  only  as  grow  out  of  the  dis¬ 
tinctive  function  of  the  Church  as  a  religious  institution  con¬ 
ceived  primarily  with  motives  and  ideals.  ’  ’  Wm.  Adams 
Brown,  The  Church  in  America,  p.  157. 


THE  CHURCH 


277 


duty  of  the  church  cannot  be  met  simply 
through  the  changing  of  individual  lives  funda¬ 
mental  as  such  a  mission  is.  Men  have  social 
relationships  that  must  be  moralized,  because 
many  of  them  are  altogether  unmoralized,  or 
half-moralized,  and  simply  follow  traditional 
attitudes.  In  the  propaganda  that  obscures 
facts  in  modern  social  contests,  the  church  must 
seek  to  get  at  the  real  status.  Then  it  ought 
boldly  proclaim  the  moral  truths  involved  with¬ 
out  fear  or  favor.  Great  leaders  of  the  church 
in  the  past  have  not  hestitated  to  give  voice  to 
the  claims  of  righteousness  in  the  morals  ills  of 
society.  Chrysostom  spoke  plainly  against  the 
vanity  and  luxury  of  liis  day.  Luther  did  not 
abstain  from  giving  his  opinion  on  the  economic 
evils  and  the  disorders  of  the  society  of  the 
sixteenth  century.  There  are  many  messages  of 
the  prophets  that  contain  permanent  principles 
of  righteousness,  and  need  to  be  applied  to  our 
times  by  the  church. 

The  church  and  its  worship.  Is  there  any 
moral  question  involved  in  the  worship  of  the 
church,  or  does  it  belong  simply  to  the  religious 
problems  of  a  church?  While  the  first  aim  of 
worship  is  to  lead  men  into  communion  with 
God,  and  it  is  therefore  religious,  still  if  the 
God  worshipped  is  ethical  His  worship  must 
be  so  also.  It  is  implied  in  the  saying  of  Christ: 
“God  is  a  spirit,  and  they  that  worship  Him 
must  worship  Him  in  spirit  and  truth,  ’  ’ 6  that 
the  spiritual  worship  is  one  of  truth.  Because 
truth  is  a  moral  attitude  a  moral  relation  must 
be  maintained  in  worship.  The  maintenance 


6  John  IV :  24. 


278 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


of  the  ethical  in  worship  is  not  finally  one  of 
form.  Neither  the  set  form  nor  the  individua¬ 
listic  method  are  wrong  in  themselves.  The 
problem  is  whether  the  fixed  liturgy  is  abused 
and  becomes  a  means  of  stagnant  worship, 
merely  formal,  repititious  and  mechanical,  thus 
injuring  spiritual  worship.  The  individualis¬ 
tic  method  may  become  erratic,  abusive  of 
devotion,  non-beautiful,  and  destroy  spiritual 
worship.  The  worship  must  aid  in  making 
man  express  his  real  attitude  toward  God.  It 
must  be  honest,  sincere,  whole-hearted,  leading 
to  the  genuine  worship  of  a  free  man  before  the 
God  who  gave  him  liberty. 

The  church  as  an  organization.  What  are 
the  problems  that  pertain  to  the  church  as 
organized?  Every  church  to  do  its  work  must 
have  some  form  of  organization.  But  the  or¬ 
ganization  ought  to  be  secondary  to  the  prophe¬ 
tic  message  of  the  church.  Above  all,  it  is  not 
morally  defensible  to  make  the  question  of 
organization  one  of  divisive  difference,  unless 
the  organization  hinders  the  truth.  But  even 
when  organization  is  not  made  primal  it  can 
become  a  hindrance.  Too  much  attention  mav 
be  given  by  the  leadership  of  the  church  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  organization.  Its  glory  and 
progress  may  be  sought;  it  may  be  exalted 
without  the  honest  self-criticism  it  needs,  not 
in  its  ideal  purpose  but  in  its  practical  life  and 
administration.  Machinery  can  become  too 
pronounced  and  powerful.  The  consistency  of 
an  administrative  policy  may  be  maintained  to 
the  detriment  of  honesty  and  the  freedom  of 
the  church.  The  whole  spiritual  purpose  of 


THE  CHURCH 


279 


the  church  is  liable  to  be  injured  and  obstructed 
where  the  interest  in  effective  organization 
becomes  controlling  and  occupies  the  minds 
and  the  talents  of  the  leadership  of  the  church 
too  exclusively.  There  will  then  be  a  trend 
toward  centralization  beyond  the  necessities  of 
the  work,  and  the  church  will  repeat  past  errors 
in  stressing  powerful  organization  rather  than 
the  power  of  its  free  and  unhampered  truth. 

The  church  and  the  state.  Among  all  the 
problems  affecting  the  church  none  is  more  far- 
reaching,  than  the  question,  how  shall  the 
church  be  related  to  the  state.  In  the  religion 
of  the  lower  tribes  the  medicine  man,  or  the 
shaman,  or  the  priest  control  the  common  life 
of  the  tribe.  Nothing  is  undertaken  without 
the  sanction  of  the  religious  leaders.  When 
religion  receives  its  national  form,  either  an 
organized  priesthood  rules,  or  the  king  is  the 
centre  of  religious  organization.  The  ruler  is 
deified  and  the  ideal  of  the  state  becomes  divine. 
With  the  rise  of  Christianity  the  established 
religion  of  the  state  opposed  the  new  faith  and 
made  it  a  forbidden  religion  (religio  illicita). 
After  the  act  of  Constantine  gave  Christianity 
the  endorsement  of  the  state  the  church  devel¬ 
oped  gradually  into  the  controlling  power  of 
life.  It  showed  its  spiritual  and  moral  power 
when  Ambrose  would  not  admit  Theodosius  to 
the  services  of  the  church  before  he  had  pub¬ 
licly  repented  for  a  cruel  deed.  But  this  moral 
control  soon  developed  into  power  over  the 
policy  and  government  of  the  state,  and  become 
political.  The  outstanding  historical  fact  dem¬ 
onstrating  this  clearly  is  the  compulsory  jour- 


280 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


ney  of  Henry  IV  of  Germany  to  Canossa  at  the 
bidding  of  the  Pope  Gregory  VII.  Another 
change  took  place  in  the  days  of  the  Reforma¬ 
tion.  The  churches  of  the  European  continent 
came  under  the  control  of  the  princes  of  differ¬ 
ent  provinces,  who  were  called  bishops  in 
necessity  as  the  chief  members  of  the  church. 
In  Geneva  the  mind  of  Calvin  governed  the 
city  according  to  strict  moral  laws  of  religion. 
In  England  Henry  VIII  directly  reformed  the 
church  and  made  it  the  established  church  of 
England.  It  was  only  on  American  soil  that  the 
effort  was  made  to  have  a  free  church  and  a 
free  state.  But  does  this  freedom  mean  entire 
lack  of  connection?  Is  there  no  co-ordination? 
What  are  the  conditions  and  what  should  they 
be? 

In  great  measure  the  church  and  the  state 
live  their  separate  and  independent  lives,  each 
fulfilling  its  own  task.  The  state  gives  the 
churches  legal  status  and  protects  them.  The 
churches  serve  the  state  indirectly  through  the 
making  of  good  character  which  is  necessary 
for  good  citizenship.  But  the  duty  of  the 
church  does  not  end  with  its  influence  upon 
individuals  in  the  state.  It  has  an  obligation 
in  the  interest  of  truth  and  righteousness 
toward  the  state.  At  all  times  there  should  go 
forth  from  its  streams  of  influence  that  help  in 
keeping  the  state  moral,  and  moralizing  it 
where  it  is  amoral  or  immoral.  The  church 
ought  to  have  a  message  for  the  ethical  import 
of  great  state  questions,  and  it  ought  to  elevate 
the  political  situation  through  the  stirring  up 
of  the  conscience  of  men.  Sometimes  it  must 


THE  CHURCH 


281 


enter  directly  into  a  state  question  when  this 
question  has  a  large  spiritual  and  moral  con¬ 
tent.  This  was  the  case  in  the  problem  of 
slavery.  It  obtains  in  the  question  of  prohibi¬ 
tion,  and  in  the  modem  selfish  movement 
toward  bloc-rule  by  small  organized  economic 
groups  to  the  detriment  and  freedom  of  the 
whole  people.  But  the  church  should  never 
descend  into  the  political  arena  or  maintain  a 
lobby.  Its  voice  must  be  heard,  but  it  should 
refrain  from  interfering  with  state  action  ex¬ 
cept  for  its  own  protection  in  critical  situations. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  the  church 
oversteps  its  rights.  The  first  is  the  power 
brought  to  bear  by  a  church  through  its  organ¬ 
ized  strength  in  order  to  obtain  state  aid  for 
its  institutions.  Such  action  is  unfair  to  all 
other  churches,  violates  equity,  and  makes  the 
state  the  direct  supporter  of  a  church  or  of 
churches  to  the  loss  of  the  independence  of  the 
church.  The  second  is  the  effort  to  perpetuate 
the  experiment  of  Calvin  at  Geneva.  It  con¬ 
sists  in  the  church  demanding  certain  restric¬ 
tive  laws  and  ordinances.  True  it  is  that  the 
state  ought  to  protect  the  church  in  all  its 
rights,  above  all  in  the  freedom  to  worship  un¬ 
molested.  To  this  extent  the  church,  e.  g.,  can 
ask  for  Sunday  laws.  It  can  oppose  the  break¬ 
ing  down  of  the  American  Sunday,  through 
uttering  its  voice  on  behalf  of  the  necessity  of 
a  day  of  rest,  and  for  the  protection  of  the 
moral  value  of  Sunday  for  the  state.  But  when 
a  church  or  group  of  churches  demand  definite 
prohibitory  laws  against  certain  liberties  on 
Sunday,  or  strive  to  impose  restrictions  upon 


282 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


amusements  not  considered  wrong  or  impure 
in  themselves,  they  assume  control  over  con¬ 
sciences  that  differ.  Their  effort  is  to  enforce 
by  law  their  own  views  upon  the  state  and  all 
its  citizens  of  various  faiths.  Such  action 
would  make  one  opinion  of  common  moral 
rights  binding  and  destroy  the  liberty  of 
conscience. 

The  state  may  encroach  upon  the  liberty  of 
the  church  in  two  ways.  First  both  the  church 
and  the  state  have  their  claim  upon  education. 
The  church  must  have  education  for  its  truth 
and  life,  and  the  state  for  the  training  of  its  citi¬ 
zens.  The  state  ought  at  all  times  respect  the 
rights  of  the  church,  unless  the  schools  of  the 
church  are  so  deficient  in  efficiency  that  they 
lower  the  common  intelligence,  or  unless  the 

church  schools  make  a  divided  citizenrv 

%/ 

through  fostering  religious  intolerance,  or  prop¬ 
agating  anti-American  sentiments  of  language 
or  nationalism.  The  state  needs  the  religious 
teaching  of  the  church  which  it  cannot  furnish 
in  its  schools.  This  is  being  granted  today 
against  the  opinion  of  some  radical  educators 
and  sociologists,  who  want  the  state  schools  to 
teach  some  universal  religion  and  morals  and 
really  establish  a  state-religion  of  mere  theism. 
But  the  state  is  endangering  the  church  when 
it  allows  the  teaching  of  certain  naturalistic 
hypotheses  as  facts  in  the  lower  grades  of  the 
schools  before  the  children  are  ripe  enough  to 
judge.  There  is  in  fact  opposition  to  the  faith 
of  the  church  whenever  any  sort  of  materialis¬ 
tic  teaching  obtains  in  the  lower  schools,  the 
high  schools,  and  the  universities.  By  devel- 


THE  CHURCH 


283 


oping  a  great  system,  and  through  strong  cen¬ 
tralization,  the  state  often  injures  the  freedom 
of  education.  The  injury  generally  falls  upon 
the  schools  of  the  church.  A  free  people  need 
all  types  of  schools  and  no  great  system  ought 
at  any  time  destroy  the  right  of  a  school  to  its 
life.  So  great  is  the  modern  pressure  of  cen¬ 
tralized  education  that  freedom  has  almost 
ceased.  The  state  has  begun  to  dictate  not 
only  in  the  interest  of  efficiency,  but  also  in 
details  of  management. 

The  second  encroachment  upon  the  liberty  of 
the  church  is  made  by  the  state  in  times  of  war. 
When  men  are  swept  off  their  feet  by  the  tre¬ 
mendous  emotions  that  make  the  war-spirit, 
the  state  asks  the  church  to  keep  silence.  It 
is  not  to  pass  upon  the  justice  of  a  war.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  expected  to  accept  the 
moral  justification  of  the  war  that  is  offered,  to 
stir  up  and  keep  alive  the  morale  of  the  people 
for  war,  to  serve  as  an  agitator,  to  preach  hate 
against  another  nation,  to  exalt  the  national 
consciousness  and  pride,  and  even  to  be  a  col¬ 
lecting  agency  for  war-funds.  This  demand 
asks  the  church  to  abandon  its  own  right  of 
judgment  and  its  truth  of  love.  The  church 
should  surely  not  oppose  the  state,  especially 
in  a  critical  time.  But  it  is  an  unjustified  tak¬ 
ing  away  of  the  liberty  of  the  church  to  make 
it  a  war  agency  while  its  message  is  to  be  that 
of  the  Prince  of  Peace. 

The  freedom  of  the  church  does  not  mean, 
however,  that  it  should  raise  a  revolution 
against  the  state.  The  Christian  teaching 
enjoins  submission.  Christ  did  not  permit 


284 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


Himself  to  aid  the  revolutionary  zealots  of  His 
clay.  On  the  contrary  He  advised  giving  Cae¬ 
sar  what  was  the  due  of  Caesar.7  Power  was 
not  opposed  to  power,  although  Pilate  was  told 
by  Christ,  that  such  power  as  Pilate  had  over 
Him  was  given  by  God.8  Paul  advised  the 
Christians  to  be  obedient  to  the  Roman  rule, 
for  it  bore  the  sword  to  punish  the  evil-doers 
and  protect  the  righteous.9  It  was  the  great 
restraining  force  for  law  and  order.10  In  the 
whole  early  church  men  were  bidden  rather  to 
suffer  than  to  disturb  the  order  of  government. 
When  the  Christians  experienced  the  persecut¬ 
ing  power  of  the  state  they  comforted  them¬ 
selves  with  the  final  triumph  of  God’s  King¬ 
dom  and  Christ’s  rule,11  but  they  were  never 
advised  to  rebel.  Their  freedom  of  utterance 
was  not  to  cease,  and  their  right  to  proclaim 
the  gospel  was  not  to  be  surrendered  at  any 
cost.  It  was  to  be  carried  on  if  necessary  at 
the  risk  of  their  lives.  But  no  matter  how  the 
state  might  oppose  and  persecute,  the  church 
was  not  to  take  the  sword,  or  endeavor  as  a 
church  to  overthrow  any  state  evil  as  it  might 
be.  The  fact  that  Christians  were  kings,  a 
spiritual,  royal  priesthood,12  was  not  to  be  used 
for  political  purposes.  Its  consequences  were 
great  through  the  new  ferment  in  Christianity, 
but  this  was  to  work  out  spiritually,  and  not 
through  the  use  of  force  by  the  church  or  for 
the  church. 

7  Matthew  XXII:  21. 

8  John  XIX:  11. 

9  Romans  XIII :  1  ff . 

10  II  Thessalonians  II:  7. 

11  Cf.  Revelation. 

12  I  Peter  II :  9 


THE  CHURCH 


285 


REFERENCES 

Newman  Smyth,  Christian  Ethics,  Chapters  III,  II.  par.  3. 
H.  Martensen,  Christian  Ethics,  Vol.  II,  par.  133  ff. 

J.  N.  Figgis,  Churches  in  the  Modern  State. 

Leighton  Parks,  The  Crisis  of  the  Churches. 

Chas.  A.  Ellwood,  The  Reconstruction  of  Religion. 

Walter  Rauschenbusch,  Christianizing  the  Social  Order. 
Walter  Rauschenbusch,  Christianity  and  the  Social  Crisis. 
Walter  Rauschenbusch,  A  Theology  for  the  Social  Gospel. 
William  Adams  Brown,  The  Church  in  America. 

The  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and 
Social  Science,  ‘ 1  Industrial  Relations  and  the  Churches ;  ’  ’ 
Vol.  CIII,  No.  192. 

Elijah  E.  Kresge,  The  Church  and  The  Ever-Coming 
Kingdom  of  God. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


THE  STATE 

What  is  the  place  of  the  state?  In  the  seven¬ 
teenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  there  was 
much  unhistorical  individualism.  Through  it 
there  arose  the  theory,  that  man  at  the  begin¬ 
ning  was  without  any  government.  A  pre¬ 
political  condition  of  society  was  supposed  to 
have  existed,  which  men  ended  by  making  a 
social  contract,  because  the  war  of  all  against 
all  had  to  cease.  The  great  advocates  of  this 
view  were  Hobbes  and  Rousseau.  But  the 
nineteenth  century  corrected  this  unhistorical 
opinion.  It  secured  general  acceptance  for  the 
fact,  that  there  was  always  a  state  of  some  sort. 
No  evidence  can  be  found  that  groups  of  men 
were  ever  without  some  government,  whether 
patriarchal  or  tribal.  The  state  is  a  funda¬ 
mental  necessity  in  common  life.  It  is  as  old 
as  the  family  and  the  church,  and  of  equal 
value  for  the  social  well-being  of  mankind. 
The  orderliness  and  steadiness  of  external  life 
depend  upon  the  state. 

But  is  the  state  not  a  limitation  of  liberty? 
Does  it  not  impair  the  individual  will?  If  a 
society  were  possible  with  individual  wills 
functioning  without  co-ordination  and  unity 
there  would  be  no  place  for  the  state.  But  in- 

286 


THE  STATE 


287 


dividual  wills  clash,  and,  therefore,  for  the 
maintenance  of  common  rights  and  liberty  the 
state  is  needed.  The  individual  will  only  feels 
limited  and  restrained  by  the  state  as  far  as 
it  fails  to  recognize  the  common  will.  As  soon 
as  we  know  that  we  are  not  only  individuals, 
but  also  social  beings,  we  must  ask  for  some 
organ  that  shall  maintain  the  social  life,  and 
for  some  institution  through  which  the  safety 
of  all  and  of  each  shall  be  guaranteed.  The 
state  is  far  from  being  a  hindrance  to  general 
]iberty.  If  it  functions  rightly,  it  supports, 
aids  and  advances  the  happiness  and  progress 
of  a  people,  and  makes  its  common  life  a  safe 
and  an  orderly  one. 

What  is  the  idea  of  the  state?  It  is  very  im¬ 
portant  to  gain  a  clear  conception  of  what  the 
state  is  essentially.  Like  the  family  and  the 
church  it  is  a  real  personality.  But  its  moral 
unity  must  be  found  in  its  essential  character 
and  being.  It  cannot  be  a  mere  corporate  per¬ 
sonality  as  Rosseau  thought;  nor  can  it  be  per¬ 
sonalized  as  an  addition  of  individuals,  or  an 
order  voted  into  existence  by  the  citizens  or 
sustained  simply  by  their  willingness.1 

The  personality  of  the  state  makes  it  the 
institution  of  justice.  It  lives  and  is  to  act  to 
uphold  justice  in  the  largest  and  fullest  sense. 
This  is  its  moral  basis  that  gives  it  worth  and 
purpose  in  social  life.  The  idea  of  justice  as 
the  foundation  of  the  state  was  first  enunciated 
by  Plato.  He  could  not  find  justice  as  long  as 
it  was  written  small  in  human  lives.  It  had 
to  be  written  large  in  the  state,  the  ideal 

1  Laski,  Authority  in  the  Modern  State,  p.  102  ff. 


288 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


Republic.  Because  justice  was  tlie  moral 
centre  of  the  state  “  kings  ought  to  be  philoso¬ 
phers,  and  philosophers  kings.  ”  Only  the 
thinkers  were  adequate  to  solve  the  great  prob¬ 
lems  of  justice,  and  not  the  common,  untrained 
mind.  Plato  was  the  advocate  of  the  expert 
in  government  in  order  to  make  justice  secure. 
We  may  not  agree,  that  only  the  expert  of  a 
certain  type  can  govern,  but  we  must  admit 
that  justice  is  the  foundation  of  the  state,  its 
right  and  its  duty. 

Plato  opposed  Thrasymachus,  who  held  that 
might  made  right.  This  theory  of  might,  the 
claim  of  the  stronger,  was  altogether  unethical. 
The  state  cannot  be  made  and  justified  by 
might.  But  this  extreme  form  of  the  concep¬ 
tion  of  might  has  been  abandoned.  A  moder¬ 
ate  formulation  of  the  necessity  of  might  as 
essential  to  the  state  has  taken  its  place. 
Paulsen  conceives  the  state  to  be  the  unity  of 
right,  will  and  might.  The  two  are  placed  on 
an  equal  basis.  He  says:  “The  state  is  the 
organization  of  a  people  into  a  sovereign  unity 
of  will,  might  and  right.  ’  ’ 2  A  large  place  is 
given  to  will  and  might  beside  justice.  James 
Seth3  thinks  that:  “The  essence  of  the  State  is 
sovereignty,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  sover¬ 
eign  power  through  coercion  or  control.”  In 
the  same  manner  Wilson4  holds  that:  “The 
essential  characteristic  of  all  government, 
whatever  its  form,  is  authority.  There  must 
in  every  instance  be,  on  the  one  hand,  gover¬ 
nors,  and,  on  the  other,  those  who  are  governed. 

2  Ethics,  Book  IV,  Part  IV,  Chapter  I. 

3  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  p.  289. 

4  The  State,  II,  p.  26. 


THE  STATE 


289 


And  the  authority  of  governors,  directly  or  in¬ 
directly,  rests  in  all  cases  ultimately  on  force.  ’  ’ 
All  of  these  definitions  put  power  on  the  same 
level  with  justice.  They  make  it  an  essential 
part  of  the  state.  The  assertion  of  sovereignty 
means,  that  the  state  is  the  final  judge  of  right 
in  human  affairs.  Each  state  claims  to  be 
sovereign.  When  states  differ  in  their  sover¬ 
eign  power  there  is  no  decision  but  through 
force.  Power  is  combined  with  sovereignty 
and  becomes  its  defense  within  the  state  and 
without.  Such  a  theory  must  logically  make 
war  the  right  of  the  state.  The  moral  defini¬ 
tion  of  the  state  must  make  justice  all-control- 
ling,  and  power  only  secondary.  If  justice 
demands  power  it  is  to  be  used  as  a  means. 
But  if  justice  can  be  obtained  without  force  it 
is  the  better  condition.  The  conception  of  the 
state  which  makes  power  and  sovereignty  of 
power  essential  glorifies  force  and  endeavors 
to  make  it  moral.  We  must  escape  from  ele¬ 
vating  the  state  into  an  instrument  of  power 
rather  than  the  institution  of  justice  and  jus¬ 
tice  alone.  Brute  force  even  if  carried  out  by 
the  common  will  is  never  moral.  To  associate 
it  with  justice  as  on  the  same  level  is  a  degrad¬ 
ation  of  justice.  This  conception  has  been  the 
fruitful  source  of  much  evil  in  the  world.  It 
always  offers  a  justification  of  any  war  if  a 
state  is  to  maintain  its  power  and  sovereignty. 
David  Jayne  Hill5  has  uncovered  the  fallacy  of 
the  prevailing  idea  of  sovereignty,  when  he 
says  of  modern  states,  with  their  economic 
desire  wedded  to  sovereignty:  “Inheriting  by 

5  The  Rebuilding  of  Europe,  p.  26. 


290 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


tradition  from  the  past  alleged  rights  of  abso¬ 
lute  sovereignty,  and  equipped  with  military 
forces  on  land  and  sea,  they  are  engaged  in  a 
struggle  for  supremacy  which  they  would  not 
for  a  moment  permit  within  their  own  legal 
jurisdiction.  Were  a  similar  organization 
formed  within  their  own  borders,  adopting  as 
its  principles  of  action  the  privileges  usually 
claimed  by  sovereign  states,  it  would  be 
promptly  and  ruthlessly  suppressed  as  a  dan¬ 
gerous  outlaw.’ ’  To  this  pass  the  idea  of  force 
and  sovereignty  has  brought  the  state. 

The  denial  of  force  as  a  integral  part  of  the 
idea  of  the  state  does  not  overthrow  the  auth¬ 
ority  of  the  state.  Because  the  state  is  the 
institution  of  justice  it  must  have  and  maintain 
authority.  Authority  is  the  consequence  of 
justice.  When  it  is  necessary  to  assert  the 
authority  through  force  then  force  is  justified. 
There  is  a  need  for  a  sane  understanding  of  the 
authority  of  the  state.  Many  men  seem  only 
ready  to  obey  the  authority  of  the  state  when  it 
is  enforced  upon  them  against  their  self-will. 
The  origin  of  the  disregard  of  the  authority  of 
the  state  is  found  in  a  misapplication  of  the  con¬ 
ception  that  government  rests  upon  the  consent 
of  the  governed.  The  common  will  and  consent 
of  the  people  does  not  give  the  state  the  author¬ 
ity  which  is  inherent  in  justice.  Justice  is  not 
established  or  disestablished  by  a  majority 
vote.  There  is  a  wrong  philosophy  of  individ¬ 
ualism  back  of  the  idea  that  men  by  their  con¬ 
sent  vote  the  state  into  its  right.  In  a  demo¬ 
cratic  form  of  government,  which  gives  the 
largest  political  liberty,  men  are  privileged  to 


THE  STATE 


291 


make  known  tlieir  attitude  in  affairs  of  the 
state.  But  the  necessity  and  authority  of  jus¬ 
tice  in  the  state  and  through  it  calls  for  a  reli¬ 
gious  foundation.  There  is  a  divine  will  of 
government  for  the  good  of  man,  and  this  con¬ 
stitutes  the  divine  right  of  government.  The 
rejection  of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  which 
meant  the  handing  down  of  divine  power  from 
God  to  the  kings,  ought  not  to  have  carried 
with  it  the  secularization  of  the  idea  of  the 
state.  The  functioning  of  the  state  through 
justice  will  always  suffer  to  the  degree  that 
men  see  in  the  state  only  a  human,  historical 
institution,  and  not  a  necessity  of  the  moral 
order  founded  upon  the  will  and  purpose  of 
God.  Country  will  never  be  what  it  ought 
until  it  is  joined  with  God.  “For  God  and 
country”  is  the  sound  basis  of  the  sentiment 
of  patriotism.  Without  the  sense  of  justice  as 
the  will  of  God,  and  the  state  as  a  minister  of 
justice,  patriotism  will  degenerate  into  selfish 
ambition  of  nationalism,  and  lose  its  just  claim 
upon  the  devotion  and  sacrifice  of  men.  The 
state  must  stand  for  sound  authority.  But  the 
problem  of  authority  becomes,  above  all,  the 
duty  so  to  organize  its  character  and  its  pro¬ 
cesses  as  to  make  it,  in  the  widest  aspect,  “the 
servant  of  right  and  of  freedom.  ’  ’ 6 

The  task  of  the  state.  How  shall  the  admin¬ 
istration  of  justice  through  the  state  be  de¬ 
fined  ?  What  is  the  duty  and  task  of  the  state '? 
In  executing  justice  the  first  necessity  is  to  up¬ 
hold  justice  among  the  citizens  of  the  state. 
As  there  are  always  disturbers  of  right  and 

6  Laski,  Authority  in  the  Modern  State,  p.  121. 


292 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


justice,  and  as  the  innocent  must  constantly  be 
protected,  the  state  should  use  the  best  means 
of  protective  and  punitive  justice.  It  must  be 
an  efficient  and  wisely  just  protector  of  common 
order,  safety  and  peace.  This  obligation  en¬ 
tails  upon  the  state  the  punishment  of  those 
that  do  wrong  and  commit  crime.  What  is  the 
best  theory  and  practice  of  punishment? 

There  are  some  who  desire  to  reduce  punish¬ 
ment  to  the  scientific  problem  of  disease.  They 
want  to  make  it  purely  a  pathological  question. 
But 4  4  to  reduce  crime  to  a  pathological  phenom¬ 
enon,  is  to  sap  the  very  foundations  of  our 
moral  judgments;  merit  as  well  as  demerit, 
reward  as  well  as  punishment,  are  thereby 
undermined.  Such  a  view  may  be  scientific;  it 
is  not  ethical,  for  it  refuses  to  recognize  the 
commonest  moral  distinctions.”  7  The  patho¬ 
logical  claim  destroys  freedom  and  virtually 
denies  personality.  Criminals  themselves  do 
not  want  to  be  treated  as  objects  but  as  individ¬ 
uals.  The  rejection  of  the  pathological  idea  does 
not,  however,  involve  the  acceptance  of  punish¬ 
ment  as  retribution  and  requital.  It  does  not 
mean  compensation  or  the  satisfaction  of  re¬ 
venge.  “An  eye  for  an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a  tooth” 
is  the  expression  of  the  obsolete  practice  of 
blood-revenge.  The  greatness  of  the  crime  is  not 
the  measure  of  the  kind  and  the  amount  of 
punishment  to  be  meted  out.  The  problem  is 
that  of  right  and  justice. 

It  has  been  found  that  the  old  practice  of 
imprisonment  in  the  usual  prison,  or  in  the  re¬ 
formatory  for  beginners  in  crime,  does  not  meet 

i  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  p.  315. 


THE  STATE 


293 


the  highest  ends  of  justice.  Criminals  are 
mostly  not  changed;  the  method  of  confine¬ 
ment,  and  the  practices  in  prisons,  lead  to  the 
breakdown  of  all  self-respect  and  make  any 
reformation  that  might  lead  to  freedom  impos¬ 
sible.  The  new  methods  of  parole  and  proba¬ 
tion  for  incipient  offenders  and  for  other  hope¬ 
ful  cases,  have  in  mind  the  reclamation  of  the 
wrong-doer.  But  they  must  be  applied  with 
wisdom,  and  endeavor  to  lead  the  one  punished 
to  a  recognition  of  the  wrong.  No  mere  senti¬ 
mentality  nor  pity  are  adequate.  The  moral 
order  must  be  upheld,  and  the  offending  will 
directed  to  acknowledge  the  common  will  and 
justice. 

The  justice  of  the  state  does  not  end  with  the 
maintenance  of  order  and  the  punishment  of 
evil  doers.  This  is  the  police  function  of  the 
state.  To  stop  with  it  is  to  accept  the  theory 
of  laissez-faire.  This  theory  does  not  measure 
up  to  the  idea  implied  in  justice.  There  is  con¬ 
structive  justice  through  which  the  state  ought 
to  seek  to  so  order  the  affairs  of  those  under  it, 
as  to  render  their  life  as  equitable  as  possible. 
Whatever  advances  the  moral  well-being  in 
external  life  belongs  to  the  state.  It  must  have 
an  interest  in  the  economic  problems  and  the 
opportunities  of  citizens.  The  common  welfare 
of  the  people  is  within  the  range  of  the  duties 
of  the  state. 

The  method  through  which  justice  concerns 
itself  with  welfare  demands,  that  the  health  of 
the  people,  the  prevention  of  disease,  the 
proper  quarantine,  the  care  of  sick  and  dis¬ 
abled,  the  protection  of  the  insane,  and  similar 


294 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


tasks,  be  undertaken.  But  tbe  largest  con¬ 
structive  work  of  tlie  state  is  education.  It  is 
necessary  not  simply  in  the  interest  of  the  state 
but  for  the  moral  good  of  the  people.  Particu¬ 
larly  in  a  democracy,  where  the  largest  possible 
intelligence  and  goodness  are  demanded  in 
order  that  liberty  may  be  maintained,  and  the 
common  rights  of  the  people  sustained,  educa¬ 
tion  is  the  great  duty  of  the  state.  It  ought  to 
fuse  the  people  into  unity,  break  down  artificial 
barriers  of  social  distinction,  and  produce  a 
people  with  common  ideals  and  purposes  of 
just  liberty  founded  upon  right  and  justice. 

The  state  and  the  nation.  What  is  the  rela¬ 
tion  of  the  state  to  nationality?  Ought  they  to 
be  correlated,  and  how  can  this  be  done  in  the 
best  manner?  A  nation  is  a  group  of  people 
with  a  common  language  and  with  certain 
common  traditions  of  history  and  culture. 
When  a  state  covers  one  nation  the  situation 
for  progress  is  most  advantageous.  But  in 
many  states  this  is  impossible.  In  Europe  no 
strict  line  of  demarcation  can  be  drawn  which 
will  put  just  one  nation  in  one  state.  The  exis¬ 
tence  of  different  nationalities  under  one  gov¬ 
ernment  creates  many  difficulties,  because  one 
or  the  other  of  the  different  nationalities  does 
not  receive  its  full  liberty  of  national  rights 
and  privileges.  Frequently  there  is  unwilling¬ 
ness  to  agree  and  the  suppressed  nationality  is 
restless  and  dissatisfied.  What  is  the  situation 
in  America?  Are  we  merely  a  state  in  the 
United  States,  or  a  nation? 

While  many  nationalities  are  represented 
amongst  us,  the  United  States  is  nevertheless  a 


THE  STATE 


295 


forming  nation.  We  have  one  language  as  the 
ideal,  and  we  possess  common  traditions  of  lib¬ 
erty  and  democracy.  For  this  reason  Ameri¬ 
canization  is  a  just  process  of  education 
through  which  we  aim  to  absorb  other  national 
elements  into  the  final  unity  of  our  national  life. 
The  process  must  not  be  arbitrary  or  oppres¬ 
sive,  for  thus  it  will  strengthen  foreign  nation¬ 
alisms.  Its  spirit  must  be  kindly  and  consid¬ 
erate,  leading  people  of  other  tongues  and  tra¬ 
ditions  into  the  understanding  of  our  distinc¬ 
tive  life  and  culture.  In  this  manner  we  shall 
advance  freedom  if  we  instruct  and  guide. 
The  foundation  of  all  education  into  American 
ideals  must  be  moral  and  rest  upon  the  vital 
liberty  of  common  goodness  and  justice. 

The  absolute  state.  What  is  the  meaning 
and  claim  of  the  absolute  state?  The  absolute 
state  endeavors  to  be  the  one  social  form  with 
complete  power.  It  has  found  advocates  both 
among  materialistic  and  idealistic  philoso¬ 
phers.  The  great  representative  of  the  mater¬ 
ialists  was  Hobbes.  In  the  days  of  the  Stuarts 
he  used  his  idea  of  man’s  pre-political  condition, 
as  a  war  of  all  against  all,  to  support  the  claim 
of  an  absolute  monarchy  with  unlimited  power 
to  keep  order  and  peace.  This  theory  never 
gained  practical  hold  in  England,  but  its  con¬ 
ception  of  power  to  remedy  the  disorders  of 
society  has  frequently  been  used.  When  con¬ 
ditions  are  serious  at  any  time  the  state  must 
enforce  justice,  but  there  are  large  groups,  who 
desire  to  stifle  all  movements  toward  freedom 
of  any  kind  through  the  employment  of  force. 
Force  is  the  cure  of  desperation  and  does  not 


296 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


solve  any  problem.  Its  unwarranted  use  only 
creates  reaction  and  does  not  lead  to  greater 
liberty  and  privilege. 

But  the  largest  influence  for  the  absolute 
state  has  been  exerted  through  the  idealists. 
Plato  thought  that  in  the  ideal  Republic  man 
would  find  his  full  moral  fulfillment.  The 
state,  which  in  Greek  society  was  the  city  state, 
was  to  serve  all  ethical  relationships.  Plato’s 
Republic  was  the  Greek  kingdom  of  God.  Con¬ 
sequently  the  family  was  dissolved  into  the 
state.  The  state  was  conceived  as  the  univer¬ 
sal  ethical  whole  beyond  which  there  was  no 
great  unity.  For  its  sake  men  were  to  live  and 
realize  the  good.  Aristotle  was  more  realistic, 
but  he  also  subsumed  his  ethics  to  his  politics. 
The  political  ideal  as  the  moral  totality  was  the 
controlling  one.  Later  Greek  Philosophy  in 
the  Stoic  school  passed  beyond  Plato  and  Aris¬ 
totle  both  in  asserting  the  conscience  in  the  in¬ 
dividual,  and  in  stressing  the  universalism  of 
humanity.  It  was  thus  that  the  absolute  state 
was  historically  discarded  in  Greek  thought. 

This  lesson  of  history  was  lost,  however, 
upon  modern  absolute  idealism.  It  reasserted 
the  universality  of  the  state  with  its  absolute 
power.  Hegel  formulated  the  modern  theory 
of  the  all-controlling  state.  In  it  the  absolute 
spirit  found  the  final  and  all-embracing  embod¬ 
iment.  There  is  a  reversal  to  the  ancient  ideal 
of  the  state  in  the  interest  of  a  logical  scheme. 
Hegel  virtually  deifies  the  state.  He  says: 
“The  State  is  the  self-certain  absolute  mind 
which  recognizes  no  definite  authority  but  its 
own;  which  acknowledges  no  abstract  rules  of 


THE  STATE 


297 


good  and  bad,  shameful  and  mean,  craft  and  de¬ 
ception.  ”  “It  is  the  phenomenon  of  God. — 
The  absolute  government  is  divine,  self-sanc¬ 
tioned  and  not  made.  ’  ’ 8  Such  an  ideal  rises 
far  beyond  what  is  justly  implied  in  authority 
as  divinely  willed.  In  this  position  Hegel  is 
not  nationalistic,  although  his  formulation  has 
found  lodgment  in  Treitschke’s  political  philos¬ 
ophy.  In  England  the  Hegelians  have  the 
same  estimate  of  the  state.  Bosanquet  claims 
that  the  state  is  the  supreme  power  of  social 
life.9  Fortunately  English  political  life  has  not 
followed  these  philosophers,  but  has  remained 
under  the  influence  of  a  liberal  theory  of  the 
state.10 

The  error  of  the  ideal  of  the  absolute  state  is 
the  impairment  of  the  right  of  personality  in 
the  individual.  Where  the  state  becomes  the 
expression  of  absolute  thought  there  is  no  real 
place  for  the  full  right  and  liberty  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual.  The  absolute  state  also  denies  the  exis¬ 
tence  of  social  relationships  outside  of  the  state. 
It  can  have  no  logical  place  for  the  family.  No 
appreciation  is  accorded  many  other  possible 
moral  contacts  in  free  association  and  fellow¬ 
ship.  But  there  is  no  liberty  in  the  absorption 
of  all  social  relations  into  the  state  particularly 
in  modern  society  with  its  many  and  varying 
possibilities  of  human  contact. 

The  absolute  state  is  the  enemy  of  freedom 
and  enshrines  man  in  the  process  of  the  move- 

8  Hegel,  System  der  Sittlichkeit,  p.  32  ff:  Wallace  Hegel  ’$ 
Philosophy  of  Mind,  p.  CLXXXTT.  Kuno  Fischer,  Geschichte 
der  Neuern  Philosophie,  Vol.  VIII,  pp.  726,  738,  907. 

9  The  Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State. 

10  Of.  Hobhouse,  The  Metaphysical  Theory  of  the  State. 


298 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


ment  of  absolute  thought.  Its  destroys  both 
individual  and  social  liberty. 

The  socialistic  state.  What  is  the  meaning 
and  ideal  of  the  socialistic  state?  Is  it  morally 
defensible?  The  socialistic  state  is  the  neces¬ 
sary  result  of  the  idea  of  a  socialistic  society. 
If  society  is  to  own  and  control  the  great  re¬ 
sources,  tools  and  means  of  production,  and  to 
possess  the  great  lines  of  transportation,  it 
needs  a  state  through  which  these  socially 
owned  goods  can  be  administered  and  managed. 
The  socialistic  state  must  not  be  confounded 
with  the  communistic  state.  In  the  latter  not 
only  the  great  articles  of  production  are  to  be 
in  the  hands  of  the  state,  but  virtually  every¬ 
thing  is  to  be  nationalized.  The  individual  will 
then  be  the  pensioner  of  the  state  in  all  his 
needs.  The  state  will  prescribe  his  work,  and 
allow  him  his  portion.  The  communistic  state 
is  the  complete  abolition  of  all  individual  privi¬ 
lege,  and  it  therefore  takes  away  man’s  legiti¬ 
mate  freedom.  At  the  same  time  it  creates  an 
enslaved  society  in  which  there  can  be  no 
natural  development  and  no  social  freedom, 
because  every  initiative  is  strangled.  The  so¬ 
cialistic  state  allows  liberty  to  a  certain  degree, 
but  it  also  limits  free  initiative  and  competition 
to  a  great  extent.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
concentration  of  production  in  a  few  hands, 
and  the  control  of  public  utilities  through  indi¬ 
vidualism,  have  forced  the  state  to  assume  an 
increasing  supervision  and  regulation  of  pri¬ 
vate  business  on  the  large  scale.  This  has  been 
the  outcome  of  the  sins  of  individual  ownership 
and  power  especially  in  its  concentrated  form. 


THE  STATE 


299 


Nevertheless  if  the  state  goes  beyond  the  neces¬ 
sary  restriction  it  enters  upon  the  limitation  of 
liberty.  The  socialistic  state  will  become  less 
and  less  soundly  political,  and  grow  into  a 
great  economic  machine,  which  takes  away 
from  men  opportunity  and  liberty  of  individual 
life  with  its  rights  and  needs  for  a  sound 
society. 

The  state  and  anarchism.  What  is  the  real 
meaning  of  anarchism?  How  does  it  affect  the 
state?  Anarchism  refuses  to  acknowledge  all 
power  and  control  over  the  individual.  It  sees 
in  the  state  and  in  any  expression  of  a  common 
will  the  destruction  of  natural  individual 
rights.  As  a  protest  against  despotism,  and 
the  deprival  of  just  individual  privilege,  it  is 
explicable.  When  it  appeared  in  the  late 
Russian  Empire  as  nihilism  it  was  the  result  of 
harsh  oppression.  But  as  an  actual  theory  of 
life  it  aims  at  the  destruction  of  all  social  order. 
The  evaluation  of  the  individual  is  purely  one 
of  individual  desire  and  wish.  Liberty  is  made 
unbridled  license.  The  actual  results  of  anar¬ 
chism  would  be  a  disordered  society,  a  state  of 
constant  warfare  between  men,  and  the  loss  of 
real  freedom. 

There  are  variations  of  the  extreme  anarch¬ 
ism  that  also  affect  the  state.  Tolstoi  with  his 
great  heart  and  out  of  a  deep  sense  of  pity 
denied  the  right  of  the  state  to  punishment. 
The  extreme  measures  of  Russia,  its  cruel  ad¬ 
ministration  of  the  prison,  and  its  banishment 
of  men  to  Siberia  serve  to  make  us  appreciate 
the  protest  of  Tolstoi.  But  when  he  wanted  a 
society  that  passed  no  judgment  on  wrong- 


300 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


doers  he  projected  an  impossible  society.  Many 
people  were  unjustly  imprisoned  in  Russia,  but 
it  does  not  follow  therefore  that  the  sinners  are 
outside  of  prison  and  the  saints  within  it.  The 
mistaken  idealism  of  Tolstoi  would  overthrow 
justice  for  the  sake  of  pity. 

There  are  two  other  types  of  theoretical  anar¬ 
chism.  The  first  is  the  conception  of  naturalis¬ 
tic  evolution,  that  men  will  evolve  into  such  a 
condition  of  society,  that  all  will  be  good,  and 
will  consequently  need  no  government.  There 
is  no  promise  of  such  a  process  that  will  ever 
make  the  state  unnecessary.  The  second  type 
consists  of  those  who  believe  that  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  will  be  such  in  our 
present  order  of  society,  that  men  will  need  no 
control  because  they  are  all  self-controlled. 
The  position  is  as  utopian  as  the  naturalistic 
conception  of  development.  Only  in  a  com¬ 
pletely  regenerate  society  will  the  state  be 
unnecessary. 

The  right  of  revolution.  Is  there  any  moral 
justification  of  revolution?  Can  ethical  judg¬ 
ment  approve  of  the  revolutionary  attitude  in 
any  form?  When  the  Reformation  began,  its 
leaders,  in  the  interest  of  order,  and  to  prevent 
the  Reformation  from  becoming  a  revolt, 
advised  submission  to  the  state  absolutely. 
They  interpreted  the  New  Testament  injunc¬ 
tion  to  individuals11  as  a  general  policy  for 
citizenship.  Luther  was  very  determined  in 
opposing  the  Peasant  Revolt.  He  believed  in 
unqualified  submission.  He  says,  referring  to 
Christ’s  word  of  rendering  to  Caesar  the  things 

11  Cf.  above  p.  284. 


THE  STATE 


301 


that  are  Caesar’s:  “He  here  clearly  confirms 
civil  authority,  princes,  and  lords,  to  whom  men 
are  to  be  obedient,  whoever  they  may  be  and 
whatever  they  may  be,  without  regard  to 
whether  they  possess  or  use  the  rule  right¬ 
eously  or  unrighteously.  ’  ’ 12 

Calvin  is  equally  strong  in  advocating  un¬ 
questioning  obedience  to  the  state.  Among  his 
utterances  the  following  is  characteristic:  “But 
let  us  insist  at  greater  length  in  proving  what 
does  not  so  easily  fall  in  with  the  views  of  men 
that  even  an  individual  of  the  worst  character, 
one  most  unworthy  of  all  honor,  if  invested 
with  public  authority,  receives  that  illustrious 
divine  power  which  the  Lord  has  by  His  word 
devolved  on  the  ministers  of  His  justice  and 
judgment,  and  that,  accordingly,  in  so  far  as 
public  obedience  is  concerned,  he  is  to  be  held 
in  the  same  honor  and  reverence  as  the  best  of 
kings.”  13 

But  these  positions  are  an  overstatement  of 
the  power  of  the  state.  They  exclude  all  possi¬ 
bility  of  changing  an  essentially  evil  govern¬ 
ment.  Modern  liberal  ideas  allow  for  the  right 
of  revolution.  They  find  one  of  their  best  de¬ 
fenses  in  the  arguments  of  Locke.  He  con¬ 
tends  that  “the  public  person  vested  with  the 
power  of  the  law,  is  to  be  considered  as  the 
image,  phantom,  or  representative  of  the 
commonwealth — and  thus  he  has  no  will,  no 

12  Von  Weltlicher  Obrigkeit,  wie  weit  man  ihr  Gehorsam 
schuldig  sei,  Weimar  Ed.  Vol.  II  p.  229  ff — Cf.  Waring,  The 
Politicial  Theories  of  Martin  Luther. 

13  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  Vol.  III.  “The 
Limits  of  Obedience  due  to  Civil  Rulers,”  p.  25. 


302 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


power  but  that  of  the  law.  ”  14  The  law  is  the 
standard  according  to  which  the  right  of  the 
state  and  its  government  is  to  be  measured. 
When  the  law  is  constantly  broken  the  govern¬ 
ing  representatives  in  the  state  have  forfeited 
their  right  to  rule.  If  he  that  governs  misre¬ 
presents  the  public  will  he  ceases  to  be  the  ruler 
de  jure.  “When  he  quits  this  public  represen¬ 
tation,  this  public  will,  and  acts  by  his  own  pri¬ 
vate  will,  he  degrades  himself,  and  is  but  a 
single  private  person  without  power,  and  with¬ 
out  will  that  has  any  right  to  obedience — the 
members  owning  no  obedience  but  to  the  public 
will  of  the  society.  ’  ’ 15  This  representative 
conception  is  in  part  correct  if  we  make  the  law 
rest  on  essential  justice,  and  not  merely  on  the 
will  of  society.  The  governing  powers  of  the 
state  must  have  committed  continuous  and 
severe  transgressions  of  the  law,  to  the  extent 
of  making  the  common  life  and  the  individual 
life  impossible,  before  the  right  of  revolution 
can  be  morally  admitted.  When  the  state  per¬ 
sists  in  injuring  the  ideal  of  the  state  revolu¬ 
tion  is  advocated  by  some  moralists.  But  shall 
any  group  of  people  judge  the  ideal,  and  if  so, 
what  group  shall  decide?  There  is  great  dan¬ 
ger  in  such  a  notion,  particularly  today  when 
ideals  of  the  state  are  so  conflicting  and  range 
all  the  way  from  communism  to  anarchism. 
The  violation  that  destroys  the  state  in  essence 
is  the  only  one  that  calls  for  revolution.  When 
individual  and  common  liberty  of  personality 
are  made  altogether  unsafe,  and  the  moral 

Treatise  of  Civil  Government,  Book  II,  Chapter  XIII. 

15  Locke,  Ibid. 


THE  STATE 


303 


order  is  undermined,  then  only  can  ethics  allow 
the  right  of  revolution.  Considerations  of  an 
economic  kind,  or  social  utopias,  have  no  moral 
claim  for  the  overthrow  of  the  existing  form  of 
the  state.  No  matter  what  are  the  historical 
facts  of  the  Revolution  that  started  our 
national  life,  and  those  that  made  the  French 
Revolution  typical,  we  must  keep  the  ethical 
judgment  clear  and  unprejudiced  in  favor  of 
the  continuity  of  the  state.  Revolution  must 
only  be  ethically  defended  as  an  extreme  meas¬ 
ure  in  an  unremediable  condition  that  negates 
the  moral  right  of  liberty  in  the  essentials  of 
life.  Commercial  advantages  and  industrial 
difficulties  ought  never  to  be  used  to  produce  a 
revolution.  No  single  groups  but  a  whole 
people,  or  its  great  majority,  must  rise  on  a 
just  basis  against  their  government,  to  give 
moral  foundation  to  a  revolution.  Unfor¬ 
tunately  oppression  often  so  arouses  a  nation 
that  the  wrongs  of  despotism  produce  the  evils 
of  revolution. 

The  state  and  war.  Is  war  a  necessity  for 
the  state?  Can  it  be  morally  defended?  The 
general  belief  is  that  the  state  cannot  surrender 
the  use  of  war.  The  necessity  of  war  is  justi¬ 
fied  as  a  matter  of  defense.  But  what  state 
admits  that  it  has  attacked.  The  people  of  all 
states  are  led  to  think  that  they  are  not  the 
aggressors.  Even  those  that  actually  declare 
the  war  always  show  to  the  satisfaction  of  their 
own  people,  that  they  were  compelled  to  act  as 
they  did.  In  order  to  give  war  a  moral  excuse 
no  people  ever  admit  their  guilt.  Each  state  is 
always  right  because  it  is  sovereign.  And  thus 


304 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


war  is  defended  as  tlie  only  way  to  decide  the 
counterclaims  of  sovereign  states.  To  this 
deceptive  and  evasive  attitude  there  is  added 
the  peculiar  belief,  that  God  only  permits  the 
right  to  win.  War  is  explained  after  the 
manner  of  an  ordeal,  and  the  fact  is  overlooked 
that  the  strongest  in  soldiery  and  in  economic 
resources  usually  win.  The  right  may  produce 
the  might,  but  the  success  of  the  might 
is  no  proof  of  the  right.  It  is  true  that  God 
directs  and  overrules  the  affairs  of  men,  and 
even  the  evil  of  war,  but  this  governance 
is  no  demonstration  that  war  is  the  means 
of  ascertaining  the  will  of  God.  Another  argu¬ 
ment  presented  for  war,  is  that  it  develops  cer¬ 
tain  virtues.  Courage,  willingness  to  sacrifice, 
patriotism,  are  claimed  as  fruits  of  war.  But 
it  is  only  by  long  tradition  that  the  courage  of 
war  and  the  acclaim  of  heroism  connected  with 
it  have  been  established.  Courage  can  be  ex¬ 
pended  upon  constructive  work,  upon  discovery 
and  reclamation  of  parts  of  the  world.16  It  is 
highest  in  acts  of  rescue  and  in  moral  situa¬ 
tions.  Patriotism  and  the  readiness  to  sacri¬ 
fice  for  one’s  country  can  be  developed  in 
peace.  In  fact  the  mistaken  notion,  that  only 
war  calls  for  sacrifice  has  lowered  the  moral 
tone  of  citizens  in  the  times  of  peace.  Patrio¬ 
tism  is  no  mere  sentiment  for  war,  but  it  is  at 
its  best  when  men  steadily  regard  the  welfare 
of  their  country  and  love  it  at  all  times.  The 
limitation  of  patriotism  to  war,  and  to  a  strong 
emotion  for  one’s  own  country  in  enmity 

16  This  is  the  suggestion  of  William  James  as  a  moral 
substitute. 


THE  STATE 


305 


against  another  country,  has  degraded  patrio¬ 
tism,  and  made  it  ineffective  as  a  constant  vir¬ 
tue  for  the  civic  betterment  and  moral  advance 
of  the  state.  The  hope  of  moral  and  religious 
awakening,  in  which  men  attempt  to  see  a  moral 
use  for  war,  is  a  disappointment.  The  tempo¬ 
rary  stirring  up  during  a  war  soon  passes  away, 
and  the  religious  and  moral  after-effects  of  war 
are  not  for  the  good,  but  show  decadence.  The 
good  will  remain  good,  and  perhaps  be  ad¬ 
vanced  in  character  by  a  hard  experience,  hut 
the  bad  will  remain  bad  and  become  worse.  In 
general  war  produces  crime  in  its  wake. 

All  defenses  of  war  fail  to  make  it  moral. 
On  the  contrary  it  is  a  perversion  of  the  moral 
order.  Murder  is  legitimatized  through  it,  and 
the  taking  of  life  becomes  a  business.  Lying 
and  deception  are  the  approved  attitudes. 
Hate  sweeps  over  peoples,  revenge  is  developed, 
and  the  bitterness  of  war  is  handed  on  as  a 
memory  from  generation  to  generation.  Every 
war  sows  the  seed  of  future  war.  Men  are 
made  a  great  machine,  surrender  their  freedom, 
and  submit  to  a  severe  control  that  asks  no 
questions.  All  the  evil  of  military  rank  with 
its  destruction  of  democracy  rules  supreme. 
Science,  that  ought  to  be  used  for  the  help  of 
mankind,  becomes  the  servant  of  destruction. 
Thousands  of  minds  think  and  plan  how  they 
can  invent  more  terrible  and  more  destructive 
agencies  of  war.  Cruelty  is  developed  and  man 
sinks  back  to  the  primal,  barbaric  instincts. 
Impurity  gains  a  larger  hold.  The  moral 
restraints  are  removed.  The  press,  the  plat¬ 
form,  and  even  the  pulpit  are  commandeered  to 


306 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


increase  the  sentiment  of  hate.  To  keep  up  the 
morale  of  war  everything  is  set  aside  but  those 
emotions  and  acts  that  will  win  the  war. 
Surely  there  is  no  part  of  war  that  does  not  de¬ 
grade  and  enslave  man.  The  effort  to  moralize 
war  has  not  succeeded. 

But  shall  the  state  become  pacifistic?  If  war 
is  morally  wrong  have  we  any  right  to  suffer 
it?  Morally  pacificism  is  the  ideal,  but  the 
state  cannot  surrender  its  existence  and  endan¬ 
ger  its  life  in  a  non-pacifistic  world.  The  citi¬ 
zens  of  the  state,  even  if  they  are  convinced  of 
the  essential  wrong  of  war,  may  feel  their  obli¬ 
gation  to  the  state.  When  there  is  war  a  con¬ 
flict  of  duties  occurs  for  those  who  know  what 
they  owe  the  state,  and  who  also  reject  war. 
In  this  conflict  the  problem  is  whether  it  is 
better  to  avoid  war,  or  to  submit  to  the  state 
and  help  to  save  it.  At  all  events  we  should 
labor  and  strive  for  a  warless  world  if  need  be 
through  suffering.  The  ideal  of  peace  is 
according  to  the  spirit  of  Christianity. 

The  state  and  internationalism.  What  ought 
to  be  the  relation  of  the  state  to  other  states? 
Is  there  a  place  for  international  ethics?  The 
fact  that  there  are  many  states  implies  that 
they  should  seek  the  right  moral  relation 
toward  each  other.  No  state  can  live  only  to 
and  for  itself.  State  must  co-ordinate  itself 
with  state,  not  only  economically  and  commer¬ 
cially,  but  above  all  ethically.  There  is  then  a 
demand  for  an  international  ethical  code  and 
ideal.  The  beginnings  of  moral  relationship 
between  states  are  indicated  in  international 
law.  It  records  the  extent  to  which  states  have 


THE  STATE 


307 


agreed  upon  certain  principles  that  make  for 
the  common  rights  of  all  nations.  But  a  law  of 
nations  must  have  back  of  it  a  morality  between 
nations,  that  recognizes  mutual  liberty.  The 
international  morality  ought  to  be  the  motive 
and  ideal  toward  which  the  formulated  inter¬ 
national  law  moves  in  its  progress. 

In  international  law  there  are  certain  agree¬ 
ments  as  to  the  limitation  of  allowable  actions 
in  war  on  land  and  sea.  The  invention  of  the 
aeroplane  will  necessitate  some  restrictions  of 
its  use.  The  right  of  freedom  especially  on  sea 
and  in  the  air  are  not  completely  covered  by  the 
present  laws.  A  larger  sense  of  justice  must 
inspire  the  nations  to  avoid  the  ruling  selfish 
policies,  and  to  guarantee  the  freedom  of  men. 
There  are  still  disparities  of  naval  equipment, 
and  superiorities  of  air-attack,  that  are  not 
demanded  except  in  the  interest  of  the  main¬ 
tenance  of  the  power  of  the  stronger  as  against 
the  weaker  nations.  War  will  be  crowded  back 
by  equalizing  war  equipment.  But  more  im¬ 
portant  still  is  the  recognition  that  arbitrament 
of  war  does  not  make  for  sane  justice.  There¬ 
fore  there  should  be  universal  international 
courts  to  adjust  disputes  between  nations. 
Such  courts  would  no  more  destroy  national 
liberty,  than  the  social  adjustment  of  contests 
between  individuals  takes  away  real  and  sane 
individual  freedom.  Internationalism  of  jus¬ 
tice  is  not  supernationalism,  but  only  justice  as 
between  nations  rather  than  power  and  fear. 

There  must  be  an  elevation  of  international 
practice  in  reference  to  colonization.  At  pres¬ 
ent  the  economic  and  commercial  demands  of  a 


308 


CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 


growing  nation  move  it  to  seize  land  from  the 
weaker  nations  wherever  it  can  do  so.  The 
weaker  nations  are  not  protected  and  advanced 
but  preyed  upon.  The  desire  for  world-mar¬ 
kets  is  the  motive  of  colonization.  There  should 
be  an  honest  and  fair  economic  co-operation 
between  nations  in  the  place  of  the  seizure  of 
lands  and  products  that  are  wanted  from  the 
less  civilized  and  weaker  nations.  The  imposi¬ 
tion  of  civilization  upon  a  people  in  the  interest 
of  commerce  is  not  liberty  but  enslavement,  and 
a  contradiction  of  the  real  spirit  of  civilization. 
Even  the  motives  for  advancing  a  backward 
nation  are  not  just  if  the  backward  nation  does 
not  freely  consent.  It  is  a  pretense  if  any 
nation  claims  to  defend  a  people  against 
another  nation  controlling  it,  when  the  real 
desire  is  to  gain  entrance  into  areas  of  great 
economic  value.  Nations  and  peoples  can  be 
delivered  from  overlords  with  the  approval  of 
moral  sanctions  only  when  such  action  offers 
real  liberty. 

The  ethical  relations  between  nations  can  be 
furthered  by  associations  across  national  boun¬ 
daries.  The  modern  labor  movement  has  such 
international  plans.  But  its  internationalism 
is  class  internationalism,  and  seeks  merely  the 
advantage  of  one  group  in  society.  The  total 
interest  is  the  economic  advantage  of  labor, 
and  its  control  of  society,  rather  than  universal 
friendship  and  good-will.  The  moral  unity  of 
mankind  is  not  sought  except  to  aid  labor. 
Therefore  the  internationalism  of  labor  tends  to 
coercion  of  humanity,  and  to  the  breaking  down 
of  the  just  right  and  power  of  separate  states. 


THE  STATE 


309 


The  real  interest  of  the  common  brotherhood 
of  men  in  liberty  is  furthered  by  friendships 
and  associations  that  seek  the  advancement  of 
science,  literature  and  art.17  The  more  men 
work  together  in  great  problems  of  science  and 
art,  the  more  a  common  bond  in  the  search  for 
truth  is  formed.  Through  it  a  large  and  free  life 
of  mankind  can  be  developed.  But  finally  men 
will  not  be  fused  into  the  real  and  lasting  fel¬ 
lowship  of  nations  and  peoples  until  there  is  a 
strong  unity  of  religion.  At  the  present  all 
faiths  ought  to  seek  points  of  approach,  and  use 
what  they  have  in  common,  to  produce  a  better 
understanding  of  each  other.  There  can  be  a 
closer  relationship  for  advancing  the  common 
good  and  freedom  through  moral  and  religious 
purposes.18  In  such  contact  that  religion  will 
finally  win  out  which  has  the  highest  and  best 
ethics  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  liberty  of 
men.  The  missionary  enterprise  of  Christian¬ 
ity  ought  to  be  carried  on  in  this  spirit,  and  not 
for  the  glory  of  any  church,  or  for  the  influence 
of  any  nationality  back  of  any  church.  The 
universal  liberty  of  man  through  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  an  international  moral  personality 
should  be  the  apex  of  ethical  hope  and  the  goal 
of  all  sound  internationalism. 

17  The  Greeks  were  unified  through  their  games.  Can 
modern  games  be  used  to  aid  in  creating  international  good 
will? 

is  Among  various  movements  of  an  international  character 
the  World  Student  Federation  has  been  very  effective  in 
creating  good  will  on  a  Christian  basis. 


310  CHRISTIAN  CONDUCT 

REFERENCES 

James  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  Part  II,  Chap¬ 
ters  II,  III. 

Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics,  Chapter  XXI,  ff. 

Durant  Drake,  Problems  of  Conduct,  Part  IV,  Chapters 
XXIII,  XXIV. 

Vladimir  Solo vy of,  The  Justification  of  the  Good,  Part  III, 
Chapters  V,  IX,  X. 

W.  Hocking1,  Human  Nature  and  its  Remaking,  Chapters 
XXVIII,  XXX,  XXXI,  XXXII. 

Fr.  Paulsen,  Ethics,  Book  IV,  Chapters  I,  II,  III. 

W.  Wundt,  Ethics,  Part  IV,  Chapters  III,  IV. 

J.  K.  Bluntschli,  The  Theory  of  the  State. 

T.  H.  Green,  Lectures  on  the  Principles  of  Political 
Obligation. 

Woodrow  Wilson,  The  State. 

Bernard  Bosanquet,  The  Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State. 

L.  T.  Hobhouse,  The  Metaphysical  Theory  of  the  State. 

David  Jayne  Hill,  The  Rebuilding  of  Europe. 

Viscount  James  Bryce,  International  Relations. 

Sidney  L.  Gulick,  The  Christian  Crusade  for  a  Warless 
World. 


INDEX 


Names  of  authorities  are  printed  in  italics. 


Absolute,  the,  156,  170. 

Action,  and  pessimism, 
86-87 ;  adjustment  of,  126 ; 
unity  of,  175. 

Adiaphora,  10. 

Aesthetics,  4. 

Altruism,  opposed  to  egoism, 
135. 

Anaxagoras :  philosophy  of 
77.  ‘ 

Anarchism,  and  the  state, 
299-300. 

Animism,  17. 

Aquinas,  Thomas:  definition 
of  virtue,  112. 

Aristippus:  and  pleasure,  116. 

Aristotle:  logic  of,  58;  mean¬ 
ing  of  ‘  ‘  the  good,  ’  ’  102 ; 
defence  of,  103n;  virtues  of, 
111,  234,  242;  and  happi¬ 
ness,  131;  and  reason,  146; 
ethics  of,  195,  223 ;  on  in¬ 
terest,  210;  idea  of  state, 
296. 

Arnold,  Matthew:  on  conduct, 
9 ;  definition  of  1  1  God,  ’  ’ 
24;  and  pessimism,  73. 

Art,  and  morals,  11;  and 
pessimism,  85 ;  apprecia¬ 
tion  of,  223. 

Asceticism,  and  reason,  160- 
162;  effects  of,  162;  of 
Christianity,  171-172. 

Atomists,  notion  of  brain,  36. 

Aurelius,  Marcus:  on  reason, 
148.  < 

Authority,  of  conscience,  67- 
69. 


Bentham,  Jeremy:  religion  as 
sanction,  23n ;  on  utilitar¬ 
ianism,  120-122,  129;  in¬ 
tensity  of  pleasure,  133 ; 
sanctions  of,  139;  on  ma¬ 
terialism,  142. 

Bergson,  Henri:  and  free 
will,  31. 

Berkley,  George :  philosophy 
of,  77. 

Binet,  Alfred:  psychology  of 
low  forms,  41. 

Biology,  and  freedom,  39. 

Boethius:  183n. 

Bosanquet,  Bernard :  theory 
of  the  state,  297. 

Brahmanism,  and  freedom, 
49;  and  pessimism,  83. 

Brain,  and  free  will,  36;  and 
mind,  37-38. 

Brown,  William  Adams:  the 
church,  276n. 

Buddhism,  and  freedom,  50 ; 
and  pessimism,  83. 

Butler,  Joseph:  on  self-love, 
191. 

Calculus,  hedonistic,  121. 

Calkins,  Mary  W.:  duty  and 
freedom,  109. 

Calvin,  John:  theory  of  the 
state,  301. 

Casualty,  and  freedom,  46. 

Cause,  attachment  to,  205- 
206. 

Chalmers,  Thomas:  and  char¬ 
ity,  233. 

Character,  and  religion,  18; 

311 


312 


INDEX 


and  free  will,  34;  and 
knowledge,  177. 

Charity,  233. 

Child,  right  of  the,  264-265. 

Christ:  high  ideals  of,  26; 
pessimism  of,  92 ;  optimism 
of,  93 ;  and  pleasure,  143 ; 
personality  of,  197 ;  and 
woman,  263 ;  as  the  truth, 
268 ;  and  the  state,  284. 

Christianity,  and  morals,  25 ; 
and  free  will,  50 ;  and  con¬ 
science,  69 ;  and  pessimism, 
91-94;  and  hedonism,  142- 
143;  and  reason,  170-173; 
and  personality,  196-200 ; 
humility  of,  223 ;  and  mar¬ 
riage,  257 ;  in  the  state, 
279. 

Church,  and  marriage,  257 ; 
and  religion,  267 ;  and  the 
truth,  268-272;  nature  of 
work  of,  272-275;  social 
work  of,  275-277 ;  and 
worship,  277-278;  organiza¬ 
tion  of,  278-279;  and  the 
state,  279-284. 

Civilization,  and  pessimism, 
87-90. 

Clarice,  Samuel:  on  intuition- 
ism,  150 ;  on  virtue  and 
reason,  167n. 

Conduct,  and  religion,  18;  in 
hedonism,  125 ;  evolution 
of,  126;  freedom  of,  127, 
177. 

Conlclin,  Edwin  G. :  on  evolu¬ 
tion,  41. 

Conscience,  and  freedom, 
54ff ;  meaning  of,  54-55 ; 
judgment  of,  56,  63 ;  origin 
of,  59;  intellectual  ele¬ 
ments  of,  60 ;  emotional,  61, 
62-65 ;  and  volition,  65 ; 
social,  66-67 ;  authority  of, 
67 ;  infallibility  of,  68 ;  and 
Christianity,  69. 

Courage,  221. 


Courtship,  253-254. 

Creeds,  271. 

Cynics:  philosophy  of,  147. 

Dance,  problem  of,  220n. 

Democracy,  defined,  30. 

Desires,  and  religion,  20 ;  and 
pessimism,  83. 

Determinateness,  social,  185. 

Dewey,  John:  relation  of  eco¬ 
nomics  to  ethics,  8 ;  doc¬ 
trine  of  progress,  89 ; 
meaning  of  ideals,  97 ; 
“the  good,”  100,  103;  the 
right,  105;  naturalizing  vir¬ 
tues,  111;  and  Epicurean¬ 
ism,  119;  inadequacy  of, 
130;  and  pleasure,  133; 
ethics  of,  200n. 

Divorce,  258-259. 

Dostoievsky,  Feodor:  emo¬ 
tion  in  conscience,  63. 

Drink,  problem  of,  218. 

Durlcheim,  Emile:  and  church, 
267. 

Duty,  95,  106-110;  claim  of, 
108;  imperative  of,  109; 
as  an  ideal,  113 ;  and 
pleasure,  137-140  ;  and  rea¬ 
son,  165-166;  and  love, 
190;  or  virtues,  202. 

Economics,  relation  of  ethics 
to,  7,  9;  and  civilization, 
88;  in  Christ’s  teaching, 
199. 

Education,  of  the  church, 
273;  of  the  state,  294. 

Ellwood,  Charles  A.:  “The 
Reconstruction  of  Reli¬ 
gion,  ’  ’  16n. 

Emotion,  and  conscience,  61, 
62-65;  and  pessimism,  82- 
86. 

End,  the  95,  100—104;  and 
ideals,  113 ;  and  pleasure, 
135 ;  in  the  individual,  159. 

Engagement,  253-254. 


INDEX 


313 


Environment,  and  free  will, 
41. 

Epictetus :  and  reason,  148. 

Epicurus:  meaning  of  pleas¬ 
ure,  117 ;  life  of  control, 
131;  philosophy  of,  141; 

Ethics,  definition  of,  3,  200; 
as  a  normative  science,  4; 
relation  to  other  sciences, 
5-9;  universality  of,  9-12. 

Euripides :  and  the  Greek 
gods,  15. 

Evolution,  and  hedonism,  125- 
128. 

Family,  value  of,  249-250; 
spirit  of  250-253. 

Feeling,  race,  246. 

Fichte,  Johann:  and  free  will, 
31;  idealism  of,  78;  theory 
of  the  1 1  ego,  ’  ’  155-156. 

Force,  use  of,  230;  in  the 
state,  290. 

Forgiveness,  231. 

Fraternities,  235. 

Freedom,  problem  of,  2;  and 
religion,  14ff ;  realization 
of,  24 ;  and  conscience, 
54ff ;  organ  of,  54 ;  and 
pessimism,  72f¥;  through 
pleasure,  115ff ;  through 
reason,  145ff ;  of  thought, 
169,  241;  through  person¬ 
ality,  174ff;  and  the  will, 
174;  and  vocation,  207- 
212;  and  work,  212-216; 
and  truth,  235-242 ;  and 
justice,  242-248 ;  of  wo¬ 
man,  261-264. 

Freud,  Sigmund:  theory  of 
mind,  38;  theory  of  sex, 
220. 

Friendship,  234. 

Galton,  John:  and  heredity, 
39. 

Gambling,  morality  of,  214. 

Gentleness,  228. 


God :  is  ethical,  25 ;  and 
right,  106;  as  the  Absolute 
Individuality,  158;  as  ab¬ 
solute  good,  188;  is  Love, 
190 ;  love  toward,  192 ; 
Kingdom  of,  198,  300 ; 

spirituality  of,  277 ;  will  of, 
291. 

Goethe,  Wolfgang :  “Faust,  ’  ’ 
76,  196;  naturalism  of, 

204n. 

Goldenweiser ,  Alexander  A.: 
and  the  family,  250n. 

Good,  the,  95,  100-104;  ex¬ 
pression  of,  113 ;  and 
pleasure,  136;  and  reason, 
163 ;  and  personality,  182. 

Green,  Thomas  Hill:  defini¬ 
tion  of  ideal,  99 ;  “  the 

end,”  104. 

Grotius:  and  right,  106. 

Groups,  conflict  between,  245. 

Haas,  John  A.  W.:  “In  the 
Light  of  Faith,”  18n,  21- 
22n,  27n. 

Habits,  and  religion,  20;  and 
free  will,  33 ;  and  virtue, 
111;  of  right,  217. 

Haeckel,  Ernst:  theory  of 
mind,  41. 

Hamilton,  William:  philoso¬ 
phy  of,  78. 

Happiness,  principle  of,  124; 
and  pleasure,  131-133;  and 
reason,  147. 

Hardy,  Thomas:  novels  of,  47. 

Hedonism,  ancient,  116-119; 
evolutionary  conception  of, 
125-128;  and  virtue,  140- 
141,  193 ;  philosophy  of, 

141 ;  and  Christianity,  142- 
143 ;  and  reason,  145 ;  op¬ 
posed  to  rationalism,  158. 

Hegel,  George  W.  F. :  and 
absolute  reason,  78;  free¬ 
dom  through  reason,  157 ; 
idea  of  the  state,  296. 


314 


INDEX 


Henotheism,  17. 

Heracleitus:  philosophy  of, 
77. 

Heredity,  and  free  will,  40. 

Hilly  David  Jayne:  the  idea 
of  sovereignty,  289. 

History,  relation  of  ethics  to, 
7,  8. 

Hobbes,  Thomas:  social  con¬ 
tract,  286;  as  materialist, 
295. 

Hobhouse,  L.  T.:  incipient 
moral  life,  7 ;  reason  and 
conscience,  62 ;  permanency 
of  ideal,  100;  “the  good, ” 
101,  103 ;  right,  105 ;  and 
duty,  108n;  and  utilitarian¬ 
ism,  120n;  failure  of  Mill, 
138;  and  the  state,  297n. 

Holland,  H.  Scott:  individul- 
ity,  183-184. 

Holt,  Edwin  B. :  theory  of 
mind,  38. 

Honor,  222. 

Hume,  David:  philosophy  of, 
78;  and  suicide,  225. 

Humility,  222. 

Ibsen,  Hendrik:  and  casual¬ 
ty,  47. 

Idealism,  169. 

Ideals,  and  religion,  23 ;  in 
realism,  74;  meaning  of, 
95,  96-100 ;  realization  of, 
98;  conception  of,  98;  and 
the  end,  113;  and  pleasure, 
136;  and  personality,  186- 
189. 

Ideas,  leading  ethical,  95ff ; 
interrelation  of  ethical, 
113;  of  the  state,  287-291. 

Immortality,  172. 

Imperative,  of  duty,  155,  166. 

Individual,  definition  of,  179; 
in  the  state,  298. 

Individuality,  and  personal¬ 
ity,  179-183. 


Infallibility,  of  conscience, 

68. 

Instincts,  influenced  by  reli¬ 
gion,  18-19;  common,  180. 

Intellect,  and  conscience,  60. 

Intelligence,  measurement  of, 
35 ;  and  free  will,  36. 

Internationalism,  and  the 
state,  306-309. 

Intuitionism,  modern,  ISO- 
154. 

James,  William:  choice  of 
freedom,  32;  theory  of 
emotions,  37 ;  substitute  for 
war,  304n. 

Jones,  Sir  Henry:  and  indi¬ 
vidual  freedom,  49n. 

Justice,  and  freedom,  242- 
248 ;  interpretation  of,  244 ; 
institution  of,  287 ;  in  the 
state,  290. 

Judgment,  of  acts,  55;  law 
back  of,  57. 

Jung,  C.  G.:  theory  of  mind, 
38. 

Kant,  Immanuel:  necessity  of 
future  life,  24;  and  casu¬ 
alty,  30 ;  philosophy  of, 
78;  stressing  of  duty, 
108,  165 ;  philosophy  of 

reason,  154-155 ;  the  end  in 
the  individual,  159 ;  and 
will,  174;  and  personality, 
195. 

Kindness,  228. 

Knowledge,  and  pessimism, 
76-82;  of  men,  243. 

Lamarck,  Jean  B.:  on  envir¬ 
onment,  42. 

Lange,  Friedrich:  theory  of 
emotions,  37. 

Laski,  Harold:  authority  of 
the  state,  291. 

Law,  of  the  sciences,  48; 
back  of  judgment,  57 ;  ori- 


INDEX 


315 


gin  of  moral,  58;  of  action, 
155 ;  and  justice,  248. 

Leclcy,  William :  ‘  ‘  Study  of 
European  Morals,  ’ 7  7. 

Legislation,  social,  276;  for 
the  church,  281-282. 

Leibniz,  G.  W.:  and  optimism, 
72;  theory  of  monads,  105. 

Liberty,  of  choices ,  29 ;  of 
knowledge,  81;  of  the 
church,  282-283. 

Lie,  238. 

Life,  sentient,  134,  204;  de¬ 
terminateness  of,  175;  in¬ 
dividual,  202f£ ;  moral,  204- 
205;  the  bodily,  216-222; 
mental,  222-224 ;  power 
over,  224-226;  family,  25i- 
252 ;  the  single,  260-261. 

Locke,  John:  philosophy  of, 
77;  use  of  words,  95; 
against  intuitionism,  152 ; 
right  of  revolution,  301; 
and  rulers,  302n. 

Logic,  4;  of  Aristotle,  58. 

Lotze,  Herman:  emphasis 
upon  value,  4;  and  person¬ 
ality,  196. 

Love,  brotherly,  25,  191;  law 
of,  190;  and  duty,  190;  of 
God,  192;  in  justice,  194; 
expression  of,  231,  274;  in¬ 
stitution  of,  250. 

Loyalty,  206-207. 

Luther,  Martin  :  on  taking  in¬ 
terest,  210 ;  economic  evils, 
277 ;  submission  to  author¬ 
ity,  300. 

Mana,  16. 

Mansel,  Henry  L.:  philos¬ 
ophy  of,  78. 

Marriage,  254-258. 

Martineau,  James:  and  con¬ 
science,  60;  and  duty,  110. 

Materialism,  and  hedonism, 
141. 

Meekness,  229. 


Mendel,  Johann  G.:  law  of 
heredity,  39. 

Mercy,  231. 

Metaphysics,  and  free  will, 
30. 

Mill,  John  Stuart:  and  utili¬ 
tarianism,  122-124,  129 ; 

failure  of,  138;  hedonism 
and  virtue,  140. 

Misrepresentation,  238. 

Modesty,  219-220. 

Mohammedanism,  and  free¬ 
dom,  50. 

Monotheism,  17-18. 

Moods,  and  pessimism,  75. 

Morality,  perfection  of,  128. 

Morris,  William:  and  interest, 

210. 

Motives,  and  religion,  21;  and 
free  will,  32;  and  pleasure, 
122;  and  will,  175. 

Nationality,  246;  and  the 
state,  294-295. 

Naturalism,  and  pessimism, 
73. 

Nature,  rational,  154. 

Nietzsche,  Friedrich:  re-valu¬ 
ing  values,  6 ;  will  to 
power,  31;  attack  on  meek¬ 
ness,  230. 

Non-resistance,  229. 

Obedience,  251. 

Omar  Khayyam:  117. 

Opinion,  public,  243. 

Organization,  of  the  church, 
278-279. 

‘  ‘  Ought,  ”  as  foundation  of 
duty,  107 ;  consciousness  of 
127. 

Pacifism,  306. 

Pain,  meaning  of,  115;  as  a 
master,  120 ;  source  of,  121. 

Pantheism,  and  naturalism, 
73. 


316 


INDEX 


Pater,  Walter:  on  eternity, 
149-150. 

Paul,  St.:  and  conscience,  60, 
70;  willingness  to  action, 
87;  asceticism  of,  171;  and 
‘ 1  the  flesh,  ’  ’  204. 

Paulsen,  Friedrich :  idea  of 
the  state,  288. 

Pedagogy,  theories  of,  79. 

Perjury,  239. 

Personality,  Hegel’s  idea  of, 
157;  and  will,  176-179; 
definition  of,  178;  and  in¬ 
dividuality,  179-183;  and 
society,  183-186;  and  the 
ideal,  186-189 ;  influence 
of,  187 ;  and  right,  189 ;  and 
virtue,  192-194;  history  of, 
194—196 ;  and  Christianity, 
196-200. 

Pessimism,  and  freedom,  72ff; 
causes  of,  73-75;  and  hu¬ 
man  moods,  75;  and  know¬ 
ledge,  76-82;  and  emotion, 
82-86 ;  and  actions,  86-87 ; 
and  civilization,  87-90 ; 
and  religion,  90 ;  and 
Christianity,  91-94. 

Philology,  and  ethics,  6. 

Philosophers,  neorealistic,  37. 

Philosophy,  of  society,  46 ; 
development  of,  77-79;  of 
hedonism,  141;  of  rational¬ 
ism,  169. 

Plato :  and  Greek  religion, 
15 ;  philosophy  of,  77,  141, 
146;  196;  ideas,  96;  happi¬ 
ness,  131;  theory  of  harm¬ 
ony,  194-195 ;  and  art, 
223 ;  idea  of  the  state,  288, 
296. 

Pleasure,  claim  of,  115-116; 
theory  and  origin,  116;  as 
a  good,  118;  as  a  master, 
120;  source  of,  121;  sanc¬ 
tions  of,  121 ;  quality  of, 
123;  and  reason,  129-131; 
and  happiness,  131-133 ;  of 


individual,  134;  social, 
135;  and  the  end,  135;  and 
the  ideal,  136;  and  the 
good,  136;  and  the  right, 
137 ;  and  duty,  137-140. 

Plotinus:  and  intellect,  163. 

Power,  and  justice,  288-289. 

Predestination,  and  freedom, 
50,  51-52. 

Prejudice,  241. 

Press,  public,  240. 

Price,  Bichard :  intuitionism, 
151. 

Pride,  222. 

Problem,  and  principle,  1;  of 
freedom,  2 ;  of  ethics  and 
religion,  14 ;  of  free  will, 
28;  of  pessimism,  72;  of 
drink,  218. 

Professions,  211. 

Propaganda,  239. 

Property,  private,  215. 

Prostitution,  evil  of,  259-260. 

Providence,  doctrine  of,  50. 

Prudence,  118,  140,  237. 

Psycho-analysis,  38. 

Psychologism,  141. 

Psychology,  ethics  and,  6;  and 
free  will,  32. 

Psycho-therapy,  38. 

Punishment,  292. 

Puritanism,  161. 

Purpose,  implication  of,  130. 

Quietists,  161. 

Race  feeling,  246. 

Radicalism,  270. 

Rationalism,  and  hedonism, 
158 ;  apex  of,  164 ;  defect 
of,  166;  philosophy  of,  169. 

Realism,  and  pessimism,  74. 

Reason,  and  morals,  69;  and 
pleasure,  129-131;  freedom 
through,  145fF ;  promise  of, 
145 ;  ancient  advocates  of, 
146-150 ;  and  intuitionism, 
150-154 ;  German  develop- 


INDEX 


317 


ment  of,  154-158;  and  feel¬ 
ing,  158-160;  and  asceti¬ 
cism,  160-162 ;  and  the 
good,  163 ;  and  the  right, 
164;  and  duty,  165-166; 
and  virtue,  167-169;  and 
Christianity,  170-173. 

Beid,  Thomas:  philosophy  of, 
78;  moral  sense,  152. 

Religion,  development  of,  14; 
history  of,  16-18;  and 
character  and  conduct,  18; 
and  instincts,  18-19;  and 
desires,  20;  and  habits,  20; 
and  motives,  21;  and  sanc¬ 
tions,  22 ;  and  ideals,  23 ; 
and  free  will,  49;  and  con¬ 
science,  69;  and  pessimism, 
90. 

Repentence,  64. 

Revolution,  right  of,  300-303. 

Right,  95,  104-106 ;  and  1 1  the 
good,”  113;  social,  104; 
and  pleasure,  137 ;  and  rea¬ 
son,  164;  and  personality, 
189;  of  the  child,  264-265; 
of  revolution,  300-303. 

Righteousness,  242-243. 

Bousseuu,  J ean  J. :  dream  of, 
147 ;  social  contract,  286. 

Boyce,  Josiah:  theory  of  loy¬ 
alty,  206. 

Bushin,  John:  and  interest, 

210. 

Sacrifice,  meaning  of,  161. 

Sanctions,  and  religion,  22 ; 
of  conduct,  121,  127;  ex¬ 
ternal  and  internal,  139. 

Schiller  Johann  C.  F.:  judg¬ 
ment  of  world,  24. 

Schleiermacher,  Friedrich:  eth¬ 
ical  ideas,  96. 

Schopenhauer,  Arthur:  “will 
to,”  31;  philosophy  of,  83; 
on  art,  85 ;  and  actions,  86. 

Science,  normative,  3 ;  of 
value,  4;  relation  of,  5. 


School,  Montessori,  265. 

Self-love,  191. 

Seneca:  and  reason,  149. 

Seth,  James:  eudaemonism  of, 
196;  idea  of  the  state,  288; 
and  punishment,  292. 

Sex,  morals  of,  219. 

Shakespeare,  William:  “Mac¬ 
beth,”  64;  “As  You  Like 
It,”  75n,  76. 

Shaw,  Charles  Gray :  theory 
of  personality,  196. 

Sidgwick,  Henry:  and  utili¬ 
tarianism,  124,  129 ;  and 
virtue,  141. 

Sin,  and  freedom,  51. 

Socialism,  economics  of,  215. 

Society,  and  conscience,  59 ; 
conscience  of,  67 ;  and 
pleasure,  135;  and  person¬ 
ality,  183-186;  and  the 
church,  275-276. 

Sociology,  and  ethics,  8,  9 ; 
and  freedom,  44. 

Socrates:  leader  of  a  new 
light,  11 ;  and  Greek  re¬ 
ligion,  15 ;  and  conscience, 
59;  philosophy  of,  77;  and 
reason,  146. 

Spencer,  Herbert:  religion  as 
sanction,  23n ;  philosophy 
of,  79;  and  evolutionary 
ethics,  126-127 ;  altruism, 
135;  and  duty,  139;  agnos¬ 
ticism  of,  142. 

Standards,  of  society,  11. 

State,  and  the  church,  279- 
284;  place  of,  286-287; 
idea  of,  287-291 ;  task  of, 
291-294;  and  the  nation, 

294- 295 ;  the  absolute, 

295- 297 ;  socialistic,  298 ; 
and  anarchism,  299-390 ; 
and  war,  303-306;  and 
internationalism,  306-309. 

Stevenson,  B.  L.:  ideal  of, 
131. 

Stimulants,  use  of,  219. 


318 


INDEX 


Stoics:  virtues  of,  167-168, 
193;  idea  of  the  state,  296. 
Suicide,  224-226. 

Superstition,  269. 

Syllogism,  of  judgment,  58. 


Tactfulness,  237. 

Tawney,  Richard  H. :  and  pro¬ 
fessions,  210;  and  social¬ 
ism,  216n. 

Telepathy,  38. 

Temperament,  and  free  will, 
34. 

Temperance,  217. 

Thought,  freedom  of,  169, 
241. 

Tolerance,  207. 

Tolstoi,  Lyof  N. :  and  the 
state,  299. 

Totemism,  17. 

Truth,  and  freedom,  235- 
242;  way  of,  237;  and  the 
church,  268-272. 

Tufts,  James  H.:  relation  of 
economics  to  ethics,  8. 


Universalism,  of  reason,  160. 
Universality,  of  ethics,  9,  10. 
Utilitarianism,  meaning  of, 
119. 

Utility,  principle  of,  120. 


Virtue,  95 ;  meaning  of,  110- 
112;  and  duty,  113,  139; 
and  hedonism,  140-141, 
193 ;  and  reason,  167-169 ; 
and  personality,  192—194 ; 
classification  of,  203;  so¬ 
cial,  228ff. 

Vocation,  selection  of,  208, 
211;  morals  of,  209;  of 
women,  262. 

Volition,  and  conscience,  65; 
possibility  of,  177. 

Von  Hartmann,  Edward.: 


philosophy,  of  the  uncon¬ 
scious,  31. 

War,  and  the  state,  303-306, 
307. 

Waring,  Luther  H.:  “  Politi¬ 
cal  Theories  of  Luther,  ’ 1 
30  In. 

Watson,  John:  and  mind,  37. 

Weisman,  August:  neo-Dar¬ 
winian  theory,  39. 

Westermarck,  Edward:  in¬ 
cipient  moral  life,  7. 

Will,  free,  28ff ;  metaphysi¬ 
cal  solution  of,  30;  and 
psychology,  32;  and  the 
brain,  36;  and  biology,  39; 
and  sociology,  44;  and 
causality,  46;  and  religion, 
49 ;  and  Christianity,  50 ; 
definition  of,  174;  and  per¬ 
sonality,  176-179,  181-182. 

Williams,  James  M.:  211n. 

Wilson,  Woodrow:  idea  of  the 
state,  288. 

Wisdom,  236. 

Woman,  freedom  of,  261-264. 

Woods,  Fredrick  A.:  and  en¬ 
vironment,  43. 

Work,  moral  side  of,  213;  end 
of,  214-215;  virtues  of, 
216;  of  the  church,  272- 

277. 

Worship,  of  the  church,  277- 

278. 

Wright,  Henry:  and  person¬ 
ality,  196. 

Wundt,  Wilhelm:  moral  im¬ 
port  of  words,  6. 

Xenophanes :  and  naturalism, 
15. 

Zeno :  philosophy  of,  148. 


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